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NATURE OF VERBÁL TESTIMONY
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of apprehension of an object — because, for example, the listener is not conversant with the meaning of this word.' The opponent objects that since apprehension of an object means simply cognition of an object, abhidhāna too means just that'; Jayanta grants the first equation but adds that cognition of an object is of three types, viz. perceptual cognition that is brought about through a sense-organ, inferential cognition that is brought about through a means other than a word, cognition of the form of verbal testimony (which is what constitutes abhidhāna) that is brought about through a word. In passing Jayanta makes another clarification; thus he says that a word acts as a probans all right when the speaker's intention or the like is to be inferred.' This clarification is directed against those who would argue that an alleged case of verbal testimony is but a case of inference where the word listened acts as probans for inferring the speaker's intention; Jayanta does not deny the possibility of such an inference but insists that the word listened is at the same time an independent means for producing the type of cognition called verbal testimony. He, of course, implies that a word is of the form of verbal testimony only in case it comes from the mouth of an authoritative person, but the point is made explicit while explaining as to what is meant by the word āpta occurring in the proposed definition of verbal testimony. In this connection Jayanta bases himself on Vātsyāyana who says : “An authoritative person is one who has a direct knowledge of what constitutes religious duty (dharma), who is desirous of telling others what he knows, who does the speaking”. Thus putting a gloss on Vatsyāyana's words Jayanta submits that by 'religious duty' is to be understood a subject-matter worth communicating, by 'direct knowledge' authentic cognition of any type - not of the perceptual type alone, by 'one who is desirous of telling others what he knows' one who is devoid of all attachment, by 'one who does the speaking' one who is an expert expositor.' By way of further clarification it is added that an authoritative person has to be devoid of all attachment only so far as the subject matter under exposition is concerned, it being impossible for any man to be altogether devoid of all attachment and it being intended that the present description of an authoritative person should equally apply to a sage, an āryan, a non-āryan 10 Then recalling that certain others define authoritativeness as 'vanishment of all defilement' Jayanta emphasizes that those people too must be having in mind vanishment of defilement only so far as the subject-matter
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