Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 66

PERCEPTION.
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future, distant, etc."? 8 Here again Jayanta is indulging in a sophistry based on the mistaken belief that in an inference the relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is established as a result of actually perceiving all the cases where this probans and this probandum are found. After so much negative criticism of the Kumārilite's argument Jayanta proceeds to positively establish that a yogin can perceive things past etc. In this connection his simple contention is that such a perception is not impossible just as it is not impossible that unlike an ordinary man a cat sees things in darkness, the legendary vulture-prince Sampāti (a Rāmāyaṇa character) saw things lying at a distance of hundred yojanas. The opponent does not dispute the validity of Jayanta's contention proper, but he goes on to submit that a religious duty is not at all a possible object of perceptual cognition; Jayanta, again citing those two illustrative cases, retorts that though not an object of an ordinary man's perceptual cognition a religious duty can well be an object of a yogin's perceptual cognition. The Kumārilite pleads that it is in the very nature of things impossible for a perceptual cognition to grasp a religious duty which is necessarily of the form of an obligation not confined to a particular period of time; Jayanta's retort : "This talk about a religious duty not being confined to a particular period of time is senseless. What has to be learnt here is that such and such a religious performance leads to such and such a 'result, just as physical motion leads to a thing's contact with a new space-point. And learning this much is possible on the part of a yogin's sense-organs though not on the part of an ordinary man's sense-organs.''!! Jayanta's point is that basing himself on an extraordinary sense-perception a yogin established the relation of invariable concomitance between a religious performance and its future result. Then relenting a bit Jayanta concedes that this relation of invariable concomitance is established not through a perception on the part of external sense-organ but through that on the part of manas; but he still insists that what is here had is a case of perception, just like the case of a man in excessive mental excitement 'seeing before his eyes things which are not present there." Jayanta concedes that the illustrative case is a case of halluciation but that does not disturb him, his point being that it is nevertheless a case of 'seeing brought about through manas. '3 The point is made clear by emphasizing that such a 'seeing' is made possible through a repeated meditation over the object concerned."