Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 85

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INDIAN LOGIC
were identical with the feature 'being Simšapā' then just as the latter feature is not found except in a Simsapā the former too should not be found except in a Simšapā ; but as a matter of fact, in trees like Khadira (a tree) etc. the former feature is found even in the absence of the latter feature. Similarly, in lightning etc. the feature being a perishable entity' is found in the absence of the feature 'being a voluntarily produced entity', something which would not have happened if the two features were identical with each other.''ll To this is added : "Since smoke and fire are different from each other, it can be said that the former acts as a probans for the latter but not vice versa; but that cannot be said about two features which are alleged to be identical with each other. So either give up this talk of identity or be ready to infer the feature being simšapā' from the feature being tree', the feature being a voluntarily produced entity' from the feature being a perishing entity'. There is no middle course open:"l2 It can easily be seen that Jayanta has completely failed to grasp the idea lying at the back of the Buddhist's concept of svabhāva-anumāna though the latter's own faulty formulations on the subject are at least partly responsible for this unfortunate situation. This should become somewhat evident from the long criticism and counter-criticism in which the Buddhist and Jayanta indulge in connection with the invariable concomitance "whatever is a produced entity is a perishing entity". Thus Jayanta asks the Buddhist to prove that the features 'being a produced entity' and 'being a perishing entity' are identical with each other; the Buddhist in effect replies that since the latter feature signifies existence-associated-with-a-beginning-and-an-end while the former feature signifies existence-associated-with-a-production, the two are identical with each other inasmuch as both signify existence;l+ Jayanta remains unconvinced saying that in that case the invariable concomitance in question should have the form "whatever exists exists."'l5 As a matter of fact, the invariable concomitance in question could not be established so cheaply as is presently attempted by the Buddhist, and he should have known it. For the famous controversy on momentarism into which the Buddhist on the one hand and the Nyāya-Mīmāṁsā philosophers on the other entered was virtually hinged on how to vindicate this very invariable concomitance. The Buddhist was provoked into undertaking the childish performance here reported because he often did talk as if in a svabhāva-hetu the probans and probandum are identical with each