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INDIAN LOGIC
there, it is not a case of memory because the concerned familiar thing as similar to the concerned unfamiliar thing was not perecived earlier, while it is not a case of inference because nothing can here possibly act as paksa, probans, probandum. To all this Jayanta objects as follows: "It is proper to say that an unfamiliar thing is cognized as similar to a familiar thing, not vice versa, as is being done here; and granting the possibility of the latter cognition it should still be a case. of simple memory.' It will not do to argue that x as similar to y cannot be recalled unless x as similar to y was perceived earlier, while in the present case the concerned familiar thing as similar to the concerned unfamiliar thing was not perceived earlier; for unless the points of similarity obtaining between the two things in question were noticed when the concerned familiar thing was perceived earlier, this thing would not at all have been recalled at the time the concerned unfamiliar thing was perceived later. And certainly the points of similarity obtaining between x and y can be noticed even when x alone is perceived and not also y." The Mimämsaka pleads: "Just as you Naiyayikas say that in a case of upamana the knowledge of wordmeaning which was doubtful earlier becomes confirmed at the time of later perception, we say that here the knowledge of similarity which was vague earlier becomes clear at the time of later perception."" Jayanta retorts "Just as you Mīmāṁhsaka say that the alleged confirmation in question is a result of later perception itself, we say that the alleged clarification in question is à result of later perception itself."" Really, both the Mimamsaka and Jayanta are right in rejecting what they are rejecting, both wrong in endorsing what they are endorsing; for the former's concept of upamana-pramāņa is faulty broadly for the same reasons as are advanced by the latter, the latter's concept of upamana-pramāņa is faulty broadly for the same reasons. as are advanced by the former. Thus if one already somehow knows that an unfamiliar thing x is similar to a familiar thing y then on encountering x and noticing its similarity to y one can say without much ado, "Here is x and this is what is denoted by the word concerned" as well as "Here is x and this is to which y is similar"; the Naiyayika submits that the latter is a case of memory (at the most a case of perception) but the former a case of upamana-pramāṇa, the Mimamsaka submits that the former is a case of perception but the latter a case of upamana-pramäṇa, both right and both wrong in the manner hinted.
