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92
INDIAN LOGIC
Thus the opponent argues that since in all inference something similar is inferred from something similar there is no sense in further classifying inference into types; in reply Jayanta offers a plea which in effect concedes that the first and third types here spoken of differ from each other only in that the probandum is something perceptible in the former something inherently imperceptible in the latter while the second type is a different proposition altogether." Really, the second type of inference here spoken of is based on the same logical principle as one type of arthapatti posited in Mimamsa logic, but here there seems to be no realization that in such a type of inference no conclusion can be validly drawn unless the alternatives concerned are enumerated exhaustively. For example, in the illustrative case quoted by Jayanta there are enumerated several alternative forms of fire, but here no conclusion can be validly drawn unless the alternatives concerned are enumerated exhaustively. In any case, Jayanta requires to feel assured that an inference-type is at hand which should enable one to infer things inherently imperceptible and his third inferencetype is exclusively such a type while the second too can be gainfully employed for the purpose; (let us recall that while vindicating the possiblity of inference Jayanta had lastly encountered an opponent who while not denying the possibility of all, inference denied the possibility of all such as would seek to demonstrate the existence of things inherently imperceptible like soul, God etc.). Thus on Jayanta's showing, the first inference-type is meant for demonstrating the existence of things perceptible, the third for demonstrating the existence of things inherently imperceptible, the second for demonstrating the existence of both. This point as pertaining to the relative worth of the second and third types is explicitly emphasized once more." Here really closes Jayanta's consideration of the Nyayasutra definition of inference, but by way of continuing the topic he undertakes a long refutation of the view that the third inference-type is to be employed in order to demonstrating the existence of a motion, the understanding being that motion is something inherently imperceptible, an understanding which Jayanta does not share. In brief, the opponent's point is that when x moves relative to y what is directly perceived is not x's motion itself but x's conjunction now with this. constituent part of y now with that, on the basis of which perception one argues that since all effect requires a cause the perceived successive conjunctions have for their cause a motion belonging to
