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INDIAN LOGIC
these cases must go along with the cases of inferring a cause from the effect concerned.
Then continuing his first set of interpretations Jayanta comes to the second word sesavat. Thus on his showing the word sesa means an effect, so that the word sesavat means 'a probans that possesses the attributes of an effect (i.e. is of the form of an effect'); e.g. from the appearance of flooded waters in a river one infers that its upper reaches have received rain.22 Here again the form of inference is supposed to be : "This river has received rain in its upper reaches, because its water over here is flooded"23, that is, a form which shows that an invariable concomitance is alone sufficient to constitute an inference. Naturally, Jayanta has again in mind those flimsy objections raised in connection with the type pūrvavat, but the noteworthy thing is that this time the Buddhist himself has nothing to object against the type of inference under consideration, it being his own view that an effect is a valid probans for inferring the cause concerned. So, Jayanta here answers an objection of a rather general type. Thus, the opponent says that the water of a'river can well be flooded owing to causes other than rain (something like the earlier objection that the gathering clouds might well not rain); Jayanta'replies that one can note the distinguishing marks that the flooded water of a river exhibits when there has been rain recently.25
Lastly, in connection with his first set of interpretations Jayanta comes to the third word sāmānyatodrsta (lit. 'observed in a general fashion'). Thus on his showing a case of this'type of inference arises when the probans and probandum are not causally related, the first two types having covered all the cases where they are causally related; e.g. the taste of Kapittha (a fruit) can be inferred from its colour.26 Jayanta notes that the Buddhist too does not say that in the present illustrative case the taste concerned is a cause of the colour concerned;27 but he does not report that the Buddhist treat the taste and colour concerned as two co-effects of the same cause, thus not giving up his insistence that a valid invariable concomitance between two things (as colour and taste are) must be based on some causal consideration or other. In any case, Jayanta here takes exception to the illustrative case quoted b; Vātsyāyana where the sun's motion is inferred from its having been noticed at a place other than the place where it was noticed earlier; Vātsyāyana must have thought that in this inference no causal consideration is involved while Jayanta argues
