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94
INDIAN LOGIC
of inference alone. Thus on the former view the temporal features like succession, simultaneity, swiftness, slowness, etc. cannot be perceived to be present there in objects unless time too is perceived along with objects. The objection that something lacking colour (as time is) cannot be an object of visual perception is rejected by pointing out that colour itself lacks colour and is yet an object of visual perception, that atoms are possessed of colour and yet are no object of visual perception, that in any case the temporal features succession etc. are not perceived with eyes closed. The query as to why time is not perceived independently like a jar etc. is answered by maintaining that it is the very nature of time that it is perceived only when qualifying a coloured object, it thus being unlike a staff which as qualifying the staff-holder is perceived independently. The objection that even as qualifying a coloured object a thing can be perceived only in case it is itself coloured is rejected by pointing out that a 'universal is perceived as qualifying a coloured object and is yet not something coloured; the clarification that this objection must hold in the case of a qualifier that is of the form of a substance (as time is supposed to be) is rejected on the old ground that whether substance or no substance what cannot be perceived with eyes closed must be an object of visual perception. Then is presented the second view according to which time is a possible object of inference alone. Here it is conceded that time is not perceived along with the object qualified by it, as staff is perceived along with the staff-holder or blue colour along with the blue lotus; and yet it is insisted that time is nevertheless a reality as is the nether part of the earth, the yonder part of the moon; thus on this view time, even if itself imperceptible, assists a senseorgan in perceiving the features like successive, etc. just as 'impressions', even if themselves imperceptible, assist a sense-organ in now recognizing things perceived in past.' Then it is argued that since the same causal aggregate produces the same effect swiftly in one case, slowly in another there must be a thing like time operating differently in those two cases.10 The suggestion that swiftness and slowness in question are due to the act concerned being different in those two cases is rejected on the ground that acts themselves are found to be swift, slow, etc. The clarification that the act concerned means the motion of astronomical bodies is rejected on the ground that this motion too is found to be swift, slow, etc., while it will lead to an infinite regress if a motion belonging to another set of astronomical
