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ANALOGY
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case of time). Why then do you say that space is one (and that time is one) ?" Jayanta replies: "Space is one because the mode of distinguishing spatial features is invariably one (just as time is one because the mode of distinguishing temporal features is invariably one). Again, space is one because what is east in relation to one thing is west in relation to another (just as time is one because what is prior in relation to one act is posterior in relation to another). Again, Jayanta's own argumentation implies that space cannot be an independent substance (just as time cannot be one). For what he means is that a universally valid definition can be formulated in terms of which two things can be said to be lying east, etc, in relation to each other just as a universally valid definition can be formulated in terms of which two acts can be said to be occurring simultaneously, etc. in relation to each other; but certainly the former circumstance does not imply that space is an independent substance and the latter that time. is an independent substance.
Here closes Jayanta's account of inference (while certain topics related to it remain to be discussed in connection with certain other Nyaya padarthas).
SECTION THREE: ANALOGY
The third pramāṇa enumerated by the Nyaya authors after perception and inference is upamana roughly translateable as analogy, roughly because the concept is rather technical. The Nyāyasūtra definition of this pramāņa runs as follows:
On the basis of a known similarity, to bring about what has to be brought about that is called upamana.
The words of this definition as it stands are rather obscure, so what is to be understood is its traditionally given interpretation. Two alternative such interpretations are reported by Jayanta, one attributed to the old Naiyayikas, the other to the 'moderns'. Both, of course, agree that a case of upamāna arises when an expert tells a novice that such and such an unfamiliar thing is similar to such and such a familiar thing and the latter later on coming across this unfamiliar thing recognizes it as similar to that familiar thing and says to himself "So this thing is what the word concerned stands for." On the old Naiyayika's showing pramaņa-ship here belongs to the expert's
