Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 86

INFERENCE
75
other in a literal sense of the term. Really, the Indian philosophers were almost always engaged in offering definitions and counterdefinitions and in this connection they would take extreme care to demonstrate that their cherished definitions were neither too narrow nor too wide; all this was in essence nothing but a long sustained exercise in what the Buddhist called svabhāva-anumāna. Be that as it may, Jayanta next assails the Buddhist concept of kārya-anumāna.
Jayanta's criticism of the Buddhist thesis on kārya-anumāna is again based on a serious misunderstanding. Thus he begins by showing that on accepting the hypothesis of momentarism as the Buddhist does it becomes impossible to speak of anything acting as cause in relation to any other thing. 16 To this is added that if smoke acts as probans for inferring fire because it is an effect produced by fire then any and every property possessed by smoke should act as a probans for inferring fire inasmuch as smoke in its entirety is produced by fire.17 The Buddhist pleads : “Even if smoke in its entirety is produced by fire, only those properties of smoke act as probans for inferring fire which are found exclusively in smoke and in all smoke"; Jayanta retorts : “In that case you should only say that there obtains between smoke and fire an invariable concomitance, not that this invariable concomitance obtains because smoke is produced by fire."18 The Buddhist pleads : “But you Naiyāyika too admit the validity of an inference where an effect acts as probans for inferring the cause concerned. Similarly, the Vaiseșikas have enumerated effect among the five possible things that can act as probans”;19 Jayanta replies : "That Vaiseșika list is not exhaustive but just illustrative, there being even other things that can act as probans. As for the Naiyāyikas, admitting the validity of inferring the cause concerned from an effect, that is because there obtains between an effect and the cause concerned a relation of invariable concomitance.”20 To this it is added : “Certainly, there are so many things that can possibly act as probans. For example, the sunset acts as probans for the rise of stars, full moon for sea-tide, the rise of the constellation Agastya for the onset of autumn, the movement of ants carrying their eggs for the oncoming rains. In one word, the Buddhist should not insist in a childish manner that a probans must either be something identical with the probandum concerned or something produced by the probandum concerned."21 Lastly is answered the Buddhist query as to what makes possible an invariable concomitance; Jayanta in effect says : “That is a senseless