Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 38

PERCEPTION :
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(4) The upholders of the fourth view note that a perceptual cognition might involve no employment of words or it might involve it; again, it might involve employment of words in one of so many ways; but they emphasize that in all cases a perceptual cognition is something different from verbal testimony. And it is their contention that the word ‘non-verbal' occurring in the proposed definition is aimed at emphasizing this very point.
Also noteworthy is Jayanta's manner of reporting. Thus first of all the first view is mentioned briefly. Then the upholder of the second view criticizes the first view and presents his own, then the upholder of the third view criticizes the second view and presents his own, then the upholder of the second view criticizes the third view, then the upholder of the third view answers this criticism, lastly the upholder of the second view criticizes this answer. After this the second view is criticized independently and the first view defended as a better alternative; then the fourth view is mentioned briefly. The whole enquiry closes with a request made to the reader that he may choose from among the traditionally current authoritative views in question whichever one sounds plausible to him.5+ A consideration of certain details of Jayanta's report should go some way to account for his procedure. Thus he begins by observing that since the Buddhists contend thåt words have nothing to do with things real and since his school counters them by demonstrating that certain types of valid cognition involve employment of word, the present aphorism, by using the word 'non-verbal', intends to emphasize that there is also a type of valid cognition that involves no employment of words. But to his chagrin Jayanta finds that both the second and the third views, which seem to have been most widely current, play into the hands of the Buddhist, one in one manner the other in another. Hence his inclination to support the first view which is in fact most odd, as also his coverage of the fourth view which too is odd enough and in any case does not seem to have been much current; for both these views allow one freedom to pay just lip-service to the concept of nirvikalpakapratyakşa, the type of perceptual cognition supposed to involve no employment of words. Really, Jayanta's problem was to explain away the word 'non-verbal' occurring in the proposed definition of perceptual cognition, for his own understanding was that for all practical purposes the only type of perceptual cognition is one that involves employment of words. As he flamboyantly remarks: “Savikalpaka-pratyaksa is the very life-breath of the Naiyāyikas”;55