Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 36

PERCEPTION
25
perceptual cognition but no pleasure, etc. are produced (barring those produced along with the signalizing sensory experience). As Jayanta's account shows, perceptual cognition of an object might evoke a memory of pleasure, etc. produced by this object in past; but this will not be a case of this object producing pleasure, etc. as a result of being perceptually cognized. As a matter of fact, memory of pleasure, etc. produced by an object in past might be evoked in so many ways, e.g. through a perceptual cognition or memory or anticipation of this object, through a perceptual cognition or memory or anticipation of another object somehow got related to this object by way of association of ideas; but in all such cases what is produced is memory of pleasure, etc., not pleasure, etc. themselves. True, in some sense (important for certain considerations) even memory of pleasure etc. might become a derivative source of pleasure, etc. but the primary source of pleasure etc. remains a physical object at the time of actually producing a certain ensemble of sensory experience; in any case, it is pleasure, etc. produced by such an object under such a circumstance that the Buddhist as well as Jayanta exclusively have in mind while investigating into the nature of pleasure, etc. Coming to the original point, Jayanta should have realized that his insistence that pleasure, etc. can be erroneous or otherwise in the same manner as a cognition can be so would play into the hands of the Buddhist with his thesis that pleasure etc. are of the nature of cognition. This thesis was countered by Jayanta by submitting that a cognition is and pleasure etc. are not of the nature of apprehension of an object, a submission which will get strengthened if it is pointed out that a cognition can and pleasure, etc. cannot be erroneous or otherwise; for apprehension of an object can be erroneous or otherwise in so natural a sense while forced maneuvering of the type just met with must be resorted to if one were to demonstrate that pleasure, etc. too can be erroneous or otherwise.
Be that as it may, another opponent of Jayanta now comes to dismiss as children's quarrel the disputation just reported, his point being that the definition of perception under examination contains another word which really applies to a cognition but not to pleasure, etc. ; the word in question is vyavasāyātmaka (=certain) and it is his contention that a cognition can and pleasure, etc. cannot be certain or otherwise. 52. It was not impossible for Jayanta to enter into another 'children's quarrel on this new score, but mercifully, he concedes the opponent's point while reiterating his own original submission that