Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 57

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INDIAN LOGIC
different. Thus on his showing when a class-character, a quality or an action is attributed to a thing it is a case of differentiating things which are in fact identical (a class-character. a quality or an action being nothing different from the thing concerned) and when a name or the possession of another thing is attributed to a thing it is a case of identifying things which are in fact different (a name or a thing possessed being in fact different from the thing concerned). This too is a considerably confused thesis. Really, all thought identifies a thing as belonging to a class and this it does through observing in this thing features that are characteristic of this class, these features being called a quality if they stand for some static aspect of the nature of this thing, an action if they stand for some dynamic aspect of it; in fact, even to attribute a quality or an action to a thing is to identify it as belonging to a relatively simple class, but there is some point in distinguishing between an individual quality or action and a class-character which is essentially an ensemble of certain qualities and actions. And all names attributed to a thing are attributed to it either because of its possessing a class-character or because of its possessing a quality or an action; even a proper name attributed to a thing becomes a reminder of the qualities and actions characteristic of this thing. Lastly, the case of one thing possessing another is a case of these two things entering into a relation where each has its own distinctive role; and a name attributed to a thing might also be a name attributed to it because of its entering into a relation with another thing. All these aspects of the true situation are at the back of the Buddhist's mind when he works out his thesis on a fivefold kalpanā, but his misguided conviction that a kalpanā must somehow falsify the nature of things real has played havoc with all this. A detailed comparison between what is the case and what he says is the case is futile, but a point or two might be noted profitably. Since all kalpanā is to be conceived as a case of attributing - potentially if not actually - a name to a thing the fourth kalpanā-type is to be understood as a case of attributing a proper name to a thing. Again, the Naiyāyika posits a class-character, a quality or an action as an independent real existing besides the thing to which it belongs, and the Buddhist's impatience with this sort of proliferation of independent reals is somewhat understandable; but the latter's own understanding that a class-character, a quality or an action is a false imposition on the thing to which it allegedly belongs is a remedy worse than the disease. In any case, Jayanta lastly puts another pertinent