Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 62

PERCEPTION
51
with him on this point the two will have nothing to differ on the question of ņirvikalpaka-savikalpaka.” It is in this background that Jayanta concludes his present enquiry by emphasizing that whatever is cognized by savikalpaka perception is also cognized by nirvikalpaka perception; and since it is his understanding that all sorts of independent reals in the form of substances, qualities, actions, classcharacters, etc. are cognized by savikalpaka perception he contends that the same are cognized by nirvikalpaka perception as well.26 But this time Jayanta clarifies his position by further noting that even if the same set of entities are cognized by nirvikalpaka perception and savikalpaka perception the latter does and the former does not involve an employment of words.27 However, we already know that on the question as to how an employment of words is involved in savikalpaka perception, there was a lot of confusion in the Nyāya camp, but the point needs no repetition.
As was noted in the beginning, the Buddhist definition of perception contained two elements in the form of saying that perception is devoid of all thought and is non-illusory. Uptil now Jayanta was peroccupied with the first element of this definition, now he briefly criticizes its second element. Thus he submits that on the logic adopted by the Buddhist there can be no perception that is illusory 28 The plea that a case like cognition of two moons is a case of illusory perception is rejected on the ground that in such a case too there is nothing illusory about the concerned nirvikalpaka cognition which alone is what the Buddhist calls perception; thus on the Buddhist's logic a nirvikalpaka cognition cognizes but one moon which the concerned post-nirvikalpaka thought misinterprets as two moons just a nirvikalpaka cognition cognizes but mirage-sands which the concerned post-nirvikalpaka thought misinterprets as water.29 The Buddhist pleads that in the former case the eye has been rendered so defective that it cannot see one moon but must see two moons; Jayanta retorts that on this logic it too might be said that in the latter case the eye has been rendered so defective that it cannot see mirage-sands but must see water.30 The Buddhist agrees to Jayant's point, but then he is told that in that case he has no right to say that a valid postperceptual thought rightly interprets what the preceding nirvikalpaka cognition has cognized, an invalid post-perceptual thought interprets it wrongly.31 This exchange of arguments is important because it throws enough light on how our philosophers grappled with the rather