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INDIAN LOGIC
be identified with bare sensory experience. Hence when Jayanta presently argues that even erroneous pleasure is pleasure because it is produced by an object capable of producing pleasure just as even erroneous cognition is cognition because it is produced by an object capable of producing cognition he is doubly mistaken ; for a pleasure cannot be called erroneous or otherwise and a cognition is not produced by its object. Then a word about how according to the Buddhist and Jayanta pleasure, etc. are produced. Really, pleasure, etc. are of the nature of a total reaction of the organism concerned that takes place at the time when this organism is experiencing certain sensory features of an object. Hence the Buddhist is correct when he contends that an object produces pleasure, etc. along with a perceptual cognition concerning itself, provided it is remembered that he in effect identified perceptual cognition with bare sensory experience. But, when Jayanta says that an object produces pleasure, etc. only after it has been cognized — by way of memory or anticipation if not by way of perception — his statement makes no sense simply because an object produces pleasure, etc. irrespective of whether it is cognized or not and even in case it is cognized it produces pleasure, etc. before it is cognized. We have found Jayanta emphasizing that perception of an object evokes the memory of pleasure, etc. this object produced in past; but for certain reasons the opponent asked him to show how perception of an object is accompanied by a perception of pleasure, etc. Jayanta then contended that when an object is encountered for the first time a perception of this object and a perception of the concerned pleasure. etc. take place together. But as a matter of fact, to perceive an object is to identify it on the basis of certain observed.sensory features and perception as thus understood does not take place in relation to an object when this object is encountered for the first time. For what then takes place is an all-round sensory experience of this object along with an experience of the concerned pleasure, etc.; at the same time, depending on the specifics of the circumstance certain sensory features of this object are particularly noticed so that when this object is encountered for the second time it is identified on the basis of an observation of these very sensory features, an identification which evokes a memory of those pleasure, etc. that were experienced at the time of the first encounter. It is in this sense that at the time of the first encounter pleasure, etc. are produced but there takes place no perceptual cognition, at the time of the second encounter there takes place a
