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PERCEPTION
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distinguished from pleasure, etc. that are of the nature of a physiological state. Lastly, when both the Buddhist and Jayanta contend that pleasure, etc. must be perceived necessarily they are identifying the concept 'undergoing the physiological state called pleasure, etc.' with the concept 'perceiving the physiological state called pleasure, etc.' so that the very being of pleasure, etc. means their being perceived; similarly, when the Buddhist contends that a cognition must be perceived necessarily he is identifying the concept 'undertaking a cognition' with the concept 'perceiving a cognition' so that the very being of a cognition means its being perceived. Really, the concept 'perception should be reserved for the cases of perceiving an external object, it being understood that neither pleasure, etc. (that is, a physiological state) nor a cognition (that is, a mental state) can be perceived though both can be cognized in the sense that a causal analysis can be undertaken in prder to reveal how the two come into being. Let it however be noted that historically our philosophers got interested in the problem of physiological and mental phenomena by way of seeking to show how their respective definition of perception apply to the cases of perceiving these phenomena which they indiscriminately called 'mental phenomenal even while often drawing a line of distinction that was actually a line dividing what is physiological from what is mental. Some interesting light on the problem is thrown by a curious discussion which Jayanta next undertakes, a discussion which another opponent soon ridicules as 'children's quarrel'.
Jayanta's problem was to justify the employment of the word 'jñāna' in the definition of perception under examination, and he solved it by submitting that this way pleasure, etc. which too are something born of a sense-object contact are eliminated from the purview of this definition. Now the opponent says that this definition already contains the adjective 'nonerroneous! which can be attributed to cognition but not to pleasure, etc. so that the very employment of this adjective eliminates pleasure, etc. from the purview of the definition in question."8 Jayanta replies that the adjective ‘non-erroneous can be attributed to pleasure etc. as well, and this gives rise to a controversy. The opponent's point is that a cognition is non-erroneous when it identifies its object correctly, it is erroneous when it identifies it incorrectly, a distinction to which nothing corresponds in the case of pleasure, etc.; Jayanta retorts that a pleasure is non-erroneous when it is generated by a scripturally non-prohibited object, it is erroneous
