Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 30

PERCEPTION
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the same role as jar plays in cognition of jar, his point being that a pleasure is made an object by a cognition which is something different from this pleasure just as a jar is made an object by a cognition which is something different from this jar.15 Then Jayanta argues as follows against the Buddhist's contention that pleasure, etc. are of the nature of cognition because both are produced by the same causal aggregate : “Yes, both do have the same samavāyikārana and the same asamavāyikārana, the former being the soul concerned, the latter the conjunction of this soul with the manas concerned. But they have got different nimittakāraņas, e.g the nimittakāraṇa of pleasure is the universal 'pleasure-ness', that of cognition the universal 'cognitionness"? Lastly Jayanta works out another difference between pleasure, etc. on the one hand and cognition on the other; this as follows: “All pleasure, etc. necessarily presuppose a cognition, a cognition does not necessarily presuppose a cognition. Even in case there takes place no perceptual cognition to produce pleasure, etc. there does take place memory — or anticipation — to secure that purpose. Nor will it do to say that a cognition too necessarily presupposes a cognition, for a cognition that arises after the state of sleep, swoon, etc. has ended does not do that."'17 This controversy deserves a most careful examination. Thus the Buddhist is emphasizing the following four points :
(1) Both pleasure, etc. and a cognition are a mental state. (2) A cognition must be perceived necessarily just as a mental
state like pleasure, etc. must be perceived necessarily. . (3) A mental state like pleasure etc. as also a cognition must
be perceived by itself, otherwise the perception of pleasure etc. as also the perception of a cognition must lead to an
infinite regress. . (4) The same causal aggregate which produces a cognition also
produces the concerned pleasure, etc. As against these Jayanta emphasizes the following four points : (1) Both pleasure, etc. and a cognition are a mental state. (2) An external object is cognized first and the concerned
pleasure, etc. are produced in the wake of this cognition. (3) Pleasure, etc. are necessarily perceived and by a cognition
arising in the wake of these pleasure etc. just as an external object is possibly perceived and by a cognition that is something different from this object.