Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 27

16
INDIAN LOGIC
Jayanta, as it certainly is in Buddhist logic. Lastly comes what Jayanta says about the perception of pleasure etc. Really, the question as to what constitutes pleasure etc. and what the perception of pleasure etc. is another important question deserving an independent treatment. Fortunately, for a certain reason Jayanta is going to take up this question immediately afterwards, and so we might make only preliminary observations just now. The Naiyāyika, the Buddhist, the Kumārilite as well as the Prābhākarite sharply distinguished between a living organism's physical states and its mental states. Thus the colour, touch, smell, movement etc. of an organism were supposed to constitute its physical states, its pleasure, pain, desire, effort, cognition etc. its mental states ; the chief distinction between the two sets was that the former was supposed to be noticeable to an outside observer, the latter not so noticeable. The Buddhist explained all this by maintaining that a living organism's mental states constitute an unintertupted series running parallel to the series of its bodily states, the Naiyāyika etc. by maintaining that they are of the form of occasional qualities produced in the soul which is allotted to this organism along with a body. Then it was realized that for a mental state (barring cognition whose status was somewhat exceptional) it is impossible that it should arise and yet not be noticed by the organism concerned; so the Buddhist maintained that a mental state necessarily perceives itself, the Naiyāyika etc. that it is necessarily. perceived by a cognition arising immediately afterwards. As regards a cognition, the Buddhist and the Prābhākarite maintained that it necessarily perceives itself, the Naiyāyika that it might possibly be perceived by a cognition arising immediately afterwards, the Kumārilite that it can never be perceived but can be inferred by a cognition arising any time afterwards. The precise import of these observations will become clear when we follow Jayanta's enquiry that is soon forthcoming. So for the present we might only note his consideration of the question as to how the definition of perception under examination covers the case of a perception of pleasure etc. On Jayanta's showing pleasure etc. are just a particular type of objects of perception, they being the qualities of a substance called soul just as colour, touch etc. are the qualities of a substance called jar. Then he has to explain as to how pleasure etc. are perceived as a result of a sense-organ coming in contact with them; his position is that the needed sense-organ is manas which is of the form of a nonphysical organ allotted to each organism so that pleasure etc. are