Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 48

DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
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as because the particular Cause is secured', and the rest --become invalid. Because, what is said regarding the securing of the particular Cause would be true if the said Securing of the particular Cause' were found anywhere to have been due to the presence (therein) of the Effect; specially as it is quite possible for the said securing of the particular Cause to be due to the restricted character of the Potency of the Cause itself.
That everything cannot be produced from everything' is also due to the restricted character of the Causal Potency itself; as it is impossible ior everything to be, by its very nature, capable of proclucing all things.
As for the argument set forth (by the Sankhya) above, under Text 12**that to which no peculiarity can be attributed, which is formless and unmodifiable, how could such a thing be produced by Canses?",--that also has been urged without understanding the real sense of our theory. We do not say that a Non-entity is produced; if we had said that then alone could it be urged against us that any modification of it would involve loss of its very essence. We have however already explained that what is produced is a Thing itself (not a mero non-entity); all that we say is that the thing was non-existent before its production,-a conclusion deduced from the fact that (prior to production) it is not found to fulfil the conditions of Cogni sability and that which is already a full-fledged entity cannot be an Effect, something to be produced ; and that it is spoken of as 'produced by that Cause on whose mere proximity it springs into existence. Nothing is produced by the entering into it of any operations (of the Cause), because all things are, by their very nature, devoid of operative activity. Then again, there is nothing that can be called a "non-entity, which could be modified (as urged by the Sankhya); nor can non-existence constitute the Essence of anything; because non-existence' is a mere negation.-Then again, if it be asserted that "What is non-existent cannot be produced, because no peculiarities of the product could be attributed to it”,-then how could the Existent also be produced, since its essential features are already accomplished, and no further peculiarities conld be attributed to it -For these reasons, the reasoning that "Because what is efficient can produce only that which can be produced by it" is invalid.
Further, inasmuch as under the theory of the 'Non-existent Effect, it is possible for things to be Causes', the final (Sänkhja) argument also - Because the Effect is of the essence of the Cause"-is invalid, too wide and Inconclusive'.-Or, inasmuch as the fact of the Existerul thing being an
Effect has been already shown to be impossible,-and as all the facts that have been urged, in the shape of the arguments in Sankhyakarika, 9) * because the particular Cause is secured and so forth, -are explicable only under the theory of the Effect being non-existent,--all these four arguments are contradictory' (as urged in support of the Sankhya doctrine of the
Existent Effect'), because they actually prove what is contrary to the conclusion desired (by the Sankhya)-(31)
[Says the Sankhya) - "If it is your view that what is produced has been non-existent, then how is it that in the Satra (of the Buddhists), the pro. duction of both, the Existent as well as the Non-eristent, has been denied ?