Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 46

A-N. 12171
51
DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
TEXT (29)
** INASMUCH AS THE PRESENCE OF LIMITS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU, THE POTENCIES CANNOT BE RESTRICTED. ON THE VIEW OF THEIR BEING EXISTENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEIR RESTRICTION WOULD BE RIGHT AND PROPER AS PERTAIN
ING TO THE LIMITS."-(29)
COMMENTARY.
For you-i.e. for the Buddhist who holds the Effect to be non-existent it is not possible for the (causal) Potencies to be restricted.-Why?-Because the presence of limits, in the shape of Effects would be impossible ; (as the Effeots would be non-existent, there would be nothing with reference to which there could be restriction); -for the simple reason, that when the limit is non-existent, that nohich is limited cannot be there. This argument may be formulated as follows:- Things devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects cannot have their potencies restricted-e.g. such things as Hare's Horns, -and (according to you) things like the Paddy.seed are devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects; hence they do not fall within range of the Major term [i.e. they cannot have their Potencies restricted)'.
-With a view to show the soundness of his own view, the Sankhya adds On the views of their being existent, etc.-i.e. if Effects are held to be existent ; - their i.e. of the Potencies.-(29)
In the following Text, the Author points out the invalidity of the reason (set forth by the Sankhya, in the preceding Text):
TEXT (30)
IT IS NOT SO ; IT MAY BE THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF LIMITS
THERE CAN BE NO SUCH SUBSEQUENT ASSERTION AS HELD BY US. BUT THERE IS NO HARM DONE TO TRE NATURE OF THE THING ITSELF WHICH IS ENTIRELY FREE FROM ALL
RESTRICTIVE ADJUNCTS.-(30)
COMMENTARY.
[It cannot be as urged by the Opponent]-because, on account of the abrence of Limits, it may be that there can be no such subsequent assertion as that the potency to produce Curd is present in the Milk'; that may be so; but there is that Entity which is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts—which is not a mere imposition (or assumption), subsequent to which there appears another Entity, which has not been previously perceived : and there can be no denial of such an Entity (as of the former one).—(30)