Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 44

DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
49
Then again, whenever people have recourse to any activity, it is either for securing what is beneficial or for getting rid of what is harmful. Under the theory of the Existent Effect however, there can be nothing that cannot be secured, nor anything that cannot be got rid of; hence the whole world would be without desire for anything; so that ultimately there would be total cessation of all worldly activities.-(27)
Having thus refuted the doctrine of the Effect being existent (even prior to the operation of its Cause),' the Author proceeds to refute the objections likely to be urged against the doctrine that 'the Effect is nonexistent (prior to the operation of its Cause):
TEXT (28). JUST AS (UNDER THE Sänkhya THEORY),-EVEN THOUGH, ON THE GROUND OF ALL THINGS BEING CONSTITUTED BY THE Three Attributes, THERE IS NO DIFFERENTIATION AMONG THEM, AND YET EVERYTHING (Caus) DOES NOT PRODUCE EVERYTHING (EFFECT), - IN THE SAME MANNER, EVEN THOUGH THE EFFECT IS NON-EXISTENT (BEFORE THE CAUSAL OPERATION), EVERYTHING CANNOT PRODUCE
EVERYTHING.(28)
COMMENTARY. The very denial of the theory of the Existent Effect has, by implication, proved that the Effect is non-existent'; as existent' and non-existent are contradictory terms; and hence no third alternative is possible. Even so, the Author now proceeds to show the futility of the objections that the Opponent has urged (against the Buddhist theory of the non-existent Effect').
The objection has been urged (by the Sarikhya, under Text 8. above) that "if the Effect were non-existent, it could not be produced, because it wordd have no form at all".
Now this Reason is fallacious, beset with the fallacy of being Unknown (not admitted); because the theory is that it is the nature or character itself (of the Effect) that is produced by the Cause), and this nature or character of the thing is not known' (admitted) to be *formless' -It might be urged that "before its production, it is certainly characterless".-Not so, we reply; as it is not possible for it to be characterless '; it cannot be right to regard the character itself as characterless ; because when something is said to be
characterless' what is meant is that it has no character, and this certainly is not there, even before the production of the thing; in fact, (under the argument of the Opponent) that itself would come to be characterless by which the Effect is produced. If the Reason 'because it would have no form 'be held to have been put forward with reference to the forinless entity' in the shape of the negation of the thing ---then the reasoning would be futile (proving what is already proved or admitted); as the negation of the thing has not been regarded by any one as 'something produced'.-Further,