Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

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INDIAN LOGIC
colour; when with the 'universal' jarness residing in this jar, it is this jarness; when with absence of cloth' residing in this jar, it is this 'absence of cloth'; when with the 'universal' colourness residing in the colour of the jar it is this colourness, when with 'absence of cloth residing in the colour of the jar it is this 'absence of cloth'. Then it is maintained that one substance gets related to another substance by way of the relation called conjunction; a quality, an action or 'universal' resides in its locus by way of the relation called 'inherence'; an 'absence' resides in its locus by way of the relation called 'qualifierand qualificand'. Now a sense-organ is itself a physical substance and so it can get related to a physical substance by way of conjunction, but its relation to a quality, action, 'universal' or absence' must be mediated through the relation of conjunction that obtains between it and the substance concerned. The various types of sense-object contact posited by the Naiyāyika are the various types of relation – direct or mediated – obtaining between a sense-organ and an object of perception'. These are the most vital points covered by Jayanta's extremely brief report on the matter.29 Then the opponent asks : "Why at all posit a 'contact' between a sense-organ and an object ?", Jayanta replies : “A sense-organ cannot grasp an object that lies separated by a distance."30 The opponent asks : “Then why not simply say that a sense-organ and the object lie close to each other ??; Jayanta replies :“A sense-organ and an object are two members of the causal aggregate that produces perceptual cognition while the different members of a causal aggregate must not just lie close to each other but be in contact with each other in the case of touch and taste the contact concerned is all too obvious)" 31 The opponent pleads : “But then merely to say that a sense-organ and an object produce perceptual cognition should imply that the contact concerned takes place”; Jayanta replies : “An explicit mention of contact has to be made so that one might learn that there are six types of it."932 The opponent asks : "But how are we to be sure that the object that is a member of the causal aggregate produces perceptual cognition ?''; Jayanta replies: "The concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence prove that perceptual cognition is never produced unless the object concerned is present there just as a mat is never produced unless the needed raw fiber is present there; (in no other way can it be explained why perceptual cognition of x relates to x, e.g. not on the ground that this cognition bears the form of x as the Buddhist will have us believe).''33 The opponent asks: "How