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strivedasya sthitim prarupitavantas teṣām sarveṣām api pravacani_ kasūrīṇāṁ matāni bhagavānāryaśyāma upadiṣṭavān | te ca prāvacanika. surayaḥ svamatena sütram paṭhanto gautamapraśna-bhagavannirvacanarūpataya paṭhanti | tatas tadavasthany eva sūtrāni likhată Gotama! ity uktam | anyatha bhagavati gautamaya nirdesṭari na samsayakathanam upapadyate bhagavataḥ sakalasamsayātītatvāt | " -Prajñā. tika, folio 385
Satkhandagama gives one view only in this context. It neither records nor discusses the various views.
In Samyaktvadvāra (1343-1345) the commentator has explained the terms simyagdṛṣṭi, mithyadṛṣṭi and samyag-mithyādṛṣṭi as follows. The living being that has the right faith in the categories propounded by Tirthankara or Jina is called samyagdṛṣṭi, the one who doubts these categories is called mithyadṛṣṭi, and the one who has neither faith in nor doubt about these categories is called samyag-mithyadṛṣṭi. On the basis of Sataka-crni he states that the samyag-mithyadṛṣṭi nether likes nor dislikes the categories propounded by a Jina just as a person ignorant of rice, etc. neither likes nor dislikes them (Prajñā. ṭikā, folio 391).
While expounding the question of the period for which a living being can continuously have avadhidarśana (extrasensory indeterminate knowledge of the spatially and temporally distant material objects) (1356), the commentator has discussed, after Ac. Jinabhadra, the difference of opinion between the sutrakāra and kārmagranthika regarding the question as to whether or not the avadhidarśana is possible in the case of a living being possessed of avadhi-ajñāna (extrasensory determinate cognition of the spatially and temporally distant material objects by a cogniser having no faith in the categories propounded by a Jina) (Prajñā. ṭīkā, folio 391).
In Upayogadvāra (1362-63) the sutrakāra has laid down that the minimum or maximum period for the continuous operation of cognitive faculty is an antarmuhurta. The commentator observes that this statement is from the standpoint of transmigratory souls, and that the sutrakāra does not mean to apply it to the case of the liberated and omniscient beings in whose case it is one moment only (Prajñā. ṭīkā, folio 392). Really speaking, this sūtra belongs to the period prior to that when Jaina theoreticians started discussing the question as to whether omniscient's jñāna and darśana operate simultaneously or alternately. The sutrakāra could not have meant what the later Jaina theoreticians arrived at in connection with this problem, the problem itself being of late origin.
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