Studies in Jainism

Author(s): M P Marathe, Meena A Kelkar, P P Gokhle
Publisher: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication Puna
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/002008/1

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989 STUDIES IN JAINISM Editors : M. P. MARATHE, MEENA A. KELKAR, P. P. GOKHALE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATION

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STUDIES IN JAINISM Editors : M. P. MARATHE, (MRS.) M. A. KELKAR, P. P. GOKHALE I. P. Q. PUBLICATION NO. 7

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Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, and its Pratap Centre of Philosophy, Amalner ( Jalgaon ) INDIA First Edition : July 1984 Price : Rs. 50.00 Published by : 1. P. Q. Publications, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Ganeshkhind, * Pune 411 007 INDIA. ( With the assistance of the University Leadership Programme of the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007) Printed at the Maharashtra Sahakari Mudranalaya, Pune 411 004

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CONTENTS (i) I. P. Q. Editors' Preface (ii) Preface Part I Jaina Metaphysics and Ontology : An Overview A Note on the Development of Some Concepts in Jaina Ontology : Mohanlal Mehta Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy : J. C. Sikdar Jajna Concept of Atomic Combination * Suzuko Ohira jaina darzana meM astikAya kI avadhAraNA : Adhunika pariprekSya meM ATTA A Jaina Conception of Space and Time Nagin J. Shah 56 The Jaina Concept of Jiva and Sarvajnata Ramjee Singh Some Amphibious Expressions in Umasvati : M. P. Marathe 83 Part II Jaina Logic and Epistemoloty: An Overview 101 jaina nyAya : parizIlana : Tatai Tout 103 The Jaina Concept of Logic: V. K. Bharadwaj 116 syAdvAdamImAMsA : cartests #foot 130 An Analysis of Syat in Syadvada : M. P. Marathe 141 Nayavada and Many-Valued Logic : S. L. Pandey 156 syAdvAda : eka ciMtana : HTTS JA . 167 syAdvAda : eka anuciMtana : P aa mezt. 193 pramANoM se nayoM kA bheda : IzvaracaMdra zarmA 205 Part III Jaina Ethics and Religion : An Overview 225 Jaina Ethics : T. G. Kalghatgi 227 Jaina Ethics and the Metaethical Trends : Kamal Chand Sogani 237 The Jaina Theory of Symbol: D.D. Malvania 248 A Note on Jain Mythology : D. D. Malvania 253 ley

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EDITORS' PREFACE The Indian Philosophical Quarterly is committed to the promotion of independent philosophical thinking in India today irrespective of doctrinal commitment or affiliations. Such an endeavour requires the creation of a national forum of philosophical investigations at advanced levels which would be committed to the achievement of structures of communication between classical perspectives, Indian and Western, and Contemporary problems, thus leading to the formation of a climate of relevance for our philosophical efforts. As a part of this objective the Indian Philosophical Quarterly intends to bring out a series of publications in Philosophy to be called Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications. The series will be devoted to publishing monographs, collection of articles, anthologies, original explorations and critical studies of specific problems or thinkers. We hope that such publications would provide a forum for scholars in our country to make available the results of their studies and reflections to a wider public. The individual monographs, however, would represent only the points of view of the authors concerned; they do not necessarily represent the editorial view-point. We are happy to release our seventh publication, Studies in Jainism, which is an outcome of the proceedings of three seminars, the first entitled 'Seminar on Jaina Logic and Philosophy the second 'Colloquium on Jaina. Logic, Culture and Literature' and the third 'Jaina Philosophy and Modern Scientific Thought. All these three seminars were organized by the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, during the years 1975, 1977 and 1979 respectively. The bilingual character of the present work is due to the fact that some of the scholars participating in these seminars, wrote and presented theirs papers in Hindi. Here is an attempt to compile an adequate record of those seminars. We hope it will be of use to all the concerned. We are thankful to Prof. M. P. Marathe, Dr. P. P. Gokhale and Dr. (Mrs.) M. A. Kelkar of the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, for

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editing the papers presented and tape-recording and presenting them into the book form. The Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, has co-sponsored the present publication as a part of the publication programme under the University Leadership Programme sanctioned by the UGC. PUNE July, 1984 vi S. S. BARLINGAY RAJENDRA PRASAD Editors, I. P. Q.

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PREFACE In India, Philosophy has developed through three different traditions : the orthodox, the Buddhist and the Jaina. Of course, although these traditions are independent there was always some communication, crisscrossing of thought amongst them which cnriched each of these traditions. About 40 years back, when some Jaina texts like Sya dvadamanjari and Syadvadaratnakara came my way I was attracted by some of the concepts and the theories engraved in the Jaina thought. It was my desire at that time to see that these valuable concepts in Jaina thought were expressed in modern idiom, in an unpolluted form. Most of the thought which comes to us through our modern or western scholarship is, to my mind, largely blame the scholars for it. Pollution takes place because our thought is mixed with religious beliefs and we are not able to separate Philosophy from Religion. This was also the case with western philosophic thought, whether it was Greek, medieval or even modern. But in Europc the sphere of philosophy was gradually separated from that of religion and one can, now, stu western philosophic thought in its purc form, more or less. But those who insist on maintaining western philosophical thought in its pure form, somehow or the other, seem to be interested in making a cocktail of Indian religious, cultural, mystical and philosophical thoughts. When I read a few Buddhist and Jaina philosophical works and also studied some systems of orthodox thought under some pandits, I thought that there was necessity of reunderstanding Indian Philosophy, a necessity of Philosophy renaissance. This could be achieved only with the help of devoted people, well-trained in the subject, equipped with the rigorous analytic and rational method and interested in deciphering the pure thought from other ingredients. With this end in view I worked for the establishment of a Chair in Jaina Philosophy, Culture and Literature. The 2500th anniversary of the mahanirvana of Bhagavan Mahavira augmented the process and with the encouragement given to me by the late Shri Ratilalbhai Nanavati, late Shri Shadilal Jain late Shri Rishabhadasji Ranka, late Shri Kesarichandji vii

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Lalwani, late Dr. A. N. Upadhye and Dr. D. S. Kothari, Shri Nawalmalji Firodia, Shri Popatlalji Shah, Shri Kanakmal Munot, Shri Shreyansprasad Jain, Shri Lalchand Hirachand, revered Shri Pushkarmuni, revered Shri Devendramuni and revered Shri Arunvijayaji Muni, the chair in Jaina Philosophy, Culture and Literature could be established in Poona University. The encouragement given to me by Dr. G. S. Mahajani and Prof. D. A. Dabholkar who were during this period Vice-Chancellors of the University played a major role in the establishment of the Chair. The seminars held in 1975, 1977 and 1979, the proceedings of which are being published now, were a part of this process. I thought that if learned pandits were closeted together for a few days they might be able to churn out the truth. We, of course, received for these seminars many learned articles; but most o them were written in traditional idiom. There is always a danger of philosophy becoming pedantic and scholastic, and our seminars could not break this routine, in fiull measure. We were long eager to publish the proceedings of the seminars, but they had to wait for various reasons. Now thanks to the efforts of Prof. M. P. Marathe, Dr. Pradeep Gokhale and Dr. (Mrs) Meena Kelkar, the tapes were transcribed and finally some of the talks assumed the form of papers. The proceedings of these Seminars are being published under the title "Studies in Jainism and are divided into three parts. The first part contains papers on metaphysics and ontology, the second is concerned with logic and epistemology and the third with Jaina ethics. Although some of these papers are presented only in the traditional way I am sure that they at least supply the data for further thought. In the first part are included papers by Prof. M. L. Mehta, Dr. J. C. Sikdar. Dr. Suzuko Ohira, Dr. Sagarmal Jain, Dr. Nagin Shah, Dr. Ramji Singh and Prof. M. P. Marathe. All these papers cover subjects dealt in Jaina metaphysics and ontology. The second part is concerned with Jaina epistemology and logic and contains papers from Shri Darbarilal Kothiya, Dr. V. K. Bhardwaj, Prof. M. P. Marathe, Prof. S.L. Pandey, Dr. Sagarmal Jain, Shri Kailashchandra Shastri and Shri Ishwarchandra Sharma. In the third part are included important papers on Jaina ethics by Prof. D. S. Kalghatgi, Prof. K. C. Sogani and Prof. D. D. Malvania. viii 39

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The first part, viz., Jaina metaphysics and ontology contains an introductory article by Prof. Mohanlal Mehta. He says, "In fact, the Bhagavati presents three different views with regard to the constitution of the universe (1) Souls and matter constitute the universe, (2) Five extensive substances are the constituents of the universe, (3) Six substances form the universe" (p. 4), Prof. Mehta adds, "These are, so to say, the three stages of the growth of Jaina ontological ideas. It is evident from this account that in their search for the basic types of reals, Jaina thinkers must have started with souls and matters" (p. 4) Unfortunately, what is evident to Prof. Mehta is not evident to me and perhaps would not be evident to anybody. I do not see how these three propositions indicate the growth of Jaina ontology. First, the three propositions stated by Prof. Mehta need not be considered in a historical perspective. They can be consistently held together. Secondly, Prof. Mehta states that Jaina thinkers must have started with souls and matters. This also is not clear to me. Why should they not start with six Dravyas? Prof Mehta again says, "The Jaina meaning of extension' is different from the sense in which material objects are many times said to be extensive. " (p. 4) What is the new sense of extensiveness discovered by Prof. Mehta and attributed to Jaina philosophers? However, the importance of Prof. Mehta's article is that he makes us see some of the problems in Jaina metaphysics. Dr. Sikdar's article "The concept of matter in Jaina philosophy" is very important in several ways. It takes us to the new understanding of matter and problems concerned with it. However, perhaps for Dr. Sikdar matter is represented only by Pudgalas. I have a feeling that the concept of matter is indicated by all the words Pudgala, Dharma and Adharma. And I have a further feeling that the concept of matter cannot be separated, though it could be distinguished, from the concept of Jiva and Kala on the one hand and Akasa on the other. For, unless something was matter it could not be the cause of inertia either in its dynamic or static form. I also think that matter will have to be defined in relation to space (in the form of Pradesas). So Akasa also will be invariably involved in the whole game. The third article Jaina Concept of Atomic Combination" by Dr. Suzuko Ohira would certainly be very useful for the study of Jaina physics and metaphysics. Unfortu < ix

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nately, she could not attend the seminar and so there was no discussion on the article. One of the important features of these proceedings is that it is bilingual. Dr. Sagarmal Jain's article on Astika ya is written in Hindi. He has tried to re-understand the concept of Astikaya. He also raises the problem as to why Kala cannot be Astikaya. I would like to suggest that scholars should consider the concept of Astika ya on the background of what Kant called schemata. The categories, the forms of intuition and the manifold of sense are in a way abstractions and they cannot become concrete and real unless they are seen as a whole on the background of space and time. The concept of Astikaja is similar. The concept of Jiva, for example, will have to be distinguished from that of Jiva stika ya. The concept of Jiva is neither in space nor in time, it would be in Plato's World of Ideas'. But Jivastika ya should have spatial and temporal existence. The macroscopic Jivci should be distinguished but not separated from Pudgalas. The case of Dharma stika ya or Adharmastika ya would be similar. These realities should be connected with micro-space and micro-matter. Dr. Nagin Shah's article on space and time, like the article of Dr. Sagarmal Jain, is equally rich in content. He does suggest to an intelligent reader the different possibilities concerned with Lokakasa and Alokakasu. The concept of Alokakasa seems to be very important. Is it merely a concept or is it something real bevond Lokakasa or is it only that part of Lokakasa which is not filled in with any kind of substance ? Dr. Shah tries to give an answer, "Has Alokakasa any form ? No, it has no form. But it may be conceived as having the form of the parabola". (p. 63 ) Dr. Naginbhai's proposition is very interesting. But no philosophical proposition can be stated to be correct, with certainty. The second part is concerned with Jaina Logic and epistemology and consists of important papers of Jaina authorities like Darbarilal Kothiya, Kailashchandra Shastri and also of modern scholars of Jainism like Dr. V. K. Bhardwaj, Prof. M. P. Marathe and Prof. Sangamlal Pandey. Prof. Sangamlal Pandey tries to understand that Syadvada is concerned with many-valued logic. Dr. Bhardwaj says that Syadvada cannot be identified with logic of possibilities. I have a feeling that many a time similarities of different doctrines act as obstructions in seeing

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them in proper perspective. Instead of searching for similarities one should rather, in the manner of Wittgenstein, search for differences. Any way, the contributions to this section are very inspiring to the students of Jaina logic. The third part of the proceedings consists of Jaina ethics and religion. Unfortunately, in this section there are only four papers by three authors: Prof. T. S. Kalghatgi, Prof. K. C. Sogani and Prof. D. D. Malvania. Prof. Malvania is a great authority in Jainology but he has only presented two small notes on Jaina theory of symbols and Jaina mythology. Of course, even then, they are very valuable. Prof. Kalghatgi and Prof. Sogani are Jaina scholars but they are primarily Professors of Philosophy. Their effort is to put Jaina thought in western ethical idiom. Both these papers are very important. I hope that this compilation would be useful to the students of Jainology and would be well received by the general reader. S. S. Barlingay

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STUDIES IN JAINISM Part I Jaina Metaphysics and Ontology

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PART I Jaina Metaphysics and Ontology: An Overview The papers that are included in the Part I, deal with Jaina Metaphysics and Ontology focussing on some of the central notions and problems that have been discussed traditionally. M. L. Mehta in his paper entitled "A Nota on the Development of some concepts in Jaina Ontology' traces the development of some concepts like dravya, guna and paryaya with reference to the Jaina treatizes like Uttaradhyayana Sutra, Bhagavati, Tattvarthasutra etc. J. C. Sikdar in his paper Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy gives a comprehensive account of the Jaina concept of matter and compares it with that of Sarikhya, Bauddha and Nyaya-Vaisesika schools of thought. He attempts to show that this problem was dealt with by Jainacaryas in a synthetic perspective. Suzuko Ohira in her paper " Jaina Concept of Atomic Combination" gives a detailed account of the subject by comparing Jaina theory with the Vaisesika theory and suggests that the Jaina theory of atomic

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combination seems to have evolved in the context of karmic bondage, which involves the concept of Jiva, Karma, Pradesa and Parinama. These concepts were then crystalized in the abstraction of four auyogadvaras. Sagarmal Jain in his paper (in Hindi) "a TA 31ffit oft TTETTUTT, YfTheTA" observes that the notion of astikaya should be understood in terms of (1) something that can be divided into parts (2) something that has multidimensional extension. He explains why Jainas accept not only pudyala, but akasa, dharma, adharma and jiva also as a stikaya, and do not accept kala to be astikaya. In his paper Jain Conceptions of Space and Time" Nagin J. Shah contends that Jaina concept of space is that of a real substance existing in its own right. Space is regarded as a universal container in which all other substances are contained. However, he suggests that the Jaina view that time is an independent substance is weak and unsound. Ramjee Singh in his paper - The Jaina concept of Jiva and Sarvajnata" argues out the case for the Jaina doctrine that every soul possesses in its natural state only the pure knowledge which is exhibited in different forms depending upon the extent and penetration of knowledge-obscuring karmas. He also discusses critically the doctrines of other Indian philosophical schools about the same issue. In " Some Amphibious Expressions in Umasvati" M. P. Marathe analyses the expressions artha, tattva, padartha, drarya and sat. By showing that Umasvati has used these expressions amphibiously and equivocally he attempts to hint at what he calls a methodologically weak point in Umasvati's writings.

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A NOTE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOME CONCEPTS IN JAINA ONTOLOGY Mohanlal Mehta Loka is a very important concept in Jaina Ontology. In the Acaranga, which is the oldest Jaina text, the word loka is used in two different senses : (1) the living beings and (2) the universe in which the living beings etc. exist. The Sutrakrtanga uses the word loka in the latter sense. According to it loka is eternal but not infinite?. Beyond this universe there is aloka or that part of space where there are no living beings etc. The Acaranga refers to both, aloka and loka.3 The basic Jaina position is that loka has got a particular shape (as it is concrete) and is surrounded by aloka. The Bhagavati ( Vyakhyaprajnapti) gives some analogies to clarify this concept. It mentions that loka lies in the midst of aloka just as an island lies in the midst of an ocean, a ship lies in the midst of waters, a hole lies in the midst of a piece of cloth, a shadow lies in the midst of sunshine. Both loka and aloka are eternal. There is a dialogue in the Bhagavati which establishes the fact that unlike aloka, loka consists of souls and matter. The dialogue mentions that even a god standing at the end of loka cannot move about his hand inside aloka. This is because Earlier version of this article was presented in "Seminar on Jaina Philosophy and Modern Scientific Thought" (Poona University, 1979).

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4 STUDIES IN JAINISM there is no matter in aloka, whereas matter is essential for any movement. The Jaina concept is that things from loka cannot intrude into aloka simply because the latter is without matter. Later it was conceived that nothing from loka intrudes into aloka because the latter lacks dharma, i. e. the medium of motion, etc. Of course, dharma etc. are categorised under ajiva (non-living substance) which includes matter (pudgala). The concept of five extensive substances (i. e. Pancastikayas) or six substances (i. e, Saddravyas) is not traceable in the two oldest canonical texts, viz. Acaranga and Sutrakrtanga. The Bhagavati refers to the five extensive substances, viz. dharma, i. c. the medium of motion, adharma, i. e. the medium of rest, akasa, i. e. space, jivas, i. e. souls and pudgala, i. e. matter. It also refers to the six substances by adding addhasamaya (kala) i. c. time, which is not an extensive substance, to the above list. In fact the Bhagavati presents three different views with regard to the constitution of the universe : (1) Souls and matter constitute the universe. (2) Five extensive substances are the constituents of the universe. (3) Six substances form the universe. These are, so to say, the three stages of the growth of Jaina ontological ideas. It is evident from this account that in their search for the basic types of reals, Jaina thinkers must have started with souls and matter. In the course of time three additional concepts, viz. the medium of motion, the medium of rest and space were posited. The search came to an end only when the concept of time was added as the sixth. Of the six fundamental substances, the first five, viz. souls, matter, the medium of motion, the medium of rest and space are called astikayas, i. e. extensive substances, whereas the last substance, viz., time is regarded as a non-extensive substance. The Jaina meaning of extension is different from the sense in which material objects are many times said to be extensive. Material objects are divisible into parts or they themselves are parts from which a whole can be composed. But when the Jainas suggest that Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Jiva are extensive, they are not extensive in the above sense. Even if we can conceive

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SOME CONCEPTS IN JAINA ONTOLOGY of parts of space, parts of Jiva etc., they are not the parts which could be obtained by the physical division of space or jiva, or the parts from which space or jiva can be composed. Still we can conceive of space or jiva as made up of parts. And we can conceive of such minutest parts or units of which space or soul is conceived to be a composite whole. But since, like material bodies, space, jiva etc. have parts, they can be named as kaya (body). Thus, as souls etc. exist, they are called asti (Asti in Sanskrit means is or exists) and because like bodies (of animals etc.) they have many pradesas, i. e. minute parts or units, they are called kayas. Hence these five are called astikayas, i. e. extensive substances.' Time does not consist of such parts which may be conceived as existing together and constituting the coinposite whole called Time. Therefore it is not an extensive substance. What is exactly meant by a pradesa ? It is defined to be that part of space which is occupied by an indivisible atom of matter.10 Thus a pradesa is the space equal in extent to an indivisible material particle. Such pradesas are occupied not only by the material atoms but also by the minute parts of other substances. Just as the minute parts of space are called pradesas, the minute parts of a soul etc. that occupy such parts are also termed as pradesas. The material particles occupying pradesas of space are known as paramanus or anus (atoms ). The pradesas (i. e. the minutest parts) of any soul are inseparably associated with one another. The same thing applies to the pradesas of dharma, adharma and akasa. The material paramanus are not inseparably mixed up. They can be divided as well as united. Time consists of particle-like entities which are not associated with one another either separably or inseparably. Hence it is not an extensive substance. Each time-unit is, really speaking, an independent substance. Thus there are as many time-substances as there are time-units. As regards the exact definition of substance as such, the Acararga, the Sutrakstanga, the Bhagavati etc. are silent. It is the Uttaradhyayana that gives a clear definition of substance for the first time. It defines substance as the possessor of qualities (guna) and modes (paryaya). The distinction between qualities and modes is that qualities are possessed only by the substance,

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6 STUDIES IN JAINISM whereas modes are in both the substance and qualities.11 What are qualities and what are modes? Those characteristics which are always associated with a substance are qualities and those which are not always associated with it are modes. A substance possesses both. Thus that characteristic of a substance which distinguishes that substance from the other is called quality (guna) and that characteristic of a substance or a quality which distinguishes one modification of that substance or quality from another modification is called mode (paryaya). The Tattvarthasutra upholds the definition given by the Uttaradhyayana at one place12 but formulates another definition at another place.13 In one aphorism it maintains that a substance is possessed of qualities and modes, whereas in another aphorism it makes the substance identical with existent' or 'real' and then defines it as characterised by origination, destruction and permanence. Origination is the attainment of another mode by a substance by means of external and internal causes without giving up its essential characteristics. Similarly, the loss of the former mode is destruction. As there is no origination or annihilation of the inherent nature or essential quality of the substance, it is permanent. Thus, origination and destruction are nothing but the changing forms or modes of the existing or real substance and permanence is the same as the essential attributes or fundamental qualities of the same. Hence, a real (sat) or substance (dravya) is possessed of both change and permanence. Change means origination (utpada) and destruction (vyaya) of different modes (paryayas). Permanence (dravya) means indestructibility of the essential quality (guna).14 a It is evident from the above account that the tradition of discussing the nature of loka and aloka as well as soul and matter was comparatively old, that of discussing the nature of five extensive substances is comparatively recent and that of discussing the nature of six substances is comparatively more recent. It seems that the tradition of discussing the nature of 'real' in general is still more recent. This problem as such seems not to have been raised in the old canonical texts. The Uttaradhyayana hints at the problem and the Tattvarthasutra discusses it in a little detail and comes out with a well-formulated answer of which there is no trace in these old texts. The Bhagavati etc.

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SOME CONCEPTS IN JAINA ONTOLOGY have no doubt, the concepts of substance, mode, quality etc. but the Tattvarthasutra way of defining the real as characterised by origination, destruction and permanence is absent in them. The Tattvartha concept, i. e. Umasvati's concept of reality as the synthesis of permanence and change is further developed by Samantabhadra in his Aptamimaisa. He has a clear idea of the doctrine of non-absolutism that a thing must be characterised by two (apparently) mutually contradictory features at one and the same time. In order to justify this position he examines the following ontological pairs of contradictory features : (1) Existence and non-existence (2) Identity and difference (3) Permanence and change (4) Cause and effect (5) Substance and mode (6) Mental Existence and physical existence Samantabhadra first considers two one-sided views and then offers a synthesis of the two. This frame-work became the model for subsequent Jaina philosophers. References 1. Acaranga, 10, 136 etc. 2. Sutrakstanga, 1.4.6 3. Acarunga, 127 4. Bhagavati. (Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1918 ), P. 78 b 5. Ibid., p. 80 b 6. Ibid., p. 717 6 7. Ibid., 13.4 8. Ibid., 25.4 9. Dravyasangraha, 24 10. Ibid., 27 11. Uttaradhyayana, 28.6 12. Tattvarthasutra, 5.38 13. Ibid., 5.30 14. Ibid., 5.31

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY J. C. Sikdar Introduction Matter has been studied by every Indian Philosophy in its own manner. Bhutal of the Carvakas, Praksti? of the SamkhyaYoga, Jadadravya3 of the Nyaya-Vaibesikat and the Mimamsakas, Rupas of the Buddhists, Maya? of the sarkara-Vedanta, Acits of the Ramanuja-Vedanta and Pudgala' of Jaina philosophy are only the diverse views on this problem. The concept of matter can be traced back in bhutavada (Doctrine of elements of matter) which arose out of the Indian speculative thought on the objects of the senses. It is known that some thinkers, having kept the perceptible world in view, which came first of all in thought, accepted the nature of the world as endowed with five elements "pancabhutas', 10 or "pancadhatus'11 or "pancaskandhas' 12. On the basis of this postulation other thinkers began to make clarification of the nature of Acetanatattva or Ajivatattva (Non-sentient principle). Ksiti ( earth ), ap (water). tejas (fire), vayu (air) and akasa (ether) are called the five elements (of matter) (pancabhutas ). 13 They are also known as five aggregates (of matter) ( pancaskanEarlier version of this article was presented in "Seminar on Jaina Logic and Philosophy." (Poona University, 1975)

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY dhas )14. The words 'dhatu'15 and Kaya16 also are used in this sense. Later on the word 'dravya'17 was employed for this bhuta. There is no difference of opinion in regard to earth, water, fire and air, the four entities, as being tangible to the senses. Akasa18 was accepted unanimously by some schools of thought as the container of four entities. In this sense of realities the word bhuta' was used, i. e. these entities exist by themselves and are also real. Just as some tree stands on the base of its trunk, just so the structure of the material universe is standing on the foundation of these elements. Therefore, these elements are called skandhas19. The meaning of dhatu' is explained in this way : that which maintains and nourishes the universe is dhatu', just as vata (air). Pitta (bile) and kapha ( phlegm )20 are called 'dhatu' because of being the maintainer and nourisher of the body. The meaning of the word kaya 'is the organic body or figure. The aforesaid entities are called kayas21 (bodies) because of being of different shapes or figures. These entities are called dravyas22 ( Substances) on account of the continuity of their various tangible qualities and actions or modes in the womb of space and time. Similarly, such a doctrine that the universe is composed of five elements (pancabhautika) has cmerged with the development of Indian metaphysical thought. The reference to these five elements ( bhutas ) 23. earth, water, fire, air and akasa is found in the Upanisads, 24 the Buddhist Pitakas25 and the Jaina Agamas26. But the speculation for Acetanatattva went on more and more and it turned towards the subtle cause ible gross cause; the group of the advocates of the doctrine of five elements fell apart from that of the speculators of the finest cause of Acetanatattva. The first group of thinkers stopped there and began to establish the doctrine that there was nothing else except the five elements ( bhutas ). This view is known by the name of Barhaspatya. Lokayata or Carvaka?. One tradition, accepting the doctrine of four elements ( bhutas ) 28, without akasa, was also going on in the field of speculation on Acetanatattva in course of time. On the other side, those thinkers who were not satisfied with the thought of the elements apprehended by the senses began to speculate on the cause of these reals and their nature. In this way two currents of thought on the problem of Non-sentient principle arose. One group of thinkers started to find out the fundamental cause out of the

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10 STUDIES IN JAINISM material realities on the basis of inner feeling and thought, while another group began to think over the nature of the fundamental cause mainly on the ground of the sense-experience. The Samkhya and Brahmavadin views represent the first current of thought and the Nyaya-Vaisesika, Jaina and Buddhist philosophies represent, the second one. The Jaina system of thought, having accepted many real entities as the cause of the universe, speculates on the nature of Non-sentient principle and advocates the theory that Non-living substance (ajivadravya) is basically comprised of four extended reals, viz. Dharmastikaya (principle of motion ), Adharmastikaya (principle of rest ), Akasastikaya ( space) and Pudgalastikaya (matter). It is explained in Jaina philosophy that the universe (loka) is constituted of pancastikaya including Jivastikaya (soul). This doctrine of pancastikayas five extensive (reals) reminds one of the Buddhist concept of panaskandbas30 (five aggregates), viz. rupa (matter), Vedana (feeling), samina (ideas), samskaras (Volition and other faculties) and vijnana (pure sensation or general consciousness). Kala (time) has been accepted in Jaina philosophy as both paryaya31 (mode) and dravya (substance).32 of course, denying it the right of horizontal organic extension33, although it is entitled to being characterized as an extensive substance (astikayadravya 34. As the most visible form of Ajivadravya (Non-living substance) Pudgalastikaya (matter) exists in the universe in various forms, such as, carth, water, fire, air, shadow, objects of four senses, viz. senses of hearing, smell, taste and touch, physical mind, speech, bodies, etc. upto Karmic matter and Paramanu34x (ultimate atom). Pudgala is a tangible reality within the sensuous and supersensuous experiences in perceptible and imperceptible conditions. Its finest form is paramanu. The concept of pudgala preserved in the Jaina Agamas forms the basis of the physical science in Jainism in a nascent form. On it a superstructure of analysis of pudgala has been raised by Umasvati and other Jainacaryas in the post-agamic period and darsanakala (age of Indian philosophy) with a synthetic view of all other Indian concepts of matter on the basis of its existence in the universe as a permanent substance endowed with infinite qualities (gunas) and modes (paryayas)35 which can be studied in the light of many unique notions of matter as explained in the physical sciences.

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Etymology of puggala' or poggala,36 Skt. pudgala, has been dealt with by the Jainacaryas36x, Bauddhacaryas,37 different foreign37x and Indian scholars including Sri S. M. Shah38 of Poona University in their respective manners of scholarly approach to the problem. According to the concensus of opinions of all scholars the basic etymological meaning of puggala is that the substance which undergoes transformation or modification by the process of integration and disintegration39 is called puggala or poggala, Skt. Pudgala, although it still remains a problem to be solved, as it has been used in the sense of both matter and soul or empirical being in the Jaina tradition40 and soul or personality in the Buddhist tradition41 respectively. So the nature of puggala according to the accepted Jaina tradition, is to integrate and disintegrate42. On account of this nature the name 'puggala' or "poggala', Skt. pudgala, has been attributed to the permanent substance-matter in Jaina philosophy. This etymology of puggala denoting matter is rich in meaning when it is compared with the concept of matter in the physical sciences where it is conceived as the substance in the sense of stuff of which the material universe is constituted, undergoing changes by the process of integration and disintegration, 42x The concept of matter of the Jainas comes near to that of matter of the physical sciences in some respects. In Jaina philosophy matter is conceived as dravya ( substance) endowed with guna (quality) and paryaya (mode)43 and it is studied from the aspects of drayya (substance), Ksetra ( locus ), Kala (time) and bhava (condition) on the basis of the metaphysical speculation which runs parallel to the conception of matter as found in Western philosophy and modern physics in which matter is conceived as one of the ultimate principles or substances of which phenomena are manifestations. "The physical world consists of substances with qualities and relations'45. A substance is defined as "that which can only enter into a proposition as subject, never as predicate or relation. Metaphysically substances have generally been held to be indestructible":46. It is to be noted that the subject 'substance of Western philosophy corresponds to Dravya of Jajna metaphysics, the predicate and relation of the former to guna and paryaya ( quality and mode) of the latter respectively. According to Jaina philosophy matter is a permenant, non-living, extensive physical, corporeal and concrete, active, disintegrating and integrating and changeable substance47. It is infinite

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12 STUDIES IN JAINISM in number, co-extensive with the universe, possessed of the capa. city to be received by sou14s and to be of assistance to it.49 It is characterized by origination, decay and permanence without giving up its essential nature of existence.so In the Samkhya philosophy Prakrti50x represents the primordial Matter. Both Pudgala and Praksti are non-living, eternal infinite and all-pervading, undecaying and indestructible in nature. The latter is formless, unmanifest and undifferentiated; paramanu of the Jainas is also formless, so it can be compared with Praksti of the Samkhya in its unmanifest state. Prakrti is inapprehensible due to its fineness, just as paramanu of smoke, stone, water, and dew are intangible to the senses, though they exist, but it is apprehended by its effects, as cause is known by the effect, buddhi (intellect), etc.; buddhi ( intellect ), ahamkara ( ego ) five tanmatras infra-atomic potentials), cleven indriyas ( senses ), five gross elements (carth, etc.) are its effects; its effects are dissimilar and similar. 51 In the Buddhist philosophy Rupa'52 stands for matter. "The term 'Rupayatana' is reserved for visible matter or more precisely the phenomena of visibility alone, this being matter par excellence."'53 According to Yasomitra, the word "Rupa' has been formed for the sake of necessity in the sense of "that which is tormented by misery is called Rupa''54 Some again solve the problem of 'Rupa' by the derivation, "that which does not allow other to be produced in its place will be known as Rupas i. e. "space occupied by one of the material elements at the same time cannot be occupied by another."56 The Nyaya-Vaisesika conceived matter as intrinsically nonliving and essentially substantive eternal reality (dravya), having the characteristics of existentiality (astitva), knowability (jneyatva, self-identity (abhidheyatva) and inherent causa lity (svatmanyarambhakatva )s?, for " the existence of a thing and its knowable and predicable character are co-existent in nature''58. The most important aspect of its nature is its inherent causa lity, i. e. capability of producing an effect within itself as its cause (svatmanyarambhakatva), an individual character in each of its ultimate forms which are eternal (antyavisesavattva) and in its emergent aspect, incapability of being destroyed, as an effect, by the cause concerned (Karyakaranavirodhitva)''59.

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13 CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Nature of Matter A detailed analysis of the eleven characteristics of matter as conceived in Jaina metaphysics throws light upon its nature. It is stated in the Jaina Agama that matter is eternal and fixed constant in number; it was in the infinite eternal past samayas (instants), is at the eternal present samayas and will be in the infinite eternal future samayas60. On the basis of the agamic statement about the characteristics of matter Umasvati61 and other later Jainacaryas have dealt with this nature of eternality attributed to it in detail. Acaryapu jyapada explains it by maintaining that matter never loses its general characteristics of existence, etc. and particular characteristics like colour, etc., because these are indestructible characteristics like colour, etc., in it. It is fixed in number, for there does not take place any increase or decrease in its number, i. e. it remains constant62 The qualities-eternality and fixity in number exist together in all substances permanently. To be eternal is not to lose its nature of permanence-in-charge, i. e. that whose nature is not destroyed and that which is not destroyed by any means is eternal.63 "Since the fixed number is not violated, the substances remain fixed in number and do not at any time exceed fixed unit of six, so these are said to remain constant."64 i.e. they do not exceed or recede the fixed number of the individuals of the particular substance-class. Matter endowed with its quality and mode is eternal and fixed substance. Therefore, it will never be destroyed nor will be coverted into other substances.65 That is to say, matter will remain the same as it is; whatever material substance there was in the past, (that much) is at present and will be in the infinite future. So it is eternal and fixed in quantity from the point of view of dravya (substance). Matter which is non-living and by all means opposite to soul is devoid of sentiency and consciousness, while the characteristic of soul is consciousness.66 Hence matter is not living because of being devoid of consciousness, but it is nonliving, 67 In regard to the nature of its existence it is explained that matter is real.63 For astitva (existence ) is the only one allcomprising characteristic of the five extensive substances amongst their various characteristics.69 It is the nature of the substances. That is to say, this nature is accompanied by its qualities and

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14 STUDIES IN JAINISM variegated inodifications and origination, destruction and permanence for all times.70 So matter is traika likasti (existent in three points of time--past, present and future).71 Matter is rupin (corporeal)72, and murta (concrete or tangi ble)73. The auto-commentary of the Tattvarthadhigamasutra explains that rupa (corporeality) is murti (concreteness)74, while Siddhasena Ganin elucidates the point by stating that parinama (resultant effect or transformation) of the aggregation of colour, taste, smell, touch and shape is rupa.75 The things which have corporeality are the material objects.76 Matter is called rupin, i.e. murta (concrete) because of parinama produced by the collection of colour taste, smell, touch and shapes like triangular, rectangular, etc.77 It is defined that rupa-parinamin gunas (corporeality producing qualities ), viz. touch, taste, smell and colour, become forms of matter78, i. e. forms of matter are characterised by touch, taste, smell and colour. According to Siddhasena Garin, guna ( quality ) which is inherent in a substance but non-existent in other substances is called laksanaguna (essential quality) and that by which an object can be determined is characteristic of it.79 One object can only be distinguished from another by its laksanaguna. Matter only is rupin (corporeal), while other fundamental substances are arupin (non-carporeal). That which is rupin is murta. Murtitva (concreteness or tangibility) of matter is brought about by particular parinama (visistaparinama) of colour, taste, smell and touch80 Therefore, the thing which is rupin is pudgaladravya (material substance)81, no matter can be arupin, i. e. devoid of colour, taste, smell and touch82. Rupatva can never be apart from matter. That in which there is arupatva (non-corporeality) is not pudgala (matter )83. The samavaya (collection or inherence of colour, taste smell and touch is called rupatva. The aggregation of these four qualities is called rupatvaguna-samavaya of matter; colour or shape (vama or samsthana) alone is not called rupatva-guna. Wherever there is colour, there are certainly touch, taste and smel184. There is no such matter in which there can be found only three or any two or any one of them. None of them can be perceived to exist in other substances. These four-qualities must be present in all forms of matter whether atoms or molecules. They exist also in all conditions of it-tangible or intangible, manifest or unmanifest. Akalanka maintainins that samsthana (shape) also is one of the

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 15 characteristics of tangibility or corporeality of matter besides varna (colour), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and sparsa ( touch ). The meaning of samsthana is akrti or akara (shape or figure), it can be the product or effect of the disintegrating and integrating nature of matter.85 Matter is active.86 In Jaina philosophy - Sat' (Reality) is characterized by origination, decay and permanence87; it is the fundamental principle of the universe88. All substances are permanent by their respective inherent co-existing qualities, while they are origination-and-decay-like by their respective successive modes. The mode of a substance arising from internal and external causes, which is the cause of its motion, is called activity (Kriya)89. All entities are inactive from the point of view of quality. An entity can be called inactive by the prominence of the substantial stand-point and the non-prominence of the modal stand-point.90 All entities are active from the aspect of origination and decay of their modes. They are active by the prominence of the modal point of view and the non-prominence of substantial point of view.91 All substances are endowed with qualities and modes; therefore, they are inactive and active respectively. The permanence of quality can be called inactivity, while the origination and decay of mode are to be called activity (kriya). Modes of substance are infinite, so there are stated to be infinite divisions or conditions of activity. Both artha paryaya and vyanjanaparyaya91x take place in soul and matter92. There are two kinds of bhava (conditions), viz. parispandatmaka (vibrating) and aparispandatmaka (non-vibrating)93. It is explained that matter and soul are active " pudgalajivastu kriyavantah"94. Activity has been stated to be characterized by vibration or oscillation (parispandana). Vibration is the nature of matter; activity takes place in it due to this vibrating nature and it is capable of being active95 only by its capacity of vibration (parispandanasaktiguna). Therefore, it is active by its own capacity. In regard to the integrating and disintegrating nature of matter it has been pointed out that the name 'pudgala' is attributed to matter because of its nature of integration and disintegration.97 A name is given to a thing according to its nature and activity.98 Matter integrates and disintegrates, the first cause of it is paramanu (ultimate atom)99, i.e. paramanu is the ultimate,

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16 STUDIES IN JAINISM finest eternal cause and least part of pudgala. On account of their mutual touch or contact one paramanu sometimes integrates with another and being united, again it sometimes disintegrates from the skandha or combination in accordance with some rules and so on. This process of integration and disintegration of paramanus takes place due to the integrating and disintegrating nature of pudgala. Paramanus, being combined thus, transform themselves into the form of oneness. The name of this form of one state is called skandha (molecule).100 There takes place also the union of one skandha with another or more than one skandha like that of paramanu. On the division of the aggregate of paramanus, the disintegration occurs not only in the form of paramanus, but it may happen also only in the form of skandha and in the mixed form of skandha and paramanu. The dissociation of some paramanus can take place only on the division of a skandha. The remaining skandha may exist as they are. There can be the union of one or more paramanus with skandhas. The ultimate capacity and multifariousness of matter are generated by its integrating and disintegrating nature. As to the changing nature of matter it is explained in Jaina philosophy that matter undergoes both adimat and anadiparinamas (transformation with a beginning and without a beginning)101. Its adimat parinamas are found in the transformation of its colour, taste, smell, touch, shape, union, division, motion, sound and neither-heaviness-nor-lightness, 102 while its anadiparinamas are experienced in its dravyatva (substantiality), murtatva (corporeality or tangibility), sattva (existentiality), etc.103 Matter is infinite in number of quantity from the points of view of dravya (substance), ksetra (locus), kala (time) and bhava (condition)104. That to say, it is infinite in number whether it is in the form of paramanu or skandha. Matter is equal to the extent of the universe (Lokapramana) from the point of view of ksetra (locus)105, i.e. it is co-extensive with the universe as it exists only in the space of the universe (loka). The forms of matter occupy one point of space onwards106. Acarya Kundakunda explains this problem by stating that the universe is densely filled with several varieties of infinitefold infinite forms of matter of subtle and gross nature in all directions 107. The auto-commentary of the Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, while interpreting the Sutra

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 66 Ekapradesadisu bhajyah pudgalanam makes it clear that the accommodation (or immersion) of partless forms of matter and matters having countable, countless and infinite parts (i.e. units of atoms) is in one point of space, that of binary compound or dyad (dvipradesika or dvyanuka) in one and two points of space, that of tertiary compound (tripradesika) in one, two and three points of space and so on upto those matters having countable, countless points of space of the universe108, Similarly, molecules (skandhas) formed of numerable, innumerable and infinite atoms are accommodated in one, countable and countless points of space of the universe109 by their capacity of contraction or of becoming subtle, just as the lights from several lamps intermingle. 110 17 99 As to the point of nature that matter is jivagrahya (receivable by soul) it is explained in the Agama that matter is endowed with the attribute of attraction or reception from the stand-point of quality.111 On the basis of the agamic statement Umasvati defines the point in this way that the individual self attracts particles of matter which are fit to turn into karma as the self is actuated by passions. This is bondage112. There is no capacity in matter to attract soul, but there is only the quality in it to be received by soul, it is the soul which receives matter by attracting it and thus attains bondage with it. All souls do not receive matter; only the wordly souls receive matter which is capable of turning into Karmic matter because of the nature of being associated with the transformation tinged with passions. Just as the digestive fire of the stomach (gastric fluid or juice) absorbs food suitable to it, so also the self attracts karmas of duration and fruition corresponding to the virulent, mild or moderate nature of passions.112 Function of Matter The function of matter is to form the basis of the body and the organs of speech and mind, and respiration113. That is, soul attracts further matters fit to turn into karmic matter by the association of forms of matter like mind, speech, and body. In other words, soul, having attracted forms of matter and attained bondage with the received matters, transforms those matters in the form of mind, speech and body and again it J-2

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18 STUDIES IN JAINISM attracts more forms of matters fit to turn into karmic matter by the contact of matters transformed by mental. vocal and bodily activities. Matters which are only capable of transformation into karmic matter are received or attracted by soul114 but all forms of matter are not receivable to it. Matter in the form of paramanu cannot be attracted by soul nor can it be received in all kinds of molecular conditions. Thus matter, being transformed into the forms of body, speech, mind and respiration, comes in the service of soul11s. Similarlay, the function of matter is also to contribute to pleasure, suffering, life and death of the living beings116. That is to say, matters render service to the worldly souls by four means as upagraha (contributions), viz. pleasure, pain, life and death, having undergone transformation as body, speech, mind and respiration. "Owing to the presence of the internal cause of karma, which produce the feelings of delight and anguish, and in consequence of the ripening of external causes, such as, objects; the disposition of agreeableness or affliction is pleasure or pain. The continuance of respiration in a being owing to the presence of the age-determining karma is called living (or life ). The cutting off or destruction of respiration is death. Matter renders help to soul in these respects, for these arises in the presence of material causes117. All these modes like pleasure, pain, etc. in soul are produced by matter as material functions towards it. Souls and forms of matter exist in the universe as being mutually bound, touched, immersed and tied to onc cach other by attraction and getting mixed up like a jar and water or a sunken boat and water in a fake118 or intermingled with cach other like milk and water119. Elements of Matter According to Jaina Philosophy 'pudgala' represents the elements of matter. Earth, water, fire, air, shadow, objects of four senses, besides, that of sight, sense-organs, physical mind, karmapudgala and paramanu120 are in general the elements of matter. They constitute the material universe in the forms of molecules and atoms - grossest and finest forms. Earth, water, fire and air121 have been accepted by all other Indian systems of thought as the basic elements which constitute the material universe. So there appears to be a close relationship of the stru

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 19: cture of elements of matter of Jaina philosophy with those of other Indian systems of thought. The Jaina concept of matter, when compared with that of hyle or ylem 122 of Greek Philosophy shows that originally the name elementary particle' was applied to the four elements only fire, earth, air and water. The Jaina conception of elements of matter appears to be unique for it has given place to indriyas ( senses )123, karmic matter, 124 and lesya (condition of soul) 123 also as the material elements in its fold on the basis of psycho-physical aspects of the material universe. The study of the order of elements of matter reveals that Jaina philosphy commenced with the conception of grossest from of matter and went deep into that of its finest form the subtile force by stages in dealing with the problem like general metaphysics and physics of the west. Some common elements of matter of earth science are found in Jaina physics and mod physical sciences, such as silicon, sulphur, iron, copper, tin, lead, silver, gold, etc. 126 It shows that like the alchemists of the middle ages the Jainacaryas also conceived the idea of pure elements of matter as distinguished from its base forms, based on the knowledge of their experimental study of making gold, silver, etc. 127 Properties of Matter Properties of matter are the characteristic qualities. According to Jaina metaphysics, matter is endowed with specific chracters of two kinds : (1) those which are inherent in paramanus and skandhas and (2) those which are found only in skandhas, matter is characterized by colour, taste, odour and touch from ten points of view of bhava 123 ( condition). They are inh in paramanus as well as skandhas as specific properties.129 In addition to them a skandha having two upto infinitefold infinite pradesas (units of matter is possessed of the physical characters, mutual attraction ( snigdhatva ) and repulsion (ruksatva )130, fineness and grossnes $131, shape and figure 132, divisibility133, opacity and casting of shadows134, and heat and light-energy133. They appear, of course, as the manifestations of matter in Jaina philosophy. In the philosophies like Vaisesika, etc. the corporeal substances, viz. earth, water, fire and air have not been accepted as equally endowed with the four specific characters as mentioned in Jaina philosophy, but it has been

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20 STUDIES IN JAINISM admitted that earth is possessed of these four qualities; water is possessed of three qualities without smell; fire is possessed of two qualities- colour and touch without smell and taste, and air is possessed of touch only136. Like this they have not accepted the above-mentioned four qualities as inherent in mind as conceived in Jain philosophy137. It is to be noted that the four qualities --- colour, etc., have also been accepted as the properties of matter in the physical sciences137x. The property of impenetrability137 y of the effects of matter is the common property of it according to all metaphysics and physical sciences. Motion of Matter (pudgala-gati ) and its oscillation (Parispandana): Motion (gati )138 is the intrinsic property of matter conceived in Jaina philosophy. Parispandana (oscillation)139 of pudgala of the Jainas is the common property of matter according to the Samkhya140 Nyaya-Vaibesika141 and Vedanta142 philosophies Parispandana represents the oscillation143 of elastic bodies of the physical sciences, while pudgalagati corresponds to the motion144 of matter of the physical sciences. Pudgalagati is defined as that action which causes the movement of paramanupudgalas up to that of skandha having anantananta pradesas145. The basic difference between the Jaina and Nyaya-Vaisesika concepts of motion of matter lies in the fact that in the former's view motion in paramanu and skandha is an intrinsic capacity, while according to the latter, it is not an intrinsic capacity in paramanu, but it is caused by adesta (unseen force) in the case of creative motion, and produced by the effect of violent shaking of a body or impact in the case of noncreative motion146. The Jaina concept of motion of matter reveals that dead matter begins where liberation ceases; science cannot procure it. All the matter known to us is dynamic or living matter in its own way. Effects and Manifestation of Matter : Matter exists in space by occupying some volume in perceptible and imperceptible conditions in various forms. Its effects appear as earth, water, fire, air and vegetation147, body, speech, mind and respiration148, while its manifestations are found as sound, combination, fineness, grossness, shape, division, darkness, shadow, heat and light149, etc. Earth, water, fire, air and vegetation are also accepted as the effects of matter in the physical sciences 150.

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 21 Besides the bodies of mobile beings, organs of speech, 1504, mind 150y and respiration151 are regarded as meterial in mataphysics and physical sciences. Paramanu (Ultimate Atom) : Jaina philosophy has conceived atomism on the basis of destruction and origination of the material world from the stand point of transformation taking place in it due to external and internal causes and made an analysis of it from the aspects of dravya ( substance ), ksetra (locus), kala (time) and bhava ( condition ).152 Paramanus are infinite in number with regard to dravya, it is the finest particle of matter with regard to ksetra, it is momentary from the point of view of kala and its quality is changing from the stand point of bhava ( condition )153. Paramanu is both cause (karana ) and effect ( karya )154 of the material world from the point of view of transformation, not only the ultimate material cause of it (tadantyam karanam ) like paramanu of the Nyaya-Vaisesika155. A paramanu is abhedya ( impassable ), acchedya ( uncuttable ), avibhajya (indivisible) adahya ( incombustible ), and agrahya (non-receivable by soul).156 It is anardha ( without half part) amadhya ( without inner part) and apradesa (partless ) from the point of view of ksetra157. It is itself beginning, it is itself middle, it is itself end158 Paramanus of Jaina philosophy are of one class only152. Paramanu can aasume any form in accordance with the causal condition. The paramanu which has undergone change in to the form of earth can undergo transformation in to the forms of water, fire, etc. on the alteration of the materials160. The capacities-colour, taste, smell and touch, exist as equal in each and every paramanu and can change in to any form according to the cause161. Even though they are equal in all paramanus, the variousness of their tranformation occurs because of the difference of materials. Skandha formed by the combination of paramanus is not a new material substance, it is only one particular form out of the combination of Paramanus. All paramanus are parmanent in their respective individual nature and their parinaminityata (permanence-in-change) is explained by accepting skandha (molecule), guna (quality) and paryaya (mode)161x as a result of transformation of paramanus162. Thus skandha is accepted as somehow non-different as well as different from them. Infinite paramanus and infinite skandhas

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22 STUDIES IN JAINISM also can exist in a subtle form in one space-point, in which one paramanu exists, by virtue of their capacity of contraction (sam koca)163. All gross and fine material entities are explained on the basis of the capacity of transformation of paramanus and their combination and dissociation263x. In the Samkhya-yoga philosophy paramanu is conceived as a produced entity evolved out of tanmatra (infra-atomic potential) 164, so it is divisible165, the Nyaya-Vaisesika conceives the indivisibility of paramanu166, while the Buddhists867 maintain the divisibility of paramanu (i. e. Samghataparamanu) which consists of, at least, eight parts of elements (astadrvyaka)168. The Vaisesika phliosophy stops by conceiving paramanu as the sixth division of rajakana (mote) in the sunrays169, whereas the Jainas accept one paramanu also as skandha170Jaina philosophy is the advocate of atomism like the Nyaya-Vaisesika. Nevertheless, the nature of paramanu conceived in this school of thought is not identical with that of the latter. But it compares well with the nature of Prakrti of the samkhya, for paramanus of Jaina metaphysics is transformable like praksti. On this ground paramanu of the Jainas changes into many forms like earth, water, fire, etc., just as praksti is the material cause of many effects like earth, water, fire, air, etc. It is to be noted that paramanu of the Jainas is finer than that of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, but it is unmanifest like Prakrti of the samkhya. Ananta paramanuvada of Jaina philosophy is nearer to the doctrine of infinite plurality of Praksti of the early Samkhya170x (with regard to the plurality of purusa), i. e. "cach being attached to a different purusa170y (self)." Transformation of Matter (Pudgalaparinama): Transformation takes place in Pudgala Dravya (Material substance) due to external and internal causes171. Dravya paramanu (material atom) undergoes transformation as a result of internal causes and external influences172. The properties in paramanu are changing from moment to moment, e. g. transformation of its rupasakti (varnaparinama), etc173. Visistaparinama174 (particular transformation) is taking place in it, e. g. ekagunakaJakaparinama, dvigunakalakaparinama, etc. (transformation of onefold black colour, twofold black colour, etc.). Agurulaghuparinama175 of pudgala (transformation of quality of neither heaviness nor lightness of matter) is the general transformation

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ::23 taking place in all substances, i. e. there occur the decrease and increase of this quality in them. Pudgala becomes of one form (egaruva)176 by the process of transformation like the energy of matter of the physical sciences. Besides, the Jaina theory of tranformation of matter brought about by the process of integration, disintegration and integration-cum-disintegration compares well with the principle of chemical behaviour of atoms and molecules as laid down in the physical sciences. "Molecules can sometimes interchange atoms and form new substances and molecules already formed can sometimes dissociate again into separate atoms":178 Combination of Particles of Matter : The combination of particles of matter takes place as a result of the chemical behaviour of the properties of matter of unequal degree, viz. (1) Snigdhatva (cohesiveness or attractive force), (2) ruksatva (dryness or repulsive force) and (3) Snigdhatvaruksatva179 (i. e. attractive-cum-repulsive force), which are inherent in both paramanus and skandhas having two up to infinitefold infinite pradesas. Two paramanus combine together into a skandha because of their possession of the property of snehakayatva (cohesiveness)180. Skandhas also integrate, and disintegrate also into two, three units181, etc. Actually this rocess of their combination and dissociation takes place by virtue of the properties of cohesiveness and dryness- attractive and repulsive forces which are associated with them.181x The Jaina view of the interactions between paramanus which give rise to the existence and behaviour of matter in bulk bears some points of similarity with that of the physical sciences, regarding interatomic forces and the combination of atoms. "Every atom exerts a force upon every other atom. Thus there will be a tendency for atoms because of their force of attraction (i. e. snehakayatva of the Jainas) to draw together and stick"182. CONCLUSION A comparative study of the Jaina concept of matter with those of the Samkhya, Bauddha and Nyaya-Vaisesika Schools of thought reveals that according to the Samkhya there is Prakstitatva among many successive changes ever existing and all-pervading; again, however, it is itself attaining also other states in accor

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24 STUDIES IN JAINISM dance with the changes. Of course it is formless, unmanifest and undifferentiated like atom (paramanu) of Jaina metaphysics in its unmanifest states. The Nyaya-Vaisesika maintains the view that when newer and newer effects like substances, etc. get produced, then an atom (paramanu) as the basis of these effects exists as Kutasthanitya (absolutely permanent) without any kind of change. According to Jaina metaphysics also, an atom too is the basis of newer and newer material effects. Nevertheless, atoms are not by any means different and independent from the effects like those of the NyayaVaisesika. But there is one point which is the same in the Samkhya, Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina systems of thought that the individuality or self-identity of the fundamental substance is to remain as whole or non-divisible (akhanda). As, according to the Samkhya view, the identity of Prakstitattva exists as whole or non-divisible from the points of view of all-pervasive substratum, just so the infinitefold infinite atoms, exist as permanent, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina concepts of matter. The Buddhists Philosophy calls the universe rupatmaka (material). Rupa does not connote only the meaning 'perception' to the eye, but it calls all the bhutabhautikatattvas (primary and secondary elements of matter) by this term which can be apprehended by the se ception. Like the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina schools of thought the Buddhist philosophy also, keeping in view the perceptible gross matter, inaterial effects like tastes, etc., as prominent, was engaged in consideration of its cause. It also has admitted the doctrine of similarity in the postulation of causality (Karyakarana), i. e. as there is an effect, so there is a cause. If the material effect is perceptible to the senses of taste, etc., then its fine, finer and finest (i.e. intangible) ultimate cause also is as such, that is to say, it can be only as rupa (colour and shape), rasa (taste), gandha (smell), sparsa (touch), etc. According to this consideration the Buddhist philosophy has made a reference to all gross, and fine elements of matter of the universe by using the word 'Rupa'. But there is a gulf of difference between the Buddhist concept of Rupa and the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina Concepts of Rupa. The Buddhist tradition also is anu-paramanuvadin (advocate of atomism) like the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina systems of thought. Nevertheless, its postulation on

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 25 the concept of matter appears to be distinct from Prakrtivada of the Samkhya on the one hand and the concept of eternal and infinite ultimate atoms (anantaparamanuvada) of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina schools of thought on the other. The Buddhist philosophy is the advocate of manifoldness (or multiplicity) of elements of Matter, but it does not admit the conception of permanence of an entity. It advocates that the constitution of reality is always subject to change or being changed. It does not accept a change in entities under the influence of an independent reality called time, but it calls the series of momentary changes due to the intrinsic nature of an entity as time. By this method, like the Samkhya and Jaina systems of thought, it does not admit any reality as ever existing (i.e. permanent) in the current of the would-be newer and newer changes at every moment, but it accepts ever dynamic momentary changes. This analysis of the concept of matter in Jaina philosophy shows how the problem was dealt with by the Jainacaryas with a synthetic view of all other Indian concepts of matter in the absence of scientific verifying data of modern science about matter which exists in space and continues in time with its static and dynamic forces in the cosmic universe. REFERENCES 1. Tattvopaplavasinha, P. I., Jayarasi, ed. by Pandit Sukhlalji, published by Gaekawad Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1940. 2. Samkhyakarika, Isvarakrsna, 8, 10, 11 3. Vai esika Sutra, Kanada, 1.1.5. 4. Prasastapadabhaaya, p. 16; Nyayakandali, sridhara, etc. 5. Prabhakara mimarsa, pp. 35 ff. 6. Abhidharmakosa, Vasubandhu, Kosa, 1. 24. 7. Sankarabhagya on Brahmasutra 1. 43. 8. Sribhasya, Ramanuja, on 1. 43. 9. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118. Published by Agamodaya, Samiti, Bombay, 1918-21. 9x. Svetasvatara Upani ad, 1.2. 10. Ibid. 11. Dighanikaya, Samannaphalasutta, the view of Ajitakesakambali. 12. Sutrakrtanga, 1.1.17-18 with Tika of Silanka, Agamodaya samiti. Mehsana, 1917.

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STUDIES IN JAINISM 13. Svetasvatara Upanisad. 1.2. 14. Sutrakstanga 1.1.17-18. 15. Abhidharmakosa, 1.20. It seems that "Dhatu has been borrowed from medical science where it means elements of body". 16. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 33.1.44 Pud havikaya, apakaya, etc. 17. Vaisesika Sutra 1.1.5., Kanada. 18. Akasa has been accepted as space container of all other substances by the Jainas (See Tattvartha Rajavartika, Akalanka, p. 434) and the Vaibhasikas respectively, (See Abhidharmakosa, Vasubandhu, K. 1, Karika 5, Sphutartha). 19. Abhidharmakosa, commentary on K. 1.2. 20. Carakasamhita, sarirasthana. 21. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, Sataka 24, Uddesaka 2-16, Sutras 702-707 22. Vaisesika, 1.1.5, 23. Nyayamanjari Pt. II. p. 3, Jayanta Bhatta. 24. Svetasvatara Upanisad 1.2. 25. Dighanikaya, Samannaphalasutta; see the view of Ajitakesakambali. 26. Sutrakrtanga 1.1.17. 27. Dighanikaya, Samannaphalasutta; Tattvopaplavasimha, p. 1. 28. Tattvopaplavasimha, p. 1. 29. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118; 7.10.305; 13.4.481. 30. The Central Conception of Buddhism, Prof. Stcherbatsky, p. 23; Visuddihimagga, 4.33; Sariyuttanikaya III. 16: Introduction to Ganadharavada, p. 82. 31. Avasyaka curni, Jinadasa Ganin, Ratlam edition, p. 340. 32. Ibid, p. 341; See Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 25.4.734; 2.10.121; 13.4.482; Anuyogadvarasutta 324; Dravyagunaparya yano Rasa Yasovijaji, p. 235 Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, Umasvati IV. 15; V. 38; V. 22, 39; Prayacanasara, Kundakunda; Sarvarthasiddhi, Pujyapada, Rajavartika, Akalanka; Slokavartika, Vidyananda; See Fifth chapter of their works; Dravya Samgraha of Nemicandra. 33. Dravya-guna-paryayano Rasa, Upadhyaya Yasovijayaji Dhala 10, 16, p. 242. 34. Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, p. 434. 35. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 5.8.221, 2.1.90. 36. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 5.8.221.; Tattvarthadhigamasutra V.1. 36x. Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, Tika by Siddhasena Ganin on V.1. P. 316. Tattvartha Rajavartika, Akalanka V. 19., Tika.; Ibid; Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti Vrtti, Vol. III, pp. 776ff Agamodaya Samiti Prakasana; Tiloyapannatti, Yati Vrsabha, Pt I, ch. 1, V. 99.. 37. Visuddhimagga 310, Buddhaghosa,

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 27 37x. Prof. P. Desco, Sanskrit Pudgala, body, soul, Journal of American Oriental Society, Vol. 67, pp. 172-77; Prof. Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, Vol. II, Delhi, 1970, p. 347; Prof. T. Burrow and Prof. M. B. Emen cau Dravidian Etymological Dictionary, Oxford, 1961, word No. 3494, p. 283. 38. Dr. S. M. Shah, Lecturerin Prakrit, Poona University "On the Etymology of Pudgala or poggala", Sambodhi, Vol. 4, Nos 3-4, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 380 009, pp. 11-16. 39. Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, Umasvati, p. 316. 40. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 20.2.664. 41. Tattvasarigraha 336, Santaraksita, Gaekwad's Oriental Series. 42. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, commentary on 20.2.664, etc. 42x. Cosmology, Old and New, Prof. G.R. Jain, pp. 58-64; See also Physics S. C. Roychandhury and P. B. Sinha, p. 2 43. Bhagavati vyakhyaprainapti. 2.10.18.: Anuyoga dvara Sutra 4.1211 Uttaradhyayana Sutra, adhyayana 28, V. 6. 44. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118. 45. Analysis of Matter, Bertrand Russell, pp. 243-4. 46. Ibid., p. 238. 47. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118; Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, Umasvati, V. 1,2, 3, 4, 6,; Dravyasamgraha 15, Nemicandra. 48. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2. 10.118; Tattvarthadhigamasutra, 8.2., Umasvati. 49. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 20, p. 343. 50. Pancastikayasara, II. 3; Kundakunda. 50x. Sarkhyakarika, fsvaraks na, Ka. 8, 10, 11 51. Ibid. 52. Abhidharmakosa, Vasubandhu, K. 1.24. 53. The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 9, Prof. Stcherbatsky. 54. Ibid., p. 9., Abhidharmakosa, K. 1, 13, Sphutartha, p. 38 55. Abhidharmakosa, K. 1.13, Sphutartha, p. 39. 56. Ibid., II. 22, Sphutartha, p. 37. 57. (dravya) Prasastapada, p. 20; (astitva) Vaisesikasutra II. 11. 25; Nyayakandali, Sridhara, p. 16. (Jneyatva and abhidheyatva), Prasastapada, p. 16. (Svatmanyarambha. katva), Ibid. 58. The Conception of Matter According to the Nyayavaieesika, Dr. U. C. Misra p. 58. 9. Ibid., p. 58. Vaisesikasutra 1.1.9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; Prasastapada. bhasya, p. 20; Nyayakandali, p. 21. 60. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 1.4.42. 61. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 3.

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28 STUDIES IN JAINISM 62. Sarvarthasiddhi, Pujyapada, p. 270. 63. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 30. 64. Sarvarthasiddhi, pp. 270-71. 65. Tattvarthadhigamas@tra Bhasya Tika, p. 323. 66. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118. 67. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Bhasya Tika, p. 315. 68. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118 (Com.) 69. Pravacanasara, II. 5, p. 130, Kundakunda. 69x.. Ibid, p. 127, pradipika. 70. Pravacanasara II, 4, p. 126 71. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118 (Com). 72. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118; 13.4. 481: Tattvarthadigamasutra V. 4, Its Bhasya, p. 322. 73. Tattvartha Rajavartika, Akalanka, V.5. 1, p. 441. 74. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Bhagya, V.4, p. 322. 75. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Bhasya, Tika, p. 323. 76. Tattvartha Rajavartika, p. 444. 77. Tattvartha Rajavartika, p. 444. 78. Tatvarthadhigamasutra V. 23, p. 355; Bhasya, p. 355. 79. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, II. 8, p. 149. 80. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Bhasya, Tika. V. 3, p. 324. 81. TS. Bbasya, p. 325. 82. TS. Bhasya sika, V. 4, p. 325. 83. Ibid., p. 324. 84. Ibid, p. 323. 85. Tattvartha Rajavartika, Ch. V. 5, 2, p. 444. 86. Tattvarthadhigamasutra. y. 6, p. 326. 87. Ibid., V. 29, p. 374. 88. Ibid., p. 327. 89. Sarvarthasiddhi, Pujyapada, p. 272. 90. Tattvartha Rajavartika, p. 449. 91. Ibid., p. 449. 91x.. Arthaparyaya signifies those minute or subtle divisions in a series of changes, which are or appear to be indivisible; no name can be attributed to it, while Vyanjanaparyaya indicates a series of changes which has such similarity to allow it to be stated by a name. Sanmatitarka, Ill, 34, p. 440 92. Pravacanasara, PV, II, 37, p. 182. 93. Tattvartha Rajavartika, y. 22, 31, p. 481. 94. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Bha ya, V. 6, p. 326. 95. Pravacanasara, II.37, Pradipika Vstti, p. 182.

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 96. Tattvartha Slokavartika, Vidyananda, V.7.29, p. 398. 97. Tattvartha Rajavartika, p. 474. 98. Srutasagaravrtti, Vide Jaina padarthavijnanamen pudgala, Mohanlal Vathia, p. 25. 99. Arya, Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Bhasya, p. 365. 100. Tattvartha Rajavartika, V. 25.16, p. 493. 101. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 42, p. 438. 102. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 8.10.355; Prajnapanasutra, Parinamapada, 13, Tattvarthadhigamasutra, p. 439. 103. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Tika, p. 439. 104. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118; Ibid., 5.8.221. 105. Ibid., 2.10.118. 106. Tattvarthadhigamasutra V.14, p. 333. 107. Pancastikayasara, 70. 108. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Bharya, V. 14, p. 333. 109. Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 279. 110. Ibid. 29 111. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118 112. Sarvarthasiddhi, pp. 376-7. 113. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 19, p. 341. 114. Ibid., VIII. 2. 115. Sarvarthasiddhi, pp. 285-8. 116. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 20. p. 343. 117. Sarvarthasiddhi, pp. 288-9. 118. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 1.6.56. 119. Sanmatitarka, Siddhasena Divakar I. V. 47, edited by Pandit Sukhlaji and Pandit Bechardasji. 120. Satkhandagama, Vol. III, p. 3.; Pancastikayasara 83, p. 81; Gommatasara (Jivakanda), Nemicandra, V. 602. 121. Samannaphalasutta,Dighanikaya, Ajitakesakambali's view; Sutrakrtanga 1.1.17-18; Svetasvatara Upanisad 1.2; Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 2.4.12; Vise savasyakabhasya, gatha, 15531; Nyayamanjari, Jayanta Bhatta, Vijayanagaram series, p. 472; Tattvopaplavasimha, Jayarashi, p. 1., Tattvasamgrahapanjika, p. 205; Sutrakrtanganiryukti, gatha 30, Ganadharavada, Gujarat Vidyasabhaprakasan-the doubt of the third ganadhara Vayubhuti, p. 501; Majjimanikaya, II, Culamalunkiya Sutta for avyakrtaprasna, etc. 122. Atoms and the universe, Ch. VI, Matter and its properties, pp. 126-149, G. O. Jones, J. Rotblat and Whitrow; A History of Greek Philosophy, W. K. Guthrie, Vol. III, p. 141.

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STUDIES IN JAINISM 123. Bhagavati. Vyakhyaprajnapti, 1.7.61; Tattvarthadhigamasutra; Ch. II. 15. 124. Satkhandagama, Vol. III, p. 3; Pancastikayasara, 83, Gommatasara (Jiva), 602; Bhagavati Vyakhya prajnapti, 1.2.22. 125. Pancastikayasara 89; Uttaradhyayanasutra (Lesy&). 126. General Chemistry; pauling. 127. Suvarna-Raupya-Siddhi-sastra, Jinadatta suri, V. S. 1210 128. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 2.10.118: Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V.23, p. 355. 129. Ibid. 130. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 24, p. 356. 131. Ibid. 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. 134. Ibid. 135. Ibid. 136. Vaisesikasutra, II. 1. 1, 2, 3, 4. 137. Sarvarthasiddhi V. 3 (Com). 137x., General Chemistry, Pauling, pp. 12-13. 138. Pannavanasutta, 16.474. 139. Tattvartha Rajavartika, V. 22.21. 140. Tattvakaumudi 10, Vacaspati Misra 141. Nyayakusumanjali, Stavaka V. Udayana. Raghunath (Anavarataparispandamanaparimita-pavanadiparamanavah) 142. "Sarvalokaparispandanam, Sankarabbasya on V rahmasutra vide posi tive sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 121, 143. Physical Sciences. 144. Ibid. 145. Pannavana Sutta, 16. 474. 146. Nyayakusumanjali Bodhini, p. 91, Varadaraja, Vide Nyayavaise ika Metaphysics, Dr. Sadananda Bhaduri, p. 147. 147. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 24.12-21.702-777 ff; 25.4.739; Gomma tasara, Jivakanda, 182. 148. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, y. 19, p. 34). 149. Ibid., v. 24, p. 356. 150. Intermediate physics, S. C. Ray Chaudhury and D. B. Sinha, p. 2. 150x. Physiology, p. 82, Dr. V. N. Bhave; Intermediate physics, p. 571. 150y. The principle of Psychology, William James, pp. 145 ff. 151. Human Anatomy, Henry Gray, p. 1016. 152. Bhagavati Vyukhyaprajnapti, 25.4.740; 20.5.670, etc. 153. lbid. 154. Tattvarthadhigama Sutra V. 26-27. See its Bhasya and Tika; Commentary on the Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 14.4.510; Ta'tvartha Rajavartika, pp. 491-92. 155. Vaise ikadarsana IV. 1.1-2; Nyayavartika, Udyotakara IV. 1.21.

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 31 156. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 20.5. 670. 157. Ibid., 5.7.215; 20.5.670. 158. Tattvartha Rajavartika, Part II; Ch. V. 25; See its commentary, No. 1, p. 491. 159. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Pt. 1, p. 324. 160. Ibid. 161. Ibid., V. 25, Bha ya, p. 365. 161x., Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 5.7.213; 14.4.510-11; Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Pt. I, y. 26-27. 162. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 1.9.73; 8.10.356; 25.4.730. Tattvartha dhigamasutra, Pt. 1, p. 324. 163. Paramanukhandasattrimsika, Ratnasimhasuri,p. 2.; Sarvarthasiddhi Ch. V. 14 ((Com) 163x., Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Pt. I, P. 324. 164. Samkhya Pravacanabhasya, Vijnanabhiksu, Ch. 1. Sutra-62; Tattvakaumudi of Vacaspati Misra, p. 174. 165. Yogasutra of Patanjali, Pada II, Sutra 52, see Vyasabha ya on it, p. 174; Tattvakaumudi, Vacaspati Misra on it, p. 174. 166. Vaisesikasutra, IV. 1,1, II. 1.12. 167. Abhidharmakosa, Tibetan text, p. 83, vide the Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 12. published by Sushil Gupta, Calcutta, 1961. 168. Abhidharmakosa, II. 22, Published by Kashi Vidyapith 169. Nyayavartika, Udyotakara, p. 647. 170. Anuyogadvarasutra, 133, p. 160; Jambudvipaprajnapti III. 19, p. 92; Lokaprakasa Vinayavijaji, Pt. I, Sarga 1, Sloka, 21, p. 5. 170x. Ses Darsana and Chintana, Pandit Sukhlaji, pp. 129-30, Vide, Jaina dharma and Darsana. 170y. Yuktidipika, p. 169, Samkhya Karikavitti, Calcutta, Sanskrit Series, 1938. Vide Avidya, Dr. E. Solomon, p. 46. 171. Prayogi-Visrasaparinama, Tattvartha Rajavartika, V. 22.10. 172. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 5.7.213. Tattvarthadigamasutra, Pt. 1, p. 437. 173. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti 8.10.355-56; Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, p. 324; p. 364. 174. Tathvarthadhigama Sutra, Bhasya Tika on v. 3. p. 324. 175. Pannavana Sutra, 13.417. 176. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 1.10.80. 177. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 26. p. 366. 178. Atons and the Universe, p. 132, Jones G. O., Rotblat, J. and Whitrowe. 179. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti, 8.9. 395; Prajiapana Sutra, Parvarddha, Pada 13, Sutra 185, p. 287. Bandhasattrimsika, Vanararsi, p. 10; Tattvarthadhigamasutra; V. 32. p. 420. 180. Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti. 1.10.80. 181. Ibid. 181x. Tattvartha Jhigamasutra, pt. I, V. 32, p. 420. 182. Atoms and the Universe, p. 126.

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32 DISCUSSION T. G. Kalghatgi : Is Dr. Sikdar talking about Skandhas in Buddhistic or in nonBuddhistic sense? Secondly, Democritian atoms having merely quantitative distinctions are closer to jaina atoms as against Vaisesika atoms. Thirdly, he argues that integration and disintegration of Pudgala is due to its own nature. Does this contention involve a reference to the jaina concept of Dharma or is it merely an attempt to clarify a term? Lastly, it would be helpful if Dr. Sikdar explains the distinction between Dravya and Astikaya, for although Astitva is common to both, time has no Kayatva even if space has. This is what is brought out in modern termonology saying that while space is multidimensional time is monodimensional. T. G. Kalghatgi : S. S. Barlingay: Has space Kayatva or is it on account of space that there is Kayatva? For jainas space is real. STUDIES IN JAINISM S. S. Barlingay: True, but has space Kayatva or does anything else have Kayatva due to space. S. S. Barlingay : T. G. Kalghatgi : Space has characteristics of Kayatva while time has none. Does space then have Kaya? T. G. Kalghatgi : Although space is not Kaya, it has characteristics of Kayatva, but time does not. S. M. Shah : Time is a process. If it is a substance too then it also occupies Pradesa. But can we talk of a Pradesa of a time? For if time has Pradesa it ceases to be monodimensional.

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CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 33 J. C. Sikdar : My talk of skandha is in Buddhist sense borrowed from Abhidharmakosa. Secondly, I don't merely say that Jaina atoms are similar to those of Democritus but also of Lucippus. Moreover, the Jaina atomic theory is prior to the Greek theory. Although I borrowed the notions of integration and disintegration from B. Russell's Analysis of Matter we find these to be characteristics of matter even in Jainism. For example, Gandhaparina ma where Parina ma means disintegration, is discussed in the Bhagavatisutra. Nextly, although the point raised by Dr. Kalghatgi about Astitva d Kavatva is pertinent, yet Astitva and Kayatva are different Time no doubt has Astitva, but regrading Kayatva of Time there is difference of opinion. Whereas a Tika on the Tattavartha - dhigamasutra talks of Time as a monodimensional existent, Siddhasenadiva kara says: "na Kalasya Kayatvam aparoddhum sakyam" S. M. Shah : Perhaps your contention that Kala is monodimensional is right if Kala is taken in actual process. But what about Kalanu or Paramanu? How many dimensions, for example, should a material Paramanu have? J. C. Sikdar : Both time and space are real. Although Paramanus exist in space there is no quesion of ther dimension for they are said to move on their axes. S. M. Shah : But even Parinama or transformation has a subsrtatum, however subtle it is and then the question of dimension does not turn out to be utterly irrelevant. J. C. Sikdar : Jainas have established atoms inferentially. They also talk of particles of atoms. When they speak of Rupa, Rasa, Gandha, sparsa as qualities of atoms they are not to be mistaken for dimensions. 1-3

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34 STUDIES IN JAINISM rAmacaMdrazAstrI jozI : jainoMne jo paramANu mAne haiM ve anumAnake AdhArapara yA anya kisI pramANake AdhArapara ? dUsarA yaha ki Adhunika vijJAna anugata aura jaina tattvajJAna nirgata zAstra hone sedonoM kI tulanA karanA galata hai / sItArAmazAstrI kuruMdakara : jisa prakAra naiyAyika anumAnake AdhArapara paramANuoMkI siddhI karate haiM vaise hI jaina bhI / ataH jainoMne kisa pramANapara paramANu mAne haiM yaha savAla galata hai / IzvaracaMdra : ___DaoN. sikadArajIne Matter ke bAremeM jo bAteM kahIM ke kisI bhI jaina graMthameM nahIM milatI haiN| dUsarA yaha ki jaina paramANuvAda aura nyAya-vaizeSika paramANuvAda eka dUsarese milate haiM yaha bAta ThIka nahIM / kAraNa nyAya-vaizeSika paraMparAmeM paramANu alaga alaga prakArake mAne gaye haiM / lekina tattvArthasUtra meM umAsvAtI kahate haiM- " sparzavarNarasavantaH paramANavaH (pudgalAH)" / pRthivI, jala, vAyu AdikA pudgalatva ekahI hai / ataH jaina paramANuoMkI nyAya-vaizeSika paramANuoMse samAnatA nahIM mAnI jAtI / vaise hI nyAyakumudacaMdra aura nyAyavinizcaya Adi graMthoMmeM zabdako pudgalakA dharma mAnA gayA hai, kiMtu nyAya-vaizeSika zabdako AkAzakA guNa mAnate haiM / isa dRSTise bhI nyAya aura jaina paramANuvicAra eka prakArakA nahIM ThaharatA / usI taraha nyAya-vaizeSika paraMparAmeM vAyu rUparahita hai aura jaina matAnusAra vAyu pudgalAtmaka hai / ataH vAyukA rUpabhI hai / to pudgalase zabda kaise prakaTa hotA hai aura vAyumeM aura paryAyata: paramANuoMmeM rUpa kaise hotA hai isakA jainoMne jo spaSTIkaraNa kiyA hai vaha kitanA ThIka hai ? dUsarA yaha ki pAzcAttya vidvAnoMmeM Matter ke svarUpake bAremeM ekavAkyatA nahIM hai / kaI loga Matter meM space aura time kA aMtarbhAva karate haiM to jana kabhIbhI nhiiN| vaise hI zvetAMbara aura digaMbara jaina adRSTakA aMtarbhAva space aura time meM karate hai, jo nyAya-vaizeSikoMko amAnya hai / ata : jaina paramANuvAda nyAya-vaizeSika paramANuvAdase bhI bhinna hai aura jaina pudgala Adhunika Matter se / J. C. Sikdar : My view was prompted by the consideration that there are certain similarities between Newtonian, Nyaya and Jaina concepts of matter. Moreover, there are Jaina texts supporting (a) Newtonian view that time is an eternal substance, (b) Einsteinian view that time is a fourth dimension as also the Einsteinian view that matter exists continually is space and time. ..

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35 CONCEPT OF MATTER IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY R. V. de Smet : Dr. Sikdar has talked, in his paper, about the receivability of matter by Jiva. But if Jiva is essentially of the nature of Jnana then such reception makes it not only Acetana and passive but also non-independent. Sangamlal Pandey : Dr Sikdar compares the Jaina theory of matter on the one hand and Greek theory of Heile, Newtonian Physics theory of nd quantum theory of matter on the other. This amounts to forgetting differences between the latter theories. But granting this also makes similarity of the Jaina theory with each one of them questionable. Secondly, on Western materialism both Jiva and Ajiva are derivative of matter, but this is not so in Jainism. Moreover, Jaina theory is not a scientific theory, amenable to the criterion of falsifiability as Popper would say, but a philosophic theory. S. S. Barlingay : Dr. Pandey rightly says that there is difference between a philosophic and a scientific theory and that we should not mix between them. Sangamlal Pandey : Yes, precisely. The Jaina theory is intuitive and neither conceptual nor inferential. K. C. Sogani : Dr. Sikdar's equation of activity with motion is unfortunate. Further, Kaya does neither mean extension nor body, for taking kaya to mean any one of them would make explanation of the Astikayatva of Jiva very difficult. Dayananda Bhargava : What is the relation between the Jaina theory of matter and that of Anekantavada ? Further, how is one to relate this theory with the position that believes in many Nayas?

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STUDIES IN JAINISM S. S. Barlingay : There is a difference between a philosophic approach and a scientific approach, or a logical approach and a physical approach. In the paper substance is defined as that which can enter into proposition as a subject, never as a predicate or relation. Now this will not be a physical definition of a thing. If this kind of definition and physical definition are confused, we are likely to go wrong. Many of our problems arise on account of translations. For example, prakrti is translated as matter or primordial matter. I think we are not really justified in translating prakrti as primordial matter and pudgala as matter and so on. Further, we usually emphasise similarities and call it a comparative philosophy----say of Jaina philosophy and other philosophies. But what about differences? We really want to know if Jaina theory of matter is different from other theories of matter and if it is different, in what way it is different.

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JAINA CONCEPT OF ATOMIC COMBINATION Suzuko Ohira Much has been already said about the Jaina theory of atomic combination, however, its lucid comprehension is pretty difficult as it is involved with many other interrelated concepts pertaining to the ontological aspect of Jainism. The following study is attempted to understand the theory of atomic combination conceived by the Jainas in this context. The Bhasya on the Tautvarthasutra v:6 reads, 'pudgala-jivas-tu kriyavantah.' The agents of kriya, movement or activity, are the jiva and the pudgala, which is denied to dharma and adharma, the passive causes for motion and stoppage in the akasa-pradesa. The Vaisesikas consider that the soul and adssta are the agents of action. They postulate an independent category of karma or motion along with dravya, guna, samanya, visesa and samavaya, and assume that the concurrent operation of them together explains the total phenomena in the world. Karma which cannot produce motion by itself requires conjunction, disjunction and the other qualities for its manifestation. Vaisesikasutra I. 7 enumerates fivefold contents of karma, i.e., utksepana, avaksepana, akuncana, prasa rana and gamana. These fivefold karmas take place among the souls themselves and among the souls and matters, and among the matters themselves when there is the concurrent existence of Presented in the " Seminar or Jaina Logic and Philosophy" (Poona University, 1975).

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38 STUDIES IN JAINISM gunas such as samyoga, vibhaga, iccha, prayatna, gurutva, dravatva, sneha, samskara (which includes vega, bhavana and sthitistha paka) and adpsta, of which exposition is detailed in the Vaisesikasutra Ch. V. and the Prasastapa dabhasya Ch. IX. Karma incurred among the souls themselves and among the souls and matter requires the conjunction of the soul with iccha, prayatna and adIsta, which must be replaced by adTsta in the case of karma occurred in the natural phenomena. Tattvarthasutra Ch. VI is devoted to the analysis of animate tivities which incur samparayika asrava. Twenty-five kriyas enumerated threin include various types of physical, mental and vocal activities, which are again taken up from the different agamic criteria, i. e., degree of intensity (tivra and manda), intention (Inata and ajnata), physical capacity, and support (jiva and ajiva). Agamic classification of kriya as such pertains to the activity taking place among samsari jivas themselves or among the jivas and ajivas.1 The characteristics of pudgala are elucidated in the TattvarthaSutra v:23-24 'sparsa-rasa-gandha-varnavantah pudgalah 1/23// sabda-bandha-sauksmya-sthaulya-samsthana-bheda-tamascayatapodyotavantah ca//24//?. Prajna pana 13 called Parinamapada likewise enumerates ten types of ajiva parinama, i.e., bandha, gati samsthana, bheda, varna, gandha, rasa, sparsa, agurulaghu, and sabda. Herein bandha is explained by the Bhasva as of threefold character : prayoga, visrasa, and misra, of which visrasa bandha is caused by snigdha and ruksa. Prajna pana, which explains bandha as twofold, i.e., snigdha and ruksa, classifies gati into two types i. e., sprsama na-asprsamana and dirgha-hrasva (Prajna pana 16-473 enumerates seventeen kinds of gati including sprsamana-asprsamana.) These evidently indicate the types of inanimate kriya conceived by the Agamic codes. Among them, snigdha and ruksa are the divisions of touch, which also include khara, mtdu, guru, laghu, sita and usna, Khara and mtdu herein have nothing to do with movement at all, but the rest surely do. The atom is postulated to be possessed of two touches, either one of snigdh-ruksa and either one of sitausna. Sita and usna, which are the types of sparsa also in the Vaisesikasutra denoting purely physical sensations of temperature, must be presumed by the Jainas to function for the contraction and expansion of atoms in the concerned pradesa,2 because one upto ananta atoms are assumed to be accommodated in one a kasa

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JAINA CONCEPT OF ATOMIC COMBINATION 39 pradesa. Sprsamana-gati and asprsamana-gati mentioned in the Prajna pana must mean the movement caused by the expansion and contraction of atoms in the matter-pradesa, wherein one kind of gati touches the border of pradesa by the expansion of an atom while the other does not by its contraction. The Vaisesikas count contraction (akuncana) and expansion (prasarana) as the types of karma. For the Jainas, sita and usna are assumed to le roles in function, firstly as the causes of physical sensation of temperature, and secondly as the causes of the movement of atomic contraction and expansion. Here the atom is assumed to have the attributes of contraction and expansion, which manifest themselves whenever their function is called forth for the atomic fusion within the concerned pradesa, which does not mean that the atom is in the constant motion as so believed by Democritus. The explanation of the function of sita-usna as such seems to find no mention in the present Agama, of which meaning appears to have been totally forgotten in the later works as we see it, for instance, in the Karmagrantha svopajnatika, Karmavipaka 40.4 Such function assumed by sita-usna is indeed peculiar to the Jaina concept of atomic combination pertaining to the doctrine of pradesa which does not find its parallel in the atomic theory of non-Jaina schools. Sixfold touches, namely, guru-laghu, sita-usna and snigdha - rukna, therefore, appear to formulate the independent causes of inanimate kriya which explain the movement in the natural phenomena in Jainism as much as the Vaisesika gunas of samyoga, vibhaga, gurutva, dravatva, sneha, sanskara and adssta, of which oncurrent presence explains the same. The Vaisesika atomists assume that the paramanu is the indivisible, final unit of the matter, a force point in spheric shape, which is of four kinds, i. e., prthivi, ap, tejas and vayu, each endowed with the respective guras. It is also possessed of five properties common to all substances, i. e., sankhya, parimana, prthaktva, samyoga and vibhaga. Atoms are classified by them into three categories, namely, paramanu, dvyanuka and tryanuka onwards, of which the first two are imperceptible and the last perceptible, and the first one is permanent and the last two transient. According to Prasasta pada, the magnitude of things arises due to sankhya , parimana and pracaya. It is presumed that two paramanus produce a dvyanuka, and three dvyanukas produce a tryanuka which gives rise to dimension for perception. The Vaisesikas seem

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40 STUDIES IN JAINISM to admit that an atom has six sides, and the Buddhists, eight sides. Both Vaisesika and Buddhist atomists therefore agree that atoms are not porous to allow interpenetration, because these consist of four elements, namely earth, water, fire and air, which are roughly comparable to three forms of matters, i. e., solid, liquid, and gas. Thus the manner of combination conceived by them is interlinking of atoms, but not their interfusion. Jaina system does not acknowledge these four elements in the matter composition. Molecules are assumed to have five colours, two smells, five tastes and eight touches, and atoms to have one property of each kind with one more addition in case of touch. four elements are removed from the constitution of atoms, it is difficult to assume what is the exact mode of their state as to whether they are considered as solid, liquid or gaseous. Tattvarthasutra v:32-36 (33-37) enunciates the rule of atomic combination as follows: snigdha-ruksatvad-bandhah/32/na janya-gunanam/33/guna-samye sadrasanam/34/dvy-adhikadi-gunanam tu/35/ bandhe samadhikau parinamikau/36/'. The Jainas postulate that the qualities of snigdha and ruksa are allowed to have the diflerent degrees of intensity by one up to ananta Atomic combination pro the basis of the mechanism of the degrees of intensity belonging to these two gunas, of which mode of combination is parinama or interfusion, but not interlinking. And the higher degrees of a property are said to absorb the lower degrees of the same to change into the same state. Parinama of atoms is expected to take place within the pudgalapradesa, either karmapradesa or matter-pradesa and one up to ananta atoms are hypothesized to be accommodated within one pradesa. This evinces that according to the Jaina atomists, number , size or aggregation of atoms do not give rise to the magnitude of things as so postulated by the Vaisesikas. The combination of two atoms and that of ananta atoms may produce the same size of one pradesa, or two atoms may occupy two pradesas, while ananta atoms may reside in one pradesa up to asankhyeya pradesas in the loka akasa. In other words, atomic combination in the Jaina system does not produce dimension and shape of a thing, but the dimension and shape of its matterpradesas decide its size and form as the container of atoms, for which its matter-pradesas ought to be in the interlinked state. Instead of size and shape, interfusion of atoms produces the degree of density or compactness within the concerned pradesas.

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JAINA CONCEPT OF ATOMIC COMBINATION In the canonical corpus, the Bhagavati provides us enough materials about the Jaina concept of atomic combinaton. In the Bhagavati 8.9, bandha is distinguished by visrasa and prayoga. Visrasa bandha is of two kinds, namely anadi bandha as represented by the pradesa bandha of dharma, adharma and akasa which is either sarva or desa bandha, and sadi bandha as represented by bandhana of anu-skandha, Prayoga bandha is likewise considered from the viewpoints of anadi-ananta, sadi-ananta, and sadi-santa bandhas. Bhagavati 18.3.619 classifies bandha into dravya type and bhava type, in the former of which visrasa and prayoga bandha are categorized. Bhava bandha is explained as karmic bondage, which is divided into mula and uttara prakstis. Bhagavati says that combination does not take place between two atoms due to the lack of snigdha, which however occurs among three atoms due to the rise of snigdha. The composite of these hree atoms is then disintegrated by two ways, either by splitting into two (i. e., 11/2 each) or into three (i. e., three atoms). Discussion is further followed by a confusing statement that snigdha arises between two atoms which then come into combination. The description obviously evinces that the atomic combination is speculated in terms, of interlinking as so assumed by the atomists. of the other schools. Dimension is produced to the aggregate by the linking of atoms, which is expressed by the number of pradesas in the composite. Bhagavati 12.4 deals with the computation of the method of atomic linking and split, which takes place in the following manner : Combination Division number of number of number of mode of reduction paramanus pradesas in divisions one skandha 1 + 1 1+2 1+ 1+ 1 +3; 2 +2 1 +1 +2 1+1+1+1 1 + 4; 2 + 3 1+ 1+ 3; 1 + 2 +1 +1 +2 1+ 1+ 1+ 1+ +++ +++ + 2 1

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STUDIES IN JAINISM .. up to the cases of sankhyeya, asankhyeya and ananta atoms. Tattvarthasutra v:26 (26) explains the production of skandhas in the similar manner that aggregates are caused by interlinking, split, and linking-cum-split. The atom is logically assumed to be produced by division alone (V:27(27)). Then the aphorism 28 (28) says that perceptibility of a skandha arises by the operation of division-cum-combination, 'bheda-sanghata bhyam caksusah' The Bhasya on it comments that perceptibility of a thing does not arise by sanghata, bheda or sanghata-bheda which are mentioned to produce skandhas in the sutra 26. Difficulty in understanding this sutra 28 in relation with the sutra 26 seems to have been derived by the lack of lucid comprehension and distinction of the two modes of the Jaina theory of atomic combination. Jaina theory of atomic combination is considered in two phases, namely, one pertaining to the method producing new dimension and shape, and the other not producing them anew. The latter is produced by the interfusion of atoms, the rule of which is prescribed by the sutras V-32-36 (33-37). It includes the atomic combination represented by karmic bondage and interfusion of liquid and gaseous substances. The former is produced by the interlinking of atoms, the rule of which is prescribed by the sutra V:26 (26) of the production of skandhas, and this type of a combination is represented by the interlinking of solid substances. Interlinking occurs also among pradesas which are either with or without atoms inside. Combination of dharma, adharma and akasa (together with kala) is permanent, but their combination with matter aggregates and souls in samsara is transient. Interfusion of atoms within one pradesa does not produce visibility as there is no magnitude, but that in many pradesas is visible in conformity with the dimenion and shape of the skandha --pradesas in question. Interlinking of atoms and skandhas necessarily gives rise to size and form. Therefore by the method of interfusion, sanghata of atoms that has taken place within one pradesa is invisible. Likewise bheda and sanghata-bheda that has taken place in the skandha with two pradesas cause only one pradesa, thus invisible. However interlinking of atoms in two divisions onwards, i. e., one and one, one and two, etc., namely by the method of bheda-sanghata, produces dimension, thus things become perceptible. In other words, when split atoms interlink (bheda

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JAINA CONCEPT OF ATOMIC COMBINATION 43 sanghata), dimension arises to a thing. In this sense, the exposition of the Bhasya on the sutra 28 makes sense. Possibly the sutra 28 was made against the non-Jaina views on the cause of perceptibility of things, for instance, the Vaisesika view which maintains, sarkhyah parimanani prthaktvam saryoga--vibhagau paratvaparatve karma ca rupi-dravya-samava yat caksusani (Vaisesikasutra 4.1.12). Number of atoms does not cause dimension according to the Jaina theory of atomic fusion. Neither the size of atoms when they are interfused in one pradesa can produce magnitude. What the sutrakara and bhasyakara wanted to express here is that the visibility of things is derived by the interlinking of atoms and skandhas; but not by their interfusion. However, the interfusion of atoms in the two matter-pradesas onwards certainly manifests the size and form of a thing, and the production of skandhas by the threefold rules of split and interlinking pronounced in the sutra 26 necessarily causes palpability. Therefore in this sense both the sutra and the Bhas ya totally lack relevancy. Umasvati thus failed in imparting the correct rule of the cause of perceptibility of things in V:28, which should have been stated pertaining to both cases of interfusion and interlinking wherein the content of V:26 must be of course included. Bhagavati 25.4.739 refers to the number of paramanus as ananta, that of skandhas pradesas as ananta, that of pradesa avagaha of pudgala as asankhyeya, and that of the degree of black colour as ananta. Prajsia pana 3.27-195 explains that pudgala, addhasamaya, sarva pradesas and sarva paryayas are possessed of ananta gunas, but sarva dravyas visesadhika gunas. Then both Bhagavati 25.4 and Prajita pana 3.27 discuss about the num strength of gunas possessed by the paramanu and skandha from the viewpoints of dravya, pradesa and dravya-pradesa. According to the Prajna pana which treats the account more systematically than the other, it is said as follows: a paramanu has ananta gunas, a sankhyeya-pradesika skandha has sankhyeya gunas, an asankhyeya pradesika skandha has asankhyeya gunas, and an ananta pradesika skandha has ananta gunas from all these three view-points. The same discussion is carried on as to avagahana and kala. Ananta gunas, for instance, the infinite degress of black colour, are attributed to an atom as well as to a composite of ananta pradesas, which is perfectly logical. But it is difficult to comprehend why

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STUDIES IN JAINISM the composites of sankhyeya pradesas and asankhyeya pradesas are said to possess sankhyeya gunas and asankhyeya gunas instead of ananta gunas. In addition to this, Bhagavati brings the topic of motion into discussion that the atoms as well as the composites of two up to ananta pradesas which are endowed with the above number of the degrees of properties are in motion (seya, saija) or not in motion (nireya, nirejasa) during how long time by minimum and maximum. It is evident here that the atomists are speculating that the parinama of matters in the concerned pradesas occurring among the said degrees of their properties incurs motion or is derived by motion. The motion of parinama in the matter-pradesas as such must be caused, it is assumed, by the difference of the degrees of the properties and by the contraction-cum-expansion due to sita-usna gunas. Or the motion incurred by the different degrees of the matter properties may be expressed by the terms sprsamanagati and aspssamana-gati. And such motion must be, it is assumed, occurring therein constantly as long as atomic fusion and disunion take place. The idea of the contraction and expansion of the atom in the different sizes of matter-pradesas seems to be conceived like that of the soul in different sizes of bodies minus its volitional contraction and expansion which occur in the case such as samudghata. The word pradesa in the sense of a limited spatial extension may occur in the other systems of thought; however the concept of pradesa which applies to any spatial extension as its unit in atomic dimension is peculiar to Jainism aione. It is very difficult to trace in the canonical source when and how this concept of pradesa evolved into the present idea of five astikayas wherein time-units also reside. In the oldest strata of the Jaina literature such as Acaranga and Sutrakrta, the word pradesa does not occur, and the treatment of its evolution may be widely left for its speculation. Jainism is built on the two ontological principles of the soul and the matter, or more precisely to say, the karma matter. The soul is conceived to be of the size of the body wherein it resides and pervades. Karma matters which are fully packed in the space outside the soul are deemed to be constantly absorbed inside the soul, wherein occurs karmic bondage. The atma-pradesa must have been therefore recognized by the Jaina metaphysicians as the place of karmic bondage from the vary early stage of their ontological speculation. The process of the absorption of outside

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JAINA CONCEPT OF ATOMIC COMBINATION matters into the atma-pradesa was expressed in the early time by the term ahara, that is, taking in food-and-drink and breathing air through mouth and skin etc., which was later absorbed by the technical term asrava. The process of assimilating food into the body or atma-pradesa obviously formulated the primitive concept of karmic inflow. The concept of ahara which constitutes the 14th marganasthana is documented in the Sutrakrta 2.3, Prajna pana 28, Bhagavati 1:1 and in many other places in the canonical codes. We are not sure when the atomic theory arose in the Indian soil, and when it came to be adopted by the Jaina metaphysicians in their system. But we are sure that at the time of its adoption, they dropped the concept of four elements from the constitution of atoms, i. e., earth-atom, water-atom, fire-atom and air-atom, which are the types of atoms assumed by the non-Jaina schools. Mahabhutavadins are frequently refuted in the Sutrakrtanga. Prthivi, ap, tejas and vayu constitute the organic lives called the one-sensed beings, the concept of which appears to be the integral part of the Jainism since the beginning of its systems in relation with the doctrine of ahimsa as attested by the Acaranga 1:1. It is not quite sure whether the removal of these four elements from the composition of atoms was derived by the ready-established concept of one-sensed beings or not. But it is quite sure that their removal from the atomic constitution was necessitated for the concepts of ahara and bondage of karma matters, because as soon as the outside matters are taken inside these have to be immediately transformed into various karmas to attain bondage with the existing old karmas of respective kinds, wherein the complex nature or structure of pudgalas would not advance such theory of assimilation and bondage, Four elements, therefore, disappeared from the constitution of atoms and the Jaina atomists attributed to them one colour, one smell, one taste and two touches, while to the aggregates five colours though eight touches. A karma composite is however said to have four touches instead of eight. The process of ahara and nirjara is incessantly at work in a samsara jiva, and karmic bondage takes place as long as the mechanism of ahara is in operation. Bhagavati 18.3.621, for instance, refers to the numerical strength of ahara and nirjara, asamkhyejjaibhagam aharamti ananta-bhagam nijjaremti, thus 1/ananta - 11

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46 STUDIES IN JAINISM asankhyeya of karma matters remain in the atma-pradesa in the state of bondage. A karma matter is naturally speculated as a very subtle substance. The Jainas assume eight varganas which are the groups of atoms distinguished by their number, i.e., audarika, vaikriya, aharaka, taijasa, bhasa, anapana, manas and karma. The number of atoms constituting each vargana herein is supposed to become more in due order, while the space they occupy becomes less in due order. In other words a karma or karma sarira is surmised to be most compactly packed with the hugest number of atoms which are accommodated in the subtlest possible space. This clearly indicates that the atoms in a karmapradesa are interfused but not interlinked. Suppose the atoms in these varganas were to interlink, a karma sarira must occupy the hugest space. In that case, the limited atma-pradesa wherein constant karmic bondage is at work immediately finds difficulty to accommodate the incessantly assimilating karma matters. The Jaina theory of karmic bondage enjoins here a rule that atomic combination has to occur in the mode of interfusion. The karma arira which bears all the karmas accumulated in the previous lives is the carrier of the soul to his new birth. Suppose the atoms were to interlink, this kasma sarira must be regarded as an enormously huge body, which is impossible, for it then could not take transit motions to its new body. Therefore it compels to lay down the rule that the atomic combination must take place in the mode of interfusion. Jaina concept of atomic combination thus appears to have been evolved in the milieu of the theory of karmic bondage. Interfusion of atoms here produces compactness or density of the degrees of properties, but not dimension or shape. In reality, however, things are possessed of definite size and form, therefore, Jaina atomists had to solve the problem as to how these can be manifested as they really are. Here the concept of pradesa seems to have been devised. The minimum size of all is that of an indivisible atom which has no beginning, middle and end. If this minimum sized units can interlink, it certainly gives rise to size and shape. This unit was called pradesa. Whatever has extension and form is then measured by the interlinked pradesas therein, thus the size and shape of jiva, ajiva, loka and aloka can be conveniently expressed by the number of their pradesas. This idea, then extended to the other substances, namely, dharma and adharma, thus seems to have caused the evolution of the concept of five

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JAINA CONCEPT OF ATOMIC COMBINATION astikayas. Acarasa ra 3.24 says that a paramanu is of square form, "vyomamurte sthitam nityam caturasram samandhanam'7. The idea of an atom in square shape was probably assumed in terms of the form of a pradesa, because if all the pradesas were in the state of interlinking, the logical shape of a pradesa must be in the form of square (some other atomists postulate that the shape of an atom is parimandala as recorded in the Maha purana 24. 128. 'anavah. . parimandalah,which is logical as it is a force point as so maintained by the atomists of non-Jaina schools.) Prajna pana 10 called Caramapada discusses about dravyas and pradesas in the loka and aloka as to carama (atoms lying in the border region), acarama (atoms lying in the intermediate region), and avaktavya (atoms lying in the region indescribable either way). These three features of the arrangement of atoms are again dealt with as to one up to ananta pradesas of paramanu and skandhas, and the first wo features are further treated in relation with sansthana and samsara jivas possessed of pradesas. The point of argument is not quite clear herein, but it is certain that the atomists are here calculating and discussing about the number and arrangement of atoms and pradesa in the things with dimension and shape. Similar argument on paramanu as to carama-acarama is carried by the Bhagavati 14.4: 512 from the viewpoints of dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava. It is therefore very likely that the concept of pradesa was evolved in the context of atomic combination in order to explain dimension and shape of skandhas which the Jaina concept of atomic fusion cannot produce. In that case the adoption of atomic theory must have preceded the evolution of the concept of astikayas. Likewise the idea of huge number by which the Jainas are well known must have evolved in the same background. The number of pradesas in loka and aloka has to be counted to express their dimension, in the former of which much higher number of souls and atoms reside. Also black colour, for instance, is presumed to have one up to ananta degrees. And one degree is conceived to have different degrees within itself ranging the scope of 1/ ananta x ananta. Such distinction must have been felt needed in expressing the difference in the degrees of compactness of the matter properties in relation with atomic fusion. In this way, the Jaina theory of atomic combination seems to have evovled in the context of karmic bondage, which involves

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48 STUDIES IN JAINISM the concepts of jiva, karma, pradesa and parinana. Probably these concepts were developed into the doctrine of dravya-pradesaparyaya very soon, which was ultimately crystalized in the abstraction of four anuyogadvaras, i. e., dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava, of which adoption is also found in the standard divisions of karmic bondage, namely, prakrti, pradesa, sthiti and anubhaga. The evolution of this concept in the canonical texts has been already treated by Dr. Dixit in his Jaina ontology. Notes 1. The capacity of kriya of the pure jiva or siddha must be considered as existent in the potential form because eight gunas attributed to them clearly indicate his capacity as the agent of cognition (samyaktva, ananta inana and darsana), enjoyment (ayyabadha sukha), action (ananta virya) and so on. He is absolutely devoid of motion upon having accomplished moksa in the Siddasila as described in the Aupapatika 42-43. The Vaisesikas seem to have solved the same problem of kriyavatva of the soul who has the omnipresent size of body by the assumption of his possessing the faculty of prayatna. In their case, likewise, the movement is denied to the atman whose physical dimension is all pervading, but his capacity as the agent of action is admitted by his possession of the said potency. For the detailed discussion on this matter, see Frauwallner : History of Indian Philosophy, v. 2, pp. 67-69. 2. This idea was suggested by Dr. T. G. Kalghatagi. 3. Prajka pana 16.474. A siddha's ascendance to the Siddhasila is said by the Aupapatika 42 as of asprsamana-gati, 'tta ujju-sedhi-padivanne aphusamana-gati uddham ekka-samaenam aviggahenam gamt& sagarovautte siijhai/ 4. Karmagrantha svopajsatika Karmavipaka 40. deha-stambhadi-hetuh praleyadyasritah sitah aharapakadi-karanam jvalanady-anugata usnah.' 5. H. Jacobi : Atomic theory (Indian)". In the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 6. Bhagavati 1.10. 7. Jainendra Siddhantakosa, V. 3, p. 17. 8. Ibid. 9. Futher see K. K. Dixit : Jaina ontology p. 42, p. 46 ff. the Agamic texts are based on the sutta game.

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jaina darzana meM astikAya kI avadhAraNA : Adhunika pariprekSya meM sAgaramala jaina jaina darzana meM dravya" ke vargIkaraNa kA eka AdhAra astikAya aura anastikAya kI avadhAraNA bhI hai| SadravyoM meM dharma, adharma, AkAza, pudgala aura jIva ye pA~ca astikAya mAne gaye haiM, jaba ki kAla ko anastikAya mAnA gayA hai| adhikAMza jaina dArzanikoM ke anusAra kAla kA astitva to haiM kintu usameM kAyatva nahIM hai, ata: use astikAya ke varga meM nahIM rakhA jA sakatA hai| yadyapi kucha zvetAmbara AcAryoM ne kAla ko svataMtra dravya mAnane ke sambandha meM bhI Apatti uThAI hai, kintu yaha eka bhinna viSaya hai, jisakI carcA yahA~ apekSita nahIM hai| ___ sarvaprathama to hamAre sAmane mUla prazna yaha hai ki astikAya kI isa avadhAraNA kA tAtparya kyA hai ? vyutpatti kI dRSTi se 'astikAya' do zabdoM ke mela se banA hai--asti + kAya / 'asti' kA artha sattA yA astitva aura 'kAya' kA artha hai zarIra, arthAt jo zarIra-rUpa se astitvavAn hai vaha astikAya hai| kintu yahA~ 'kAya' yA zarIra zabda bhautika zarIra ke artha meM prayukta nahIM hai jaisA ki jana-sAdhAraNa samajhatA hai| kyoMki paMca-astikAyoM meM pudgala ko chor3akara zeSa cAra to amUrta hai, ataH yaha mAnanA hogA ki yahA kAya zabda kA prayoga Presented in the "Seminar on Jaina Philosophy and Modern Scientific Thought" ( Poona University 1979 ). J-4

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50 STUDIES IN JAINISM lAkSaNika artha meM hI huA hai| pAMcAstikAya kA TIkA meM kAyatva zabda kA artha spaSTa karate hue, kahA gayA hai- "kAyatvamAkhyaM sAvayavatvam ' arthAt kAyatva kA tAtparya sAvayavatva hai| jo avayavI dravya haiM ve astikAya haiM aura jo niravayavI dravya hai vaha anastikAya hai| avayavI kA artha hai aMgoM se yukta / dUsare zabdoM meM jisameM vibhinna aMga, aMza yA hisse (Parts) haiM vaha astikAya hai| yadyapi yahA~ yaha zaMkA uThAI jA sakatI hai ki akhaNDa dravyoM meM aMza yA avayava kI kalpanA kahAM taka yukti-saMgata hogI? jaina darzana ke paMca astikAyoM meM se dharma, adharma aura AkAza ye tIna eka, avibhAjya evaM akhaNDa dravya hai, ataH unake sAvayavI hone kA kyA tAtparya hai ? punazca, kAyatva kA artha sAvayavatva mAnane meM eka kaThinAI yaha bhI hai ki paramANu to avibhAjya, niraMza aura niravayavI hai to kyA vaha astikAya nahIM hai ? jaba ki jaina darzana ke anusAra paramANu-pudgala astikAya mAnA gayA hai| prathama prazna kA jaina dArzanikoM kA pratyuttara yaha hogA ki yadyapi dharma, adharma aura AkAza avibhAjya evaM akhaNDa dravya hai, kintu kSetra kI apekSA se ye lokavyApI hai ataH kSetra kI dRSTi se inameM sAvayavatva kI avadhAraNA yA vibhAga kI kalpanA kI jA sakatI hai, yadyapi yaha kevala vaicArika stara para kI gaI kalpanA yA vibhAjana hI hai| dUsare prazna kA pratyuttara yaha hogA ki yadyapi paramANu svayaM meM niraMza, avibhAjya aura niravayava hai ataH svayaM to kAyarUpa nahIM hai kintu ve hI paramANu-skandha banakara kAyatva yA sAvayavatva ko dhAraNa kara lete hai / ata: unameM kAyatva kA sadbhAva mAnanA cAhiye / punaH paramANu meM avagAhana zakti hai, ata: usameM kAyatva kA sadbhAva hai / jaina dArzanikoM ne astikAya aura anastikAya ke vargIkaraNa kA eka AdhAra bahupradezatva bhI mAnA hai / jo bahupradezI dravya haiM ve astikAya haiM aura jo eka pradezI dravya hai vaha anastikAya hai| astikAya aura anastikAya kI avadhAraNA meM isa AdhAra ko svIkAra kara lene para pUrvokta kaThinAIyA~ banI rahatI haiN| prathama to dharma, adharma aura AkAza ye tInoM sva-dravya apekSA se to eka-pradezI hai kyoMki akhaNDa haiN| punaH paramANupudgala bhI eka pradezI hai / vyAkhyAprajJaptisUtra meM to use apradezI bhI kahA gayA hai| kyA inheM astikAya nahIM kahA jAvegA? yahA~ bhI jaina dArzanikoM kA sambhAvita pratyuttara vahI hogA jo ki pUrva prasaMga meM diyA gayA hai : dharma, adharma aura AkAza meM bahupradezatva dravyApekSA se nahIM apitu kSetra apekSA se hai---- dravya saMgraha meM kahA gayA hai-- yAvanmAnaM AkAzaM avibhAsipudgalANvavaSTabdham / taM khalu pradezaM jAna hi sarvANusthAnadAnAham / / pro. jI. Ara. jaina bhI likhate hai : Pradesa is the unit of space occupied by one indivisible atom of matter. arthAt pradeza AkAza kI

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jaina darzana meM astikAya kI avadhAraNA vaha sabase choTI ikAI hai jo eka pudgala paramANu gheratA hai| vistAravAna hone kA artha hai kSetra meM prasArita honA / kSetra apekSA se hI dharma aura adharma ko asaMkhya pradezI aura AkAza ko Ata pradezo kahA gayA hai, ata: unameM upacAra se kAyatva kI avadhAraNA kI jA sakatI hai / pudgala kA jo bahupadezopana hai vaha paramANu kI apekSA se na hokara skandha ko apekSA meM hai| isIliye pudgala ko astikAya kahA gayA hai na kimANu ko / paramANu to svayaM pudgala kA eka aMza yA prakAra mAtra hai| ___ vastuta: isa prasaMga meM kAyatva kA artha vistArayukta honA hI hai| jo dravya vistAravAn haiM ve astikAya haiM aura jo vistAra rahita hai ve anastikAya hai| vistAra kI yaha avadhAraNA kSetra kI avadhAraNA para Azrita hai / vastutaH kAyatva ke artha ke spaSTIkaraNa meM sAvayavatva evaM satradezatva kI jo avadhAraNA se prastuta kI gaI hai ve sabhI kSetra ke avagAhana kI saMkalpanA se sambadhita hai / vistAra kA tAtparya hai kSetra kA avagAhana / jo dravya jitane kSetra kA avagAhana karatA hai vahI usakA vistAra (Extension) pradeza pracayatvayA koyatva hai / vistAra yA pracaya do prakAra mAnA gayA hai : Urdhva pracaya aura tiryak pracaya / Adhunika zabdAvalI meM inheM kramazaH Urdhva ekarekhIya vistAra (Longitudinal) aura bahu AyAmI vistAra (Multidimensional Extension) kahA jA sakatA hai / astikAya kI avadhAraNA meM pracaya yA vistAra ko jisa artha meM grahaNa kiyA jAtA hai vaha bahu AyAmI vistAra hai na ki Urya ekarekhIya vistAra / jaina dArzanikoM ne kevala unhIM dravyoM ko astikAya kahA hai, jinakA tiryak pracaya yA bahu AyAmI vistAra hai| kAla meM kevala Urdhva pracaya yA eka AyAmI vistAra hai, ata: use astikAya nahIM mAnA gayA hai| yadyapi pro. jI. Ara. jaina ne kAla ko eka-AyAmI (Mono dimensional) aura zeSa ko dvi-AyAmI ( Two dimensional ) mAnA hai kiMtu merI dRSTi meM zeSa dravya tri-AyAmI hai, kyoMki ve skandharUpa haiM, ata: unameM lambAI, caur3AI aura moTAI ke rUpa meM tIna AyAma hote haiM / ataH kahA jA sakatA hai ki jina dravyoM meM tri-AyAmI vistAra hai ve astikAya dravya haiN| yahA~ yaha prazna uThAyA jA sakatA hai ki kAla bhI lokavyApI hai phira use astikAya kyoM nahIM mAnA gayA ? isakA pratyuttara yaha hai ki yadyapi lokAkAza ke pratyeka pradeza para kAlANu sthira hai kintu pratyeka kAlANu (Time grains) apane Apa meM eka svataMtra dravya hai, ve paraspara nirapekSa haiM, snigdha evaM rUkSa g2aNa ke abhAva ke kAraNa unameM baMdha nahIM hotA haiM, arthAt unake skandha nahIM banate haiM / skandha ke abhAva meM unameM pradeza pracayatva kI, kalpanA saMbhava nahIM hai, ata: ve astikAya dravya nahIM hai / kAla-dravya ko astikAya isaliye nahIM kahA gayA ki usameM svarUpataH aura upacAra donoM hI prakAra se pradeza pracaya kI kalpanA kA abhAva hai /

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52 STUDIES IN JAINISM yadyapi pAzcAtya dArzanika dekArta ne pudgala ( Matter) kA guNa vistAra ( Extension ) mAnA hai kintu jaina darzana kI vizeSatA to yaha hai ki vaha AtmA, dharma, adharma aura AkAza jaise amUrta dravyoM meM bhI vistAra kI avadhAraNA karatA hai / inake vistAravAn ( kAyatva se yukta ) hone kA artha hai ve dik ( Space ) meM prasArita yA vyApta haiM / dharma evaM adharma to eka mahAskandha ke rUpa meM sampUrNa lokAkAza ke eka sImita asaMkhya pradezI kSetra meM prasArita yA vyApta hai / AkAza to svataH hI atyanta ( loka evaM aloka ) meM vistArita hai, ataH inameM kAyatva kI avadhAraNA sambhava hai / jahA~ taka AtmA kA prazna hai dekArta usameM ' vistAra' ko svIkAra nahIM karatA hai, kintu jaina darzana use vistAra yukta mAnatA hai / kyoMki AtmA jisa zarIra ko apanA AvAsa banAtA hai usameM samagrataH vyApta ho jAtA hai / hama yaha nahIM kaha sakate haiM ki zarIra ke amuka bhAga meM AtmA hai aura amuka bhAga meM nahIM hai, vaha apane cetanA lakSaNa se sampUrNa zarIra ko vyApta karatA hai | ataH usameM vistAra hai, vaha astikAya hai / hameM isa bhrAnti ko nikAla denA cAhiye ki kevala mUrta dravya kA vistAra hotA hai aura amUrta kA nahIM / Adhunika vijJAna ne yaha siddha kara diyA hai ki amUrta dravya kA bhI vistAra hotA hai / vastuta: amUrta dravya ke vistAra kI kalpanA usake lakSaNoM yA kAryoM (Functions) ke AdhAra para kI jA sakatI haiM, jaise dharma dravya kA kArya gati ko sambhava banAnA hai, vaha gati kA mAdhyama mAnA gayA hai| ataH jahAM-jahAM gati hai yA gati sambhava hai vahAM-vahAM dharma dravya kI upasthiti evaM vistAra haiM, yaha mAnA jA sakatA hai / isa prakAra hama isa niSkarSa para pahu~ca sakate haiM ki kisI dravya ko astikAya kahane kA tAtparya yaha hai ki vaha dravya dik meM prasArita hai yA prasAraNa kI kSamatA se yukta hai / vistAra yA prasAra ( extension ) hI kAyatva hai kyoMki vistAra yA prasAra kI upasthiti meM hI pradeza pracayatva tathA sAvayavatA kI siddhi hotI hai / ataH jina dravyoM meM vistAra yA prasAra kA lakSaNa hai ve astikAya haiM / ( 2 ) hamAre sAmane dUsarA prazna yaha hai ki jaina darzana meM jina dravyoM ko astikAya mAnA gayA hai usameM prasAra (kAyatva) nahIM mAnane para kyA kaThinAI AvegI aura isI prakAra kAla ko, jise anastikAya mAnA gayA hai, astikAya yA prasAra - lakSaNa yukta mAnane para kyA kaThinAI AvegI ? sarvaprathama yadi AkAza ko prasArita nahIM mAnA jAvegA to usake mUla lakSaNa yA kArya kI hI siddhi nahIM hogI / AkAza kA kArya anya dravyoM ko sthAna denA hai, dravyasaMgraha meM kahA gayA hai, 'avagAsa hANa joggaM jIvAdINaM viyANa AyAsa

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jaina darzana meM astikAya kI avadhAraNA 53 arthAt jo jIvAdi dravyoM ko sthAna detA hai vahI AkAza hai| prasAra yA vistAra to AkAza kA svarUpa lakSaNa hai| usake abhAva meM usakI sattA hI sambhava nahIM hogii| yadi AkAza vistArita na hogA to anya dravyoM ko sthAna kaise de pAvegA ? ataH AkAza ko vistAra yukta athavA astikAya mAnanA Avazyaka hai| vistAra kI sambhAvanA AkAza meM hI sambhava hai yadi AkAza svayaM vistArita na hogA to usameM anya dravyoM kA avagAhana yA vistAraNa kaise hogA? avasthiti, vistAra, gati Adi kisI prasArita yA vistArita dravya meM hI sambhava haiM / ataH AkAza ko vistAra yukta (astikAya) mAnanA Avazyaka hai / yahAM yaha prazna pUchA jA sakatA hai ki yadi AkAza vistArita hai to usakA vistAra yA prasAra kisameM hai ? vastutaH AkAza svata: hI vistIrNa hai, anya dravya usameM avagAhana karate haiM, vistArita hote haiM aura gati karate haiN| vistAra to usakA svalakSaNa hai vaha anya kisI meM vistArita nahIM hotA / yadi usake vistAra yA avagAhana ke liye hama kisI anya dravya kI kalpanA karegeM to anantatA ke duzcakra ( Fallacy of infinite regress) meM phaMsa jAveMge / ataH use svarUpataH hI vistAravAn yA astikAya mAna liyA hai| dharma, dravya gati kA mAdhyama hai (gamaNa nimittaM dhamma-niyamasAra) gati vistIrNa tattva meM hI sambhava hai| yadi dharma-dravya gati kA mAdhyama hai to use utane kSetra meM vistIrNa yA vyApta honA cAhiye jisameM gati sambhava hai| yadi gati kA mAdhyama svayaM vistIrNa yA prasArita nahIM hogA to gati sambhava hI nahIM hogii| jaise jala kA prasAra jitane kSetra meM hogA utane hI kSetra meM machalI kI gati sambhava hogii| usI prakAra dharma-dravya kA prasAra jisa kSetra hogA usI kSetra meM pudgala aura jIvoM kI gati sambhava hogii| ataH dharma dravya ko vistAra yukta yA astikAya mAnanA Avazyaka hai| gati loka ( universe ) meM hI sambhava hai kyoMki dharma-dravya kA vistAra loka taka sImita hai| adharma-dravya sthiti kA mAdhyama hai (adhamma Thidi jIva puggalANaM ca-niyamasAra) jisake kAraNa paramANu skandha kI racanA karate haiM aura skandha rUpa meM saMgaThita rahate haiN| jo Atma pradezoM ko zarIra taka sImita rakhatA hai aura vizva ko eka vyavasthA meM bAMdhakara rakhatA hai vahI adharma-dravya hai| vizva kI eka vyavasthita racanA banAye rakhane ke liye yaha Avazyaka hai ki adharma-dravya kA prasAra loka vyApI mAnA jAye, anyathA vizva ke mUla ghaTaka paramANu ananta AkAza meM chitara jAegeM aura koI racanA sambhava nahIM hogii| ataH jahAM-jahAM gati kA mAdhyama hai vahAM - vahAM usakA virodhI sthiti kA mAdhyama bhI honA cAhiye, anyathA usa gati kA niyaMtraNa kaise hogA ? vizva meM gati ke saMtulana aura isa rUpa meM vizva ke saMtulana banAye rakhane ke liye adharma dravya ko loka-vyApI evaM vistAra lakSaNa yukta arthAt astikAya mAnanA Avazyaka hai|

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STUDIES IN JAINISM pudgala-dravya meM vistAra hai-yaha to pratyakSa siddha hai kyoMki jina pudgala skandhoM kA hameM pratyakSa hotA hai ve saba vistAra yukta haiN| skandha kI racanA hI paramANuoM ke tiryak pracaya se hotI hai, ataH ve kAya rUpa haiM hI / yadyapi pudgala-dravya ke antima avibhAjya ghaTaka ve paramANu haiM jo svayaM to skandha rUpa nahIM hai kintu usameM bhI snigdha aura rUkSa guNoM ( Positive and negative charges) kI upasthiti ke kAraNa skandha racanA kI sambhAvanA hai, ataH unameM bhI upacAra se kAyatva mAnA jA sakatA hai / puna: unameM avagAhana zakti bhI mAnI gaI hai, ataH unameM kAyatva yA vistAra hai| yadi pudgala ko astikAya nahIM mAnA jAyegA to eka mUrta vizva kI sambhAvanA hI nirasta ho jaayegii| jIva dravya meM yadi hama vistAra kI sambhAvanA ko asvIkAra karegeM to kaThinAI yaha hogI ki jIva apane svalakSaNa caitanya guNa se apane zarIra ko vyApta nahIM kara skegaa| zarIra se caitanyatA kA saMkoca evaM vistAra dekhA jAtA hai| ataH usa caitanya guNa ke dhAraka AtmA ko vistAra yukta yA astikAya mAnanA Avazyaka hai| zarIra kA vistAra to bAlyakAla se yuvAvasthA taka pratyakSa rUpa se dekhA jAtA hai| yadi hama zarIra ko vistAra yukta aura AtmA ko vistAra rahita mAnege to donoM meM jo sahacAra bhAva hai vaha nahIM bana pAyegA: isIliye vedAnta ne AtmA sarvavyApI mAna liyA / yadyapi AtmA ko sarvavyApI mAnane ke siddhAnta meM bhI aneka tArkika asaMgatiyAM hai, kintu prastuta Alekha ke saMdarbha se alaga hone ke kAraNa unakI carcA yahAM apekSita nahIM hai| jaina darzana meM AtmA zarIra-vyApI hai, ata: vaha astikAya hai| aba eka prazna yaha zeSa rahatA hai ki kAla ko astikAya kyoM nahIM mAnA jA sakatA? yadyapi anAdi bhUta se lekara ananta bhaviSya taka kAla ke vistAra kA anubhava kiyA jA sakatA hai, kintu phira bhI usameM kAyatva kA AropaNa sambhava nahIM hai| kyoki kAla kA pratyeka ghaTaka apanI svataMtra evaM pRthak sattA rakhatA hai| jaina darzana kI pAramparika paribhASA meM kAlANuoM kA snigdha evaM rUkSa guNa ke abhAva meM koI skandha yA saMghAta nahIM bana sakatA hai, yadi unake skandha kI parikalpanA bhI kara lI jAya to paryAya samaya kI siddhi nahIM hotI hai| punaH kAla ke vartamAna lakSaNa kI siddhi kevala vartamAna meM hI hai aura vartamAna atyanta sUkSma hai / ata: kAla meM vistAra (pradeza pracaya) nahIM mAnA jA sakatA aura isaliye vaha astikAya bhI nahIM hai| sabhI astikAya dravyoM kA vistAra kSetra samAna nahIM hai, usameM bhinnatAye haiN| jahAM AkAza kA vistAra-kSetra loka aura aloka donoM haiM vahAM dharma dravya aura adharma dravya kevala loka taka hI sImita haiM / pudgala ke pratyeka skandha aura pratyeka jIva kA

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jaina darzana meM astikAya kI avadhAraNA 55 vistAra-kSetra bhI bhinna hai| pudgala - piNDoM kA vistAra-kSetra unake AkAra para nirbhara karatA hai, jaba ki pratyeka jIvAtmA kA vistAra-kSetra usake dvArA gRhIta zarIra ke AkAra para nirbhara karatA hai| isa prakAra dharma, adharma, AkAza, pudgala aura jIva astikAya hote hue bhI unakA vistAra-kSetra yA kAyatva ke samAna nahIM hai / jaina dArzanikoM ne unameM pradeza dRSTi se bhinnatA spaSTa kI hai| bhagavatI sUtra meM batAyA gayA hai kI dharma dravya aura adharma ke pradeza anya dravyoM kI apekSA sabase kama haiN| ve lokAkAza taka (within the limits of universe) sImita haiM aura asaMkhya pradezI hai| AkAza kI pradeza saMkhyA ina donoM kI apekSA ananta guNa adhika mAnI hai| AkAza ananta pradezI hai kyoMki vaha sasIma loka (Finite Universe) taka sImita nahIM hai / usakA vistAra aloka meM bhI hai| punaH AkAza kI apekSA jIva dravya ke pradeza ananta guNa adhika haiM kyoMki prathama to jahAM dharma, adharma aura AkAza kA dravya hai vahAM jIva ananta dravya hai| punaH pratyeka jIva ke asaMkhya pradeza haiN| jIva dravya ke pradezoM kI apekSA bhI pudagala dravya ke pradeza ananta guNA adhika hai kyoMki pratyeka jIva ke sAtha ananta karmanpudgala saMyojita hai / yadyapi kAla kI pradeza saMkhyA pudgala kI apekSA bhI ananta guNa mAnI gaI, kyoMki pratyeka jIva aura pudgala kI vartamAna, anAdi bhUta aura ananta bhaviSya kI dRSTi ananta paryAyI hai| ata: kAla kI pradeza-saMkhyA sarvAdhika hai| phira bhI usakA samAveza astikAyoM ke sandarbha meM pudgala dravya ke pradezoM meM hone kI vajaha se pudgala dravya ke pradezoM kI saMkhyA hI sarvAdhika hai|

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME Nagin J. Shah SECTION 1: SPACE 1. Introductory Regarding primary material elements (mahabhutas), there were two old views. One view recognised five mahabhutas and the other recognised four mahabhutas. The five mahabhutas recognized by the first view were akasa, vayu, tejas, ap and prthvi. They possessed the five special qualities akasa sabda, vayu sparsa, tejas rupa, ap rasa and psthvi gandha. Those who followed this view counted akasa as a mahabhuta with a special quality sabda. The Sankhya-Yoga, the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Prabhakara mimamsa accepted this view. The old form of this view of five mahabhutas was that the external material world, as also the human body, is composed of the five mahabhutas. The Sankhya adopted this old form of the view. That is, according to the Sankhya the five mahabhutas are the material causes of all the material effect-substances (bhautila karya-dravyas). So, for the Sankhya, akasa, along with other four mahabhutas, is the material cause of material effect-substan'es. The Vaisesika differs from the Sankhya. The Vaisesika mainains Presented in "Seminar on Jaina Logic and Philosophy," (Poona University 1975) Published in "Sambodhi" (Vol 6, Nos. 3-4).

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME 57 that only four mahabhutas viz. vayu, tejas, ap and prthvi are the material causes of material effect-substances. Akasa is not a material cause of any material effect-substance. It is simply the substratum (dravya) of the quality sabda. This view of the Vaisesika somewhat undermined the status of akasa as a mahabhuta. The Bhatta Mimarsa gave the status of independent substance to sabda, thus putting at stake further the existence of akasa as a mahabhuta. The four mahabhutas recognized by that other old view were vayu, tejas, ap and prthvi. Those who followed this view maintained either that akasa is a form of matter, produced from the four mahabhutas or that a kasa is non-material, non-spitirual subsubstance. The Theravadi Buddhists accepted the first alternative. For them akasa is samskrta, it is produced from the four mahabhutas, thus it is a derived matter (upadaya rupa?). But the Vaibhasika Buddhists, who too recognized the above mentioned four mahabhutas only, raised akasa to the status of asamskrta (eternal) dharma (element)2, thus putting at stake its bhautikatva (materiality). So, for them akasa is a non-material non-spiritual (rather non-psychical) element. Jainas too follow this old tradition of four mahabhutas and hence maintain that akasa is not pudgala (matter), it is an independent stubstance. The upholders of the view of four mahabhutas maintain that sabda is not a quality; it is a mode or an aspect of these four mahabhutas. So, akasa was not needed as a substratum of sabdaguna. Hence, before these philosophers there arose a question as to what function the substance akasa is required to perform. All these philosophers declared that its function is to provide room to all other substances. It functions as a container of all other substances. It offers obstruction to no substance. All material bodies can move freely in it. The first group of philosophers thinks that the akasa-mahabhuta which is the substratum of sabda could not play the entirely different role, viz. to function as a condition of our cognitions of relative spatial positions of material bodies. They seized upon an old idea of dik found in the Rgveda and the Upanisads. In the Rgveda dik was regarded as that which made possible our knowledge of relative spatial positions of material bodies and gave rise to the notions of far and near. These philosophers accepted dik

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58 STUDIES IN JAINISM to account for our cognitions of relative spatial positions of material bodies. According to the Sankhya dik is produced from akasa etc. (i, e. five mahabhutas) along with the material bodies. In the absence of all the material bodies, there is no dik. In this sense, dik is dependent on material bodies. In other words, we may say that it is an aspect of material bodies. The Sankhya view of dik, understood and interpreted in this way, comes very near to the Theravada view of a kasa. The Vaisesika view of dik differs from the Sankhya view of it in that the Vaibesika dik is not produced from a kasa etc; it is an eternal independent non-material substance, it exists even before the production of material bodics i.e. even in pralaya. The second group of philosophers maintained that their akasa which allows material bodies to occupy their positions in it can very well function as a condition of our cognitions of relative spatial positions of these bodies. So, they have not posited dik as an independent substance besides akasa. For them the terms 'dik' and 'akasa' are synoyms referring to the same substance. 2. Jaina Descripiion of Akasa As we already remarked, Jainas do not regard it as a mode or an effect of mahabhutas. For them, it is an independent fundamental substance. It is devoid of colour, odour, taste and touch. According to Jainas sabda is a mode of mahabhutas or matter (pud gala). Aggregates (skandhas) of atoms strike against one another and sabda is produced from them. Hence sabda is not the nature of akasa, nor is it its quality. If sabda were its quality, the quality of akasa being formless or nonphysical, it would not have been heard through the organ of hearing, say the Jainas.? Akasa is infinite in extent, it is present everywhere, it stretches not only over the universe but also far beyond it over the nonuniverse. All other substances are confined to the universe only, Thus no substance is so extensive as akasa is. The pervasiveness of akasa is infinite. Akasa is one in number. It is a one-membered class, so to say. There is no possibility of increase or decrease in its number. It is one and will remain one for ever10. It is eternal in the sense that it never gives up its nature.11 As it is present everywhere in the universe, the possibility of movement from one place to another is rejected in its case12

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME 3. Function of Akasa The function of akasa is to afford room to other substances.13 Other substances exist by their own nature. There is no doubt about it. But they require something to exist in. They do exist by themselves. But wherein do they exist ? They exist in akasa. Their existence is not the same as akasa. Nor is akasa an aspect of them. It is a fundamental substance different from them. Thus a kasa is a universal container in which all other substances are contained Some might argue against this Jaina position as follows : if a substance requires other substance to exist in, then akasa itself being a substance will also require some other substance and this other substance in its turn will require the third substance to exist in and so ad infinitum. If to avoid this the Jainas were to say that akasa does not require another substance to exist in, then they should apply the same logic in the case of other substances also. Thus the conception of akasa as a universal container is self-destructive14. Again the Jaina view that akasa contains itself is beset with another difficulty, viz. kartrkarmavirodhadosa. It is a rule that in a particular act the subject and the object cannot be one and the same. However sharp a knief may be, it cannot cut itself. However expert an acrobat may be in the art of acrobatics he cannot stand upon his own shoulder. So, akasa cannot contain itself. The Jainas overcome these difficulties as follows : Not all substances require another substance to exist in. The less extensive substance is contained in the more extensive one. This is the special relation that obtains between the container and the contained. Hence, if we conceive a substance infinite in extent and maintain that there is no substance more extensive than it -- not even as extensive as it, then this conception logically compels us to conceive this substance as requiring no other substance to contain it because there is no stubsance more extensive than it to contain it. Akasa is such a substance.15 Regarding Kartskarmavirodhadosa, it does not arise because the function of akasa to contain substance is really passive.16 Moreover, that akasa contains itself is simply a positive statement of the fact that a kasa being of the infinite and the highest extesion cannot be contained in any other substance.

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60 STUDIES IN JAINISM Can akasa function as a condition of motion ? The Jaina answer to this question is emphatic 'no'. They contend that if it be also the condition of motion, then wherever there is akasa, there should be chance of motion; but neither a single jiva, nor a single body, nor a single atom could step beyond the limit of universe (loka); there is akasa beyond the universe. If akasa were with the function of assisting motion, then it being present in aloka (non-universe) also the division of loka and aloka would disappear, the loka. (universe) would dissipate, the atoms would disperse in the infinite space, they could be very far from one another, they would hardly come in contact with one another to form material bodies.17 Regarding the capacity of akasa to contain substances or their instances, one should note that those that obstruct one another cannot be contained in the same portion of space whereas those that do not obstruct one another can be contained in the same portion of space. Though Space gives room to all substances or their instances, it never contains the two mutually obstructing things in the same portion. 4. Units of Space (akasa-pradesas) A primary indivisible atom of matter is the ultimate unit of matter. And the space occupied by a material atom is the ultimate unit of space. It is called pradesa (space-point).18 Though material atom is physically indivisible, it is amenable to mental divison because it possesses ananta attributes or modes. As these modes or parts of a material atom are inseparable from it and can only be nientally abstracted from it, they are never found physically discrete in space. So, a part of a material atom cannot serve as the defining measure of the unit of space. The physically indivisible unit of matter, viz. atom being discrete and concrete (as opposed to its abstracted part) serves as a defining measure of the unit of space. Though akasa does never accommodate two material bodies in the same space-points at a time, it, under certain conditions, can accommodate two upto ananta material atoms in one and the same space-point at a time19. This phenomenon becomes possible because material atoms in their subtle states, are conceived as mutually non-obstructive.20 Again, this phenomenon definitely proves the fact that a material atom is subtler than a space-point21.

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME 61 Akasa has ananta space-points22. But this number ananta is fixed in the sense that there is no possibility of increase or decrease of even a single space-point. The space-points are conceived as inseparable parts or avayavas of akasa. Thus a kasa is an avayaviastikaya23. Avayavas or parts (pradesas) of akasa are as much objectively existent as akasa of which they are parts. Were it not so, the two cities say, Ahmedabad and Poona which, like the two mountains, the Himavat and Vindhya, Occupy different locations of space, would, the Jainas affirm, tend to be at one location, which is an absurd position.24. They maintain that the partless akasa can never be a favourable receptacle for the objects having parts. Thus they contend that a kasa too must have parts; for, when the table exists in space, it does not cover the whole space, as case other things cannot exist at all anywhere; the table exists not in all space but in that part of space where it does actually exist, leaving room for the other objects to exist elsewhere; all this clearly implies that space too has parts; space is an avayavi. To be an avayavi does not necessarily mean that it should be produced from its avayavas put together at some point of time 5. Divisions of Akasa Akasa is ananta (infinite) in extension. That portion of it, which contains all substances, is called Lokakasa (universe-space) and that portion of akasa, which has no substance to accommodate in itself is called Alokakasa (Space- beyond- the Universe). Akasa is one only. Lokakasa and alokakasa are not two individual akasas. Thus this division is not in a kasa itself but it is due to its relation with other five substances 25. 6. Lokakasa Lokakasa has asamkhyata (innumerable) space-points.26 This number is fixed. That is, there is no possibility of increase or decrease of the space-points of lokakasa. Though lokakasa has asamkhyata space-points it accommodates ananta material atoms. The number ananta is infinite times greater than the number asar khyata. So, there arises a question as to how the space of asamkhyata space-points can accommodate ananta material atoms. The answer to this question is there in the Jaina belief that, under certain conditions, one space-point can accommodate more than one material atoms27.

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62 STUDIES IN JAINISM There is no possibility of expansion of loka kasa (universespace). There are two reasons for this. First, the lokakasa has fixed number of space-points and these space-points cannot expand or contract. Secondly, lokakaia can expand provided loka (universe) expands, and loka can expand provided the bodies get exploded and thrown into akaia which was till then cmply; but this possibility has no room in Jainism because according to this system the medium of motion is necessary for bodies to move from one place to another, and this medium of motion is not present in empty space, it is confined to the universe only. So no body crosses the limits of universe set up by the medium of motion. Thus universe is not expanding and hence universe-space is also not expanding. One may pose here another question : 'Does the universe s a whole move in the empty space with the result that though universe-space is fixed in its extension, this universe-space is not the smae for ever ?' He may further ask that as dharma (medium of motion) and adharma (medium of rest) pervade the universe they cannot move in the Universe, nor do they as individuals pecl themselves off the universe and slip into the non-universe because they constitute the nature of the universe, but what prevents them from moving with the universe in the empty space? These questions have not occurred to the Jaina thinkers and hence they have not answered them. The loka (universe) is of the form of a standing human trunk with two feet apart and two hands on hip28. So, secondarily the lokakasa (universe-space) may also be said to possess this form. Usually the formless is said to assume the form of its container. But there the formless container is said to assume the form of its content. Of course, loka kasa cannot be said to assume this form at some point of time. Like the areas (divisions) of Time Cycles, the different regions of lokakasa are characterised by the different degrees of pleasure or happiness. As we go higher and higher from the lowest region of the lokakasa the degree of happiness increases. The degree of happiness in the lowest region of lokakasa is almost nil, whereas the degree of happiness in the highest regions of lokakasa is the highest--ananta. A living being becomes more and more happy if he enters higher and higher regions of lokakasa, but for the entry he should earn the passport by his meritorious deeds. By

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME good acts a living being carns the passport for the entry into higher regions and by bad acts a living being earns the passport for the entry into lower regions. 7. Alokakasa As we know, akasa as a whole has ananta pradesas (spacepoints). And alokakasa also has ananta pradesas. Having taken asamkhyata pradesas of lokakasa from ananta pradesas of akasa as a whole, the remaining pradesas of alokakasa are still ananta. Alokakasa is infinite (ananta) but this infinity is also fixed in the sense that increase or decrease of a single space-point is an impossibility. Again, no encroachment from loka on its infinity is possible. Has aloka kasa any form ? No, it has no form. But it may be conceived as having the form of a parabola. Parabola is a symbol of spatial infinity. So, we may say that infinity of aloka kasa is represented by a parabola put on the highest end of lokakasa. And we may further say that its emptiness is represented by a sunya put in the parabola. But we cannot say all this because the Jainas have included the parabola (with a sunya in it) in the loka putting a boundary line of loka over it29 8. Application of Jaina Criterion of Reality As Akasa is real (sat), it must conform to the definition of reality. According to Jainism a real must possess a triple character of origination, persistence and decay. Ac. Kundakunda actually applied this criterion of reality to Jiva, Pudgala and Kala. But Pujyapada, Akalanka and later logicians attempt to apply it even to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa. Of course, the parinamas or changes of these substances had to be shown not directly but through those of living beings and matter. This difficulty is due to the peculiar nature of Dhrama, Adharia and Akasa which are one each, without any movement and pervade the whole universe. Their association with the different moments of Time also makes possible their modes or changes running parallel to the moments of Time. A mode of the entire space at time moment t is different from the next mode of the enire space at time moment ta, because they are associated with two different time-moments. Except this there is no other difference between two modes of space. Some

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64 STUDIES IN JAINISM might urge that as there is no substance--not even Time substancein aloka kasa, alokakasa should not undergo changes and consequently should not be regarded as a real. The Jainas contened that lokakasa and alokakasa being not two akakasa individuals, the effect of time is present throughout the one akasa. Again, they maintain that entire akasa undergoes changes through the rhythemic rise and fall in its agurulaghuguna (literally : neither-heavey-norlight-quality)30 SECTION II : TIME 1. Introductory In the < ldest times, we find the idea of Time as the highest principle and power governing all things. In the Atharvaveda we come across a hymn which extols time as the basis of all things; it creates all things and it destroys all things. This idea of Time further asserted itself. We find discussed in philosophical works the doctrine of time (kalavada) which traces all things back to Time. In the mouth of the upholder of this doctrine the following words are put : " Time brings all creatures to ripeness, Time again destroys all things. Time keeps awake among the sleepy. It is hard to transgress Time. Without Time not even a bean is cooked, even when a man has placed the pot in Fire; therefore a man knows that it has occured through Time.2" Time creates all things, Time ripens all things and Time destroys all things. Time is all-powerfull. But in the days of philosophical systems the doctrine of Time (kalavada) remains in the background and Time loses its importance as the prime ground of all things. Some philosophical systems altogether rejected Time and others that accepted it recognized it not as the prime ground of all things but merely as a condition of their temporal aspect. We need not enter into the exposition of the various conceptions of Time, found in different philosophical systems. 2. Time and Jaina Agamic Works In the Avasyaka Curni, three different views on the nature of time are referred to. Some say that time is a quality3; some maintain that is it nothing but modes of substancest; still some others opine that it is an independent substance (dravya) in addition

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME 65 to the five, namely, jiva (Soul Substance) pudgala, (Matter Substance), Akasa (Space Substance), Dharma and Adharma (Substances serving as the media of motion and inertia respectively)s. Out of these three views, the first is, to the best of my knowledge, neither referred to nor explained elsewhere in the whole of the Jaina literature. The last two views are considerably old and find mention in the Bhagavatisutrab. The Svetambara philosophers refer to both these views, though they favour either of them. The Digambara thinkers accepted that view only according to which time in an independent substance. 3. Arguments for the Time as an Independent Substance Now let us study the arguments put forward by the Svetambara and the Digambara thinkers to establish time as an independent substance. (1) The existence of real time is established by the incessant minute imperceptible changes (vartana) that go on in the five substances; without it these changes would not take place as it is their auxiliary cause?. To give a concrete example, we might say that the stone under a potter's wheel assists in the movement of the wheel. The stone here does not impart motion to the wheel, but without this stone such a kind of motion would not have been possible. Similarly, time assists or works as an auxiliary cause in the changes produced in substances, though it does not work as a cause proper in their production. (2) Jainas should accept Time as an independent substance. Though spiritual and material substances are regarded capable by nature to move and to rest, yet they have posited two independent substances Dharma and Adharma serving as the media or auxiliary causes of motion and inertia respectively. Similarly, though the five substances are by nature capable of transforming themselves into their proper modes, some auxiliary or general cause like Time should be posited to help them in their transformations. Were they to reject Time as an independent substance, they would have not right to posit Dharma and Adharma. The case of Time is on par with that of Dharma and Adharma' (3) Though all the causal conditions are there, the mango-tree, etc. do not bear fruits all at once; this suggests that there is Time substance, with varied capacities, which the effects expect for their fruition1o. (4) Time substance is a controlling principle. Without it terampol order could not be accounted for. Were it not an independent substance, all serial effects would J-5

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66 STUDIES IN JAINISM take place simultaneously and thus there would ensue chaos instead of order11 (5) Without Time substance, how ensue chaos instead of order11 (5) Without Time substance, how can we have particular divisios of Time ? Divisions imply something of which they are the divisions12 (6) Simple uncompounded word 'time presupposes an independent entity, namely, Time.13 (7) Activities like cooking etc. are conventionally referred to as 'cooking time' etc. But in this traditional usage of 'cooking time' and so on, the name of time is superimposed on activity. The term 'time' really signifies the existence of real time which is the basis of this conventional time14 (8) Those who maintain that time is nothing but movement of the sun and other luminaries are not right. Mere movements of the sun and stars could not account for the changes in substances. Even in regard to movement we say "it is past, it is present, "it is future'. Movements require the assistance of Time. Without it they are impossible. Minute changes constituting movements could not be explained if Time were not posited as an independent real substance.15 (9) It is untenable to maintain that Space (akasa) can very well perform the function assigned to time. In other words, to reject time as an independent substance we cannot legitimately maintain that Space serves as an auxiliary cause of the minute changes (vartana) in the five substances. Space merely contains or gives room to the substances. For instance, a pot can at the most support or contain the rice but it cannot cook the rice; for that we need fire16 (10) Some might even argue that 'Existence' (Satta) itself can perform the function of time; and hence there is no need of positing an independent substance called Time. But this view is not sound. Minute imperceptible changes themselves constitute the nature of Existence'. So, how could it be viewed as an auxiliary cause of minute changes17. (11) A theory is propounded by some that time is nothing but activity (kriya). Akalanka explains it as follows. Movement of an ato from one space-point to the next space-point is called an 'instant'. There is nothing like a minute time over and above this movement to measure the span of this instant. The collection of these instantaneous activities is called avalika, the collection of these is called ucchvasa and so on. There is no entity called Time. In our every day usage we say "he sits as long as the cows are milked.' Here the usage of 'time' is based on the activities. When one

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME 67 activity is circumscribed or limited by another activity, to the latter is applied the term 'time'. Thus time is nothing but activity18. Akalanka refutes this view in the following manner. He admits that the usages like 'he did it within a wink of an eye', 'he did it within a breath' are no doubt based on activities. But he points out that our application of the term 'time' to activities of 'winking', 'breathing' etc. could not be without any ground whatsoever. Take an example of our application of the term "dandi' (Staff-bearer) to Devadatta. This application of the term 'dandi' to Devadatta ld not be baseless. Its basis is the relation obtaining between danda (staff) and Devadatta. Similarly, we should maintain that there is something like Time which, being in relation with activity, makes possible our application of the term 'time' to activity 19. Moreover, if we were to consider time as identical with activity, the contingency of the absence or non-existence of the present would ensue. How ? In connection with activity there are only two alternative states, namely activity either done or undone. There is no third state in its connection, namely, activity neither done nor undone. Thus activity is devoid of its present and hence it cannot provide the basis for the usage of present. And past and future being relative to present, in the absence of present they too would be non-existent20. It might be suggested that the collection of activities from the beginning of the effect to its completion is called present. But this stand is very weak. The activities being momentary, how could there be any possibility of their collection21. Again, if it were argued that time is not accepted independent of activities on the ground that it is not cognised as distinct from activities, Akalanka retorts that similar logic should be applied by the opponent to activities. When done so, even activities would suffer the same fate as that of time; they would be nothing over and above agents or substances as they are not cognised as distinct from them22. The last argument adduced by Akalanka against this theory is that an activity cannot limit or measure another activity. Only persistent or perdurable things can meausre another such thing. But activity being momentary how can it meausre another such activity ? A thing which itself is momentary can never meausre another (momentary) thing23. 4. Time Substance according to Digambaras According to the Digambara thinkers, time is atomic. There

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68 STUDIES IN JAINISM are innumerable time-atoms. Each time-atom occupies one spacepoint of the cosmic space. Thus time-atoms are confined to cosmic space only. They are not present in the space beyond cosmos24. They do not combine to form molecules as the material atoms do. Nor do they constitute one single whole as the spacepoints do. Thus they have no spatial extension (tiryakpracaya). Only those substances that have spatial extension are termed astikaya. Hence time is not counted among astikayas.25 Time-atoms go on assuming different modes all the while. All these modes are not measurable. The smallest measurable mode of a time-atom is termed 'sa maya' (instant) which is defined as the time taken by a material atom to traverse a unit of space by slow movement. Each time-atom has infinite such modes27. Though these modes are not simultaneous, a time-atom being a substance pervades all of them. That is, these modes are not discreate, without any permanent substance underlying them. This is the reason why time-atoms are said to have temporal extension (urdhvapracaya)2 Time-atoms are motionless29 and hence each of them for every occupy one particular space-point in cosmic space. They are eternal as they are atomic and do not form aggregates30. Origination, persistence and decay in their case are explained through the origination, persistence and decay of other things31. It is also said that they are eternal in the sense that they never give up their own nature and that the origination and decay in their case is due to the rhythmic rise and fall of their agurulaghuguna (untranslatable term, literally means neither-heavy-nor-light-quality32). A. Kundakunda maintains that a time-atom undergoes origination persistence and decay at one and the same moment33 Time-atoms are devoid of physical qualities like colour, etc. and in this sense only they are called amurta34. They are subtle and imperceptible35. Though other substances require time as an auxiliary cause in the emergence of their modes, time-atoms do not require any other substance as an auxiliary cause in the production of their own modes. Digambara thinkers recognize two types of Time-Absolute (mukhva) and Conventional (vyava harika). A time-atom with immeasurable minutest modes is Absolute time. In other words. a continuum of immeasurable minutest inodes of a time-atom is Absolute time36 But modes of a timc-atom, that are measured

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME 69 by motion of a material atom or a heavenly luminary constitute Conventional time37. Absolute time has no reference to motion of a material atom or a heavenly luminary whereas Conventional time has pointed reference to it. So, it is said that absolute time does not require motion of a material atom or a heavenly luminary for its mainfestation, whereas Conventional time does require it for its manifestation. Absolute time is the auxiliary cause of the immeasurable minutest modes of substances38 whereas Conventional time is the auxiliary cause of the measurable modes of substance. As time-atoms are spread over the entire cosmic space, Absolute time is present everywhere in the cosmic space. As the motion of a material atom is available throughout the cosmic space, samaya division of Conventional time is also present in the entire cosmic space. But as the motion of the sun and other heavenly luminaries is not available outside the space inhabited by human beings, the divisions of Conventional time having reference to this motion are confined only to this portion of cosmic space39. Absolute time being what it is, usage or division of past, present, and future is metaphorically or secondarily applicable to it; but it is primarily applicable to Conventional time40. 5. Time Substance according to Svetambaras A few out of those Svetambara thinkers who recognised time as an independent substance favour the Digambara view. AC. Hemacandra is the foremost among them41. But others reject the Digambara view. According to them time is not atomic. It is not a manifold of atoms. It is one and pervades the entire cosmic space. Though it is one whole, it can be said to have spatial parts. It has extension over the cosmic space and the parts of this space covered by it are obviously understandable in terms of the parts of time substance. Consequently time substance is entitled to being characterised as an extensive substance (astikaya). Tradition however restricts the use of this notion to five substances, but this does not annul its extensity (tiryakpracaya or astikayata)42. Though it pervades the entire cosmic space, its divisions, viz. day, month, year, etc. which depend upon planetary movements are not possible outside human region because planetary movements are available in human region only43. As it pervades the entire cosmic space, it is motionless.

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10 STUDIES IN JAINISM Time substance is constitutionally dynamic in the sense that it continuously undergoes changes by virtue of its intrinsic nature like other substances. Changeless time substance cannot assist changes in other substances. So, time substance is not changeless. Thus time qua substance is one, but time qua modes is many. Though time substance is changeing it never loses its identity. It permeates and pervades all its modes. Thus time qua substance has temporal extension (urdhvapracaya) also44. The ultimate measurable unit of time is called samaya (instant). It is measured by the movement of a material atom over the spacepoint. Hence it is defined as the time taken by a material atom to traverse one space-point by slow movement. Time substance has infinite samayas. As a samaya is an ultimate measurable unit of time substance, it is devoid of temporal parts. A samaya is not bereft of time substance. But the time substance contained in it is indivisible. Hence a samaya is devoid of substantial parts also. But as a samaya pervades the entire cosmic space of innumerable space-points, it may be conceived as possessed of spatial parts. As it is possessed of a plurality of spatial parts, it is capable of being charaterised as an astikaya. Again, it has manifold of capcities with which it assists various changes proper to infinite number of substances. These capacities may also be conceived as its parts45. All the samayas are not absolutely discrete; they are related to one another by an underlying time substance4. 6. Relative Subtlety of Units of Time, Space and Matter It is interesting to have some idea of the relative subtlety of units of time, space and matter. A space-point (pradesa) is subtler than a time-point (samaya). It is contended that the number of spacepoints of a small space of one angula is equal to the number of time-points of a countless number of cycles of time. But an atom of matter is subtler than even a spacepoint. An infinite number of atoms can be accommodated in one space-point. Thus a material atom is subtler than a space-point and a space-point is subtler than a time-point47. 7. Time identical with Change We have studied the view that Time is an independent substance which assists change in various substances. But according to the

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME 71 other view Time is nothing but modes or changes of substances. In other words, Time is identical with change and nothing over and above change. The minute changes and gross changes are merely the modes of substances. And the Jainas being the upholders of the theory of non-absolutism (syadvada), believe that there obtains a relation of indentity-cum-difference between a substance and its modes. In other words, according to them, modes are in a way identical with the substance. Hence the name 'substance' (dravya) is secondarily applied to them also. As a result of this, time which is nothing but modes of substances is also called substance. The statement, occurring in the Bhagavatisutra, that Jiva and Ajivasubstances themselves are called Time means that modes of these substances are called Time; Time is nothing over and above these modes48 Substances undergo incessant minute changes by virtue of their intrinsic nature. An independent time substance is not required to assist them in their modification or change. These minute changes or modes are not measurable. So, the Jainas seem to have conceived a mode sufficiently thick to be measured. This is called samaya or moment, the ultimate measurable mode of a substance49. This mode is measured by the slow movement of a material atom over one space-point. Where the movement is fast, the thickness of the mode would get reduced to such an extent that it would not remain amenable to measurement. What are called avalika, muhurta, etc. are merely the long and short series of the ultimate measurable modes. The argument that the case of an independent Time Substance is on par with Dharma and Adharma is not sound. Dharma and Adharma are, of course, posited to account for motion and inertia respectively. But motion and inertia of a substance are not eternal. Sometimes we find a substance in motion and sometimes we find it at rest. This suggests that there must be some condition of motion and intertia over and above the substance itself. And hence the Jainas posited Dharma and Adharma as conditions or media of motion and intertial. Those who posit Time as an independent substance do so to account for mainly the incessant minute changes. But according to the Jainas such changes are eternalwithout beginning and end. Hence it is not necessary to posit a asual condition to account for it. What is eternal-beginningless and endless has no cause whatsoever. Again, the argument that without an independent Time substance the order of the world

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72 STUDIES IN JAINISM could not be explained; that in its absence, the seed, the sprout and the fruit would emerge simultaneously-is also very weak. The order of the universe is firmly based on the principle of causality. The temporal order is reducible to causal order. Time as an independent substance is superfluous. The description of Time substance as atomic seems metaphorical. Each and every material atom could be called time-atom. And this very well explains the scriptural statements regarding the absence of its spatial extension (apradesi)50. The conception of Time as an independent substance is vitiated by many contingencies. The main one is as follows: Time is posited to account for the incessant minute changes in other subtances, but what would account for the changes in the Time substance itself ? If it be said that the modification of Time substance is natural and hence requires no other causal condition, the same logic should be applied to explain the modification of other substances. If some other auxiliary cause is posited to explain changes in Time substance, it would inolve infinite regress. Hence the view of an independent Time substance is weak and unsounds1. 8. Jaina Cycle of Time According to the Jainas. Cycle of Time ceaselessly and eternally moves on. It consists of two halves. One half represents the period of progress with the gradual increase in happiness. And the other half represents the period of decadence with the gradual decrease in happiness. Each period is again divided into six parts (aras). The period of decadence has the following six parts : (1) The part characterised by the greatest happiness (susama susama) (2) The part characterisd by some happiness but absolutely no misery (susama) (3) The part characterised by excess of happiness over misery (susama-dusama) (4) The part characterised by excess of misery over happiness (dusama-susama) The part characterised by some misery but absolutely no happiness (dusama) (6) The part characterised by the greatest misery (dusama dusama).

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME It is noteworthy that the Jainas have not recognised the possibility of the following two parts : (1) the part characterised by absolute absence of both happiness and misery, (2) the part characterised by exactly equal quantities of both happiness and misery. The above mentioned six parts in the reverse order constitute the six parts of the period of progress. During the period of progress the bodily strength, bodily height and lifespan gradually increase. During the period of decadence the living beings gradually lose their bodily strengh, bodily height and life-span. Each such period of progress and decadence is ten crores of ocean Time. The two periods together constitute one complete round of Time Cycle. This one round is called Kalpa.52 REFERENCES Part-I 1. Introduction to Abhidharmadipa, p. 90. 2. Ibid. 3. Rgveda 1.31.4; 2.27.11; 10.82.4; 1.30.21, 7.67.2. 4. Sankhyasutra, 2.12. 5. Tattvarthasutra, 5.1-2. 6. Pravacanasara, 2.40. 7. Pancastikayatatparyavrtti, gatha 76. 8. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.12. 9. Tattvarthasutra, 5.6. 10. Tattvartha sutra, 5.4. 11. Ibid. 12. Tattvarthasutra, 5.7. 13. Tattvarthasutra, 5.18. 14. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.12. 15. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.12. 16. Tattvarthasara, 31, Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics' (H. S. Bhatta charya), p. 85-86. 17. Pancastikaya, 14. 18. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.8. 19. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.10. 20. Bhagavati 5.7. 21. Avasyakaniryukti (Agamodaya) 37. 22. Tattvarthasutra, 5.9.

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74 STUDIES IN JAINISM 23. Tattvarthasutra, 5.1. 24. Tattvartharajavartika, 5.8; Sanmatitarkaprakarapatika (Gujrat University Publication) p. 641. 25. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.12; Rajavartika, 5.12. 26. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.10. 27. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.10. 28. Lokaprakasa, 12.3. 29. In the Bhagavatisutra Alokakasa is conceived as having the form of a hollow sphere. (11-10-420). 30. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.7. Part-II 1. Atharvaveda, 19.53. 2. Sastravartasamuccaya, 166. 3. Avasyaka curni (Ratlam ed.) p. 340. 4. Ibid., p. 340. 5. Ibid., p. 341. 6. Kimidan bhante Kalo tti pavuccai ? Goyama, jiva ceva ajiva ceva tti, kai nam bhante davva pannatta ? Goyama, cha davya pannatta. Tam jaha dhammatthikae, adhammatthikae, agasasthikae, puggaatthikae jivatthikae, addhasamaye ya. Bhagavati. 7. Sarvarthasiddhi (Ed, Pt. Phulchandji) p. 291. 8. Dravyasangrahavitti, gatha, 21. 9. Dravyanuyogatarkapa (Nirnayasagar Ed.), p. 175. 10. Lokaprakasa, 28.48. 11. Tattvarthasutra, Siddhasenagamitika, 4.15. 12. Lokaprakasa, 28.21. 13. Lokaprakasa, 28.20. 14. Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 292. 15. Rajavartika (Ed. Mahendrakumar), p. 477. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., p. 482. 19. Ibid., pp. 482-83. 20. Ibid., p. 483. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Dravyasangraha, gatha, 22. 25. Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 312; Pravacanasaratattvadipika, 2.49. 26. Tattvarthabhasya, 4.15.

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME 75 27. Tattvartbasutra, 5.40. 28. Pravacanasaradipika, 2.49. 29. Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 313. 30. Rajavartika, p. 482. 31. Ibid. 32. Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 312. 33. Pravacanasara, 2.51. 34. Rajavartika, p. 482. 35. Ibid., p. 501. 36. Dravyasangrabavitti, gatha 21. 37. Rajavartika, p. 222 38. Ibid., p. 482. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Yogasastravstti, 1.16. 42. Siddhasenaganitika (Tattvartha), p. 434. 43. Lokaprakasa 28.105 44. Siddhasenaganitika pp. 430-31. 45. Ibid., p. 434. 46. Ibid. 47. Avasyakaniryukti (Agamodaya), 37. 48. Lokaprakasa, 28.5,11, 12. 49. Tattvarthasiddhasenaganitika 4.15 (p. 290) 50. Dravyanuyogatarkana, 10.18-19 51. Darsana aur Cintana, Pt. Sukhalalji, pp. 331-2. Discussion K. C. Sogani : Is it possible to experience time as we experience matter? M. P. Marathe : How is one to understand the expression mental division? in terms of distinguishability or separability ? Secondly, how to understand 'avaya vas or parts of Akasa' - in the sense of Avayava or Amica? Lastly, are omnitemporality and timelessness the same? N. J. Shah : If matter is severed from space there shall be no change and without change experience of time is difficult. S. S. Barlingay : Change and time are coimplicans but have Jainas said it ?

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76 STUDIES IN JAINISM N. J. Shah : On one view they are. On another they are identical. S. S. Barlingay : ___What is the expression for identity -- tadatmya? N. J. Shah : Paryaya -- Jivadi paryayah kalasya S. S. Barlingay: But how to understand this-as Jiva is a paryaya of kala ? N. J. Shah : No; it rather means inseparability of time from Jiva. S. S. Barlingay : But similarly Jiva is inseparable from time; and even so Jiva cannot be understood as paryaya of time. N. J. Shah : Perhaps what is intended is time is nothing over and above Jiva and is an avayava as a drop of water is of water. K. P. Jog : A drop of water is not an avayava but an amsa of water. N. J. Shah : Yes, you are right. M. P. Marathe : You should also explain your contention that akasa is a whole. N. J. Shah : Akasa is a whole and its avayavas are not skandhas but pradesas. Izvaracandra zAstrI: jIva Adike paryAya hI kAla ke paryAya hai| vartana Adi kAla ke paryAya nahIM mAne jA skte| ke. sI. sogAnI: pAramArthika aura vyAvahArika kAla meM pharka karake hameM kahanA cAhie ki pradeza Adi jo space ke avayava kahe gaye haiM ve space ko samajhAne ke lie haiN| Izvaracandra : yaha kahanA jaina darzana ke viruddha hai| nyAya, vaizeSika aura vedAMta darzanoMke anusAra vyApaka dravyake avayava nahIM hote / usI taraha jIva aura AkAzake avayava alaga nahIM kiye jA sakate / kevala pudgalakehI avayava alaga alaga ho sakate haiN|

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF JIVA AND SARVAJNATA Ramjee Singh According to Jain Philosophy, Knowledge is the inherent and distinguishing characteristic of the Jiva or Soul. If it were not the nature of the Jiva, it would be either the nature of the Ajiva or of nothing whatsoever. In the former case, the unconscious becomes the conscious, and the soul would be unable to know itself or anything else; because it would be then devoid of consciousness. In the later case, there would be no knowledge, nor any consciousness, being which, happily is not a fact. Knowledge and the knower cannot be seperated from each other as a substance is inseperable from its attributes. This proves that self and knowledge are inseperable. There is no soul without knowledge and there is no knowledge without soul. Omniscience, therefore, becomes the natural property of the soul and non-omniscience only adventitious or accidental owing its existence to some external causes or obstructives. However, to the Nyaya-Vaisiskas, consciousness is an adventitious quality of the soul which comes temporarily as an effect of a complete cognitive mechinery - contact between sense and object and then between sense and mind and finally between mind Presented in "Seminar on Jaina Logic and Philosophy" (Poona University 1975)

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78 STUDIES IN JAINISM and the soul. Soul, therefore, according to the Nyaya-Vaisisikas is devoid of all cognition. But Jainas argue that if consciousness is absolutely different from the soul, there will be no knowledge. Like Bradley, we can say that if quality is different from the substance i. e. the relation is external, the attempt to relate the one to the other is bound to lead to infinite regress. To say that since the soul is the agent ( Karta ) and cognition is the instrument (Karanas), the distinction between the two is necessary, is incorrect. Their relation is like that of eye and the vision and not like that of lamp and vision. Therefore, to the Jainas, knowledge is identical with the soul just as serpent is identical with the coil of his body. We are always aware of ourselves as the knower and never as unconscious, or first being unconscious and then becoming conscious as a result of our relation with the consciousness. The Nyaya-Vaisisikas cannot save the situation by playing on words that in the sentence, "I have knowledge", there is a proved distinction between the self and consciousness. The sankhya position that Purusa is of the nature of Consciousness is also difficult to accept. The intellect or buddhi is treated by sankhya thinkers as unconscious being an evolute of Prakrti. To the Vedantins also, the quality of knowing does not constitute the nature of Brahman for Brahman is above these limitations, because He is pure existence-consciousness. The quality of knowing is the function of consciousness when associated with the internal organ (antahkarana). Brahman is free from the duality of knower and known. The Vedanta treats all empirical knowledge as only psuedo-knowledge. But the Jainas claim to preserve the concreteness of knowledge and empirical knowledge because they neither treat intellect as unconscious nor do they acuse empirical knowledge as being of the nature of psuedo-knowledge. There is no problem of relation between the soul and consciousness to the Buddhists, because they do not believe in the existence of any substance like soul. Cognition to them is a function of the beginningless stream of consciousness (citta) which takes the form of Alaya Vijnana and Pravstti Vijnana. The Mimansakas, on the other hand, treat consciousness as the attribute of soul. However, the Bhattas regard knowledge as not selfrevelatary but only "inferentially cognisable by something other than itself (paranumeya)." In that case, we cannot establish the validity of this position because even an explanation of its meaning is an attempt at knowing it and this knowing, if it is not self-revela.

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF JIVA AND SARVAJNATA tory will not be intelligible. But this is an absurd position. It is commonly accepted that non-practical unknown piece of knowledge cannot establish its meaning. That which is itself unconscious cannot help some one in cognising other things. Unless we our low our own experience, how can we claim to know others ? II The distinction between the empirical and the spiritual self is based on the distinction between what man actually is and what he may become. Potentially the soul possesses infinite knowledge or is omniscient, which has been substantiated by certain principles of the Jaina ethics and metaphysics. Firstly, the concept of gradation in the form of Panca Paramesthi (Five kinds of Divine souls) indicates a gradual unfolding of the potentialities of the self : the Arhat (Perfect and embodied souls) the Siddhas (Perfect souls), the Acharyas (experts), Upadhyayas (experts guiding ascetics) and Sadhus (ascetics devoted to the contemplation of self). The Arthats or the perfect embodied souls possess infinite knowledge and preach the whole truth. Then there are five kinds of conditions for existence (gati) of the soul - hellish (nara kiya), sub-human (tiryanca), human (manusiya), celestial beings (Deva), and libertated beings (Siddha). The different states of existence are the different modifications of Jiva gradually leading to infinite knowledge and happiness. Thus the state of liberation or Siddha-Gati is the ideal state of existence of the soul. There is a tendency in Jainism to classify souls according to the degrees of their development because there is a belief in the natural upward movement of the soul by virtue of which one can reach to the highest state of existence. There is a tendency towards a serial gradation from the less perfect to the more perfect. There is such a principle known as Margana or Gradation of fineness of the Jivas. Every soul is potentially equipped with four-fold infinitness. (Ananta-Chatustaya). Hence, we find a gradation according to the stages of spiritual development of the soul. The inner light, the quest of perfection, is never extinguished in the soul. Omniscience is the legitimate claim of very soul as it follows from the essential nature of the soul as consciousness. Omniscience is the natural culmination of consciousness. However, it does not come all at once. There are

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80 STUDIES IN JAINISM various stages of spirituality and omniscience is attained in the last stage. The classification of the transcendental spirit into external (Bahiratman), internal (antaratman) and absolute (Paramantman) indicate the three stages of the progress of soul. The Bahiratman represents the materialistic view of self; the internal soul is of the nature of knowledge and well-established in perfect tranquility. This internal self is further sub-divided into the types--superior, inferior and in between the two. However, the Parmatman is the super-spirit which exists in knowledge. It has been classified into spirit (Arhat) and super-spirit (sedoha). The spirit becomes the super-spirit when it knows itself, exists in knowledge, and is free from Karmas. When the Atman is known everything is known. This sounds like Upanisadic idealism "one who knows the self knows everything." However, the subject matter of perfect knowledge according to the upanisads and the Jainas is different because of different metaphysical stand-points. In fact, soul is the very embodiment of knowledge, so, when one knows the soul one knows everything. Omniscience being an innate potential property of the soul, the fact of its being the ground of omniscience is also thereby established. But there are arguments based on perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), analogy (upamana), scriptural authority (Agamas), circumstantial implication (arthapatti) and non-cognition (abhava) for the existence of soul. However these classical proofs may be regarded as indirect proofs to omniscience since soul is the substratum of omniscience. To the Jainas, the soul and consciousness are inseparable. In fact knowledge without self or self without knowledge is inconceivable. Omniscience is not perfection of knowledge but also of happiness and bliss. The inseparability of soul and consciousness follows from the fact that the soul is the substance and consciousness is the attribute. This means that they are not externally related. Their inseparability follows from the very definition of substance as possessed of attributes and modifications and also that attributes depend upon substance because they can exist only as residing in substances. Soul as 'the substratum of consciousness is the basis of knowledge. When the soul is in the pure state, omniscience is inevitable. We miay question about the achievability of the ideal but we have to

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF JIVA AND SARVAJNATA accept it to be logically possible. When the soul is in pure state and where there are no obstructions, omniscience is inevitable and natural because soul is constitutionally a knowing being. It is very interesting to study the various objections raised by the Mimamsakas and the answer given by the Jainas and Buddhists side by side. The arguments based on classical pramanas are also very interesting. Leaving them aside, I have chosen to advance a few positive Jaina arguments for the existence of the omniscient being. The argument from the nature of soul as consciousness implies that consciousness and soul are not different things which can be separated from each other, nor are they related together by some external relation like Samavaya. The soul is either conscious or unconscious before it is being related to consciousness through external relation. Now, the soul cannot already be conscious before it is related to consciousness by samavaya, because then samava ya need not be there. If, on the other hand, it is unconscious, it may be so either due to unconsciousness being its very nature or due to unconsciousness being its property. If the latter is the case, inherence is again useless, since the soul is already accepted as unconscious; but if, on the other hand, unconsciousness is its very nature then it is similar to saying that consciousness is its very nature. In short, there cannot be any valid objection to accepting consciousness as the nature of the soul. Hence the soul and knowledge are not separable from each other like fire and heat but are co-extensive with each other. But this essentially knowing ability of the soul is crippled by it's long association with the Karmic-matter and comes back to its original glory when the obstacles are removed. Both positive and negative analogy have been given. As fire burns fuel when there is no obstacle, similarly the knowing-self will know anything, when all obstructions are removed. Negatively just as a diamond covered with dust does not reflect its usual lusture, so the self covered with knowledge-obscuring karmas etc. does not know anything. The argument from inferability (anumeyatva) is as follows. The existence of an omniscient being is established from the fact that to some beings, invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time and place become known as objects of direct perception. This knowledge could not have been derived through the senses because there is no sense-object-contact. This leads to the inference J- 6

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82 STUDIES IN JAINISM that these things must have been known in some non-sensuous way There is nothing which is not the object of some knowledge: every object must be knowable by somcone, by anyone of the means of cognition. This means that there must be someone who could hold to other everything as an object of his knowledge, who is an omniscient. An important proof of omniscience is based on the necessity of final consumation of the progressive development of knowledge. But there is a limit to the development of our cognitive powers. Through practicc and other things our powers develop but no one has been found to become capable of perceiving things beyond the reach of senses, however rich his practice may be. Similarly, the development of knowledge cannot necessarily take the form of omniscience. But granting the possibility of refining all intelligence by practice and exercise, it cannot be proved that this process has inherent limitations. Knowledge in one field does not necessarily imply knowledge in all other fields. To hold that our knowledge suffers from inherent limitations is another dogmatic assertion. Newer frontiers of knowledge are being known and who knows whether what has been unknown to us will always remain unknown to us. There are other arguments also like the argument based on the truth of astronomical prcdictions, arguments based on the absolute non-existence of any obstructive pramanas and argument from the natural tendency of thought to go from part. to whole. It is a tendency of human thought to transcend its limits. According to Jainisin every soul possesses in its natural state only the pure knowledge or omniscience which is exhibited in five different forms depending upon the extent and penetration of knowledgeobscuring Karmas. So in perceptual knowledge (mati-jnana) there is a partial glimpse of pure knowledge (Kevala-jnana), the doctrine of Kevala-jnana is a distinctive achievement of the Jainas in Indian epistemology. The other Indian systems have been able to recognise only the six kinds of Pramanas ranging from perception to negation : Keva la-jnana has a super-validity of its own. It is like a mirror which shows the purity and exactitude of knowledge without any distinction or confusion and the absence of any effort, mental or sensorial. Ever free from obstruction fully absorbed in one's own self, the Supreme Soul is effulgent like the sky in the highest stage.

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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI M. P. Marathe Umasvati's Tattvarthadhigamasutra (TAS) is devoted to the statement and elaboration of the threefold Mok samarga. He himself wrote a commentray on it for the purposes of explanation and clarification. But in both these works Umasvati seems to have used certain expressions amphibiously and equivocally. In some places he has attempted to explain the significance of one expression by another expression. This seems to give the impression that he reckons these expressions as synonymous. In some other places he appears to have used certain expressions interchangeably. These instances tend to generate certain ambiguities and confusions. It is the object of this paper to focus on some of them and point out that, neither in the TAS nor in the commentary, Umasvati has made any attempt to avert then. It will also be pointed out that he does not clearly demarcate the boundaries of the significances of those expressions. The cxpressions in question are : Artha, Tattva, Padartha, Dravya and Sat. Of these, the discussion of the first three expressions seems to give rise to one set of amphibious expressions, while that of the last two to another. After dealing with them, we shall hint at one methodologically weak point in Presented in the "Colloquium on Jaina Philosophy, Logic, Literature and Culture." (Poona University, 1977). Published in 3978279 87115 1 (Bombay, Udaipur, 1979).

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84 STUDIES IN JAINISM Umasvati that seems to emerge. We shall concentrate on the first and the fifth chapters of the TAS. For, it is in these chapters and commentary on them that the discussion of the significances of these expressions figures mainly, if not exclusively. Coming to the first set of amphibious expressions. Let us first deal with "Tattva'. After the prefatory remarks, in which Umasvati tells us that Samyak darsana, Samyak Jijana and Samyak Caritra are the three pillars of the Mok samarga, he begins the discussion of tattvas. For, Samyak darsana, according to him, is nothing else than either acceptance of Tattvas or Arthas, or acceptance of Arthas as they are. We are not told what the word Artha signifies. Since difference of opinion about the commonly accepted convention is not registered it seems that by Artha is meant an object, no matter of what kind. Similarly, regarding the significance of the word "Tattva', too, any deviation from the convention noticed. This means that Tattva seems to signify that which is the case or that which is accepted to be the case. On the contrary, the word Artha means an object, no matter given or not. It (Artha) can be an object presupposed, talked about, mentioned or of any other sort. Umasvati seems to hold that the expressions 'tattra' and 'artha' are loosely interchargeable, if not totaly synonymous. Our contention is not that they cannot at all be so, but that they need not necessarily be so. That the expressions artha' and tattya' cannot necessarily be taken to be synonymous does not seems to have struck Umasvati. That is why he appears to have taken that which is accepted to be the case and that which is considered to be an object as the same. Something may be presupposed to be a case or a fact; but every fact is not an object. For example, it is raining is a fact, not an object. Again something may be an object, but need not necessarily be a fact. Nor should it necessarily be taken to be so. For instance, according to some, a proposition is an object but this need not make it a fact too. Or, according to some, there are negative facts; but that does not signify that there are negative objects also. Thus, given objects, that there will be facts is a permanent possibility. Conversely, given facts, that they will comprise of objects is quite understandable. Yet, what facts comprise of are not objects alone. Moreover, facts and objects need not be the same. Umasvati does not merely seem to hold that

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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI 85 Tattvas and Arthas are the same. He seems also to favour the view that each one of them should, in principle, be capable of being given empirically,2 This view would hold provided we are talkir about empirical objects and not about any object whatever. Interchangeability of the expressions Tattva and Artha would be a weak link in Umasvati's explanation For, that seems to generate the view that the sets of Tattvas and Arthas are co-extensive. And it seems difficult to accept such a view. Again in his commentary on 1.2 he mentions that Jiva etc. are Tattyas and in 1.4 he proceeds to enumerate them. He enumerates seven Tattvas,3 and in the commentary on 1.4 he writes that these are seven kinds of objects. Here there seems to be a slip. Kinds or sorts can be enumerated, but what is enumerated need not necessarily be sorts or kinds. Such an enumeration can even be by naming. Naming is an enumerative device but not necessarily a sortal one. For instance, when I enumerate the persons present at the meeting naming them as Ram, Kiran, Ajit etc., I am not enumerating kinds of persons. Here, then, Umasvati seems to overlook the distinction between enumerated individuals or objects and kinds of objects which can be enumerated. Thus, in the first instance, it is incorrect to cquate Tattvas with Arthas, and further maintain that the same basis and pattern of classification would apply to both of them. Further, in his commentary on 1.4 Umasvati states that these Tattvas (which were earlier taken to be objects or their kinds) are Padarthas. That means, he appears to take the terms Tattva and Padartha as synonymous. But this seems to be an error as would be clear in our further discussion. As in the case of the word Artha or Tattva, Umasvati does not register any deviation from the commonly accepted convention regarding the word Padartha. There are three different generally accepted senses of the word Padartha. It may nevertheless be granted that these three senses might not be so understood at the time of Umasvati or perhaps even later. For, Pujyapada, who wrote a commer on the work of Umasvati also does not shed any light on the issue. Be that as it may. But the general context of the word Padartha leads one to believe that Umasvati perhaps uses it in one sense, viz., 'Padasya padena sucitah va arthah'. This is because as stated earlier, he presumes that the expressions Padartha and Tattva are interchangeable, however, loosely they may be.

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86 STUDIES IN JAINISM What seems to have guided Umasvati's view is that both Tattvas and Padarthas can be enumerated. Prima facie this contention is sound as far as it goes. Enumerative rather than classificatory statement of Padarthas appears to be common to the discussion of Padarthas by the Pracina Niava and that by Umasvati. Similarly, the Samkhyas as also Umasvati adopt the enumerative pattern while enlisting their Tattvas. But this seems to be too weak a ground for Padarthas being equated with Tattyas. Equation of Tattvas with Padarthas seems to be Umasvati's innovation. But let it not be forgotten that innovations, philosophical or otherwise, should be meaningful and tenable. The only point which Umasvati seems to bring to the focus successfully is that both Tattvas and Padarthas can be mentioned by enumeration. But this does not warrant the equation of the two. As one proceeds in one's study of Umasvati's works one begins to notice yet weaker links in his explanatory observations. Whereas consideration of Tattvas presupposes no use of communicative language and the scheme of concepts it brings in, that of Padarthas, does presuppose them. For, by Tattvas one may minimally mean the topics around which a philosophical discussion is designed to centre. It is irrelevant and redundant whether any statements are made about them or whether anything is attempted to be, communicated about them. Regarding Padarthas, on the contary the case seems to be different. They presuppose language and communication, no matter whether successful or not. This being the case, it seems misleading to suppose that Tattvas and Padarthas are the same. Further, there can be no language, which is bereft of concepts. Any consideration of and in terms of Padarthas, therefore, presupposes some concepts. Perhaps, it presupposes an interrelation between or among such concepts also. But it is doubtful whether a consideration of Tattvas also presupposes any concepts and the interrelation between or among them. Supposing, again, even if one grants, for the sake of argument, that there is some relation, proximate or remote, between Tattvas and Padarthas, it does not follow that one should accept as many Tattvas as Padarthas. Further it is irrelevant for any philosophical inquiry to talk in terms of both of them. The number of items which the employment of significant expressions in a language designates and the number of topics or items that figure in a philo

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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI 87 sophical discussion need not necessarily bear any relation to one another. Nor should there be one to one correspondence among them. This is not, of course, to say that they cannot at all be related. The only point is that there is no necessary relation between them and the acknowledgement of a contingent relation between them docs not seem to suffice for the establishment of the synonymity or interchangeability of the expressions. This being the case, it seems equally dobutful whether sets of Tattvas and Padarthas be taken to be co-extensive. As pointed out earlier, Umasvati seems to take the sets of Tattvas and Arthas as co-extensive. Now, since he holds Tattvas and Arthas on the one hand and Tattvas and Padarthas on the other as co-extensive, he seems to favour the view that the sets of Padarthas and Arthas are also co-extensive. Indeed this scems difficult to accept for there is not any additioal explanation and clarification available in Umasvati's works. Further, Umasvati states that he intends to explain Padarthas in detail, definitionally or symptomatically (laksanatah) and (ca) stipulatively (vidhanatah)6. There may not be any objection to this procedure provided one does not intend to derive any ontological implication from one's discussion of Padarthas. But it is not correct to hold that the procedure of explaining Padarthas and Tattvas can be the same. Even if the procedures of explaining both of them may contingently meet and tally, it is doubtful whether it would hold universally and necessarily. This seems, therefore, to be another weak link in the procedure of Umasvati's discussion. It seems that Umasvati would adopt the same procedure with regard to Arthas. One might ignore this as a similar kind of weak point in Umasvati's explanation just mentioned. But it all depends upon how the logical connective and (ca) is to be understood and interpreted. If it is interpreted conjunctively it would lead to one consequence. If, on the contrary, it is interpreted disjunctively, that would lead to another consequence. But more about this at the end of the paper. II Up to the close of the fourth chapter of the TAS and Umasvati's Bliasya thereon, the discussion centres around the explanation of the nature of Jiva and other related topics. At the very beginning of the fifth chapter he declares his intention of proceeding to consider the nature of Ajivas,7 they being the second Tattva. This, as

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88 STUDIES IN JAINISM far as it goes, is in line with his declaration of considering various Tattyas or Padarthas in the same sequential order in which they have been mentioned in 1.4. At this juncture, Umasvati seems to introduce another set of amphibious expressions. It is to this set that we now turn. At the beginning of the fifth chapter, Umasvati enumerates four Ajivaka yass or Ajivas. He states that he intends to explain them symptomatically or definitionally. In the next Sutra he tells that Jiva etc. are Dravyas.10 In his commentary on V.2, he states that the four Ajivaka yas and living beings (praninasca) are Dravyas 11 One may not dispute Umasvati's statement that there are five Dravyas. But his stipulation here seems to disagree with his statement in the first chapter. After the enumeration of Tattvas, which are nothing else than Padarhas, an anticipatory question seems to be answered saying : one would be in a position to bring out each one of the Tattvas beginning with Jiva etc. by naming (nama), idolization (stha pana), substantiation (dravya) and consideration of state/modality (bhava).12 This seems to indicate that each one of the Tattvas can also be considered as a Dravya. Now, if this contention is juxtaposed with the view that there are five Dravyas, there seems to arise some inconsistency. Perhaps Umasvati did not realise that it so happened. It is likely that Umasvati intends to concentrate only on Aji vadravyas in the chapter under consideration. He also seems to mention in passing that the four Ajiva Dravyas along with the Jivadravya make five Dravyas. This may not perhaps give an impression that Dravyas are just five, no more and no less. Be that as it may. There is another point which Umasvati makes with regard to Dravyas in his commentary on 1.5. He argues that (any) Dravya is Bhavya.13 While explaining what he meant by this, he states that 'bhavya' is to be understood in the sense of acquirable. Hence, Dravya is that which acquires or can be acquired.14 It is doubtful whether Umasvati would allow this to be applied to Tattvas. If he has no objection in doing so, Tattvas too become either those which acquire or are acquirable. This would perhaps be acceptable to him, if Tattvas and Dravyas are the same. It may, however, be contended that Umasvati did not mean to take seven Tattvas to be Dravyas and to hold that Tattvas either

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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI 89 acquire (something) or are acquirable. For, one does not normally raise points of this kind with reference to Tattvas. Perhaps there is a substance in this contention. But Umasvati takes at least some Tattvas to be Dravyas. This should be taken to be just a contingent feature. This means that, although Dravya and Tattva need not necessarily be the same, what is called Tattva may be a Dravya. In principle one may not dispute this. Yet one may object that this kind of contingency does not yield any necessary relation between them. It does not give rise to any reciprocity between Tattvas and Dravyas either. It is this which needs to be grasped. Perhaps it is likely that in the initial stages of philosophical inquiry and investigation boundaries of the significances of various expressions were not clearly demarcated. But this should not lead us to continue to do so even now. Ambiguity of expressions in Umasvati does not seem to come to an end here. In the fifth chapter of the Tattvarthadhigamasutra there are in all two statements about a Dravya. They are : (i) Dravya is that which has Gunas (and) Parya yas;15 (ii) Dravya is Sat definitionally or symptomatically.16 Of these the former is important in one way, the latter in another. In the commentary on the former, Umasvati states that anything is Dravya which has both Gunas and Parya yas 17 It is needless for our present purpose to enter into the other nuences mentioned in the commentary. It seems that this statement is either about any Tattya that is considered to be a Dravya or about five Dravyas18 only. Whatever may be the case. We shall concentrate on the latter view, it being the least troublesome one as also being explicityly approved by Umasvati. Even if we delimit our consideration to five Dravyas, there seems to be a certain ambiguity. Out of the five Dravyas, each one is said to have Gunas as well as Parya yas. This may be the case. But the question is: does each one of the Dravyas have a a Guna as well as a Parya ya in exactly the same way and sense or in different way or sense? It does not seem to be sufficient to say symptomatically or definitionally that each one of the Dravyas has both Gunas as well as Parya yas. For, each one of the five Dravyas is not physical. Where physical as well as extra-physical Dravyas are considered together, it seems doubtful whether each one of them has a Guna or a Paryaya or both in exactly the same way.

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90 STUDIES IN JAINISM It seems equally doubtful whether mere symptomatic or definitional statement about all of them would establish the point. But this is a minor point. Let us consider the other way of explaining Dravyas. Here we are told that to be existent is the symptom or definition of a Dravya.19 Understood in this way, anything that is existent is Dravya and anything that is Dravya is existent. This seems to be slippery and ambiguous. It seems difficult to accept that anything that is existent is Dravja, for although thcre are Gunas, Parya yas etc., just on that count we do not call them Dravyas. Further, when we use 'exists' or its near synonyms with reference to different items, we do not use it in the same sense. For example, we do say, there is a table, there is a ghost, there is an idea in my mind, there is a human society etc. Statement of existence or obtainability docs not necessarily seem to have an ontological implication. For, at least sometimes, existential claims are ontologically sterile and impotent. Hence, even if it is said that Dravpas exist, this does not entail that each one of them is a part of the furniture of the world. Secondly, it also seems difficult to accept that anything that is Dravya is existent. This contention seems to stem from the normal convention that anything that is considered to be a Dravya is mentioned in the nominative case. But unfortunately the converse of this does not hold. For, although Gunas, Parya yas etc. could be mentioned in the nominative, none of them has a substantial implicaion. Thus, substantive usages of an expression and its substantial import do not necessarily go hand in hand. Substantive usage, however, has substantival implication but not necessarily a substantial one. The distinction could be brought out in a technical language saying that whereas substantial is obiect-linguistic, substantival is metalinguistic. Substantive usage and its substantial implication may seem to meet in some cases: but this is more an accident than a rule, It is for this reason that acceptance of the co-extensivity of the sets of Dravyas and Sats seems very dificult both to entertain and justify. Unfortunately, Pujyapada goes a step further, saying that the expressions Sat and Dravya are synonymous 20 And that appears more difficult to sustain. Another anticipatory question is raised by Umasvati : What is Sat ? The question is answered saying: anything is Sat, provided it is generated or has a beginning in time, undergoes change and

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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI 91 yet retains its unity or continuity21. These features any Sat is supposed to exhibit conjunctively and not disjunctively. Now, if Sat and Dravya are the same, then Dharma, Adharma, Akasas Pudgala too must exhibit these features of Sat. Now, we are told by Umusvati himself that, of the five Dravyas, every Dravya except Jiva is a Nityadravya22. It seems, therefore, difficult to accept that Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Pudgala are Nitya and exhibit the features of Utpada, Vyaya and Dhrauvya. It may be argued that when Utpada is spoken of with regard to nitya Dravyas it does not mean that they themselves are produced. Rather it means that they have the potentiality of producing others23. But this would be the case provided the expression Utpada is used equivocally. And there does not seem to be any indication to that effect. Hence, this argument, designed to give Umasvati a benefit of doubt, also seems to turn out to be an equally weak link. To turn to the other definition of a DravyaAccording to it a Dravya is that which has Gunas as well as Parya yas.24 Taking this definition of Dravia together with that of Sat would raise two questions : (a) how is one to reconcile them? (b) why are these two definitions there, if Dravia and Sat are the same? First, coming to the problem of reconciliation. It has been maintained25 that what are called generation and corruption(to use Aristotelian phraseology), with regard to any Sat, are nothing else than what are called Parya yas with regard to a Dravya. What, on the contrary, is called Dhrauva (continuity or unity) with regard to Sat is nothing else than what is called Guna with reference to a Dravya. Thus understood, it does not raise any dust of inconsistency. But ambiguity it does not seem to free itself of completely. For, if Dravya is Sat and Sat is Dravya and if definitions of Dravya and Sat are to be understood with regard to each one of them, there does seem to remain a weak point at least with regard to Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Pudgala, if not with regard to the Tattvas like Asrava, Bandha, Saivara, Nirjara and Moksa, as well. Because, if Tattvas are Dravyas and Dravyas are Sats, there seems to be no reason to preclude ascription of Utpada, Vyaya and Dhrauvya to each one of the Tattvas. This problem would, of course, arise provided Tattvas are Dravyas. If, on the contrary, Jiva and Ajivaka yas alone are Dravyas such a problem would not arise regarding every Tattva, Dravya and Sat, but rather with regard

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92 STUDIES IN JAINISM to some Tattvas, every Dravya and each Sat. That is, it seems that the problem would still remain with regard to Akasa, Dharma, Adharma and Pudgala. Instead of pressing this point further, let us, however, turn to the next problem. The reason hy the separate definitions of Sat and Dravya are given is perhaps that, it may be argued, although Umasvati takes every Dravya to be Sat, he does not seem to take every Sat to be a Dravya. But this prima facie plausible line of the explanation of the weak link in Umasvati seems to turn out to be unacceptable one. For, first. Umasvati himself does not seem to favour this defence as he seems to take the sets of things which are Sat and Dravya to be co-extensive. Secondly, both of these could plausibly be taken to be definitions of Dravya or Sat itself. Actually, Pujyapada maintains26 that these are not two different things at all. Similarly, he states that these are not two different definitions of different things either. They are the two ways of stating the definition of Dravya itself. But both Umasvati and Pujyapada seem to be silent on the necessity of giving these two definitions of Dravya. Thus, Dravya and Sat seems to be another set of amphibious expressions in Umasvati. III So far we endeavoured to point out two possible sets of amphibious expressions in Umasvati. Our inquiry shows that, even .fter making sufficient allowance to Umasvati, there appear certain weak points in his explanation. Before we close, we wish to draw attention to one more weak point that seems to emerge by way of a corollary. In the commentary on 1.4, Umasvati states his intention to explain each one of the Tattvas, Arthas or Padarthas definitionally and stipulatively 27 But in the fifth chapter, while talking about Dharma etc., he states that he would explain their nature definitionally.23 Further, in the same chapter a question is raised : How is one to say that there are Dharma etc ? This question is answered saying definitionally. Now, the two ways mentioned in 1.4 are to be understood conjunctively or disjunctively. On each count, there seems to remain some weakness. It conjunctively understood, Dharma etc., which one is to comprehend definitionally alone, are not to be counted as Tattvas even derivatively. Since Tattva, Artha, Padartha, Dravya and Sat seem to be the same, Dharma etc.,

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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI 93 cannot be called any of them. Moreover, if stipulation or description is taken as having existential import, then those Tattvas, Arthas, Dravyas etc., which lack this aspect are considered to be so either improperly or metaphorically. Now, if disjunctively understood, the ground for taking each one of them as Tattva, Artha, Dravya etc. seems to be shaky. For, criteria of lak sanatah and vidhanatah respectively may bring to the fore two different sorts of Tattvas, Dravyas etc. Even the contention of Pujyapada that whereas 'utpa davyayadhrauvyayuktam sat' is a samanya laksana (generic property ) while rupinah pudgalah' etc. are Visesalaksanas (differentia ) of pudgala etc. too seems to leave a weak link.30 For, while accepting the distinction between two sorts of definitions bringing definienda of both the kinds of definitions under one banner does not seem to be the ground for Tattvas or Dravyas being treated on par. If we are going to count anything as Tattva, Dravya, Sat etc. irrespective of the distinction between those fulfilling and not-fulfilling existential or ontological condition, then we to be mixing between them. For, unless Tattvas, Dravyas, etc., are of the same kind, it seems futile to call them to be so. Such way understood there remains a difficulty in the comprehension of Tattvas, Dravyas etc; for, any mixing up between what is ontological and what is other than ontological seems unreasonable. And therein one is constrained to say that there are certain weak links in Umasvati's explanation of Tattvas, Dravyas etc. NOTES 1. Tattvanam arthanam sraddhanam tattvena varthanam sraddhanam tattvarthasraddhanam tat samyak darsanam / Tattvabhasya 1.2. 2. Tattvani jivadini vaksyante/ ta eva ca arthah tesam sraddhanam tesu pratyayavadharanam | Tatt vabhasya 1.2. 3. Jivajavasravabandhasamvaranirjaramoksah, tattvani / Tattva 1.4. Before Umasvati the Jaina cannon had accepted nine Dravyas. Umasvati, omitting Papa and Punya, enumerates seven. Pujyapada, on the contrary, accepts nine. 4... iti esa saptavidhah arthavattvam | Tattvabhasya 1.4. 5. Pramitivisayah padarthah / (b) abhidheyah padarthah / (c) padasya padena sucitah va arthah padarthah. 6. Tam laksinatah vidhanatah ca purastat vistarena upadesyamah / Tattvabhasya, 1.4.

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94 STUDIES IN JAINISM 7. Uktah jiyah / ajivan vaksyamah / Tattvabhasya V.1. 8. Ajivakayah dharmadharmakasapudgalah | Tattva V.1. 9. Tan laksanatah purastat vaksyamah / Tarpvabhusya V.1. 10. Dravyani jivah ca / Tattra V.2. 11. Ete dharmadayah catvarah praninah ca panca dravyani / Tativabhasya V.2. 12. Namasthapanadravyabhavatah tanyasah / Tattva 1.5. Bhasya on it too is instructive. 13. Dravyari ca bhavye / Tattvabhusya, 1.5. 14. Bhavyan iti prapyamaha / bhu praptau-atmanepadi / tadeva prapyante prapnuvanti va dravyani / Tattvabhasya, 1.5. 15. Gunaparyayavat dravyam/ Tatrva .37. 16. Sat dravyalaksanam/ Tattva V.29. This aphorism is not available in the Tativurthudhigamasutiam, (ed) Keshavalal Premachand; Bengal Asiatic Society, Samvat, 1959. 17. Gunan laksanata vakoyamah | bhavantartin Srijfantara ca paryayah | tadubhayam yatra vidyate tat dravyam/ gunaparyayah asya asmin va santi iti gunaparyayavat / Tativabhu sya, V.37. 18. Umasvati considers Jiva, Dharma, Akusa, Adharma and Pudgala to be Dravyas. But he also mentions a view that kala too is a Dravya, without any further comment by way of approval or disapproval. Yet the Vartikakara Pujyapada holds that kula is a Druvya. He also holds that two definitions of Dravya are applicable to kula. cf. Sarvarthasiddhi, V.39. 19. Sat dravyalaksanam / Tattva V.29. 20. Yat sat tat dravyamityarthah / Sarva V.29 (Kolhapur edition, Samvat, 1825) 21. Utpadavyayadhrauvyayukta sat | Tattva. V.29. 22. Eta ni dravyani nityani bhavanti / tadbhavavyayarin nityain iti vaksyate ... 1 Tattvabhasya, V.3. 3. Gunaparyayavat dravyam/ Tattaa, V.38. 24. Utpannam va utpanne va utpannani va sat | Tattvabhusya, V.31. 25. Devendramuni Shastri; Jaina Darsana : Svarupa qur vislesana; p.59. 26. Utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat iti dravyalaksinamuktam / punab apareni prakareni dravyalaksinam pratisa dayannaha ginaparyayavat dravyam-Sarva., V.37. 27. Tan laksanatah vidhanatah ca purastat vaksyamah / Tattvabhusya, 1.4.. 28. tan laksanatah purastat vaks, amah / Tattvabhusya V. 1. 29. atraha dharmaliai santi iti katham gpayate iti, atrocyate laks.natah...! Tattvabhusya, V. 28. 30. ana dharma linan dravyanam vis: salaks na i uklani, samanyala ksinin na uktam, tadvaktavyam/ ucyate sat draypalaksanam - Sarya. V. 28-29.

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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI Discussion J. C. Sikdar : If we want to study Umasvati we shall have to take into consideration the background of the whole Indian philosophical systems. His date is later, as somebody has pointed out, 4th century A. D. His book was influenced by other systems of thought. Consequently the terminology he employs is also available in other systems like Nyaya, Vasesika etc. His work does have its roots in the Jaina Agamas. But he was also influenced by others, as he paid attention to the disputes, argument etc current in his times in other systems of Indian philosophical thought. Then he worked out his own systems. Hence there arise number of problems as Dr. Marathe has very ably drawn our attention to. It is possible to resolve some of the problems only if we deal with the whole account with the background of Indian philosophy. S. S. Barlingay : Granting that Umasvati has used certain words and expressions ambiguously, sometimes, I think, to be vague is an ornament of language. What I mean is not that it is a figure of speech but that there cannot be a language without vagueness at some stage or the other. Some kind of vagueness is bound to be there. Even if we try to use certain words in a certain way, yet each word has a certain place in a time sequence. At a particular time, two, three or more meanings would go consistently. Umasvati has used certain words, as Dr. Sikdar also pointed out, in a certain way. For instance, Vaisesikas have used the word Padartha and the Samkhyas used the word tattva. And as a matter of fact Sankara's criticism of Sankhya has really been based on this fact that what they regard as tativas are in fact padarthas, dravyas or something else. Sankara further, I think, correctly points out that if Prakrti ard Purusa are to be taken as existent then it will create confusion. So whereas I appreciate Dr. Marathe's point of view very much, his criticism seems rather theoretical and neg In spite of the fact that Umasvati uses expressions amphibiously it might be a step in the direction of enrichment of philosophy. When Sankara criticised Sankhyas he pointed out that tattvas understood in the sense of Padarthas or dravyas would not only

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96 STUDIES IN JAINISM be ambiguous but also inconsistent. I want the scholars to consider whether ambiguity in Umaswati leads to any inconstency. sAgaramala jaina : jaina darzana meM yA umAsvAtI meM jo dravya, tattva aura padArtha ina zabdoM kA prayoga huA hai, vaha vibhinna apekSAoM se yA vibhinna sthiti meM huA hai| 'tattva' ethical realities hai, jaba ki artha aura padArtha epistemological realities haiM aura dravya tathA sat ye metaphysical realities hai| isa prakAra ina zabdoM kA prayoga alaga alaga saMdarbho meM huA hai| hamArA nyAyadarzana mukhyataHjJAnamImAMsA ko letA hai| isaliye vahA~ padArthoM kI carcA hai / sAMkhya meM ethical yA metaphysical bAtoM kA prAdhAnya hone se tattvoM kI carcA kI gayI hai / jaina AgamoM meM bhI tattva aura dravya kA aMtara spaSTa rUpa se hai / mere khyAla se mokSa, nirjarA Adi ko kahIM bhI padArtha yA dravya nahIM kahA gayA hai / inako kevala tattva kahA gayA hai R. Sundara Rajan : In his paper Dr. Marathe seems to suggest that he would be prepared to accept that the word "exits' has many meanings. Does Dr. Marathe really believe that in the ultimate analysis *exists' could have a plurality of meanings ? Dr. Marathe also seems to allow the possibility that a relation between two concepts may be a contingent relation. He has argued that certain relation between two categories need not be necessary and that it could be contingent. Could there be continent conceptual relations ? Conceptual relations are either necessary or non-existent. M. P. Marathe : My intention in this paper is this: When we are dealing with any author or any philosophical text, to be able to write history of Indian philosophical ideas or history of Indian philosophical trends, we must first study every author, every philosophical work minutely and we must present the thought of the author with as much clarity as possible. It is this kind of clarity which I found at some points to be lacking in Umasvati. And it is situation of this kind that I thonght to be fitting to be brought to the attention of learned scholars.

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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI 97 I agree with Dr. Barlingay's contention that if the contention of the author gives rise to inconsistency then only there is a philosophical trouble and that we cannot succeed in getting rid of ambiguity completely. And yet, at the same time, I say that if on the one hand we are saying that jiva, a jiva etc. are dravyas and on the other that they are tattvas then there does remain some ambiguity and a misleading ambiguity. Similarly, it is equally misleading to say that akasa, dharma, adharma are dravyas. Are we saying that akasa is a dravya in exactly the same sense in which jiva is a dravya ? If we are saying that something is a dravya because it is spatial as well as temporal and if we are saying that akasa too is a dravya then the question does remain whether akasa is called dravya because it is spatial and/or temporal. Dr. V. P. Jain raised a question that although every dravya has or is said to have guna as well as paryaya, with reference to dharma, adharma and aka sa it is said that it is not they themselves that have gumas as well as pr yayas, but the things which are in akasa or in kala, are supposed to have gumas and paryayas. In such a situation my only objection is : here is a case of transferred epithet. Is it philosophically right to treat both these cases on par? Dr. Sundara Rajan raised a question whether I believe in different kinds of existents. My answer is no. I count only those things to be existent which are part of the furniture of the worldYet in ordinary language we use * exists' or its near synonyms not only with reference to those objects which are part of the furniture of the world but even with reference to other objects. wanting to draw attention of the scholars to such a phenomenon that is philosophically misleading as also the one that is noticeable in Umasvati.

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STUDIES IN JAINISM Part II Jaina Logic and Epistemology

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Darbarilal Kothia, in his Hindi article "371974afritasa" makes a historical survey of Jaina logic in which he brings out the three stages of the development of Jaina logic which he calls Samantabhadra period, Akalanka period and Prabhacandra period. The aim of V. K. Bharadvaja's paper "The Jaina concept of Logic" is to note the distinctive features of the Jaina concept of Logic. The author remarks that Nayarada does not properly fit in Jaina logic as its part and that syaduada canot be identified with logic of possibilities. Darbarilal Kothia in his another Hindi article "Traare Har" explicates the classical Jaina doctrine of syadzada. He distinguishes between syadrada and anekantarada by saying that former is either a statement or the systematisation of the latter. In - An Analysis of syat in syadvada", M. P. Marathe critically presents syadrada doctrine which he regards as explanatory foundation of anekantarada. By analysing syadrada he (in contrast with V. K. Bharadvaja ) shows that in the context of syadvada three kinds of possibilities are clearly acknowledged; possibility as potentiality, epistemological possibility and nomological as well as existential possibility. The author suggests that Jaina logicians seem to accept change in truth-values of propositions due to the change in the features of the things described by the same propositions. S. L. Pandey in his " Nayavada and Many-valued Logic" assimilates the logic of nayas with Lukasiewiczian three-valued logic by exploiting the distinction between pramana naya and durnaya. In the discussion

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he agrees that such a programme will have limitations and contends that the other possibility of interpreting the logic of nayas as modal logic has also to be examined seriously. Sagarmal Jain in his Hindi article "FUTCAIC : gae facram" discusses ontological, epistemological as well as linguistic grounds of syadvada and distinguishes it from other doctrines with which it is many a time assimilated. As against S.L. Pandey's attempt to present saptabhangi in terms many-valued logic the author presents saptabhangi in the form of a set of conditional statements, the anticidents of which express the view-points from which the respective consequents are supposed to hold. Kailaschandra Shastri in his Hindi artile "FTICA : Tapi utafan7" explains the Jaina doctrine of anekanta and elucidates its relationship with syadvada, saptabhangi, nayavada and samya-drsti. Pramara and naya are two very important notions in Jaina logic and epistemology. Ishvarachandra Sharma in his Hindi paper 'STATOTT A TUT FIT " gives a detailed account of the controversy amongst Jaina Acaryas and scholars regarding the conceptual relation between pramana and naya. He concludes that naya arises from pramana and is of the nature of pramara, rather sabdapramana. It is still called naya for distinguishing it from kevalajnana as well as other forms of srutajnana.

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jaina nyAya : parizIlana darabArIlAla koThiyA prAgvRtta sAhitya, itihAsa aura purAtattvakI sAkSiyoM se yaha siddha ho cukA hai ki jaina dharma bhAratIya dharma hote hue bhI vaha vaidika aura bauddha donoM dharmoM se judA dharma hai / isake pravartaka mahAvIra na hokara unase pUrvavartI tIrthaMkara haiM, jo 23 kI saMkhyA meM ho cuke aura mahAvIra antima 24 veM tIrthaMkara haiN| prathama tIrthaMkara RSabha deva hai, jinheM AdibrahmA, AdinAtha, bRhadeva, purudeva aura vRSabha nAmoM se bhAratIya sAhitya meM smaraNa kiyA gayA hai| yugArambha meM inhoMne prajA ko bhogabhUmi kI samApti honepara AjIvikA hetu kRSi, asi, ali Adi vRttiyoM kI dIkSA dI thI, isase unheM prathama prajApati bhI kahA gayA hai| inake garbha meM Anepara hiraNya (suvarNa) kI varSA hone ke kAraNa inakA eka nAma hiraNyagarbha bhI thA / Rgveda, atharvaveda zrImada bhAgavata Adi vaidika vAGamaya meM bhI inakI prajApati, hiraNyagarma aura RSabha nAmoM se saMstuti kI gayI hai| bhAgavata meM RSabhAvatAra ke rUpa meM inakA pUrA jIvana-carita upalabdha hai aura vahA~ inheM arhatdharma kA saMcAlaka kahA gayA hai / DhAI hajAra varSa pUrva inakI pratimAe~ pratiSThita karake unakI pUjA kI jAtI thii| khaNDa 3 giri-udaya girikI gaphAoM se prApta khAravela ke zilAlekhoM se vidita hai ki khAravela ke rAjavaMza meM pUjita Adi jina kI mUrti samprati usake rAjyapara AkramaNa kara ke le gayA thA aura jise khAravela use jItakara vApasa le AyA thaa| * Presented in the seminar on 'Jaina Logic and Philosophy (Poona University, 1975 )

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104 STUDIES IN JAINISM RSabha deva ke bAda vibhinna kAloM meM ajita se lekara nemi paryaMta bIsa anya tIrthakara hue , jinakA jaina vAGamaya meM savizeSa varNana hai aura jo mahAbhArata kAla se prAk kAlIna hai| ___ inake pazcAt mahAbhArata kAlameM kRSNa ke cacere bhAI aura samudravijaya ke rAjakumAra ariSTanemi hue, jo bAIsaveM tIrthaMkara the aura kumArAvasthA meM hI pravrajita hokara UrjayantagirI (gujarAta) se mukta hue the| inakA bhI vaidika sAhitya meM ullekha milatA hai| inake koI eka hajAra varSa pIche teIsaveM tIrthaMkara pArzvanAtha hue, jo kAzI ke nareza azvasena ke rAjaputra the aura inheM aba aitihAsika mahApuruSa mAna liyA gayA hai / pArzvanAthake DhAI sau varSa bAda vardhamAna mahAvIra hue, jo antima cauvIsaveM tIrthakara aura buddha ke samakAlIna the tathA jinakI Aja sAre rASTrameM 2500 vIM nirvANazatAbdI manAyI jA rahI hai / ina tIrthakAroM ne jana-kalyANa ke lie jo upadeza diyA use unake gaNadharoM (pradhAna ziSyoM) ne bAraha vargoM meM nibaddha kiyA, jise 'dvAdazAGagazruta' kahA gyaa| mahAvIra kA dvAdazAGagazruta Aja bhI maujUda hai / anya sabhI tIrthakaroM kA dvAdazAGagazruta naSTa evaM vilupta ho gayA hai / vardhamAna-mahAvIra kA zruta bhI pUrA upalabdha nahIM hai| Arambha meM vaha ziSya-paramparA meM smRti ke AdhAra para vidyamAna rhaa| bAda meM use saMkalita kiyA gayA / vartamAna meM jo zruta prApta hai vaha digambara paramparA ke anusAra bArahave aMga dRSTivAda kA kucha aMza hai , zeSa gyAraha aMga aura bArahave aMga kA bahubhAga naSTa evaM lupta ho cukA hai / zvetAmbara paramparA ke anusAra gyAraha aMga upalabdha haiM aura bArahavAM dRSTivAda aMga vicchinna ho gayA hai| dharma, darzana aura nyAya ukta zruta meM dharma, darzana aura nyAya tInoM kA pratipAdana hai| AcAra ke pratipAdana kA nAma dharma hai| dharma kA jina vicAroM-cintanoM dvArA samarthana evaM sampoSaNa kiyA jAtA hai una vicAroM-cintanoM ko darzana kahA jAtA hai, aura jaba dharma ke samarthana ke lie prastuta vicAroM ko yukti-pratiyukti, khaNDana-maNDana evaM zaGakA-samAdhAna purassara dRr3ha kiyA jAtA hai to use nyAya athavA tarka (lAz2ika) kahate haiM / dharma, darzana aura nyAyameM saMkSepataH yahI maulika bheda hai / vastutaH nyAyazAstra se vicAra ko jo dRr3hatA milatI hai vaha cirasthAyI, gaharI aura nirNayAtmikA hotI hai / usameM sandeha, viparyaya yA anadhyavasAya (anizcitatA) kI sthiti bahuta kama hotI hai / isI kAraNa bhAratIya darzanoM meM nyAyazAstra kA mahatvapUrNa sthAna hai|

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105 jaina nyAya : parizIlana jaina-nyAya kA udgama prakRta meM jaina nyAyakA parizIlana abhISTa hai / ata: prathamataH usake udgama para vicAra prastuta kiyA jAtA hai| dRSTivAda aMga meM jaina nyAya ke pracura mAtrA meM udgama-bIja upalabdha haiM / dRSTivAda aMga ke aMzabhUta SaT khaNDAgama meM 'siyA pajjatA, siyA apajjattA;' 'maNusa apajjattA davvapamANeNa kevaDiyA, asaMkhejjA'9 jaise 'syAt' zabda aura praznottara zailI ko lie hue pracura vAkya pAye jAte haiM, jo jaina nyAya kI utpatti ke bIja haiM / kundakunda ke paMcAstikAya, pravacanasAra Adi ArSagrathoM meM bhI jaina nyAya ke kucha aura adhika bIja milate haiM / 'siya atthi Natthi uhA', 'jamho' 'tamhA' 'jaise yukti pravaNa vAkyoM evaM zabda prayogoM dvArA praznottaroM ko uThAkara unameM viSayoM kI vivecanA ko dRr3ha kiyA kiyA hai| isase pratIta hotA hai ki jaina nyAya kA udbhava dRSTivAda aMgazruta se huA hai| dRSTivAda kA jo svarUpa vIrasena Adi ne diyA hai usase bhI ukta kathana kI pUrI dRSTiyoM - vAdiyoM se puSTi hotI hai| usake svarUpa meM kahA gayA hai ki 'usameM vividha kI mAnyatAoM kA prarUpaNa aura unakI samIkSA kI jAtI hai|' yaha samIkSA hetuoM evaM yuktiyoM dvArA hI sambhava hai| ___ zvetAmbara paramparAke AgamoM meM bhI "se keNaThaTeNaM bhaMte, evamuccaIjIvANaM bhaMte? ki sAsayA asAsayA? goyamA! jIvA siya sAsayA siya asAsayA / goyamA! davvadvayAe sAsayA bhAvayAe asAsayA" jaise tarka-garbha praznottara milate haiM / 'siyA' yA 'siya' zabda 'syAt' (kathaMcidartha bodhaka) saMskRta zabdakA payAryavAcI prAkRta zabda hai, jo sthAdvAda nyAyakA pradarzaka hai / yazovijaya ne 12 spaSTa likhA hai ki syAdvAdArthodRSTivAdArNavotthaH' - sthAvAdArtha - jaina nyAya dRSTivAda rUpa arNava (samudra) se utpanna huA hai / yathArtha meM 'syAdvAda' jaina nyAyakA hI paryAya zabda hai / samantabhadra ne 3 samI tIrthaMkaroM ko sthAdvAdI - syAdvAdanyAyapratipAdaka aura unake nyAya ko sthAdvAdanyAya batalAyA hai| yahA~ yaha prazna ho sakatA hai ki brAhmaNanyAya aura bauddhanyAya ke bAda jaina-nyAyakA vikAsa huA hai, isa lie usakI utpatti ina donoM se mAnI jAnI cAhie / chAndo gyopaniSad (a. 7) meM eka 'vAkovAkya' pAstra-vidyA kA ullekha kiyA gayA hai jisakA artha tarkazAstra, uttara-pratyuttara zAstra, yukti-pratiyuktizAstra kiyA jAtA hai|14 vAtsyAyana ke nyAyabhASya meM bhI eka AnvIkSikI vidyA kA, jise nyAya vidyA athavA nyAyazAstra kahA gayA hai, kavana milatA hai| takSazilA ke vizvavidyAlaya meM darzana zAstra evaM nyAyazAstra ke adhyayana-adhyApana ke pramANa bhI milate batAye jAte hai|16 isase jainanyAya kA udbhava brAhmaNanyAya aura bauddhanyAya se huA pratIta hotA hai /

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106 STUDIES IN JAINISM yaha mata yukta nahIM hai, kyoMki uparyukta nyAyoM se bhI pUrvavartI ukta dRSTivAda zruta pAyA jAtA hai aura usameM pracura mAtrA meM jaina nyAya ke bIja samAviSTa haiM / ataH usakA udaya usI se mAnanA upayukta hai| dUsarI bAta yaha hai ki brAhmaNa nyAya aura bauddhanyAya meM kahIM bhI syAdvAdakA samarthana nahIM hai, pratyuta usakI mImAMsA hai / aisI sthitimeM syAdvAda rUpa jainanyAya kA udgama syAdvAdAtmaka dRSTivAda zruta se hI sambhava hai / siddha sena,17 akalaMka aura vidyAnandakA bhI yahI mata hai, akalaMkadevane 20 nyAya vinizcaya ke Arambha meM kahA hai ki 'kucha guNadveSI tAkikoMne kalikAlake prabhAva aura ajJAnatA se svaccha nyAya ko malina banA diyA hai| usa malinatA ko samyagjJAnarUpI jala se kisI taraha dUra karanekA prayatna kreNge|' akalaMkake isa kathana se jJAta hotA hai ki jainanyAya brAhmaNanyAya aura bauddhanyAya se pUrva vidyamAna thA aura jise unhoMne malina kara diyA thA tathA usa malinatA ko akalaMka ne dUra kiyA / ataH jainanyAya kA udgama ukta nyAyoM se nahIM huaa| yaha sambhava hai ki ukta nyAyoM ke sAtha jainanyAya bhI phalAphUlA ho| arthAt jainanyAya ke vikAsa meM brAhmaNanyAya aura bauddhanyAya kA vikAsa preraka huA ho aura unakI vividha kramika zAstra racanA jainanyAya kI Rmika zAstraracanA meM sahAyaka huI ho / samakAlInoM meM aisA AdAna-pradAna honA yA preraNA lenA svAbhAvika jaina nyAya kA vikAsa __kAla kI dRSTi se jaina nyAya ke vikAsa ko tIna kAloM meM bAMTA jA sakatA hai aura una kAloM ke nAma nimna prakAra rakhe jA sakate hai - 1. AdikAla athavA samantamadrakAla (I. 200 se I. 650 taka) 2. madhyakAla athavA akalaMkakAla (I. 650 se I. 1050 taka) 3. antyakAla athavA prabhAcandrakAla (I. 1050 se I. 1700 taka) 1. AdikAla athavA samantabhadrakAla jaina nyAya ke vikAsa kA Arambha svAmI samantabhadra se hotA hai| svAmI samantabhadra ne bhAratIya dArzanika kSetra ke jaina darzana kSetra meM yuga pravartaka kA kArya kiyA hai| unase pahale jaina darzana ke prANabhUtatatva 'syAdvAda' ko prAyaH AgamarUpa hI prApta thA aura usakA Agamika tatvoM ke nirUpaNa meM hI upayoga hotA thA tathA usakI sIdhI-sAdI vivecanA kara dI jAtI thI-vizeSa yuktivAda dene kI usa samaya AvazyakatA nahIM hotI thii| paraMtu samantabhadra ke samaya meM usa kI AvazyakatA mahasUsa huI, kyoMki dUsarI-tIsarI zatAbdI kA samaya bhArata varSa ke itihAsa meM apUrva dArzanika krAnti kA rahA hai / isa samaya vibhinna darzanoM meM aneka krAntikArI vidvAn paidA hue haiN| yadyapi mahAvIra aura buddha ke upadezoM se yajJapradhAna vaidika-paramparA kA bar3hA huA prabhAva kAphI kama ho gaya thA aura zramaNa -

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jaina nyAya : parizIlana 107 jaina tathA bauddha-paramparA kA prabhAva sarvatra vyApta ho cukA thA, kintu kucha zatAbdiyoM ke bAda vaidika paramparA kA punaH prabhAva prasRta huA aura vaidika vidvAnoMdvArA zramaNa paramparA ke siddhAntoM kI AlocanA evaM kATa-chAMTa Arambha ho gyii| (phalasvarUpa zramaNa bauddha paramparA meM azvaghoSa, mAtRceTa, nAgArjuna prabhRti vidvAnoM kA prAdurbhAva huA aura unhoMne vaidika paramparA ke siddhAntoM evaM mAnyatAoM kA khaNDana aura apane siddhAntoM kA maNDana, pratiSThApana tathA pariSkAra kiyaa| udhara vaidika paramparA meM bhI kaNAda, akSapAda, bAdarAyaNa, jaiminI Adi mahA udyogI vidvAnoM kA AvirbhAva huA aura unhoMne bhI azvaghoSAdi bauddha vidvAnoM ke khaNDana-maNDana kA sayuktika jabAba dete hue apane vaidika siddhAntoM kA saMrakSaNa kiyaa| isI dArzanika uThApaTaka meM IzvarakRSNa, asaMga, vasubandhu, vindhyavAsI, vAtsyAyana prabhRti vidvAn donoM hI paramparAoM meM hue / isa taraha usa samaya sabhI darzana akhAr3e bana cuke the aura paraspara meM eka dUsare ko parAsta karane meM lage hue the| isa saba kA AbhAsa usa kAla ke azvaghoSAdi vidvAnoM ke upalabdha sAhitya se hotA hai / jaba ye vidvAn apane-apane darzana ke ekAnta pakSoM aura mAnyatAoM ke samarthana tathA parapakSa ke nirAkaraNa meM vyasta the, usI samaya dakSiNa bhArata ke kSitija para jaina paramparA meM AcArya gRdhra piccha ke bAda svAmI samantabhadra kA udaya huaa| ye pratibhA kI mUrti aura kSAtra teja se sampanna the / sUkSma evaM agAdha pANDitya aura samanvaya kAriNI prajJA se ve samanvita the| unhoMne ukta saMgharSoM ko dekhA aura anubhava kiyA ki paraspara ke AgrahoM se vAstavikatA lupta ho rahI hai| dArzanikoM kA haTa bhAvaikAnta, abhAvaikAnta, dvaitekAnta, advaitekAnta, anityaikAnta, nityakAnta, bhedaikAnta, abhadaikAnta hetuvAdaikAnta, ahetuvAdaikAnta, apekSAvAdaikAnta, anapekSAvAdaikAnta, daivaikAnta, purUSArthaMkAnta, puNyaikAnta, pApaikAnta Adi aikAntika mAnyatAoM meM sImita hai| isakI spaSTa jhalaka samantabhadra kI AptamImAMsA meM milatI hai| samantabhadra ne AptamImAMsA meM dArzanikoM kI ina mAnyatAoM ko dekara syAdvAdanyAya se unakA samanvaya kiyA hai| bhAvakAntavAdI apane pakSa kI upasthApanA karate hue kahatA thA ki saba bhAvarUpa hI hai, abhAva rUpa koI vastu nahIM hai - 'sarva sarvatra vidyate' (saba saba jagaha hai), na koI prAgabhAva rUpa hai, na pradhvaMsAbhAvarUpa hai, na anyonyAbhAvarUpa hai aura na atyantAbhAvarUpa hai / abhAvavAdI isake viparIta abhAva kI sthApanA karatA thA aura jagat ko zUnya batalAtA thaa| advaitavAdI kA mata thA ki eka hI vastu hai, aneka nahIM / aneka kA darzana mAyAvijRmbhita athavA avidyopakalpita hai| advaitavAdiyoM ke bhI aneka pakSa the / koI mAtra brahma kA samarthana karatA thA, koI kevala jJAna ko aura koI kevala zabda ko mAnatA thaa|dvaitvaadii isakA virodha karate the aura tattva ko aneka siddha karate the| dvaita vAdiyoM kI bhI mAnyatAe~ bhinna-bhinna thIM / koI sAta padArtha mAnatA thA, koI solaha aura koI paccIsa tatvoMkI sthApanA karatA thA /

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108 STUDIES IN JAINISM nityavAdI vastumAtra ko nitya batalAte the| ve tarka dete ki yadi vastu anitya ho to usake nAza ho jAne ke bAda yaha jagat aura vastue~ sthira kyoM dikhAyI detI hai? anityavAdI kahatA thA ki vastu pratisamaya naSTa ho rahI hai, koI bhI vastu sthira nahIM hai| anyathA janma, maraNa, vinAza, abhAva, parivartana Adi nahIM honA cAhie, jo spaSTa batalAte haiM ki vastu nitya nahIM hai, anitya hai| isI taraha bhedavAda-abhedavAda, apekSAvAda-anapekSAvAda, hetuvAda-ahetuvAda, daivavAda - purUSArthavAda Adi eka - eka vAda (pakSa) ko mAna jAtA aura paraspara meM saMgharSa kiyA jAtA thA / jaina tArkika samantabhadra ne ina sabhI dArzanikoM ke pakSoM kA gaharAI aura niSpakSa dRSTi se adhyayana kiyA tathA unake dRSTikoNoM ko samajhakara syAdvAdanyAya se unameM sAmaJjasya sthApita kiyaa| unhoMne kisI ke pakSa ko mithyA kahakara tiraskRta nahIM kiyA, kyoMki vastu anantadharmA hai| ataH koI pakSa mithyA nahIM hai, vaha mithyA tabhI hotA hai, jaba vaha itara kA tiraskAra karatA hai| samantabhadra ne vAdiyoM ke ukta pakSa-yugaloM meM syAdvAdanyAya ke mAdhyama se saptabhaGagI kI vizada yojanA karake unake ApasI sagharSoM ko jahA~ zamana kiyA vahA~ unhoMne tattvagrAhI evaM pakSAgrahazUnya niSpakSa dRSTi bhI prastuta kii| yaha niSpakSa dRSTi syAdvAdadRSTi hI hai, kyoMki usameM sabhI pakSoM kA samAdara evaM samAveza hai / ekAnta dRSTiyoM meM apanA apanA Agraha hone se anya pakSoMkA na samAdara hai aura na samAveza hai| samantabhadra kI yaha anokhI kintu sahI krAntikArI ahiMsaka dRSTi bhAratIya dArzanikoM, vizeSakara uttaravartI jaina tAkikoM ke lie mArgadarzaka siddha huI / siddhasena, akalaGaka, vidyAnanda, haribhadra Adi tAkikoM ne unakA anugamana kiyA / sambhavataH isI kAraNa unheM 'kaliyuga meM syAdvAdatIrtha kA prabhAvaka' aura 'sthAdAdAgraNI' Adi rUpameM smRta kiyA hai / yadyapi sthAdvAda aura saptabhaMgI kA prayoga AgamoM21 meM tadIya viSayoM ke nirUpaNa meM bhI hotA thA, kintu jitanA vizada aura vistRta prayoga evaM yojanA unakI kRtiyoM meM upalabdha hai utanA unase pUrva prApta nahIM hai / samantabhadra ne 'nayayogAnna sarvathA 22, 'nayanyavizAradaH23 jaise padaprayogoM dvArA saptabhaGaga nayoM se vastu kI vyavasthA hone kA vidhAna banAyA aura 'kayaMcita sadeveSTaM' 24 'sadeva sarva ko necchet svarUpAdi catuSTayAta'23 jaise vacanoM dvArA usa vidhAna ko vyavahRta kiyA hai| udAharaNa ke lie hama unake bhAvavAda aura abhAvavAda ke samanvaya ko inakI AptamImAMsA se 26 prastuta karate haiM - vastu kathaMcit bhAvarUpa hI hai, kyoMki svadravya, svakSetra, svakAla aura svabhAva se vaha vaisI hI pratIta hotI hai| yadi use saba prakAra se bhAvarUpa mAnA jAya, to prAgabhAva, pradhvaMsAbhAva, anyonyAbhAva aura anyantAbhAva ina cAra abhAvoM kA abhAva ho jAyagA,

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jaina nyAya : parizIlana 109 phalataH vastu anAdi, ananta, sarvAtmaka aura svarUpa-rahita ho jAyegI / ataH vastu svarUpacatuSTaya kI apekSA bhAvarUpa hI hai / isI taraha vastu kathaMcit abhAvarUpa hI hai kyoMki paradravya, parakSetra, parakAla aura parabhAva se vaisI hI avagata hotI hai| yadi use sarvathA abhAva rUpa hI svIkAra kiyA jAya to vidhi rUpa meM hone vAle sAre jJAna aura vacana ke vyavahAra lupta ho jAyeMge aura jagat andha evaM mUka bana jAyegA / ataH vastu paracatuSTaya kI apekSA se abhAva rUpa hI hai| isI prakAra vastu kathaMcit ubhayarUpa hI hai, kyoMki kramazaH donoM vivakSAe~ hotI haiM / vastu kathaMcit avaktavya hI hai, kyoMki ekasAtha donoM vivakSAe~ sambhava nahIM hai| ina cAra bhaGagoM (tattad dharma ke pratipAdaka uttara vAkyoM) ko dikhalA kara vacana kI zakyatA ke AdhAra para samantabhadra 20 ne apunarukta tIna bhaGaga (tIna dharma ke pratipAdaka tIna uttara vAkya) aura yojita karane kI sUcanA dete hae saptabhaGagI-yojanA pradarzita kI hai| isa taraha samantabhadra ne bhAva (sattA) aura abhAva (asattA) ke pakSoM meM hone vAle Agraha ko samApta kara donoM ko vAstavika batalAyA aura donoM ko vastudharma nirUpita kiyaa| isI prakAra unhoMne dvaita-advaita, nitya-anitya Adi pakSoM ke Agraha ko bhI samApta kara unheM vAstavika siddha kiyA hai| unakA kahanA thA28 ki itara pakSa ke tiraskAraka 'sarvathA' ke Agraha ko choDa kara usa pakSa ke saMgrAhaka 'syAt' ke vacana se vastu kA nirUpaNa karanA caahie| isa nirUpaNa meM vastu aura usake sabhI dharma surakSita rahate haiM / eka-eka pakSa satyAMzoM kA hI nirUpaNa karate haiM, sampUrNa satya kA nahIM / sampUrNa satya kA nirUpaNa tabhI sambhava hai jaba sabhI pakSoM ko Adara diyA jAya-unakI upekSA na kI jAya / samantabhadra 29 ne spaSTa ghoSaNA kI ki nirapekSa-itara tiraskAraka-pakSa samyak nahIM haiM, sApekSa-itara saMgrAhaka-pakSa hI samyak (satyapratipAdaka) hai| AcArya samantabhadra ne pramANalakSaNa, nayalakSaNa, saptabhaGagIlakSaNa, syAdvAdalakSaNa, hetulakSaNa, pramANaphalavyavasthA, vastusvarUpa, sarvajJasiddhI Adi jaina-nyAya ke katipaya aMgoM-pratyaMgoM kA bhI pratipAdana kiyA, jo prAyaH unake pUrva nahIM huA thA athavA aspaSTa thaa| ataH jaina nyAya ke vikAsa ke Adi kAla ko samantabhadrakAla kahanA ucita hI hai| samantabhadra ke isa mahAna kArya ko uttaravartI, zrIdatta, pUjyapAda, siddhasena, mallavAdI, sumati, pAtrasvAmI prabhRti jaina tAkikoM ne apanI mahattvapUrNa racanAoM dvArA agrasara kiyaa| zrIdatta ne, jo vesaTha vAdiyoM ke vijetA the, jalpanirNaya, pUjyapAda ne sArasaMgraha siddhasena ne sanmati, mallavAdI ne dvAdazAranayacakra, sumatI ne sanmatiTIkA; pAtrasvAmI ne vilakSaNa samarthana jaisI tArkika kRtiyoM ko racA hai / durbhAgya se alpanirNaya, sArasaMgraha sanmatiTIkA aura trilakSaNa samarthana Aja upalabdha nahIM haiM, kevala unake ullekha milate haiM / siddhasena kA sanmati aura mallavAdI kA dvAdazAranayacakra upalabdha hai| hamArA anumAna hai ki isa kAla meM aura bhI aneka nyAyagrantha race gaye hoMge,30

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110 STUDIES IN JAINISM kyoM ki eka to usa samaya kA dArzanika vAtAvaraNa pratidvandvitA kA thaa| dUsare, jaina vidvAnoM meM dharma aura darzana ke graMthoM ko racane kI mukhya pravRtti thii| bauddha vidvAn zAntarakSita (I. 7 vI, 8 vIM zata) aura unake ziSya kamalazIla (I. 7 vI, 8 vI, zatAdvI) ne tatvasaMgraha evaM usakI TIkA meM jaina tAkikoM ke nAmollekha aura vinA nAmollekha ke uddharaNa dekara unakI AlocanA kI hai| parantu ve grantha Aja upalabdha nahIM hai| isa taraha isa Adi- kAla athavA samantabhadra kAla meM jaina nyAya kI eka yogya aura uttama bhUmikA taiyAra ho gayI thii| 2. madhyakAla athavA akalaMkakAla ukta bhUmikA para jaina nyAya kA uttuMga aura sarvAMgapUrNa mahAn prAsAda jisa kuzala aura tIkSNa buddhi tAkika-zilpI ne khar3A kiyA, vaha hai akalaMka / akalaMka ke kAla meM bhI samantabhadra kI taraha jabaradasta dArzanika muThabher3a ho rahI thii| eka tarapha zabdAdvaitavAdI bhartahari, prasiddha mImAMsaka kumArila, nyAyaniSNAt udyotakara prabhRti vaidika vidvAn apane pakSoM para ArUDha the, to dUsarI ora dhamakIrti aura unake tarkapaTu ziSya evaM vyAkhyAkAra prajJAkara,dharmottara karNaka gomina Adi bauddha tArkika apane pakSa para dRr3ha the| zAstrArthoM aura zAstra-nirmANa kI parAkASThA thI / pratyeka dArzanika kA prayatna thA ki vaha jisa kisI taraha apane pakSa ko siddha kare aura parapakSa kA nirAkaraNa kara vijaya prApta kre| itanA hI nahIM, para pakSa ko asad prakAroM se parAjita evaM tiraskRta bhI kiyA jAtA thaa| virodhI ko 'pazu' 'anhIka' jaise zabdoM kA prayoga karake use aura usake siddhAntoM ko tuccha prakaTa kiyA jAtA thaa| yaha kAla jahA~ tarka ke vikAsa kA madhyAnha mAnA jAtA hai vahA~ isa kAla meM nyAya kA bar3A upahAsa bhI huA hai / tattva ke saMrakSaNa ke lie chala, jAti aura nigrahasthAnoM kA khulakara prayoga karanA aura unheM zAstrArtha kA aMga mAnanA isa kAla kI dena bana gayI / 31 kSaNikavAda, nairAtmyavAda, zUnyavAda, vijJAnavAda Adi pakSoM kA samarthana isa kAla meM dhar3alle se kiyA gayA aura kaTTaratA se itara kA nirAsa kiyA gayA / akalaGaka ne isa sthiti kA adhyayana kiyA aura sabhI darzanoM kA gaharA evaM sUkSma abhyAsa kiyaa| isake lie unheM kAMcI, nAlandA Adi ke tatkAlIna vidyApIThoM meM pracchanna veSa meM rahanA pdd'aa| samantabhadra dvArA sthApita syAdvAdanyAya kI bhUmikA ThIka taraha na samajhane ke kAraNa diDanAga, dharmakIrti, udyotakara, kumArila Adi bauddha-vaidika vidvAnoM ne dUSita kara dI thI aura pakSAgrahI dRSTi kA hI samarthana kiyA thaa| ataH akalaGaga ne mahA prayAsa karake do apUrva kArya kiye - eka to syAdvAdanyAya para Aropita dUSaNoM ko dUra kara use svaccha banAyA 2 aura dUsarA kitanA hI nayA nirmANa kiyaa| yahI kAraNa hai ki unake dvArA nirmita mahattvapUrNa granthoM meM cAra grantha to kevala nyAya-zAstrapara hI likhe gaye haiN| yahA~ akalaMka ke ukta donoM kAryoM kA kucha digdarzana karAyA jAtA hai -

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jaina nyAya : parizIlana 111 1. dUSaNoddhAra yoM akalaDaraga ne vibhinna vAdiyoM dvArA diye gaye sabhI dUSaNoM kA parihAra kara unake siddhAntoM kI kar3I samIkSA kI hai| kintu yahA~ unake dUSaNoddhAra aura samIkSA ke kevala do sthala prastuta kiye jAte haiN| mAptamImAMsA meM samantabhadra ne 3 3 mukhyatayA Apta kI sarvajJatA aura unake upadeza syAdvAda kI sahetuka siddhi kI hai / tathA sarvajJatA-kevala jJAna-aura sthAdvAda meM sAkSAt (pratyakSa)evaM asAkSAt (parokSa) sarvatattva prakAzana kA bheda batalAyA hai " / kumArila ne mImAMsAzlokavArtika meM sarvajJatA para aura dhamakIrti ne pramANavatika meM syAdvAda (anekAnta) para AkSepa kiye haiN| kumArila kahate haiM - evaM yaiH kevalajJAnamindriyAdyanapekSiNaH / sUkSmAtItAdiviSayaM jIvasya parikalpitam / / naste tadAgamAnsiddhayannaca tenAgamo vinaa| mImA. zlo. 87 'jo sUkSmAdi viSayaka atIndriya kevalajJAna puruSa kA mAnA jAtA hai vaha Agama ke vinA siddha nahIM hotA aura usake vinA Agama siddha nahIM hotA, isa prakAra sarvajJatA ke svIkAra meM anyonyAzraya doSa hai|' akalaMka kumArila ke isa dUSaNa kA parihAra karate hue uttara dete haiM - evaM yatkevalajJAnamanumAnavijRmbhitam / naste tadAgamAt siddhayeta na ca tena vinA''gamaH / / satyamarthabalAdeva puruSAtizayo mata : / prabhavaH pauruSeyo'sya prabandho'nAdiriSyate / / nyAya vi. kA. 412,413 'yaha saca hai ki anumAna dvArA siddha kevalajJAna (sarvajJatva) Agama ke binA aura Agama kevala jJAna ke vinA siddha nahIM hotA, tathApi unameM anyonyAzraya doSa nahIM hai| kyoMki puruSAtizaya - kevalajJAna arthabala - pratItivaza se mAnA jAtA hai aura isalie vIjAkura ke prabandha-santAna kI taraha ina (kevala jJAna aura Agama) kA prabandha (santAna) anAdi kahA gayA hai / yahA~ spaSTa hai ki samantabhadra ne anumAna se jisa kevalajJAna (sarvajJatA) kI siddhi kI thI, kumArila ne usI meM anyonyAzraya doSa diyA hai / akalaGakadeva ne sahetuka usI doSa kA parihAra kiyA aura sarvajJatA tathA Agama donoM ko anAdi batalAyA hai|

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112 STUDIES IN JAINISM (kha) dharmakIti kA syAdvAdapara nimna AkSepa hai - sarvasyobhayarUpatve tadvizeSanirAkRteH / / coditodathi khAdeti kimuSTra nAbhidhAvati / / pramANa vA. 1-183 'yadi saba padArtha ubhayarUpa- anekAntAtmaka hai, to unameM bheda na rahane ke kAraNa kisI ko "dahI khA" kahane para vaha U~Ta ko khAne ke lie kyoM nahIM daur3atA' ? dharmakIti ke isa AkSepa kA sabala jabAba akalaMka dete hue kahate haiM / dadhyuSTrAderabhedatvaprasaMgAdekacodanam / pUrvapakSamavijJAya dUSako'pi vidUSakaH / / sugato'pi mRgo jAtA mRgo'pi sugataH smRtaH / tathApi sugato vandyo mRgaH khAdyo yatheSyate / / tathA vastubalAdeva bhedAbhedavyavasthiteH / codito daghi khAdeti kimuSTramabhidhAvati / / nyAya vi. kA. 372, 373, 374 'daghi aura U~Ta ko eka batalAkara doSa denA dharmakIti kA pUrva pakSa (anekAnta) ko na samajhanA hai aura dUSaka hokara bhI vidUSaka - upahAsya hai, kyoMki unhIM kI mAnyatAnusAra sugata bhI mRga the aura mRga bhI sugata huA hai| phira bhI sugata ko vandanIya aura mRga ko bhakSaNIya kahA jAtA hai aura isa taraha paryAya bheda se sugata meM vandanIya-bhakSaNIya kI bhedavyavasthA tathA sugata va mRga meM eka citta santAna (jIvadravya) kI abhedavyavasthA kI jAtI hai, usI prakAra vastubala (paryAya aura dravya kI pratIti) se sabhI padArthoM meM bheda aura abheda kI vyavasthA hai / ataH kisIko dahI khA' kahane para vaha U~Ta ko khAne ke liye kyoM daur3egA, kyoMki sat dravya kI apekSA abheda hone para bhI paryAya kI apekSA unameM bheda hai / ata eva vaha bhakSaNIya dahI (paryAya) ko hI khAne ke lie daur3egA, abhakSaNIya U~Ta (paryAya) ko khAne ke lie nhiiN| yahI vastuvyavasthA hai / bhedAbheda (anekAnta) to vastu kA svabhAva hai, usakA apalApa nahIM kiyA jA sktaa| yahA~ akalaMka ne dhamakIrti ke AkSepa kA zAlIna upahAsa ko lie hue bar3A hI karArA uttara diyA hai / bauddha-paramparA meM sugata pUrvajanma meM mRga the, taba ve bhakSaNIya the aura jaba vahI mRga sugata huA taba vaha bhakSaNIya nahIM rahA - vandanIya bana gyaa| isa prakAra eka-citta-santAna kI apekSA unameM abheda hai aura maga tathA sugata do paryAyoM kI dRSTi se bheda hai / isI prakAra jagat kI pratyeka vastu isa bhedAbheda kI vyavasthA kA atikramaNa nahIM krtii| akalaka ne dharmakIrti ke Aropa kA uttara dete hue yahA~ yahI siddha kiyA hai| isa taraha akalaMka ne dUSaNoddhAra kA kArya bar3I yogyatA aura saphalalA.ke sAtha pUrNa kiyA hai| .

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jaina nyAya : parizIlana 113 nava nirmANa akalaGakadeva ne dUsarA mahattvapUrNa kArya nava-nirmANa kA kiyaa| jaina nyAya ke jina Avazyaka tatvoMkA unake samaya taka vikAsa nahIM ho sakA thA, unakA unhoMne vikAsa kiyA athavA unakI pratiSThA kii| unhoMne apane cAra grantha nyAyazAstra para likhe haiM / ve haiM - 1 nyAyavinizcaya (svopajJavRttisahita), 2. siddhivinizcaya (svopajJavRtti sahita), 3 pramANasaMgraha (svopajJavRttisahita) aura 4 laghIyastraya (svopajJavRtti sahita / ye cAroM grantha kATikAtmaka haiM / nyAyavinizcaya meM 450, siddhivinizcaya meM 367, pramANasaMgraha meM 57 aura laghIyastraya meM 75 kArikAe~ haiM / ye cAroM grantha bar3e kliSTa aura durUha hai / nyAyavinizcaya para vAdirAja ne, siddhivinizcaya para anantavIryane aura laghIyastraya para prabhAcandra ne vistRta evaM vizada vyAkhyAe~ likhI haiM / pramANasaMgraha para bhI AcArya anantavIrya kA bhASya (vyAkhyA) hai, jo upalabdha nahIM hai| akalaGaka ne inameM vibhinna dArzanikoM kI samIkSApUrvaka pramANa, nikSepa, naya ke svarUpa, saMkhyA, viSaya, phala kA vizada vivecana, pramANa ke pratyakSa-parokSa bheda, pratyakSa ke sAMvyavahArika aura mukhya ina do bhedoM kI pratiSThA, parokSa pramANa ke smRti, pratyabhijJAna, tarka, anumAna, Agama ina pAMca bhedoM kI iyattAkA nirdhAraNa, unakA sayuktika sAdhana, lakSaNa-nirUpaNa tathA inhIM ke antargata upamAna, arthApatti, sambhava, amAva Adi para kalpitapramANoM kA samAveza, sarvajJa kI aneka pramANoMse siddhi, anumAna ke sAdhyasAdhana agoM ke lakSaNoM aura bhedoMkA vistRta nirUpaNa tathA kAraNa hetu, pUrvacara hetu, uttaracara hetu, sahacara hetu Adi anivArya hetuoM kI pratiSThA, anyathAnupapatti ke abhAva se eka akicitkara hetvAbhAsa kA svIkAra aura usake bheda-rUpa se asiddhAdi kA pratipAdana, dRSTAnta, dharmI, vAda, jAti aura nigrahasthAna ke svarUpAdi kA jaina dRSTi se pratipAdana, jaya-parAjayavyavasthA Adi kitanA hI nayA nirmANa kara ke jaina-nyAya ko na kevala samRddha aura paripuSTa kiyA, apitu use bhAratIya nyAya zAstrameM vaha gauravapUrNa sthAna dilAyA, jo bauddha nyAya ko dharmakIti ne dilAyA hai| vastutaH akalaMka jaina nyAya ke madhyakAla ke sraSTA hai / isase isa kAla kI 'akalaMkakAla' kahA jA sakatA hai| akalaMka ne jaina nyAya kI jo rUparekhA aura dizA nirdhArita kI, usIkA anusaraNa uttaravartI sabhI jaina tArkikoM ne kiyA hai / haribhadra, vIrasena, kumAranandi, vidyAnanda, anantavIrya prathama, vAdirAja, mANikyanandi Adi madhyayugIna AcAryoMne unake kArya ko Age bar3hAyA aura use yazasvI banAyA hai / unake sUtrAtmaka kathana ko ina AcAryoM ne apanI racanAoM dvArA suvistRta, suprasArita aura supuSTa kiyA hai / haribhadra kI anekAntajayapatAkA, zAstravArtAsamuccaya, vIra sena kI takaMbahula dhavalA, jaya-dhavalA TIkAe~, kumAranandi kA vAdanyAya, vidyAnanda ke vidyAnaMdamahodaya, tattvArthazlokavAtika, aSTasahasrI, AptaparokSA, pramANaparIkSA, patraparIkSA, satyazAsanaparIkSA, yuktyanazAsanA J-8

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114 STUDIES IN JAINISM laMskAra, ananta vIrya kI siddhivinizcayaTIkA, pramANasaMgraha bhASya, vAdirAja ke nyAyavinizcaya vivaraNa, pramANanirNaya aura mANikyanandi kA parIkSAmukha isa kAla kI anUThI tArkika racanAe~ hai / 3. antyakAla athavA prabhAcandrakAla ___ yaha kAla jaina nyAya ke vikAsa kA antima kAla hai| isa kAla meM maulika granthoM ke nirmANa kI kSamatA kama ho gayI aura vyAkhyA graMthoM kA nirmANa haa| prabhAcaMdra ne isa kAla meM apane pUrvaja AcAryoM kA anugamana karate hue jaina nyAya para jo vizAlakAya vyAkhyAgraMtha likhe hai vaise vyAkhyAgrantha unake bAda nahIM likhe gye| akalaGaka ke laghIyastraya para laghIyastrayAlaMkAra, jisakA dUsarA nAma nyAyakumudacandra hai aura mANikyanandi ke parIkSAmukha para prameyakamalamArtaNDa nAma kI prameya bahula evaM tarkapUrNa TIkAe~ prabhAcandra kI amogha tarkaNA aura ujjvala yaza ko prastuta karatI hai| vidvajjagata meM ina TIkAoM kA bahu Adara hai / abhaya deva kI sanmatitaTIkA aura vAdi. devasUri kA syAdvAdaratnAkara (pramANanayatattvAlokAlaMkAra TIkA) ye do hI TIkAe~ bhI mahattvapUrNa haiM / kintu ye prabhAcandra kI tarka-paddhati se vizeSa prabhAvita haiM / __ isa kAla meM laghu anantavIrya, abhayadeva, devasUri, abhayacandra, hemacandra, malliSeNa sUri, AzAdhara, bhAvasena vidya, ajita sena, abhinava dharmabhUSaNa, cArukIrti, vimaladAsa, nareMdrasena, yazovijaya Adi tAkikoM ne apanI vyAkhyA yA mUla racanAoM dvArA jaina nyAya ko saMkSepa evaM saralabhASA meM prastuta kiyA hai / isa kAla kI racanAoM meM laghu anantavIrya kI prameyaratnamAlA (parIkSAmukhavRtti), abhayadeva kI saMmatitarkaTIkA, deva sUrikA pramANanaya tattvAlokAlaMkAra aura usakI svopajJa TIkA syAdvAdaratnAkara, abhayacandra kI laghIyastrayatAtparya vRtti, hemacandra kI pramANamImAMsA malliSeNa sari kI syAdavAdamaMjarI, AzAdhara kA prameyaratnAkara, bhAvamena kA vizvatattvaprakAza ajita sena kI cAyanaNidIpikA, cArukIti kI aryaprakAzikA aura pramevaratnAlaMkAra vimaladAsa ko saptabhaDigataraDigI, narendra sena kI pramANaprameya kalikA aura yazovijaya ke aSTasahasrI-vivaraNa, jJAna bindu aura jana taka bhASA vizeSa ullekha yogya jaina nyAya grantha haiN| antima tIna tAkikoM ne apane nyAya graMthoMmeM navyanyAyazailI ko bhI apanAyA hai / isake bAda jaina nyAya kI dhArA prAyaH banda sI ho gayI aura usameM Age koI pragati nahIM huii| TippaNiyA~ 1. samantabhadra, svavambhU , zloka 2 2. jinasena,, mahApurANa, 12-95: vimala sari, padamacari. 3-68 2 Rgda .2-33-07

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jaina nyAya : parizIlana 115 4. atharvaveda, 15, 1-2-7 5. zrImadbhAgavata, skaM. 5, a.3-1 6. vahIM, skaM. 5, a. 3 7. kundakunda, cauvIsa titthayara. bhatti. 3, 4, 5 8. bhUtabali, puSpadanta, SaTkhaNDAgama, 1-1-79; dhava . pu. 1 pR. 219 9. SaTkhaNDAgama, 1-2-50, pu. 3, pR. 262 10. paMcA. 14, 13, 36 11. SaTvaM., dhavalA, pu. 1, pR. 108 12. aSTasa. TIkA. pR. 1 13. svayambhU., 14, 102; AptamImAMsA, kA. 13 14. darzana kA prayojana, pR. 1 15. nyAyabhASya, pR. 4. 16. vikramasmRtigrantha 1-718 17. dvAtriMzikA, 1-30, 4-15. 18. tattvArthavArtika, pR. 295 19. aSTasahasrI, pR. 238 20. mAhAtmyAttamasaH svayaM kalivazAtprAyo guNadveSibhiH / nyAyo'yaM malinIkRtaH kathamapi prakSAlya nenIyate / samyagjJAnajalairvacobhiramalaistatrAnukampAparaH / / nyAyavi. zlo. 2 21. SaTkha. 1-1-79, 1-2-50 Adi tathA paMcAsti. gAthA 14 22. AptamImAMsA, 14 23. vahIM, kA. 23 24. vahIM, kA. 14 25. vahIM, kA. 15 26. vahIM, kA. 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 27. AptamI. 20, 22, 23 28. svayambhU, 101, 102 29. AptamI. 108, svaya. 61, yuktyanuzA. kA. 51 30. zravaNabelagolA ke zilAlekha naM. 54/67 meM sumati-saptaka nAma ke eka mahattvA pUrNa tarka-grantha kA ullekha hai, jo Aja anupalabdha hai| 31. nyAyasUtra 11111, 4 / 2 / 50, 112 / 2, 3,4 Adi 32. nyAyavinizcaya, zlo. 2, jo pahale TippaNi meM A cukA hai| 33. AtmamImAMsa', kA. 5 aura 113 34. vahIM, kA. 105

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC V. K. Bharadwaja (1) One way of identifying the Jaina concept of logic and arriving at a level of clarity with regard to it is to inquire into how does a Jaina thinker reason things out when he is placed in a given situation. This approach would require us to specify the situation or situations in which he does this and also to outline the structure of reasoning pattern he adopts. Once we have done this, it would be posssible for us, I think, to be in a reasonably good position to say what the structure and function of Jaina logic is or how at least it is to be interpreted and understood keeping in view the Jaina tradition as we are acquainted with it through the vast Sanskrit literature available to us. (2) By 'logic', I do not mean the formal logic the paradigm of which the modern, mathematical logic is. Nor do I mean by it what is traditionally known as inductive logic. By logic ' in the Jaina context, I mean three things taken together : One, the analysis of concepts like jnana, prama, vyapti, and tarka and the methods of winning knowledge in the sense of having beliefs aboutthe world, the world of facts, the world of values, and the metaphysi cal world if there is one; and also the criteria developed and used Earlier version of it was presented in the seminar on "Jain Philosophy and Modern Scientific Thought" (Poona University, 1979). Revised version was published in the Indian Philosophical Quarterly (July. 1982).

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC 117 for assessing evidence and evaluating these beliefs as true and false consistent and inconsistent. Two, within one and the same tradition, the methods and criteria used for avoiding and resolving disagreements about religious and metaphysical matters, the knowledge of which is supposed or claimed to be delivered to us in the accepted Scriptures. Finally, three, the reasoning strategies adopted in dealing with the opponents and the critics of one's views, in thej aina tradition particularly, with the explicit aim of avoiding conflicts, violence, and strife, and if possible, to look at them as though the opponents' views could be mutually harmonized in the sense that they were different philosophical reactions to one and the same situation from different points of view. (3) In the history of Indian philosophy, these three different jobs for which reasoning has been employed have not often been distinguished sharply. It is one the distinctive features of the Jaina logical enterprize that, in this tradition, there have been quite a few thinkers who differentiated reasoning used for one job from reasoning employed for the other job. Yasovijaya Gani at one place1 remarks that the saptabhaiigi is used in the case of the Agama or the Scriptures, and nowhere is the Jaina logician prepared to employ saptabharigi or even the nayavada in relation to what is known by pratyaksa or anunana.2 There is a jar here' is known by pratyaksa : it is a fact of observation, and for this reason the question of its pramanya from the points of view of metaphysics is not relevant to its truth or falsity. Similarly, the Jainas used their naya vyavastha in order to account for the different metaphysical views of their opponents and critics by interpreting whatever the non-Jaina views there were, in terms of nayabhasas.3 The Jaina theory of Naya, thus, is employed as an instrument of describing the non-Jaina views of reality. A naya is a relative description, it is a description of reality relative to a certain point of view. A nayabhasa or the fallacy of naya is the fallacy of mistaking a relative for an absolute description; it is the mistake of identifying a description Di which is true for some values of x for a description Dj which is true for every value of x. The structure of the Jaina reasoning in such a case is as follows: A non-Jaina philosopher describes some one only facet of reality from a certain given point of view. But, reality is anaikantika, many-faceted; and for this reason, it is a mistake to regard a description of some

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118 STUDIES IN JAINISM one only facet of reality as the only description of reality. To do this, in other words, is to commit the fallacy of naya or a nayabhasa. The non-Jaina philosophers make precisely this mistake. Hence, their views are false in this sense: they are nayabhasas only. Again, another Jaina thinker Amota Candra Suri differentiates the role of prama nas from the role of nayas by saying that pramanena prami yante niyante ca nayaistatha4. (4) By identifying three distinct types of jobs for which the Jaina logicians used their reasoning, I am not suggesting that every Jaina thinker kept these different functions of reasoning apart from each other neatly. In fact, many of them landed themselves in conceptual confusions by mistaking the anekantavada which is a metaphysical thesis for an empirical thesis and thus were led to apply the saptabhangi or for that matter sahasrabhangi structure of reasoning to the factual statements and empirical generalization which are matters of observation and inference. To my mind, it indeed is fair on the part of the Jaina logician least some of them whom I have mentioned above, to confine the application of the saptabhangi thesis to things in the metaphysical realm rather than to things in the empirical world. Similarly, the areas of operation of the pramanas and the nayas will have to be kept apart, or else, as I have shown in one of my earlier papers on Jaina logics there will be no criterion for differentiating a naya vakya from a pramana vakya, except on the basis of the completeness/incompleteness of description, namely a naya vakya is an incomplete while a pramana vakya is a complete description of what there is. Even so, this criterion turns out to be inadequate when what interests us most as logicians is knowledge and pramanja of what is described rather than mere description of what there is. Besides, what is described may be a religious or a metaphysical fact, or it may be something which is a matter of empirical observation. Certainly, the question of pramanya in the former case will be decidable in a way very different from the way in which the quesion of pramanya in the latter case is decidable. So the descriptional criterion for differentiating nava vakya from a pramana vakya won't do. This consequence indeed follows when the job which nayas are designed to do is confused with the job which the pramanas are assigned to do. (5) Now if the thesis I am proposing here is accepted as

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC 119 plausible, namely that the Jaina theory of pramana, naya, and suptabhangi or syadvada have different areas of operation, it is easy to see that there is all the greater probability that the structure of reasoning in the case of the one is different from the structure of reasoning in the case of the other. And, I am inclinded to think that this really is the case. The nayavada has to do with the Jaina niti vis-a-vis the other non-Jaina religious and metaphysical traditions; the saptabangi or syadvada has to do with the Agemas or the Scriptures; and the pramanas (with the obvious exception of the agama pramana and also in so far as they do not pronounce judgement on matters of metaphysical realm,) concern themselves with the criteria for the pramanya of what may be called knowledge in the sense of true beliefs about the world of observable facts. (6) The pramana theory of the Jainas, as I have indicated above, is different from their naya theory and also it is different from the syadvada theory. Where does this difference consist in? A part of the answer I have already given, viz, that these three different theories are designed to do different jobs and that they have functionally distinct areas of operation. Another part of the answer is that the Jaina theory of pramanas deals with the questions of justification of our beliefs about the world and also that it seeks to provide criteria for classifying and evaluating the evidence that we do cite in support of our beliefs. For example, the Jaina legician requires that a hetu (a reason or evidence) must be cited for the thesis, for instance, that the Rohini star will rise, and provi. des the reason in the observable evidence that the Krttika have risen (upalabdhi hatu)6. For another instance, 'There is no jar here; why? because it is unobservable (anupalabdhi hetu). Or, 'The man had a mother', for He had a father' (sahacara hetu)8. (7) The Jainas used the anumana pramana for things which are paroksa and not pratyaksa, things which are not known to us in our direct observational confrontation with them. However, the way they developed their theory of anumana pramana, it did no longer remain a theory exclusively of inference from the known to the hitherto unknown, but included in its fold the theory of explanation and of prediction also. From the observation of the rise of the Krttika they could make the prediction that the Rohini star will rise. Similarly, having observed that there is a

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120 STUDIES IN JAINISM shadow here, they sought its explanation in the fact, given the context, that there is an umbrella here. It does not matter for our purpose here how primitive were the models the Indians of the age used: This only indicates the rural setting in which they lived. The reasoning pattern that the Jainas used included in general these five steps: (1) assertion of the proposition to be justified or paksa prayoga or pratijna, (2) citing the reason or evidence, or hatu prayoga, (3) employing a vyapti vakya together with an instantiative drstanta or a paradigm case, (4) applying the generalisation to the particular case in question (upanaya); and finally (5) drawing the inference (nigamana).' Their vyapti vakyas or generalisations always carried the existential interpretartion and also they could properly be described as empirical generalisetions, though of course they were not always of the cause-effect type. For, sometimes they were based on observable connections like, If a man had a father, then he had a mother also'; sometimes on the analysis of the meaning of terms like, 'If there is no certainty here, then there is uncertainty here'; and sometimes on the analysis of certain observable but essential properties of things like, "If there is heat here, then there is no sensation of cold here'.10 (8) One important feature of the Jaina logic is its emphasis on the pramanya of the vyapti vakyas on which, together with the knowledge of the initial conditions, depended the pramanya of anumana. The Jaina logician observes that the generality of a generalisation is not merely a conjuction of several observable instances, such that the knowledge of vya pti vakya is not a matter of observation or pratyaksa. Nor is it a matter of inference or anumana, for anumana itself is parasitic on a vyapti vakya. The Naiyayikas thought that tarka was an effective instrument of the pramanya of a vyapti vakya. But this the Jaina logician denies. For, he argues, tarka as the Naiyayikas conceived it could not even take off without the necessary logical support of a vyapti vakya how then could it be regarded as an instrument of the pramanya of a vaypti vakya itself ?11 It just could not be. To solve the problem of the pramanya of a vyapti vaykya, like Bertrand Russell12 in the West who accepted the principle of induction as a logical principle, the Jaina logician looked upon tarka as an independent pramana the sole function of which is to give us vya ptis which are to constitute the basis of anumana pramana. 13 The way I have analysed the Jaina thory of pramana, the theory clearly is seen

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC 121 to be an instrument of knowledge -- knowledge of things which are either pratyaksa-a matter of observation or paroksa-a matter of inference. It is this characteristic which, to my mind, sets the Jaina theory of pramana apart from the Jaina theory of naya The Nayava da or the theory of na ya in no sense, is an instrument or a part of the instrument of knowledge. (9) These are not all the important features of the Jaina theory of pramana. I have drawn attention to only some of them which I presonally think to be important enough to set the Jaina concept of logic apart, for example, from the Nyaya and the Buddhist concepts of logic.14 Furthermore the Jaina logicians distinguished the concept of pramana (the word comes from ma dha tu which means 'to measure') from the concept of naya (the word comes from ni dhatu which means 'to lead'). I am inclined to think that the concept of naya is not a concept of logic. It is used by the Jaina thinkers to describe the philosopical positions of the other thinkers who held theories which were either opposed to or at least different from theirs. The role that they assign to this concept is clearly illustrated by their assertion nayabhasesvajainamata na mantarbhavah.is The acceptance of nayavada on the part of the Jaina logician, I have indicated in the last sentence, is the acceptance of a certain attitude to what the other non-Jaina thinkers had to say about the structure of and the furniture in their respective metaphysical worlds. The concept of naya, to be sure, was never applied to such empirically ascertainable cases like 'Fire burns', or. A high level of colestrol in the human body is one of the causal conditions of cardiological diseases. However, one can talk of the criterion of the distinction between a naya vakya and a pramana vakya. This I have done elsewhere.16 (10) Professor Barlingay in his celebrated book on Indian logic 16 observes : The most important feature of the Jaina logic is its introduction of saptabhangi naya, and formulation of the logic of possibility or syadvada.17 He adds : I feel that these two doctrines are independent and are valuable to logic. It must have been due to some confusion amongst the later Jaina logicians that these two separate theories were identified as one 18

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122 STUDIES IN JAINISM To my mind, Barlingay is right when he refuses to identifly nayavada with syadvada, though it is of cource true that some Jaina logicians (hopefully) mistakenly have envisaged the saptabhangi yojana in botn nayavada and syadvada.19 I myself have differentiated the two by saying that saptabhangi or syadva da has been the case of the Scriptures or the Agamas which assert that the metaphysical reality is anaikantika while nayavada has been harnessed to serve different ends altogether.20 The question, which I think, is of the last importance;, is: how are we to understand syadvada? In the recent past, so much indeed has been said about it that one feels lost in the jungle of opinions having far-reaching consequences. Barlingay calls syadvada the logic of possibilities21 and regards 'syadasti' as an example of a modal proposition.22 Some look upon it from an angle that it has appeared to them that a calculus of probabilities could be developed on the lines of syadvada.23 Others have characterised syadvada as the seven-valued logic of the Jaina philosophy.24 Ramchandra Pandeya25 thinks-but he arrives at this result in a way different from mine and independently-that 'sya dasti' and the other syat sentences really are no assertions at all, such that the truth values--true and false--could not be assigned to them. An old scholar of the Jaina philosophy Satkari Mookerji2 treats syat as a corrective proviso. And, the greatest historian of Indian logic, Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana does not hesitate to characterize syadvada or saptabhangi naya as the doctrine of sevenfold paralogisms27! The seven sentences which constitute the syadvada are well-known in the Jaina literature and I give them as follow :28 One : A thing is existent from a certain point of view Two : A thing is non-existent from another point of w. Three: It is both existent and non-existent in turn from a third point of view. Four It is indescribable29 (that it both exists and does not exist simultaneously) Five: It is existent and indescribable from a fifth point of view. Six : It is non-existent and indescribable from a sixth point of view. Seven: It is both existent and from the seventh point of view. non-existent and indescribable

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC 123 These seven syat-sentences are far from being clear. The question whether the Jainas regarded existence' as a predicate is debatable; and as I am writing this paper, I have not as yet come across any mentionable discussion on this issue. I myself would not discuss it in this paper. Let this be the subject for another independent paper. However, there are few other difficulties which I would like to put on record. The first is about interpretation of the prefix 'syat' to each one of these seven syat-sentences. Philosophers have constructed different theories about syadvada on the strength of one or the other interpretation of this word30 I myself have regarded syat as functioning for the purpose of eliminating the element of ekantikata from any Jaina description of what there is or how it is. This takes into account the pragmatics of syadvada. It takes into account the role the Jaina thinkers assign to the syat sentences for the interpretation of their scriptures or the Agamas. Notice, howeve, that the critics of syadvdaa like Sankaracarya3t saw this; and they were quick to point out that by prefixing the word 'syat' to his statements the Jaina thinker failed to commit himself to any logical position. For this reason, indeed, they saw no point in arguing with him. The second difficulty which continues to haunt me is the question: What is the analysis of the word 'avaktavyam' (frequently rendered in English as indescribable' or inexpressible') in the fourth, fifth sixth, and the seventh syat-sentences? The Dictionary usage apart, the word may mean any of the following: (a) I am not able to describe what there is or how it is. (b) It is logically impossible to describe what there is & c. (c) We ought not to describe what there is & c. (d) We can never be sure of the adequacy of our description of what there is & c. It seems to me that the Jaina thinkers never used avak tavyam in either (a) or (b) of the above four senses. The (c) and (d) are connected: (d) could be cited as a reason for (c). I am inclined to think that (d) is a fairly reasonable interpretation of avaktavyam in the syat-sentences wherever the word avaktavyam occurs. Nevertheless, by this innocently looking device of using 'syat' as a prefix to all that he seems to claim to assert, the Jaina thinker does something which is disarmingly non-violent but remains logically, awefully

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124 STUDIES IN JAINISM embarrassing. I do not propose to develop in this paper my theory about the theory of saptabhangi naya or sya dva da. I only wish to do two things here : One is to ask the question : Can syadvada form a part of the Jaina concept of logic ? and two : to comment on Matilal's defense of syadvada. My answer to the first question is in the negative. For one thing, the Jaina metaphysical theory called anekantavadu and syadva da go hand in hand. The function of syadvada is to eliminate the element of ekantikata from the Jaina view of metaphysical reality. For another thing, any two syat-vak yas are logically consistent if at all they can be said to be true or false. To my mind, there is absolutely no circumstance under which they can be said to be false at all. If true, they must always be true. But then, they are not tautologies either; nor can they be shown to be analytically true in any sense of the term "analytically true'. Nor does the question of pramanya arise in their case. Then what justification is there to call them statements at all ? I think that one is right in denying the syat vakyas the status of assertions. Those who think they can develop the calculus of probabilities on the basis of syadva da mistakenly treat syat va kyas as if these were empirical assertions. If it is accepted that they are not assertions at all, it is much the far more difficult to accept that they are empirical assertions whose probabilities could be calculated. Nor do I think that the saptabhangi naya vada offers us any ground whatever to suggest that what we are dealing with in the Jaina philosophy is a sort of multivalued logic which can be systematized with some ingenuity. How can a set of sentences if they are treated as statements at all each one of which if true is always true has only one truth value true not logically but paralogically only, how can such a set of sentences be used to develop a system of multivalued logic? This seems to me to be sheerly impossible. These considerations make me think that whatever else the Jaina concept of logic be the saptabhangi naya or sya dvada, from a strictly logical point of view, cannot be said to form a part of it. I will examine now Matilal's defense of syadvada.32 Notice that Matilal discusses syadva da in isolation from the other two theories of the Jainas--the theory of pramana or pramanava da, and the theory of naya or nayavada. He mentions the second but leaves out untouched the first. I disagree with him here. In order to

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC 125 understand what the Jaina thinker is doing in his syadvada it is methodologically instructive to connect contextually syadvada to other two theories and to consider the function these different theories are designed to perform in their respective fields. Matilal does not do this; however, he connects sya dvada to the Jaina metaphysical thesis of anekantata by saying that the Jaina thinker used syadvada as a method 33 to support the anekantavada. He might have liked to call it the method of non-violence; and I would certainly have agreed with him. But then, he would not have gone about discovering the logical virtues of syat-sentences, and defending sradva da on purely logical grounds. And, this is precisely what in fact he does. Matilal identifies three different usages of the particle 'syat'. (1) In the ordinary Sanskrit 'syat' means 'perhaps' or 'may be'. But, the Jainas used it in a special sense to indicate the anekanta nature of a proposition.34 (2) Etymologically, 'syat' is derived from the root as + potential optative third person singular. In this usage, the word expresses sambhavana or probability. Matilal remarks: 'the Jaina syat is even different from this use of syat in the sense of probability 35 and adds emphatically: "The Anekanta doctrine, to be sure, is neither a doctrine of doubt, or even uncertainty, nor a doctrine of probability. Thus, "syat" means in the Jain use, conditional YES. It is like saying, "in a certain sense yes" 36 (3) 'Syat' has a concessive use also as in the sentence "syat etat" which means "let it be so (but).' 37. By using the particle 'svat', the Jaina thinker concedes the opponent's thesis in order to blunt the sharpness of his attack and disagreement, and at the same time, it is calculated to persuade the opponent to use another point of view, carefully consider the other side of the case.38 (4) Finally in the Jaina literature on syadva da, the particle 'syat' is treated as synonymous with 'kathamcit' ('in some respect', or "from a certain standpoint') and "kada cit' ('somehow, or sometimes'). Grammatically, the function of the particle (nipata) in a sentence is to modify the acceptance or rejection of the proposition or predication expressed by the sentence.39 On these considerations of the semantical behaviour of the particle 'syat' Matilal supports his two-fold thesis: (a) that a syat sentence experesses a proposition which could be true or false, and (b) that the proposition expressed by the use of syat sentence is a conditional assertion of the f If p' then A is B'.. 40 The (b) part of this thesis is not very clear.

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126 STUDIES IN JAINISM It is not clear at least to me. The form (i) 'If p' then, 'A is B' is conceptually quite different from (ii) 'a conditional YES', or from (iii) 'in a certain sense, yes'. To a conditional statement of the form (i), one can assign truth-values truth or falsity; but an utterence having the force of (ii) or of (iii), if at all it is used to make an assertion in Frege's sense, is always true.41 And, as I have said above, there is no good reason to characterize such a thing as statement or assertion. Though Matilal does not differentiate the form (i) from the forms (ii) or (iii) of a syat sentence, he chooses the form (i) as that of a statement which could be true or false. It is alright if one is interested in doing logic to go about one's business in this way; but one is in utter confusion when one seeks to analyze a syat-sentence in terms of a conditional statement. For, a syat-sentence does not have the virtues or disvirtues of a conditional statement; for it does not have the virtues and disvirtues of a statement at all.. It is sought to express something which does not admit of a logical or even a factual appraisal. For, truth and falsity, consistency and inconsistency are not the properties which characterise a syat sentence. Consider now Matilal's analysis of the notion of avaktavyam. The word 'avaktavyam' in the ordinary Sanskrit is not everywhere synonymous with the word 'inexpressible' or 'indescribable'. What other usages of 'avaktavyam' there are or there can be, some of them that I have cited above must be included in any set of the usages of the word. Matilal is undecided. He does not appear to have made up his mind on the question whether avaktayam denotes a self-contradictory concept, which, by definition, cannot be used to describe any state of affairs. His first argument in defense of syadvada is based on a negative answer to his question and his second argument on an affirmative answer to it. And he offers only two arguments. The first argument is that 'by simple application of contradictory prebicates to a thing in the same breath( simultaneously) the speaker does not land himself into a self-contradiction,43 for the contradiction may be apparent only and not a genuine contradiction. The Jaina philoshphers did not use 'avaktavyam' in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and the seventh syat-sentences to state a contradiction or to conjoin a contradiction to one or more of the other syatsentences. Fine. Matilal characterizes the predicate avaktavyam

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC 127 as both unitary and primary, and symbolizes it by the neutral symbol 'O', the other two unitary and primary predicates being affirmation and negation, denoted by him by '+' and '-' signs. In his opinion, the internal structure of avaktavyam, essentially, is that of incompatible predicates applied to something in the same respect simultaneously. The argument is self-descrepent. It takes avaktavyam, on the one hand, to be used for affirming of something a set of predicates which are incompatible in appearance only and, on the other hand, it treats the internal structure of avaktavyam essentially as that of an inconsistent predication. The second argument is more devastating to the Jaina position which Matilal is so keen to defend. The argument is this: If according to the Jaina philosopher reality is possessed of an infinite number of attributes or properties anantadharmatmakam vastu,44 then it follows that any two incompatible predicates can also be truly affirmed of it. Aware as he is of the disquieting logical implications of affirming truly two incompatible predicates of one and the same thing in the same respect simultaneously, he adds that 'in such predication the purpose of description might fail, but the purpose of stating a truth will not fail45. The last remark suggests that a syat-sentence frustrates the purpose of description by failing to describe any state of affairs. This happens because the internal structure of avaktavyam, essentially, is that of an inconsistent predication. If this is so, then how can a syat-sentence possibly serve the purposes of stating a truih? It just cannot do it. NOTES 1. * "Yasovijaya Gani's Jaina Tarka Bhasa. Delhi, 1977 paras 61 & 62: p. 91 Agame saptabhangi. 2. Ibid, p. 19. Yatra tu ghato'sti ityadi lokavakye saptabhangisamsparsasunyata tatrarthaprapa katv amatrena loka paksaya pramanyepi tattvato na pramanyamiti drastavyam. 3. Ibid, p. 24-25 Nayabhasesu ajainamatanamantarbhavah. The Sanskrit word "naya" comes from ni dhatu (root) which means, to lead'. Vidybhusana renders it in English as a 'method of description'. I think, this is the best translation consistent with the philosophical usage of the word in the Jaina traditions. 4. Amrtacandra Suri's Tatvarthasata, Varanasi, 1970 SI. 14, p. 5.

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128 5. Bharadwaja, V. K., 'Pramana and Naya in Jaina Logic', Philosophica, Vol. 7 No. 2, June 1978, p. 11. 6. Vidyabhusana, Satish Chandra. A History af Indian Logic, Delhi, 1971 pp. 190-91. 7. Ibid, pp. 190-91 8. Ibid, pp. 190-91. 9. Ibid, pp. 203 10. 11. Bhavasena's Prama-Pramya Sholapur, 1960, p. 41 Mark the use of the word "vyapti-balcna" in "va@ptibalema pararyalstpudamam tarba. 12. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, London, 1912, p. 103. 13. Vadi Devasur is Pramamo-nayarattvloka-lankara Bombay, 1967, 14. p. 216. The Naiyayikas continue to have their problems with the relation, for instance between tarka and vyapti having made the former an upaya of yvaptigraha. The Buddhist approach is more presuppositionalitric than any other either of the Naiyayikas or of the Jainas. 15. Yasovijaya Hani's Jaina Tarka Bhasa, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 16. STUDIES IN JAINISM Ibid, pp. 190-91 23. 17. 18. 19. Yasovijaya Gani's Jaina Tarka Bhasa, op. cit., Nayesvapi saptabhangtya jana. pp. 21-25. As discussed above. 24. 20. 21. Barlingay, S. S., op. cit., p. 6. 22. lbid, p. 62 Barlingay writes: "In the Jaina variety of Indian logic, another form of paopositions is found. An instance of this is "Syadusti" -"Possibly, this is". Such propositions are modal". p. 62. 27. 28. 29. Barlingay, S. S. A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic, Delhi, 1965, Second edition 1976. p. 6, 30. Ibid, p. 6 Ibid, p. 6. Professor D. S. Kothari's talk in the seminar on "Jaina Philosophy and Modern Scientific Thought" held at the Department of Philosophy. Poona University, Poona from April 5 to 7, 1979. 25. Pandeya, Ramachandra; Indian Studies in Philosophy, Delhi, 1977; the Chapter VIII 'The Jaina Conception of Syadvada'; pp. 114-123. 26. Mookerjee Satkari, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism, Delhi 1978; p. 122. Bharucha, G. B,, 'Seven-Valued Logic in Jaina Philosophy', International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol, 4, 1964 pp. 68-92. Vidyabhusana, Satish Chandra, op. cit., p. 211. Mallesena's Syadvadamanjari, Bombay, 1933. For an interesting discussion on the notion of avaktavyam see Satkari Mookerjee work, op. cit. See, for instance, some of the references given in the preceding para.

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC 129 31. Samkaracrya's Brahmasutra-bhasya II. 2.33 : pp. 559.62 of the Bombay 1938 edition. 32. Matilal, B. K., "Saptabhangi" in Self, Knowledge and Freedom, ed. : J. N Mohanty and S. P. Banerjee, Calcutta : The World Press Private Limited, 1978 pp. 159-72. Ibid p. 159. I ain using the word 'support and not 'prove', Matilal himself employs the 'pillar' analogy due to Padmarajiah,(Sec Padarajiah's Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge), Bombay, 1953. 34. Ibid. p. 163 35. Ibid. p. 163 36. Ibid. p. 163 37. Ibid. p. 163 38. Ibid. p. 163 39. Ibid. p. 164 40. Ibid. p. 163 41. Frege, G., Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege ; P. Geach and M. Black; Oxford, 1952. See also Apte's Sanskrit English Practical Dictionary. Matilal, B. K., op. cit. 169. 44. Mallisena's work, op. cit. Matilal, B. K. op. cit., p. 170.

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syAdvAda -mImAMsA darabArIlAla koThiyA syAdvAda pravartaka syAdvAda jaina darzana kA eka viziSTa, pramukha evaM maulika siddhAMta hai aura samasta jainAgama kA bIja hai| tIrthaMkaroM ne jo upadeza diyA vaha syAdvAda - vANI meM diyA / ataeva unheM syAdvAda kA pravaktA tathA unakI vANI ko syAdrAdavANI kahA gayA hai| AcArya samastabhadra ne zrI zambhavatIrthaMkara kA guNastavana karate hue unakA 'syAdavAdI' ke rUpa meM ullekha kiyA hai / bhaTTa akalaGakadeva ne bhI zrI RSabhadeva Adi ko lekara zrI mahAvIraparyanta sabhI (caubIsa) tIrthaMkaroM ko 'syAdvAdI' aura unakI vANI ko 'syAdvAdAmRtagarbha' kahA hai| isase vidita hai ki syAdvAda tIrthaMkaroM kI dena hai aura ve usake pravartaka haiM / syAdvAda kA svarUpa aba vicAraNIya hai ki yaha syAdvAda hai kyA ? 'syAdvAda' saMskRta-bhASA kA eka pada hai / prAkRta meM ise 'siyavAda', 'siyAvAda' yA 'siyavAya' kahA hai| yaha do zabdoM se banA hai 1 syAta aura 2 vAda / 'syAt' zabda kA prayoga saMskRta sAhitya' meM aneka arthoM meM milatA hai| kahIM vidhi-liGakI kriyA meM, kahIM vicAra meM aura kahIM prazna Adi meN| vidhi - font kriyA kA 'syAt' zabda as dhAtu se liGalakAra ke prathama puruSa ke eka Presented to the Seminar on "Jaina Logic and Philosophy" (Poona University, 1975).

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sthAdvAda-mImAMsA 131 vacana meM banatA hai aura jisakA artha hindI meM honA cAhie' hotA hai| 'syAnmataM' jaise zabdoM se Arambha honevAle dArzanika pUrvapakSIya sthaloM meM prayukta 'syAt' zabda vicAra yA prazna ke artha meM AyA hai| 'syAdvAda' pada meM AyA huA 'syAt' zabda nipAta (avyaya) hai aura vaha prakaraNavaza ukta arthoM kA dyotaka na hokara anekAnta' artha kA dyotaka hai| jaise 'saindhava lAo' isa vAkya meM prayukta saindhava' zabda vaktA ke abhiprAyAnusAra bhojana prakaraNa meM namaka aura yAtrA prasaGaga meM ghor3A artha kA bodhaka hai| AcArya samantabhadra ne spaSTa likhA hai ki vaktA ke sabhI vAkyoM meM usake abhiprAya ko vyakta karanevAlA 'syAt' zabda nipAta hai aura vaha anekAntArthaka hai| akalaMka aura vidyAnanda ne bhI use anekAnta kA sUcaka nipAta hI batalAyA hai / vidyAnanda ne yaha bhI kahA hai ki nipAta dyotaka aura vAcaka donoM hote haiM / ataH syAdvAda' pada meM prayukta 'syAt' zabda nipAta (avyaya) hai aura vaha anekAnta ke artha meM grAhya hai, vidhi, vicAra, prazna Adi ke artha meM nahIM / isa 'syAt' nipAta ke dvArA 'kathaMcit', 'kicit' 'kisI eka apekSA' 'kisI eka dRSTi', 'kisI eka dharmakI vivakSA' athavA 'kisI eka ora' artha kA bodha karAyA jAtA hai aura antataH vaha 'anekAnta' meM paryavasita hotA hai / 'vAda' kA artha siddhAnta , mAnyatA athavA kathana hai / 'syAt'kA siddhAnta arthAt anekAnta kA siddhAnta syAdvAda hai| athavA syAt' (kathaMcit) kA avalaMbana kara vastusvarUpa kA kathana karanA yA mAnanA syAdvAda hai| kathaMcidvAda, apekSAvAda, anekAntavAda Adi isoke paryAya nAma hai / tAtparya yaha ki syAdvAda vaktA kA aisA vacana prayoga hai, jo abhipreta kA kathana karatA huA anya anabhipreta dharmoM kA, jo vastu meM vidyamAna haiM, niSedha nahIM krtaa| kintu unakA mauna astitva svIkAra karake unheM mAtra gauNa kara detA hai / syAbAda kA prayojana vastu kA svarUpa anekAnta hai / aisI koI vastu nahIM, jo aneka svabhAvoM ko liye huI na ho| udAharaNa ke lie agni ko liijie| vaha dAhaka bhI hai, pAcaka bhI hai aura prakAzaka Adi bhii| isa taraha usameM dAhakatA, pAcakatA, prakAzakatA Adi aneka svabhAva (dharma) vidyamAna hai / yA yoM kahie ki agni unakA samuccaya hai / yaha samuccaya saMyogAtmaka na hokara tAdAtmyasvarUpa hai| agni kI dAhakatA usake pAcakatA Adi svabhAvoM se na sarvathA bhinna hai aura na sarvathA abhinna / sabhI svabhAva usameM rUpa-rasAdi ke samAna maitrI bhAva se vartamAna haiM aura ve saba usakI AtmA (apanA svarUpa) haiN| unakA yaha tAdAtmyasambandha aviSvagabhAvarUpa athavA kathaMcit bhinnAbhinna evaM saha-astitvAtmaka hai|

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132 STUDIES IN JAINISM eka udAharaNa aura lIjie / eka hI puruSa ekasAtha bhinna-bhinna puruSoM kI apekSA pitA, putra, mAmA, bhAnajA, dAdA, nAtI, bar3A, choTA Adi hotA hai / athavA usameM pitRtva, putratva, mAtulasva, bhAgineyatva, pitAmahatva, naptRtva, jyeSThatva, kaniSThatva Adi aneka dharma samAye hue haiM athavA vaha unakA samudAya hai| isa prakAra pratyeka vastu anekAnta hai| vaktA jaba vacanadvArA use usake jisa vivakSita dharma ko lekara kahatA hai to vaha usa dharmavAlA hI nahIM hai, usameM usI samaya anya dharma bhI vidyamAna haiM, jinakI vaktA ko usa samaya vivakSA nahIM hai aura avivakSAmAtra se unakA abhAva nahIM hotA / 'agni dAhaka hai' kahane para usake pAcakatA, prakAzakatA Adi dharmoM kA lopa nahIM hotA / api tu unakI avivakSAmAna hai / devadatta ko usakA lar3akA 'pitAjI' kahakara jaba saMbodhita karatA hai, to devadasa apane pitA kI apekSA putra, bhAnaje kI apekSA mAmA Adi miTa nahIM jaataa| mAtra unakI usa samaya avivakSA hai| itanA hI hai ki jisakI vivakSA hotI hai vaha mukhya ho jAtA hai aura jisakI vivakSA nahIM hotI vaha gauNa ho jAtA hai / parantu isase vastu kA anekAntasvarUpa samApta nahIM hotA / syAdvAda isI tathya ko sUcita evaM avavodhita karatA hai| vaha yaha bhI batalAtA hai ki jaba hara vastu anekAntAtmaka hai - tad (vaha) aura atad (vaha nahIM) ina virodhI dharmoM ko apane meM samAye hue hai, to koI vacana bhI, cAhe vaha vidhi paraka ho aura cAhe niSedhaparaka, vastu ke isa anekAntasvarUpa kA lopa nahIM kara sakatA / yadi vidhiparaka yA niSedhaparaka vacana kramazaH kevala vidhi yA kevala niSedha kAhI pratipAdana kareM aura virodhI ke astitva se inkAra kareM to, virodhI ke avinAbhAvI abhidheya dharma kA bhI abhAva ho jAyegA aura taba vastu meM koI bhI dharma na rahane se vaha bhI na rhegii| ataH vidhivacana aura pratiSedhavacana donoM prakAra ke vacana anekAnta ke prakAzaka hai| ise yoM samajhie, jaba hama kisIse yaha kahate haiM ki 'dahI lAo', 'dUdha nahIM', to ina vidhAyaka aura pratiSedhaka donoM vAkyoM meM kramazaH dahI kA vidhAna aura dUdha kA niSedha makhyatayA abhipreta tathA gauNa rUpa se unameM kramaza: dUdha kA niSedha aura dahI kA vidhAna bhI, jo avivakSita hai, avabodhita haiM / isI taraha hama kaheM ki 'bhArata bhAratIyoM kA hai to yadyapi yaha vidhivAkya bhArata para bhAratIyoM ke hI svAmitva kA vidhAna karatA hai, para sAtha meM vaha gauNa rUpa se yaha bhI prakAzita karatA hai ki vaha abhAratIyoM kA nahIM hI hai| antara yahI hai ki vaha vidhi (svAmitva) kA prakAzana mukhyatayA karatA hai, kyoMki vaha vivakSi tahai aura pratiSedha (asvAmitva) kA prakAzana gauNa rUpa se, kyoMki vaha avivakSita hai| aura jaba hama kahate haiM ki 'bhArata kisI videzI kA nahIM hai to yaha niSedhavAkya yadyapi bhArata para kisI bhI videzI ke svAmitva kA niSedha karatA hai, tathApi sAtha meM vaha yaha bhI sUcita karatA hai ki bhArata bhAratIyoM kA hI hai / itanA hI hai ki isakI sUcanA vaha gauNa rUpa se karatA hai kyoMki vaha avivakSita hai / aura videziyoM ke svAmitva kA niSedha vaha mukhya rUpa se karatA hai, kyoMki vaha vivakSita

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syAdvAda-mImAMsA 133 hai / hama pahale kaha Aye haiM ki vivakSita mukhya aura avivakSita gauNa hotA hai / ___ isa prakAra vidhi aura pratiSedha sabhI vacana aura unake dvArA abhihita evaM sUcita sabhI vastueM anekAntarUpa haiM / syAdvAda sabhI vastuoM aura sabhI vacanoM meM rahanevAle isI ekAnta kA udghATana karatA hai aura ekAnta rUpa se mAne jAnevAle vacanoM tathA vastuoM ko pUrNa satya nahIM batalAtA, unheM vaha satya kA eka aMza kahatA hai| isI tathya ko abhivyakta karatA huA syAdvAda vaktA aura zrotA donoM ko pUrNa satyArtha (anekAnta) ke grahaNa kI ora le jAtA hai / syAdrAda kA yahI prayojana hai| eka dRSTAnta sthAdvAda ko samajhane ke lie eka dRSTAnta bahuprasiddha hai| 1 / eka sthAnapara chaha andhe ekatrita ho gaye aura unhoMne udhara se A rahe eka hAthI ko pakar3a liyaa| kisIne paira pakar3e, kisIne pU~cha pakar3I, kisIne dA~ta, kisIne chAtI, kisI ne sUMDha aura kisIne kaan| aura apane-apane sparzAnubhava se hAthI kA bakhAna karane lge| jisane paira pakar3e the, usane hAthI ko khambhA jaisA batAyA / jisane pU~chapakar3I, usane use rassI jaisA kahA / jisane dA~ta pakar3e usane usa khUTI jaisA prakaTa kiyaa| jisane chAtI pakar3I usane hAthI ko dIvAla jaisA batalAyA / jisane sUMDha pakar3I usane use musala jaisA kahA / aura jisane kAna pakar3e the vaha use sUpa jaisA batAne lagA / aura isa taraha ve Apasa meM jhagar3ane lge| isI bIca eka netravAn vahA~ A phuNcaa| usane unake jhagar3e ko sunA aura sunakara bolA bhAiyo, tuma saba ThIka kahate ho, kintu sabako milAne para hI hAthI kA svarUpa bnegaa| tuma apane pakSa meM sahI ho, tumheM dUsare ke pakSa kA niSedha nahIM karanA cAhie / anyathA hAthI kA svarUpa apUrNa rhegaa| yahI sthiti vastu ke svarUpa meM hai / vastu anekAnta hai - usameM ananta ekAnta bhare par3e haiM / yadi eka eka ekAnta ko lekara samagra vastu kI vyavasthA karane kA Agraha kareM to pUrNa satya kI vyavasthA nahIM ho skegii| vAstava meM jitane ekAnta Agraha haiM ve anya pakSa kA nirAkaraNa karate haiM aura isalie ve pakSAbhibhUta hai / aura syAdvAda (anekAntavAda) meM sabhI pakSa apane apane sthAna para maitrI bhAva se samAhita haiM / vaha pratyeka pakSa kA sammAna karatA hai, vaha kisIkA tiraskAra nahIM karatA / yahI pakSAtikrAnta evaM samanvayavAdI dRSTi syAdvAda dUsarA dRSTAnta ... eka rAjA thA / usake pahale-pahala rAjakumArI kA janma huaa| usake kucha bar3I hone para use khelane ke lie rAjA ne sone kA eka choTA ghar3A banavA diyaa| rAjakumArI usa ghar3e se roja khalatI aura prasanna rahatI thii| kucha varSoM bAda rAjA ke rAjakumAra paidA huaa| bar3I khuzI manAyI gyii| rAjakumAra jaba kucha bar3A huA to rAjA ne rAja

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134 STUDIES IN JAINISM kumArI ke usa ghar3e ko miTavAkara rAjakumAra ke lie mukuTa banavAne kA vicAra kiyA aura sunAra ko vaha ghar3A de diyA / sunAra use tor3akara jaba mukuTa banAtA hai to rAjakumArI ko ghar3e ke nAza se duHkha hotA hai aura rAjakumAra ko mukuTa banane se prasannatA hotI hai tathA rAjA ko na duHkha hotA hai aura na harSa-vaha madhyastha rahatA hai| yadi sone meM nAza, utpAda aura dhruvatva ye tIna pariNAma na hoM to uparyukta viSAda, harSa aura mAdhyasthya ye tIna bhAva utpanna nahIM ho sakate / ghaTa kI icchuka rAjakumArI ko ghaTake nAza meM viSAda, mukuTa ke abhilASI rAjakumAra ko harSa aura svarNa ke AkAMkSI rAjA ko mAdhyasthya ( na viSAda, na harSa) ye tIna bhAva tabhI ho sakate haiM, jaba svarNa meM ukta tIna pariNAma ( nAza, utpAda aura sthiti) hoN| isase spaSTa hai ki vastu anekAnta hai / syAdvAda ukta tInoM pariNAmoM (svabhAvoM) kI vyavasthA yoM karatA hai - suvarNa sAmAnya ( dravya ) rUpa se na utpanna hotA hai aura na naSTa - sthira rahatA hai, kintu vizeSa (paryAya - ghaTa, mukuTa) rUpa se naSTa hotA hai aura utpanna hotA hai| isa prakAra vastu meM aneka dharmo kara sadbhAva anekAnta hai aura usakA vyavasthApaka syAdvAda hai / syAdvAda aura anekAntavAda yadyapi syAdvAda aura anekAntavAda ko paryAya samajhA athavA kahA jAtA hai, para vaha sAmAnya athavA upacAra hai / jaise viSayI (jJAna) ke dharma ( jAnane) kA viSaya (jJeya - ghaTAdi) meM upacAra karake viSaya (jJeya - ghaTAdi) ko bhI viSayI ( jJAna - ghaTa - jJAna, paTa- jJAna Adi ) kaha diyA jAtA hai, usI taraha syAdvAda dvArA kahA jAne se anekAntavAda ko syAdvAda yA usakA paryAya kaha diyA jAtA hai / yathArtha meM sUkSma dhyAna dene para unameM antara pratIta hotA hai / vaha antara hai vyavasthApaka aura vyavasthApya athavA vAcaka aura vAcya kA / syAdvAda vyavasthApaka athavA vAcaka hai aura anekAntavAda vyavasthApya athavA vAcya hai| isa prakAra jJAna aura jJeya meM jJAna - jJeya sambandha yA pramANaprameya meM pramANa- prameya sambandha kI taraha syAdvAda aura anekAntavAda meM vyavasthApaka-vyavasthApya athavA vAcaka - vAcya kA sambandha vidyamAna hai / anekAntarUpa vastu kI vyavasthA yA kathanI syAdvAdadvArA kI jAtI hai / akalaGakadeva ' 3 ne spaSTa likhA hai ki 'anekAntAtmakArthakathanaM sthAdvAda:' arthAt anekAntAtmaka vastu kA kathana syAdvAda hai aura kahI jAnevAlI vastu anekAnta hai / syAdvAda aura saptabhaMgI syAdvAda jaba anekAntAtmaka vastu kA kathana karatA hai to usake kathana ke sAta tarIke haiM / ina sAta tarIkoM ko jaina darzana meM 'saptabhaMgI' prakriyA (paddhati) kahA gayA hai / anekAnta-vastuke kathana ke adhika-se-adhika saMbhAvya tarIke (prakAra) sAta haiM / dharmabhUSaNa ne saptabhaMgI kI vyutpatti dete hue likhA hai 'saptAnAM bhaMgAnAM samAhAraH

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syAdvAda-mImAMsA 135 saptabhaMgI-sAta bhaMgoM ke samudAya ko saptabhaMgI kahate haiN| prakRta meM 'bhahasga' zabdakA artha dharma aura vAkya donoM abhipreta haiM / sAta dharmoM athavA sAta vAkyoM kA samudAya saptabhaMgI hai| isakI paribhASA akalaMkadeva15ne isa prakAra dI hai -praznakartA ke praznoM ke anusAra eka vastu meM vidhi aura pratiSedha kA kathana karanA saptabhaMgI hai| mUla meM do hI dharma haiM - 1 tad (vidhi) aura 2 atad (pratiSedha) / tat se sattva, ekatva, nityatva, abhinnatva Adi vidhisvabhAva dharmoM kA aura atad se asattva, anekatva, anityatva, bhinnatva Adi pratiSedhasvabhAva dharmoM kA grahaNa abhipreta hai| isa prakAra vidhi aura pratiSedha ke rUpa meM laharAte hue satva-asattva, ekatva anekatva, nityatva-anityatva, abhinnatva-bhinnatva Adi ananta yugaladharma vastu-samudra meM samAye hue haiN| tathA pratyeka yugala-dharma ke AdhAra se usameM sAta-sAta avAntara dharmoM kI syAdvAda saptabhaMgI prakriyA se vyavasthA karatA hai - unakI abhivyakti karatA hai| jaise sattva-asattva yugala ke Azraya se sattva, asattva, ubhayatva, avaktavyatva, sattvAvaktavyatva, asattvAvaktavyatva, aura sattvAsattvAvaktavyatva ye sAta asaMyogI - saMyogI apunarukta avAntara dharma abhivyakta hote haiM / isI prakAra ekatva-anekatva, nityatva-anityatva, abhinnatvabhinnatva Adi yugaloM se bhI tadIya sAta-sAta avAntara dharmoM ko syAdvAda saptabhaMgI dvArA udghATita karatA hai| inhIM sAta-sAta dharmoM ke sambandha meM jijJAsuoM ko utane (sAtasAta) hI sandeha, utanI (sAta-sAta) hI jijJAsAe~ aura utane (sAta-sAta) hI prazna uThate hai| inhIM sAta-sAta praznoM ke samAdhAna ke lie syAdvAdI vaktA sAta-sAta uttaravAkyoM kA pratipAdana karatA hai / ina sAta-sAta uttaravAkyoM kA nAma saptabhaMgI hai / isa taraha tad-tad yugala ke Azraya se abhivyakta ukta sAta-sAta dharmoM kA pratipAdana karane ke lie anaginata (ananta) saptabhaMgiyAM jaina darzana meM iSTa hai| vastutaH saptabhaMgI, praznoM ke uttara meM abhihita vAkyAvalI, jo sAta vAkyoM kA samuccaya hai, eka prakriyA paddhati yA nayavivakSA hai, jisakI yojanA karake vaktA anekAntarUpa vastu kA kathana karatA hai / syAdvAda isa saptabhaMgI para AdhArita hai, isIse syAdvAda ko 'saptabhaGaganayApekSa' kahA gayA hai / praznakartA jaba pUchatA hai ki vastu kyA sat hai ? kyA asat hai ? kyA ubhaya hai ? kyA avaktavya hai ? kyA sadavaktavya hai ? kyA asadavaktavya hai ? athavA sadasadavaktavya hai ? syAdvAdI ina sAtoM praznoM kA uttara saptabhaMgI prakriyA se isa prakAra detA hai : 1. kisI apekSA se vastu sat hI hai / 10 2. kisI apekSA se vastu asat hI hai /

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136 STUDIES IN JAINISM 3. kisI apekSA se vastu ubhaya hI hai / 4. kisI apekSA se vastu avaktavya hI hai / 5. kisI apekSA se vastu sat aura avaktavya hI hai / 6. kisI apekSA se vastu asat aura avaktavya hI hai 7. kisI apekSA se vastu sat aura asat tathA avaktavya hI hai| uparyukta praznoM ke ye sAta uttara haiN| prathama uttara meM kahA gayA hai ki pratyeka vastu svarUpa kI apekSA se sat hI hai, dvitIya uttara meM batAyA hai ki pararUpa kI apekSA se vaha asat hI hai / isI prakAra tIsare Adi uttaroM meM kahA hai ki donoM (svarUpa-pararUpa) kI krama se apekSA karane para ubhaya hI hai, donoM kI yugapad apekSA hone para unheM eka sAtha kaha na sakane se avaktavya hI hai, svarUpa aura yugapad donoM kI dRSTi se sat aura avaktavya hI hai, pararUpa aura yugapad donoM kI vivakSA se asata aura avaktavya hI hai, tathA krama aura yugapad donoM kI apekSA se sat-asat aura avaktavya hI hai| ina sAta uttaroM meM prathama ke cAra uttara sahajagamya haiM aura vinA adhika AyAsa ke jAne jA sakate haiN| kintu agale tIna uttara kucha kaTina evaM adhika AyAsa se gamya haiM / para ve sambhAvanA kI adhikatA para AdhRta hone se nirUpita haiM / ina sAta uttaroM se adhika apunarukta uttara sambhava nahIM hai / jo bhI uttara hoMge ve punarukta hoNge| inameM pahalA, 18 dUsarA aura cauthA ye tIna uttara asaMyogI hone se maulika hai / tIsarA, pAMcavAM aura chaThA ye tIna uttara do-do ke saMyogase hone se dvisaMyogI aura sAtavA~ tInoM ke saMyogase hone se trisaMyogI uttara hai / ye sAta uttara mUla tIna uttaroM para usI prakAra saMbhavita hai, jisa prakAra namaka, mirca aura khaTAI ina tIna mUla svAdoM ke sambhAvya (amitha aura mizra) svAda sAta hI ho sakate haiM - 1 namaka, 2 mirca, 3 khaTAI (ye tIna amizra), 4 namaka mirca, 5 namaka-khaTAI aura 6 mirca-khaTAI ye tIna do-do ke saMyogajanya mizra, tathA 7 namaka-mirca-khaTAI yaha, tInoM ke saMyoga se niSpanna mizra / saptabhaMgI ke isa vivecana meM kitanI sUkSma gaharAI aura bArIkI kA cintana nihita hai, yaha dhyAtavya hai / ukta saptabhaMgI ke pratyeka uttara vAkya meM jahAM 'kisI apekSA' (syAt) zabda kA prayoga hai vahA~ 'hI' (evakAra) kA bhI prayoga kiyA gayA hai / usakA abhiprAya hai ki usa apekSA se vaha dharma vastu meM nizcita torepara vidyamAna hai / usakI vidyamAnatA meM zAyada yA sandeha kI jarA bhI guMjAiza nahIM hai / jaina dArzanikoM ne isI Azaya ko abhivyakta karane ke lie vAkyoM meM 'syAt' nipAta aura 'evakAra' donoM zabdoMkA prayoga vihita kiyA hai| bhale hI vaktA vAkyoM meM unakA prayoga kareM, cAhe na kareM, para unake prayoga kA abhiprAya vaktAoM kA avazya rahatA hai /

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syAdvAda-mImAMsA 137 eka zaGkA aura usakA samAdhAna jaina darzana ke isa saptabhaMgI ke viSaya meM kucha vidvAnoM kI zaDakA hai ki jaina dArzanikoM ne saMjaya evaM mAdhyamikoM kI caturbhagI meM hI tIna naye bhaMga milA kara apanI saptabhaMgI banAI hai| parantu unakI yaha zaMkA nirmUla hai kyoMki saMjaya, jo anizcitatAvAdI hai aura mAdhyamika, jo zanyavAdI haiM, donoM hI vastu aura vastudharmoM kA uccheda karate hai, jaba ki jaina darzana vastu aura vastu meM svabhAvataH vidyamAna sAta-sAta dharmoM tathA una sAta-sAta dharmoke ananta samuccayoMkA nizcita sadbhAva svIkAra karatA hai| tIrthaMkaroM kA upadeza una sAta-sAta dharmoM ke prarUpaNArtha saptabhaMgAtmaka hI hotA hai / ataH yaha kyoM na kahA jAya ki jaina darzana kI vastu kI saptadharmAtmakatA kI mAnyatA meM se hI saMjaya ne usakA ucchaMda karane ke lie sahajagamya cAra bhaMgoM ko lekara apanI caturbhagI banAyI hai aura mAdhyamikoM ne bhI vastukA lopa karane ke lie usI saptabhaMgI meM se sahaja vyavahArya cAra bhaMgoM ko le liyA hai| niSedha sadbhAvakI sthiti meM hI kiyA jA sakatA hai / AcArya samantabhadra aura akalaMkadeva ne sabhI tIrthaMkaroM ko, na kevala mahAvIra ko, syAdvAdI kahA hai, jaisA ki nibandha ke Arambha meM batAyA jA cakA hai| aura syAdvAda saptabhaMganayApekSa hai| ataH janadarzana kI saptabhaMgI maulika hai| aura usake bIja mUla jainAgamoM meM pracaratayA upalabdha hai| lokajIvana meM syAvAda kA upayoga syAdvAdakA upayoga kevala zAstrIya vivecana meM hI nahIM hotA, apitu lokajIvana meM bhI usakA aharniza upayoga hotA hai| hamArA samasta vicAra, samasta AcAra aura sArI bAtacIta syAdvAda ko lie hue hotI hai / jaba hama kucha socate, kahate yA vyavahAra karate hai ki amuka hamArA mitra hai to vaha hamAre lie mitra hotA huA bhI kisI anyakA vaha amitra (zatru) bhI ho sakatA hai| jaba kahate haiM ki kasAyI bar3A hiMsaka hotA hai, to yaha kathana bhI sApekSa hai, kyoMki vaha apane parivArakA ghAtaka na hone se ahiMsaka bhI hai / dUdha rucikara aura svAsthyaprada hai, yaha kathana bhI sApekSa hai, kyoMki pecisa vAle yA pitta-jvara ke rogI ke lie vaha hAniprada hai / pAnI jIvana hai, yaha kathana bhI sApekSa hai| jopyAsa se prANa choDa rahA hai use pAnI mila jAne para usakI jIvana-rakSA ho jAtI hai| kintu jo kisI nadI yA tAlAba meM DUba kara mara jAtA hai usake lie pAnI mAraka hai - viSa hai / tAtparya yaha ki bhale hI hama dhyAna na deM, kintu syAdvAda pratyeka vyavahAra meM vidyamAna rahatA hai, isake binA lokavyavahAra cala nahIM sakatA / syAvAda ekAnta Agraha ke tyAga para bala detA hai aura sApekSatA, saha-astitva, samanvaya evaM samabhAva kI preraNA pradAna karatA hai, sAre virodhoM, jhagaDoM aura saMgharSoM ko dUra karane ke lie yaha eka ahiMsaka aura zAMtipUrNa amogha astra hai|

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138 STUDIES IN JAINISM TippaNiyA~ 1. zrImatparamagambhIrasyAdvAdAmoghalAMchanam / jIyAt trailokyanAthasya zAsanaM jinazAsanam / / akalaMka, pramANasaM. 11 / syAdvAdino nAtha tavaiva yuktam / svayambhU. 14 tathA 102 / 3. (ka) dharmatIrthakarebhyo'stu syAdvAdibhyo namo namaH / RSabhAdimahAvIrAntebhyaH svAtmopalabdhaye / / laghI. 1 // (kha) vanditvA paramArhatAM samudayaM gAM...syAdvAdAmRtagarbhiNI ... / aSTasa. 1 / 4. vAkyepvanekAntadyotI gamyaM prati vizeSaNam / syAnnipAto'rthayogitvAttava kevalinAmapi / / AptamI. 103 5. kvacitprayujyamAnaH syAcchabdastadvizeSaNatayA prakRtArthatattvamanavayavena sUcayati, prAyazo nipAtAnAMtatsvabhAvatvAdevakArAdivat / vidyAnanda, aSTasa. pR. 286 / 6, 8. tadeva lakSaNeSu vAkyeSu syAditi zabdo'nekAntadyotI pravipattavyo, na punavidhi vicAra-praznAdidyotI, tathAvivakSApAyAt / vahIM, 286 7. dyotakAzca bhavanti nipAtAH iti vacanAt / - vahIM, pR. 286 / 9. AptamI. kA. 107 / / 10. (ka) vivakSito mukhya itISyate'nyo guNo'vivakSo na nirAtmakaste / A. samantabhadra, svayambhU. kA. 53 (kha) apitAnarpitasiddheH / - tattvArtha sU. 5. 32 11. puruSArthasiddhayupAya zloka 2 / 12. AptamI. zlo. 59 / 13. laghIyastraya, svopajJa bhASya 3162 / 14. sampAdana, darabArIlAla koThiyA, nyAyadIpikA pR. 127, vIra sevA mandira, dillI 6 15. praznavazAdekatra vastunyavirodhena vidhipratiSedhakalpanA saptabhaTagI' - ta. vA. 1-6 16. 'anantAnAmapi saptabhaMgInAmiSTatvAt, tavaikatvAnekatvAdikalpanayApi sa ptAnAmeva bhagAnAmupapatteH, pratipAdyapraznAnAM tAvatAmeva sambhavAt...saptavidha eva tatra praznaH kuta iti cet, saptavidhajijJAsAghaTanAt / sApi saptavidhA

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syAdvAda-mImAMsA 139 kuta iti cet, saptadhAsaMzayotpatteH / saptadhava saMzayaH kathamiticet, tadviSaya vastudharmasaptavidhatvAt / ' vidyAnanda, aSTasa. pR. 125-126 / 17. samantabhadra, AptamI. 14, 15 / 18. yuktyanuzA. 45, samantabhadra / svayambhU. 2. 16, samantabhadra / Discussion sureMdra bAraliMge: syAtvAda meM 'syAt' zabda anekAMta kA nidarzaka hai isakA kyA pramANa hai ? darabArIlAla koThiyA: AptamImAMsA meM kahA gayA hai : "vAkyeSu anekAMta dyotigamyaM prativizeSaNam syAt upayogitvAt tat evahI nAma api / " syAt jo hai vaha nipAta hai aura anekAMta kA dyotaka hai| rAmacandrazAstrI jozI : tathApi 'nipAta' kA artha dyotaka nahIM hotaa| darabArIlAla koThiyA: syAt kA TIkAkAroM ne kevala nipAta hI nahIM dUsarA bhI artha diyA hai| kailAzacandrazAstrI zarmA : "nipAtAt dyotakAH bhavantiH" iti vacanAt / sureMdra bAraliMge: merA savAla yaha thA ki 'syAt' kA anekAMta yaha artha kaise hotA hai ? dasasukhabhAI mAlavaNiyA : Agama prajJApanA meM jahA~ bhaMga batAye haiM, jahA~ vaha apekSA batAyI hai, vahA~ syAt zabdakA prayoga nahIM kiyA gayA hai| aura jahA~ apekSA nahIM batAyI vahAM syAt zabda kA prayoga kiyA hai| kelAzacandrazAstrI zarmA : 'syAt zabdasya apekSAvacanAt' sureMdra bAraliMge : syAt zabda apekSA dyotaka hai yaha niHsaMdeha hai| lekina merA matavya yaha hai ki 'syAt' zabdakA artha anekAMta nahIM ho sktaa|

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140 STUDIES IN JAINISM darabArIlAla koThiyA: artha nahIM ho sktaa| sureMdra bAraliMge: Apake nibaMdha meM asA artha batAyA gayA hai isaliye merA savAla / sAgaramala jaina : asat ko vastukA dharma kaise kahA jAe ? darabArIlAla koThiyA: asat meM vastukA abhAva hone se yaha dharma nahIM ho sktaa| svayaM ke asat kA abhAva hone se vastu sat hotI hai / tathApi svayaM ke asat kA abhAva hI vastu kA kArana nahIM; vaise hI para ke sat kA abhAva bhI vastu ke sat kA kAraNa nhiiN| to bhI vastu kA svarUpataH sat aura pararUpataH asata aisA svarUpa milatA hai| . mo. pra. marAThe : bIja, aMkura Adi vRkSake aMza kaise ? darabArIlAla koThiyA: vRkSa ke jitane utpAdana hai saba vRkSa meM Ate haiM isa dRSTi se maiMne bIja aMkura Adi ko vRkSa ke aMza khaa| mo.pra. marAThe utpAda, vyaya aura dhrauvya paraspara ke atyaMtAbhAvAtmaka kaise ho sakate haiM ? darabArIlAla koThiyA : utpAdapUrvaka vyayapUrvaka utpAda hotA hai / pUrvaparyAya kA pUrNa vinAza hone para uttara paryAya kI utpatti hotI hai / ina donoM meM anusyUta tattva hI dhrauvya hai / mo. pra. marAThe : - eka-eka milake aneka hote hoMge, kiMtu eka-eka ekAMta milake anekAMta hotA hai yaha kaise mAnA jAe? darabArIlAla koThiyA : khAlI 'aMta' pada jAdA laga gyaa| vastu ke eka dharma ko grahaNa karane vAlA ekAMta aneka dharmoM ko grahaNa karane vAlA anekAMta /

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AN ANALYSIS OF "SYAT' IN SYADVADA M. P. Marathe Many scholars have acknowledged the importance of the role that Syadra da or Saptabharigi plays in the exposition and explanation of the central tenet of the Jaina Philosophy. In the elaboration of the doctrine of Syadvada the expression "syat' is rendered by such corresponding cxpressions as "possibly', 'may be', 'it is possible that', 'perbaps' etc. The point such renderings and their explanations bring to the focus is solely that consideration of some kind of possibility or some kind of modal predicate is involved in the doctrine. But, unfortunately, hardly any effort is made to analyse and explain the kind of possibility that is involved. It is the object of this paper to focus attention on this issue. The entire paper falls into four main sections : the first deals with the brief statement of the various kinds or possibilities which western philosophical and logical discussions have brought to the fore; the second attempts to offer interpretation of 'syat'; the third focusses on the question of the kind of possibility or possibilities that such an interpretation of 'syat' embraces and the final section discusses some of the important consequences this explanation leads to. Presented in the Seminar on Jaina Logic and Philosophy" (Poona University, 1975), published in the Indian Philosophical Quarterly (April, 1978)

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142 STUDIES IN JAINISM Starting from Aristotle many philosophers and logicians have concentrated their attention on elaborate explanation of such modal predicates as necessity, possibility, impossibility etc. Of late logicians like von Wright have also been maintaining that modes are principally of four kinds: Alethic modes or modes of truth, Existential modes or modes of being, Epistemic modes or modes of knowing and Deontic modes or modes of obligation. The entire discussion is very important. But we need hardly to concentrate on it here. For Syadvada in particular and Jaina Logic and Philosophy in general do not talk about every modal predicate but rather about one modal predicate viz. possibility. Even if we decide to focus our attention only on one mode viz. possibility, we shall not have to, as it will turn out later, take into account all kinds of possibilities. We shall, therefore primarily concentrate only on the the mode of possibility. If we pool together the various kinds of possibilities that have been considered during the entire span of the development of the consideration of modal notions in western philosophical thought, they seem to fall readily under six main heads: (i) Absolute possibility which is of two kinds: (a) conceptual or apriori and (b) pomological, physical or real, (ii) Relative possibility which again is of two kinds: (a) conceptual and (b) nomological, (iii) Epistemic possibility, (iv) Possibility understood as ability, capacity, disposition or what Aristotle called potentiality, (v) Technical or etiological possibility and (vi) Possibility as minimal probability. We shall presume the general sense in which these modal notions are understood in modern philosophical thought to be clear. We should bring out, nevertheless, some important considerations about them. For, some of these considerations are important from the point of the consideration we shall bring forward later on with reference to possibility or possibilities that syat brings to the foreground. First, the notion of possibility as minimal probability is not employed in technical language; but in everyday language we are familiar with it. Yet in our present context we need hardly to bother about it. Secondly, not only absolute nomological possibility can be subsumed under absolute

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AN ANALYSIS OF 'SYAT IN SYADVADA 143 conceptual possibility or that relative nomological possibility can be subsumed under relative conceptual possibility but also that relative conceptual and nomological possibilities are definable in terms of absolute conceptual and nomological possibilies respectively. Thirdly, the major controversies that have arisen recently are about the possibilities of first and fourth kind. Fourthly, the fourth kind of possibility is tied down, in one of its way of exposition at least, with an important presupposition about both world and things in it. Lastly, possibility of the third kind presupposes that of the fourth and sixth kind but not vice ve In connection with the discussion of possibility in Aristotle, moreover, Hintikkahas argued that Aristotelian broad notion of possibility really embraces two important kinds of it within its fold :(a) 'possibility proper' or what we would term today to be conceptual possibility and (b) possibility as contingency. The latter kind of possibility, again, is further of two kinds : (a) possibility that is short of necessity and (b) the one that is, descriptive of something indeterminate. This kind of possibility is generally expressed in the form of thus' or not thus' without prevalence of either one of the alternatives. Hintikka has further argued that although Aristotle mentions and uses both these kinds of possibilities yet no sharp distinction between them is made by him and that the second kind of possibility is, according to Aristotle, connected with generation or change of a thing while the first is not. The first kind of possibility of these comes to be stated in terms of what Quine calls "eternal sentences' while that of the latter kind in terms of what Quine calls 'occasion sentences'. As the earlier considerations about possibility have an important bearing, it will become clear in what follows, on the consideration of possibility or possibilities indicated by syat', so too the points Hintikka has made in connection with the Aristotelian discussion of possibility. II Althouth there is an important relation between Anekantava da and Syadvada yet the two are not the same. Further, although there is quite an important relation between Nayavada and Syadvada, the two are not the same. Except a very cusory reference to the relation betweeu Anekantavada and Syadvada we shall hardly be in a position to dwell on this point any further

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144 in this essay. The point, however, is made to avert the possible confusions of mixing between them. STUDIES IN JAINISM The expression Saptabhangi or syadvada literally means a set of seven formulae. Each one of such formulae is prefixed by of the expression 'syat'. It is on account of this that the doctrine Saptabhangi is also known as Syadvada. The expression Syat', as mentioned in the beginning of the paper, is rendered and understood in a particular way i.e. in the sense of a modal predicate or modal notion. It is this phenomenon that causes a considerable strain in understanding it as clearly as possible. However it may be. One point, nevertheless, is clear viz. that the expression Saptbhangi is understood as a set of seven formulae each one of which is prefixed by the expression "Syat'.2 It is clearly ackowledged that the expression 'syat can indeed be used in various senses. Yet out of the plurality of all these different senses only two are mainly to be prominently highlighted in the context of Syadvada. The one of them, in the sense of a grammatical particle (avyaya) is so very clearly mentioned by many authors. The other, on the contrary, in the sense of a potential (lin), however, is left understood by some texts. This sense is clear, however, not only from dictionaries but also from reliable Jaina philosophical texts. This second sense, though, has an important consideration about it as will become clear in the sequel. It is argued that although the word or expression 'syat' is understood in the sense of anekanta, vidhi vicara etc., yet in the context under consideration, that is, fixation of the significance of the expression in the context of Saptabhangi, it is, nevertheless, to be understood in the sense of anekanta.5 Anekanta means that a given object or thing is (potentially) beset with many dharmas. The grammatical particle (avayaya) syat is indicative (dyotaka) of this. Syadvada as a doctrine arises from this consideration. Syadvada, thus, essentially is that hypothesis (abhyupagama) in accordance with which it happens to be maintained that (any) one thing is (potentially) beset with many dharmas, invariable or variable (nityanitya). Understood in this way, Syadvada is that frame in terms of which we are in a position to explain and justify our contention that as a matter of fact different dharmas can be predicated of a given thing.

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AN ANALYSIS OF "SYAT' IN SYADVADA 145 There is, however, another, although equally important, sense of the word syat in terms of which the expression syat, turns out to be indicative potential third person singular of the root' as '8. But it is not merely the grammatical consideration that brings this sense to the foreground. Equally important is the philosophical and modal consideration. In such consideration of the significance of the term 'syat' the expression brings out symptomatically (pratirupakah) such nature of a thing that it is a collection or conjunction (nipa tah) of dharmas potentially it is beset with. If both these interpretations of the expression "syat' are brought to bear upon each other then two important consequences seem to follow, the fuller implications of which will become clear as we proceed, and they are : (a) Syadvada is the explanatory foundation of anekantavada, the explanatory frame in terms of which anekantavada, the doctrine according to which a thing can take many dharmas without contradiction,10 becomes significant and meaningful; and (b) Syadvada is connected with potentiality, capacity or dispositions of a thing which actualize. Such actualized dispositions are given either right which the emergence of a thing (sahabliavidharmas), in which case they are called gunas or as those which happen to be actualized collectively or sequentially (kramabhavi) in course of time. In the latter case they are called Parya yas. Both these considerations have important consequences in the entire frame of the Jaina philosophical explanation, but more of it later. III In order to be able to determine as unambiguously as possible, the kind/s of possibillity/possibilities that is/are involved in the consideration of Syadvada we shall have to prepare a detailed preparatory background. As a step in this direction let us understand three important expressions, viz. dharma, guma, and parya ya. For, it is in the light of these terms that we shall be in a position to understand the nature of dravya, in the light of which, consequently, we shall be in a position to understand the fuller implications both of Syadvada and of syat. Dharma perhaps means any potential feature of a thing. We need to assume that a totality of dharmas as dis positions is given. This has an imporJ-10

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146 STUDIES IN JAINISM tant consequence; but we postpone the consideration of it to a later stage. Guna, on the contrary, perhaps mcans actual feature of a thing. But such a feature shall be either of the nature of a differentia or proprium. These features of a thing are given along with it. Parya yas, on the other hand, mean perhaps those features of a thing which are actualized through a thing undergoing a change. Such features are actualized either conjunctively or alternatively in course of time. These features are of the nature of accidents--inseparable or separable.11 In Jaina philosophical texts, it appears, that the terms Padartha, Dravya, Tattva, Vastu and Sat are used almost interchangeably. This leads to number of problems. But we need not bother about them here. It is for this reason, perhaps, that what is said about a dravya becomes inter alia applicable to a vastu or sat.12 We shall understand these terms broadly in the sense of any physical thing. One extremely important feature of a thing that is brought out in one important definition of it is that it is beset with three kinds of features : (a) emergence (Utpada) (b) decay or degeneration or change (vyaya) and (c) some kind of permanence (dhrauvya)13 that becomes the basis of reidentification and recognition of it. This definition of a thing, however, brings out a general and generic, although important, feature of a thing. But such a feature of a thing, nevertheless, has two further kinds of features on the plane of actuality : (a) gunas or those features that are given to us experientially along with the thing itself and are, as stated above, of the nature either of differentia or proprium, and (b) those features, which although given experientially, the thing does not possess as it emerges but are such as it comes to have either conjunctively or alternatively. Such features the thing comes to have in a (long) passage of time. They are further, as argued earlier, of the nature of accidents. Our descriptive statements about a thing happen to be made either in terms of gunas or parya yas or both.1! Such features are actualized features and are experientially given to us. Since any feature that is epistemically given to us is given in course of time and since epistemically any descriptive statement about a thing presupposes maximally the totality of such features that are either collectively or alternatively given to us in course of time, either alongwith the

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AN ANALYSIS OF 'SYAT IN SYADVADA 147 emergence of a thing or in course of its life-history, a thing is also defined as one that is beset with many (literally innumerable) such features.15 The reason being tbat a thing can change and through such a change can come to have newer and newer features and even epistemologically we shall not be in a position to say that a thing has so many features and no more. Such a statement can maximally be made only with reference to the given occasion. If we make a statement about a thing independently of the stipulation of occasion it would hardly be informative in the genuinc sense of the term. A thing nevertheless, does not have those and only those features that are experientially given to us. We shall rather be in a position to say that a thing has at least those features which it now is having or those beset with which it happened to be given to us in passage of time. But a thing potentially has not only those fcatures that are actualized but also those which were or will be actualized. That is, a thing has totality of all the features, actualized or not, potentially. This is how a thing is also defined as that which is beset with totality of all features potentially.16 If we bring to bear these three. descriptions of the nature of a thing upon one another then it turns out that the possibilities that we can envisage with regard to a thing fall readily into two groups : (a) cpistemic possibilities -- the ones which figure in the descriptive statement about a thing, and (b) possibilities understood as capacities, abilities or dispositions. Here capacities or dispositions or potentialities are understood perhaps as a sub-visible structure of a thing. Unless a thing has potentialities they will never be actualized. It is in this sense that dispositional possibilities are prior to epistemic possibilities. But contrarywise, all our statements about dispositions of a thing are anchored in epistemic possibilities and they are, therefore to possibilities as potentialities. But the features a thing comes to have either as differentia or otherwise are those and only those, it appears to be maintained by Jaina Philosophers and logicians, which it has a disposition to have. It is in this sense that epistemic possibilities presuppose possibilities as potentialities. Here arises one important question. Granted there are possibilities, it may be argued; but what kind of possibilities are they? In this connection four alternatives stand out prominently:

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148 STUDIES IN JAINISM (a) possible events, both specific and otherwise, (b) possible courses of events, (c) possible kinds of individnals, and (d) possible individuals or particulars. Out of these, in the context of Syadrada, the first two are ruled out simply because they are basically technical possibilities. Although they are explainable in terms of nomological possibilities, to the extent to which they are at heart etiological or causal possibilities and to the extent to which Jainas are talking about physical objects independently of causal chain in the context of Syadva da, these possibilities are out of question. The basic issue in Syadvada is to describe a thing in terms of the features it has. Such features are experientially given to us. Some of them are given along with the thing, others the thing comes to have in course of time. Further, these features the thing comes to have simaltaneously or in succession. This issue is different from the issue of the explanation of either emergence of a thing or its features. It is in this context that etiological possibilities will figure. More importantly, however, we should understand that every genuine characterization of a thing consists in giving a determinate value to indeterminables; and for this determinables need not at all be conceived as causally enchained possibles. Bu at about the last two? In some texts we get a clue about this. It is argued that the expression "syat' is envisaged to bring forward the possibilities in the sense of such objects as a ghata.17 But an object may be considered as a kind of individual or as an individual or a particular. Now, out of these the former is ruled out at least so far as the contention of some texts is con The reason for this is that the same text adds that such a possible which is potentially beset with many dharmas must be the one that is existent18. But this view does not seem to be uniformly borne out by all scholars. Jaina philosophers would not have an objection, it seems, to the acceptance of the kind of individuals. In this case, however, the possibilities that would figure in our consideration would not be existential possibilities but nomological possibilities, although they are explainable in terms of conceptual possibilities. But the issue being of the description of a thing absolute conceptual possibilities are out of question, as statements in terms of these are descriptively impotent and hence in the context of making descriptively significant statements quite irrelevant. The conceptual possibilities would figure on

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AN ANALYSIS OF 'SYAT' IN SYADVADA 149 thc level of explanation and justification of descriptive statements. But that is quite different a story. Even then a question may be posed that can we not say that although the Jaina thinkers do not expressly deal with formal possibility in the context of the descriptively significant statements might they not be dealing with relative possibility ? This alternative too is ruled out. For the question of relative possibility arises only where we are talking about a thing cither with reference to another thing or a prior state of itself. The descriptive statements in terms of possibility that Jainas envisage in the context of Syadvada are non-relative statements and are by their very nature of the case supposed to be about a particular thing alone independently of the reference to another thing or its prior state. Hence the alternative of relative possibility, too, is ruled out. Out of the two kinds of possibilities Aristotle talks of the Jaina philosophers are not talking about what Hintikka calls * possibility proper' or logical possibility. They are rather considering possibility of the kind of contingency. Such a contingency they further understand in both of its senses : either the one that is short of necessity or the one that is descriptive of an indeterminate. The kind of statements that bring out possibility in the scnse of contingency that Jaina philosophers envisage are also those in which contingency is understood in the sense of two features of a thing going together or their compatibility, a notion weaker than that of a consistency of two dlarmas or gunas or parya yas. Further it is important to remember that possibilities that are under consideration in the frame of Syadva da are those that come to the foreground with respect to emergence, or degeneration or change of a thing. That is why, perhaps, eternal sentences are considered to be out of question and occasion sentences are concentrated upon. The entire programme that Jaina Logic envisages to put forward in terms of its doctrine of Sya dvada needs to be considered in a still wider perspective. In contrast to the view of the modern logicians, the Jaina logicians seem to hold that although a given sentence may express the same proposition on different occasions, yet in spite of the fact that it is the same

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150 STUDIES IN JAINISM proposition, its truth-value changes with time. The propositions that are considered relevant in the context of Syadvada are descriptive propositions. As sameness of a thing does not preclude it from undergoing change and taking on different features similarly although it is the same proposition that is expressed on different occasions, this in itself should not prohibit it from taking different truth-values. That things change in spite of retaining their identity is a fact. Thus things assume different features in course of time. Correspondingly, on the plane of propositions, Jaina logic seems to hold, that although propositions are the only bearers of truth-values yet they are bearers of not the same but changing truth-values. It accepts change both of truthvalues of a proposition and features of a thing. On the plane of things it seems to argue that things or dravyas are the only entities that can take contrary gunas on different occasions and yet retain their numerical identity at least which can form basis of reidentification and recognition of them. That is why temporally indefinite sentences are taken to be paradigm of informative sentences. In saying this they indeed are in a great company of such masters as Aristotle. The reason for this seems to be that temporally indefinite sentences about a thing are the proper vehicles of communication. This contention obviously presupposes that knowledge properly so called must come in terms of direct acquaintance. This position, moreover, seems to propound that correspondence between propositions and facts is the basis of assigning truth-values to propositions. Things change and take on new features. Such changed things cannot be matched with older propositions and yet get truth-value truth. In order to be able to cope with the situation of things changing their features and we being able to describe them by means of propositions which not only bring out new features of a thing but also take truth-value truth we shall have to take either one of the following two courses : (a) frame altogether new propositions or (b) allow older propositions to change their truth-values. Without ruling out the first alternative completely the Jaina logicians seems to maintain that to be able to cope with such a situation propositions should also be taken to be changing their truth-values. Either changed proposition or propositions with changed truth-values correspond with changed things and this is how they take truth-value truth.

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AN ANALYSIS OF 'SYAT' IN SYADVADA 151 Thus correspondence is the crux of the problem and changing things is the reinforcing situation. Both these taken together seem to thrust on them acceptance of the change in truth-value of a proposition. This is what Jaina logicians seem to advocate. It is perhaps this which they intend to convey when they say that truth-value of no descriptive proposition is fixed in so far as things change. The contention that truth-value of a proposition changes, however, raises two important issues : (a) what is the basis to draw a line of demarcation between sentences and propositions ? and (b) if it is maintained, and it is so maintained by Jaina Logicians, that a thing has number of potentialities, then how to account for change in the truth-value of a proposition? For, whereas insistence on number of potentialities would demand assumption of number of propositions descriptive of them, a change in the truth-value would demand that number of propositions available at our disposal is a limited one. Perhaps a distinction is sought to be made between propositions descriptive of potentialities and those descriptive of actualities, the former being treated as genuinely descriptive of the nature of a thing. Obviously the number of the statements of the latter kind is limited. If this phenomenon is connected with changing things then change in truth-value seems to be a plausible alternative. But still, why not frame a new proposition? Inspite of the fact that Jaina logicians admit temporality within the fold of their logic what would be their reaction to this problem is very difficult to say. But we need not bother further about this issue here. One thing, nevertheless, is very clear. The doctrine of the change of truth-value neither amounts to the doctrine of relativity, nor scepticism nor again to the notion of historical relativity. For the position of an historical relativist is different from that of the one who holds possibility of change in truth-value of a proposition. What historical relativist is out to maintain is that we do not have any absolute truths simply because we do not have any absolute criterion of truth. The one, on the contrary, who argues in terms of changing truth is not at all bothered about change in criterion of truth. That is, he is not saying that truth-value changes because our criterion of truth changes. What he focusses his attention on is change in object about which we are making

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152 STUDIES IN JAINISM any informative statement. Since things change, he seems to argue, the truths we have discovered will have to undergo change too, for we shall have to rediscover the truths about the changed thing although the criterion of truth, viz. correspondence which Jaina philosophers accept, is retained. For him, in this way, discovery of truths about changing things is a never-ending and yet not a hopeless and fruitless programme. The entire contention of Jaina logicians seems to be based on the presupposition that the dispositions that a thi happen to be actualized in course of time. Every genuine possibility is actualized in time. It is not necessarily the case that each possibility is realized, but it can be assumed to be realized without contradiction. They hold that everything has a subvisible structure of dispositions that are, as Quine maintains, its built-in enduring structural traits; yet the typical sentences used to express human knowledge in the form of descriptive sentences are not eternal or standing sentences' but rather what are called occasion sentences'. Although the modern general philosophical opinion is that the former kind of sentences are superior, Jaina logicians seem to maintain that the sentences of the latter kind are the ones to which we assent or from which we dissent. Such assent or dissent is further determined by the feature or features of the occasion on which they are uttered. Such sentences are temporally indefinite to make explicit the full sense of which we have to employ such expressions as now etc. Even if, therefore, it is assume that there is a correspendence between grammatical and logical form of a sentence, yet it requires stipulation of occasion. Independently of such stipulation of occasion our assent to or dissent from is impotent and logically indefensible. Our investigation so far has made it clear, it is hoped, that out of many kinds of possibilities Jaina logicians do not at all consider technical possibility in the context of Syadvada. The cases where causal considerations are predominent an account of technical or etiological possibilities is significant. But such considerations are unimportant from the point of view of descriptive statements about a thing, the proper contex of Syadva da. It

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AN ANALYSIS OF 'SYAT' IN SYADVADA 153 is for this reason that such possibilities are beside the point in this context. Similarly, the possibility as minimal probability, too, is nowhere considered. Further, absolute conceptual possibility is not expressly and explicitly employed, although it is possible to say that it is presupposed for the cxplanation of nomological possibility. In the context of Syadva da three kinds of possibilities are clearly acknowledged: possibility as potentiality, epistemological possibility anbd nomological as well as existential possibility. Etiological possibility that figures in the causal explanation falls outside the perview of Syadvada. Jaina logicians and philosophers believe that this world is full of things or dravyas and hence accept, it seems, what A. O. Lovejoy calls the Principle of - Plentitude. In this they are in great company of Aristotle and Leibnitz. They further hold that dispositions are actualized in course of time. Possibilities for them, thus, figure on two levels : potentiality and actuality. Potentialities are given in order of being, but not necessarily in order of knowing. Actualities are given in order of kno This is how they become epistemic possibilities. All our statements descriptive of the nature of things to which one can assent or from which one can dissent are and should be occasion sentences and not eternal sentences, although former are explainable in terms of latter. Jaina logicians and philosophers, however, do not clearly draw a line of demarcation between possibility proper and contingency, for neither on the level of potentiality nor on the level of cpistemic possibility can this distinction be drawn. The distinction comes to the foreground, that is, not on the level of truth-conditions but on the level of explanation of the way truth-conditions are presumed to be given to us. This is indeed an important consideration and a detailed account of it would require consideration of three main issues : (a) total-truth values acknowledged, (b) the kinds of truth-conditions envisaged and (c) the way truth-conditions are presumed to be given to us. These considerations, although important in the full context of Syadva da, must be set aside here because our purpose here is to analyse - syat' and the possibilities it brings to the forth. In conclusion, thus, it can be said that Jaina logicians and philosophers acknowledge, in the context of Syadvada possibilities of potency, epistemic and nomological along with existential

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154 possibilities. Outside the context of Sya dva da etiological possibilities too are acknowledged. They seem also to acknowledge conceptual possibilities in the explanatory frame although not in the descriptive frame. In the descriptive frame, they further seem to hold, no distinction could be drawn between possibility proper and contingency understood in any sense. NOTES 1. Hintikka, J.; Time and Necessity, 1973, oxford. 2. Vadideva Suri; Pramananayatattva lokalankara; IV. 14. 3. Abhidhanarajendrakosa; Vol. VII, p. 848. 4. Monier-Williams, M.; Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 1273. Vimaladasa; Saptabhangitarangint: p. 16. 5. Vimaladasa; op cit p. 16. 6. Op cit. 7. Abhidhanarajendrakosa; Vol. VII. p. 848. 8. Monier-Williams: op cit. 9. Devabhadra; Nyayavataravtrttitippani, 30. 10. Vimaladasa: op cit. 11. Abhiadhanarajendrakosa; Vol. III, n. 510 12. Tattvarthidhigamasutra, V. 37; V. 29. Pramanatattvalokalamkara: VII. 9. STUDIES IN JAINISM Nyayavatoro, 29. Syadvadamanjari, 22. 13. Mallisenasuri; Svudvadamau jart, 22. 14. Tattvarthasutra, V. 29. 15. Umasvati; Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 37. 16. Kundakunda; Pravacanasara, 1. 49. 17. Vimaladasa; Saptabhangitarangint, p. 16. 18. op cit.

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AN ANALYSIS OF 'syAT IN SYADVADA 155 Discussion R. Sundara Rajan : What does subsumability of absolute and relative nomological possibilities under absolute and relative conceptual possibilities mean? M. P. Marathe : It is not to be understood as reduction: rather it means that former are explainable on the basis of the latter. R. Sundara Rajan : As relative possibilities are definable in terms of absolute possibilities so too absolute nomological possibilities are definable as a limiting case of relative possibilities. But what is the philosophical advantage of preferring the former over the latter ? M. P. Marathe : Preference of the former in directly connected with the possible word semantics while the latter indirectly. It is not out of place to remark that possible word semantics along with substitutivity of belief has a great relevance in Jaina philosophy.

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NAYAVADA AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC S. L. Pandey The doctrine of Nayas is a chicf characteristic of Jaina Philosophy. Both historically and logically it has been so inalienably associated with Jainism that we can safely say that the whole of Jainism has developed round or from this doctrine. Consequently, there is no Jaina philosophical work which does not treat naya doctrine. Moreover, there are special treatises like Dvyadasaranavacakra of Mallavadin, Dravyasvabha vaprakasaka of Mailla Dhavala, Nayarahasya of Yasovijaya, and Nayadarpana of Muni Nathamala which deal only with the doctrine of Nayas. Obviously, this doctrine has its own problems of knowledge; it has its own syntactics, semantics and pragmatics. To deal with all the problems of naya doctrine in a short paper like the present one which I am attempting here, is well nigh impossible. Indeed, I do not want to discuss those problems that have already beer posed, disposed or supposed in the various works of Jainism. Nor do I wish to trace the history of the doctrine or explicate the ipse dixit on it. What I intend to do in this paper is a bit of fresh thinking leading to the reconstruction of the doctrine in the light of modern developments of Logic, particularly manyvalued logic or three-valued logic. Presented in "Seminar on Jaina Logic and philosophy" (Poona University 1975). Published as a part of the book by the same author, entitled 'Whither Indian Philosophy' Allahabad (1978).

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NAYAVADA AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC 157 For my present purposes I shall take 'Naya' in the sense of statement as Siddhascna Diwakara indicates. Now the first question which I want to raise and solve is : what is the truth-value of a Naya?' The correct answer to this question is suggested by every Jaina philosopher. But I shall take the remarks of Mallisena into consideration and determine the truth value of a statement. He distinguishes a naya from a pramana on the one hand and from a durnaya on the other. According to him a pramana is true and a durnaya is false. Consequently the truth-value of a naya is different from the true and the false and is properly speaking 'indeter or indefinite' or a 'third logical value'. The illustrations of a pramana, durnaya and naya are respectively (a) Syat words are ephemeral, (b) words are ephemeral only and (c) words are ephemeral. A naya is not qualified with any particle (Nipata) but a pramana is qualified with the particle 'Syat' and a durnaya is qualified with the particle Eva (or only). The false statement is called Ekantavada or the statement of exclusive predication, while the true statement is called syadvada or the statement of relative predication i. e. a statement under the perspectives of its truth-conditions. Finally the unqualified or unmodified statement that is naya is ordinary or common sense statement that has a neutral truth-value which may be called the indeterminate truth-value. Now my second question is "what is this neutral truthvalue ?" The straight answer to this question as already suggested, is that it is an intermediate truth-value i. e. it is a truth-value which lies between truth and falsehood. In other words, the indeterminate truth-value is less true than the true and more true than the false. The Jaina concept of the indeterminate truthvalue, thus perfectly accords with the similar concept of Lukasiewicz. But a question may be raised here : 'what are the grounds for interpreting the indeterminate truth value of Naya as the indeterminate truth-value proposed by Lukasiewicz ?' This question is extremely relevant and may be disposed off on the consideration of following grounds : First Ground: Jaina logicians call naya neither as pramana (true statement) nor as apramana (false statement) but as approximation

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158 STUDIES IN JAINISM to pramapa. The terms that they use are Pramanamia (aspects of pramana and Pramanaika-desa (a segment of Pramana). Both these words signify or presuppose the ontological category of the whole and parts. But Jaina philosophers themselves have made a clear. cut distinction between knowledge and reality.3 So the ontological category of the whole and parts cannot be applicable to the epistemic category of truth-values or processes like Pramana, and Naya. Nayas qua knowledge differ ipso facto from things or real objects. It is ludicrous therefore, to maintain that a naya is a part or segment of pramapa. The logical relation betwee and pramana is based on their truth-values. Consequently, 'aspects of Pramana or segments of Pramana' are to be understood as approximations to Pramana. In other words, the truth-value of Nayas falls between the true and the false or it is removed from the false and approximates to the true. So the Jaina concept of the truth-value of Nayas is logically the same as Lukasiewicz's concept of the indetermininate truth value. Pandit Kailash Chandra Shastri has also come to a similar conclusion in his Hindi translation of the Nayavivarana portion of Vidyananda's Tattvarthailoka Vartika,4 for he says that the truth-value of Nayas is true from one stand-point and false from another stand-point, i.e. it has two aspects-the aspect of the true and the aspect of the false. Lukasiewicz's concept of indeterminate truth-value renders the truth-value of nayas meaningful and the observation of Pt. Kailash Chandra Shastri is, in all likelihood, indicative of the position vouchsafed by Lukasiewicz. Had he known the logical system of Lukasiewicz, he would have certainly compared the Jaina system of logic with it. In absence of this knowledge his reconstruction of the truthvalue of nayas is based simply upon the psychological consideration of two stand-points and wants in logical significance and rigour. Second Ground : Both Akalanka and Vidyananda have a clear conception of Probability. Vidyananda, for example, says while commenting upon the Astasati of Akalanka that Pramanya or logical value of every naya is a probability-value or a mid-way position between truth and falsehood or a position involving both truth and falsehood in various degrees. Prof. Mahendra Kumar Jaina has rightly understood this mid-way position as probability. Again, a naya is called sunaya or sound

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NAYAVADA AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC 159 naya when its truth-value is intrinsic to itself and does not depend on any other naya?. This means that there are nayas and hence nayavada leads to a non-truth functional many-valued logic of probability. But when the question is raised about the truth-values of only three statements which are respectively true, probable and false, then this logic of probabilities gives rise to * Three-valued Logic. Further, Jainas have conceived this logic is truth-functional also, in as much as they have tried to seek truth-value relations among nayas, particularly between the three original nayas and the remaining four ones of the nayasaptabhangi Jaina Logic is thus indicative of both a non-truth functional many valued logic of probabilities and a truth-functional three-valued logic of which one type is the logic of Lukasievicz. Our main concern, however, is, obviously, the latter. Third Ground : Mallavadin has designated the three original nayas as vidhi, vidhiniyama and niyamas which may be understood as the positive, indeterminate and negative statements. What is remarkable in this conception of Mallava din is the point that he clearly conceived the three truth-values and classified statements according to their truth-values. He placed the indeterminate statement just below the true statement and above the false statement in the scale of decreasing truth-values. This is exactly what Lukasiewicz has done and is totally different from what Aristotle, Kant and Hegel have donc, for unlike Lukasiewicz they have placed the limitative judgement which is the analogue of the indeterminate statement in their systems, below the positive and negative judgements. The truth-value of an indeterminate statement, according to Jainism and Lukasiewicz is more than F and less than T. Fourth Ground: : Jaina logicians have made a clear distinction between Nayava kya and Pramanavakya or between Naya Saptabhangi and Pramana Saptabhangi. The former is a table of seven statements each one of which has the truth-value I whereas the latter is a table of seven statements each one of wbich has the truth-value T or I. Now Jaina logicians have further displayed their correct grasp of three truth-functional operatives, namely negation, disjunction or alternation and conjunction. Negation (Nisedha or Pratiscdha) may be symbolized as ~ , conjuction (Yugapadbhava) as A and disjunction (Kramabhava) as V. Again

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160 suppose a statement P has the truth-vaiue I. Now the negation of P is also I. The conjunction of P and ~ P is again I and the disjunction P and P, i. e. P V ~P is also I. Thus the first four statements of Naya Saptabbangi are respectively P, P, PV~P and PA P and each one of them has the truth-value I. The fifth statement is the conjunction of the first and the fourth statements, the sixth statement is the conjunction of the fourth statement and the second statement and lastly the seventh statement is the conjuction of the fourth statement and the third statement. In this way, obviously according to the rule of conjunction the truth-value of all these three compound statements is I. So the table of seven nayas is like this; 1. P where P is I 2. ~P which is I 3. PV 4. PA 5. P) which is 1 6. PA (PAP) which is I 7. (PV~P) A (PAP) which is I This table becomes logically verified if we maintain that the logic of Nayas is a three-valued logic of Lukasiewicz. Surprisingly enough, the Naya Saptabhangi challenges the law of Excluded Middle, because here PVP which is the classical formulation of the law is not a tautology as its truth-value is I and not T. It further challenges the law of contradiction because here PA P which is the classical formulation of the law is not false but I. It assumes that the truth-value of a conjunction it the falsest, and that of a disjunction is the truest, of the truth-values of its components. Now these epoch-making discoveries of Jaina logicians can be understood in their proper perspectives and further they can be logically, though not historically, linked with the modern developments of three-valued logic. ~ ~ P which is 1 P which is I ~ STUDIES IN JAINISM PA (PA~ 2 ~ Now it may be asked here as to how and why we should suppose that Jaina logicians knew such important truth-functional connectives or operators as negation, disjunction and conjunction of Lukasiewiczian Three-valued logic. To this we may reply that at first it should be noted that logicians like Vidyananda and Anantavirya have clearly described these operators and secondly it is to be conceded that they have also a clear concept of the

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NAYAVADA AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC 161 truth-value I as we have already discussed above. Then as regards the first point we may cite the authority of Vidyananda who interprets the seven modes (Bhangas) of Naya as Vidbikalpana (Positive statement), Pratisedha kalpana ( Negative statement), KramavidhiPratisedha-kalpana (consecutive or successive combination of positive statement and negative statement ), Yugapad-VidhiPratisedha-kalpana (simultaneous combination of positive statement and negative statement), Vldhikalpana and Yugapad-vidhipratisedha-kalpana, pratisedha-kalpana and Yugapad-vidhi-pratised ha-kalpana and finally Kramena vidhi-pratisedha-kalpana and Yugapad-vidhi-pratisedha-kalpana. The fourth Bhanga i. e. the conjunction of a positive statement and its negative form needs a little more consideration as it is basic to Jaina logic. It is also called as avaktavya or indescribable. But, as a matter of fact, the word avaktavya here means indeterminate. Most importantly, what is remarkable on the part of the Jaina logicians is their keen observation that the indeterminate compound statement is a conjuncion of a positive statement and its negative form and that it challenges the law of contradiction. They have given a logical theory that does not accept the law of contradiction, at least in the form in which it is stated in two-valued logic. The denial of this law, therefore, has logically rendered their logic a type of three-valued logic. Now the next question which I want to discuss in this context pertains to Syadvada and Pramana Saptabhangi, If our interpretation and reconstruction of Nayavada is accepted, then it can be said that Syadvada is a species of Nayavada and Pramana-Saptabhangi is that of Naya-Saptabhangi. Syadvada is a true statement and Pramana-Saptabhangi is the table of seven true statements which are availed from a positive statement by the operations of negation, conjunction and disjunction. For example let us think that P is a true statement, then Pramana-Saptabhangi will become as follows: 1. P (assertion of P) 2. not-P (negation of P) 3. P or not-P (disjunction of P and not-P) 4. P and not-P (conjunction of both P and not-P) 5. P and (P and not-P) (conjunction of 1 and 4) J-11

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162 STUDIES IN JAINISM 6. Not-P and (P and not-P) conjunction of 2 and 4) 7. (P or not-P) and (P and not-P) (conjunction of 3 and 4) Now these seven statements can be shown to be truc even on the basis of two-valued logic. To demonstrate it, we have first to understand P according to Syadvada. Suppose P stands for a statement that cows are white. Now Jainas will show that the correct formulation of this true statement is 'Syat cows are white, where Syat is a semantic qualifier. But it also includes the syntactic quantifier and may be understood in the sense of the Existential quantifier, as statements qualified by Syat are particular statements and not universal statements. Now a vidhi or a positive statement can be taken as a particular positive proposition or I propositions. So 'Syat cows are white' is an I proposition. The negation of 'Syat' cows are white' is 'Syat cows are not white' which may be taken as an O proposition. Now the relation between I and O propositions is that of sub-contraries according to which both I and O can be true together though both cannot be false together. Hence if (1) Syat Pis true, then (2) Syat not-P may also be true, as both I and O can be true together. Now by disjunction and conjunction we get respectively, (3) Syat Por not-P and (4) Syat P and not-P which may be true, because both I and I can be true together. In this way, the first four statements of Pramana-Saptabhangi can be assigned the truth-value T. The other three statements are derived by conjunction of the fourth statement with the first, the second and the third statement. Hence, they may also be assigned the truth-value T. Thus all the seven statements of Pramana Sapta bhangi may be true toge1her. The above explanation and validation of Syadvada and its seven statements is perfectly allright according to Aristoletian logic and the modern two-valued logic of propositional calculus involving quantifiers. So this has led some contemporary Indian philosophers to the view that Syadvada does not presuppose, indicate, or refer to, any system of three-valued logic.1) But their view appears to be prejudiced and superficial as it is not taken after considering the relation of Nayavada with Syadvada. Syadvada, in fact, is an instance of Nayavada which has all the basic characteristics of Many-valued Logic as we have already shown abovc. So, it is

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NAYAVADA AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC 163 nothing but a vainglorious statement that Syadvada has no reference to Many-valued Logic. If Syadvada is meaningful only in the context of Nayavada which is a sort of Three-valued Logic, then Syadvada necessarily refers to a Three-valued Logic. Moreover, there are certain other relevant considerations which indicate that Syadvada refers to a Many-valued Logic. At first, the expla, nation of the fourth statement in the Pramana-Saptabhangi according to the principles of two-valued logic does not make it indeterminate or paradoxical (i. e. avaktavya) as it is perfectly all right that both I and O propositions having the same subject and predicate may be true together. But Jaina logic of Syadvada goes deeper than such a cavalier interpretation of the conjunction of I and O propositions. It refers, as a matter of fact, to the principle of contradiction which is represented as P.-P. Obviously this statement is false on the theory of two-valued logic. But Jainas hold that it is indeterminate, undecided or paradoxical and so they call it as avaktavya. Their Syadvada challenges the law of contradiction and is, therefore, called the destroyer of contradiction" and the protector of the common sense view that holds that reality has contradictory attributes.12 Hence only that logic is indicated by Syadvada which challenges the law of contradiction and gives some truth-value to contradictory statements. Obviously such a logic would be a Three-valued Logic. So Syadvada needs the support of a Three-valued Logic for its meaningful formulation and interpretation. Secondly, Jainas have indicated future of a contingent judgments while discussing the various meanings statement qualified with Syat. When such a statement is made historically or psychologically it is stipulated with regard to some substance, field, time, condition or state or state of affairs. For example, when it is said that Syat this pot exists, this statement is made with regard to the present moment of time and a particular pot that lies before the speaker and so it is true. And when it is said that this pot does not exist, then, this statement is made with reference to the future state of the pot whereas it is completely destroyed and hence even this statement is true. But these ways of psychological investigation conceal some logical truths. When the statement concerning the present state of affairs is considered along with that concerning its future or past status or vice-versa, then a third logical truth-value

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164 STUDIES IN JAINISM of the type I emerges with regard to the truth-value of furturecontingent statements. The consideration of the future-contingent statements is basic to Jaina Logic. Now it is well known in the West that this very consideration has given rise to Three-valued Logic. So there is nothing wrong in supposing that Jaina Logic of Syadvada is indicative of a Three-va lued Logic. Moreover, as it becomes more sound and articulate on the basis of a threevalued logic than on that of a two-valued logic, so it is logically linked with a three-valued logic which is its raison detre NOTES 1. Sanmati Prakarana 2-47. 2. See Syadyadamanjari on Verse No. 28. 3. Pramananayair adhigamah. Knowledge is the means and reality is the end. Tattvartha Sufra, 1-6, by Umaswati. 4. Vide Dravyas vabhava Prakadaka Naya Cakra of Mailla Dhavala, ed. and tr. in Hindi by Pt. Kailash Chandra Shastri, Bhartiya Jnanapoetha Prakashan, Varanasi, 1971, Appendix-2, p. 232. Preyasah Samkipa pramasyetarasthitih- Astasahasri, p. 271. 6. Prayika sthiti, vide Siddhiviniscaya tika, Prastavana, by Prof. M. K. Jain. 7. Vide Naya Rahasya Prukarana of Yasovijaya with pramodavivrti, pp. 7-8. Also see Devasari's definition of Naya in Syad-vadaratnakara and comments on it by Ratnaprabhasuri. 8. Dvadasaranayacakra, vol. I, p. 9. 9. Astasahasri p. 125. Also vide the verses of Ananta virya quoted in Sarva darsana Sangrahu of Madhavacarya in Arhata Darsana. 10. See proceedings of All India Philosophical Congress. Kanpur Session, 1972, Symposium on Syadvala, especially the paper of Dr. R. C. Pandey of Delhi University. 11. Virodhadhvansako mata". quoted in Nayacakra of M&illa Dhawala, p. 127. 12. Loknatha or Prahari Vide Dalsukha Malvania's Hindi introduction to Nyayavataravartikavrtti, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavana, Bombay, 1949 and Prof. Mahendra Kumar Jain's Hindi Introduction to Nyayakumudacandra of Prbhacandra, Diganbara Jaina Granthamala, Bombay, 1941.

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NAYAVADA AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC DISCUSSION M. P. Marathe : The attempt to connect probability consideration with manyvalued or even three-valued logic is incorrect for former can arise in spite of the latter. Secondly, if many-valued logic is accepted on par with non-Euclidian geometry then applicability issue is redundant. Thirdly, the attempt to interpret Syat in modal sense without providing for modal operators or modal predicates is confusing. Further, do you propose to assign truth-values to statements along with modal operators or independently of them? The contention that Syadvada stands against the Law of contradiction is thoroughly misleading. For, even if Syadvada is in accordance with threc-valued logic, this does not necessarily entail repudiation of the law of non-contradiction, for every system of three-valued logic does not reject the law of non-contradiction. But more importaatly the law is the foundation of consistent communication and if Syadva da repudiates the law on all levels then it also rupudiates consistent communication. S. S. Barlingay : Some systems of many-valued logic repudiate law of noncontradiction. M. A. Marathe True ; but those systems that repudiate the law on objectlinguistic level don't repudiate it even on the metalinguistic level and not every system of many-valued logic has repudiated the law. Lastly, Mr. Pandey's interpretation of syat in terms of quantifiers and linking this with Modal logic is misleading for apart from the fact that Syat docs not mean quantifier, Modal logic is not necessarily tied down with quantified propositions. R. Sundara Rajan : Lucasiewicz's consideration of many-valued logic arose out of Aristotelian consideration of future contingency as also out of taking temporality seriously. There is no point in camparing Jaina logic with that of Lucasiewicz unless similar concern is shown to be prevalent in both. Nextly, in your contention that many-valued logic has applicability to quantum

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166 STUDIES IN JAINISM theory you seem to be impressed by Reichenbach; but recently Reichenbach's contention is seriously disputed and his presuppositions challenged. Lastly, in support of Dr. Marathe's point I seek to draw your attention to Bortikiewicz's theorem wherein he maintained that if the system is many--valued the meta-language of the system will always be two-valued. So one cann't dispence with two values at all levels. That is, two-valued systems are interpretative and if they are disputed, according to Bortikicwicz, consistent communication is impossible. IzvaracaMdra zAstrI zrI. saMgamalAlajIkA naya kA spaSTIkaraNa galata hai| hemacaMdrAcArya ne siddhivinizcaya, nyAyavinizcaya, Adi kisI bhI graMtha meM naya ko pramANa nahIM kahA hai| prAcIna graMthakAroM kI dRSTi se pramANanaya zabdahI galata hai| pramANa naya, aura durnaya tIna alaga haiM / pramANa kA sAmAnya artha meM jaina graMthoM meM prayoga nahIM kiyA gayA hai / sthAtvAdamaMjarI, nyAyakumudacaMdra yA prameyakamalamAtaMDa Adi graMthoM meM aura jaina siddhAMta ke anusAra 'pramANa' zabda zabdapramANa kA vAcaka hai, aura kisI pramANa kA yA pramANa ke sAmAnya artha kA nahIM / naya pratyakSa yA paroTA ke bheda nahIM haiN| aura bhadra akalaMka ne bhI kahA hai - pramANabhedAt nayA: sapta / vrajanArAyaNa zarmA: zrI. saMgamalAlajI unake vicAra meM naigamanaya aura saMgrahanaya kA vivecana kaisA kareMge? dUsarI bAta yaha ki naya meM mukhya aura gauNa bhAva rahatA hai| inakA vivecana saMkhyIkArakoM kI bhASA meM nahIM kiyA jA sktaa| saMgamalAla pAMDe DaoN. marATe aura DaoN. saMdararAjana ne uThAye prazna citanIya hai / lekina syAdvAda ko Modal Logic kI frame lagAte samaya bhI hameM pUrI taraha se socanA cAhiye aisA merA maMtavya hai / paM. IzvaracandrazAstrI ke isa kahanese ki pramANa ora naya meM pharka hai, maiM sahamata huuN| symbolization ke bAremeM DaoN. marAThe aura DaoN. saMdararAjana ne uThAye savAla bhI citanIya haiM / merA uddiSTa Jaina Logic ko many - valued logic kA application hotA hai yaha dikhAnA itanAhI thaa|

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syAdvAda : eka cintana sAgaramala jaina syAdvAda kA artha-vizleSaNa syAdvAda zabda syAt aura vAda ina do zabdoM se nippana huA hai / ataH syAdvAda ko samajhane ke lie ina donoM zabdoM kA artha vizleSaNa Avazyaka hai / syAt zabda ke artha sandarbha meM jitanI bhranti dArzanikoM meM rahI hai, sambhavataH utanI anya kisI zabda ke sambandha meM nhiiN| vidvAnoM ke dvArA hindI bhASA meM syAta kA artha "zAyada", "sambhavataH" "kadAcit" aura aMgrejI bhASA meM Probable, May be, Perhaps, Somehow Adi kiyA gayA hai aura inhIM arthoM ke AdhAra para use saMzayavAda, sambhAvanAvAda yA anizcayavAda samajhane kI bhUla kI jAtI rahI hai / yaha sahI hai ki kinhIM sandarbho meM syAt zabda kA artha kadAcit, zAyada, sambhava Adi bhI hotA hai| kintu isa AdhAra para syAdvAda ko saMzayavAda yA anizcayavAda mAna lenA eka bhrAnti hI hogaa| hameM yahAM isa bAta ko bhI spaSTa rUpa meM dhyAna meM rakhanA cAhie ki prathama to eka hI zabda ke aneka artha ho sakate hai, dusare aneka bAra zabdoM kA prayoga unake pracalita artha meM na hokara viziSTa artha meM hotA hai, jaise jaina paramparA meM dharma zabda kA prayoga dharma-dravya ke rUpa meM hotA hai / jaina AcAryoM ne syAt zabda kA prayoga eka viziSTa pAribhASika artha meM hI kiyA hai| yadi syAdvAda ke Alocaka vidvAnoM ne syAdvAda sambandhI kisI bhI mUla grantha ko dekhane kI koziza kI hotI, to unheM syAt zabda kA jaina paramparA meM Presented in the Seminar on "Taina Logic and Epistemology" (Poona University, 1975).

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168 STUDIES IN JAINISM kyA artha hai, yaha spaSTa ho jAtA / syAt zabda ke artha ke sambandha meM jo bhAnti utpanna hotI hai, usakA mUla kAraNa use tiDannata pada mAna lenA hai, jabaki samantabhadra, vidyAnanda, amRtacandra, malliSeNa Adi sabhI jaina AcAryoM ne ise nipAta yA avyaya mAnA hai| samantabhadra syAt zabda kA artha spaSTa karate hue AptamImAMsA meM likhate haiM ki syAt yaha nipAta zabda hai, jo artha ke sAtha sambandhita hone para vAkya meM anekAntatA kA dyotaka aura vivakSita artha kA eka vizeSaNa hai| isI prakAra paMcAstikAya kI TIkA meM AcArya amRtacandra bhI syAt zabda ke artha ko spaSTa karate hue likhate hai ki "syAt" ekAntatA kA niSedhaka, anekAntatA kA pratipAdaka tathA kathaMcit artha kA dyotaka eka nipAta zabda hai| 2 malliSeNa ne bhI syAdvAdamaMjarI meM syAt zabda ko anekAntatA kA dyotaka eka avyaya mAnA hai / 3 isa prakAra yaha bAta spaSTa ho jAtI hai ki jaina vicArakoM kI dRSTi meM syAt zabda saMzayaparaka na hokara, anekAntika kintu nizcayAtmaka artha kA dyotaka hai / mAtra itanA hI nahIM jaina dArzanika isa sambandha meM bhI sajaga the ki Alocaka yA jana sAdhAraNa ke dvArA syAt zabda kA saMzayaparaka artha grahaNa kiyA jA sakatA hai, isalie unhoMne syAta zabda ke sAtha "eka" zabda ke prayoga kI yojanA bhI kI hai, jaise "syAdastyeva ghaTa:" arthAt kisI apekSA se yaha ghar3A hI hai| yaha spaSTa hai ki "eva" zabda nizcayAtmakatA kA dyotaka hai / "syAt" tathA "eva" zabdoM kA eka sAtha prayoga zrotA kI saMzayAtmakatA ko samApta kara use sApekSika kintu nizcita jJAna pradAna karatA hai / vastutaH isa prayoga meM "evaM" zabda syAt zabda kI anizcitatA ko samApta kara detA hai aura "syAt" zabda "eka" zabda kI nirapekSatA evaM ekAntatA ko samApta kara detA hai aura isa prakAra ve donoM milakara kathita vastu dharma kI sImA niyata karate hue sApekSa kintu nizcita jJAna prastuta karate haiN| ataH syAdvAda ko saMzayavAda yA sambhAvanAvAda nahIM kahA jA sakatA / "vAda" zabda kA artha kathana vidhi hai / isa prakAra syAdvAda sApekSika kathana paddhati yA sApekSita nirNaya paddhati kA sUcaka hai / vaha eka aisA siddhAnta hai, jo vastutattva kA vividha pahaluoM yA vividha AyAmoM se vizleSaNa karatA hai aura apane una vizleSita vividha nirNayoM ko isa prakAra kI bhASA meM prastuta karatA hai ki ve apane pakSa kI sthApanA karate hue bhI vastutattva meM nihita anya "anukta" anekAneka dharmoM evaM sambhAvanAoM (paryAyoM) kA niSedha na kreN| vastuta: syAdvAda hamAre nirNayoM evaM tajjanita kathanoM ko prastuta karane kA eka nirdoSa evaM ahiMsaka tarIkA hai| vaha avirodha pUrvaka kathana kI eka zailI hai / usakA pratyeka bhaMga anekAntika Dhaga se ekAntika kathana karatA hai, jisameM vaktA apanI bAta isa DhaMga se kahatA hai ki usakA vaha kathana apane pratipakSI kathanoM kA pUrNa nivedhaka na bane / saMkSepa meM syAdvAvAda apane samagra rUpa meM anekAnta hai aura pratyeka bhaMga kI dRSTi se samyak ekAnta bhI hai / saptabhaMgI ananta dharmAtmaka vastutatva ke sambandha meM eka aisI paddhati yA vAkya yojanA hai, jo usameM anukta dharmoM kI sambhAvanA kA niSedha nahIM karate hue

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syAdvAda : eka cintana 169 sApekSika kintu nizcayAtmaka DhaMga se vastutattva ke pUrNa svarUpa ko apanI dRSTi meM rakhate hue usake kisI eka dharma kA mukhya rUpa se pratipAdana yA niSedha karatI hai| syAdvAda ke AdhAra sambhavata: yahAM yaha prazna upasthita kiyA jA sakatA sakatA hai ki syAdvAda yA sApekSika kathana paddhati kI kyA AvazyakatA hai ? syAdvAda yA sApekSika kathana paddhati kI AvazyakatA ke mUlata: cAra kAraNa hai : 1- vastutattva kI anantadharmAtmakatA, 2- mAnavIya jJAna prApti ke sAdhanoM kI sImitatA, 3-- mAnavIya jJAna kI apUrNatA evaM sApekSatA, tathA 4-- bhASA ke abhivyaktI sAmarthya kI sImitatA eva saapekssttaa| (a) vastutattva kI anantadharmAtmakatA : sarvaprathama syAdvAda ke aucitya sthApana ke lie hameM vastutattva ke usa svarUpa ko samajha lenA hogA, jisake pratipAdana kA hama prayAsa karate haiN| vastutattva mAtra sImita lakSaNoM kA pUMja nahIM hai, jaina dArzanikoM ne use ananta dharmAtmaka kahA hai / yadi hama vastutattva ke bhAvAtmaka guNoM para hI vicAra kareM to unakI saMkhyA bhI aneka hogii| udAharaNArtha, gulAba kA phUla gandha kI dRSTi se sugandhita hai, to varNa kI dRSTi se kisI eka yA ekAdhika viziSTa raMgoM se yukta hai, sparza kI dRSTi se usakI paMkhuDiyAM komala haiM, kintu DaMThala tIkSNa hai, usameM eka viziSTa svAda hai, Adi Adi / yaha to huI vastu bhAvAtmaka dharmoM kI bAta, kintu usake abhAvAtmaka dharmoM kI saMkhyA to usake bhAvAtmaka dharmoM kI apekSA kaI gunA adhika hogI, jaise gulAba kA phUla, camelI kA, mogare kA yA phlAsa kA phUla / vaha apane se itara sabhI vastuoM se bhinna hai aura usameM una sabhI vastuoM ke anekAneka dharmoM kA abhAva bhI hai / punaH yadi hama vastutattva kI bhUta evaM bhAvI tathA vyakta aura avyakta paryAyI (sambhAvanAoM) para vicAra kareM to usake guNa-dharmoM kI yaha saMkhyA aura bhI adhika bar3hakara nizcita hI ananta taka pahuMca hI jAvegI / ataH yaha kathana satya hI hai ki vastutattva ananta dharmo, ananta guNoM evaM ananta paryAyoM kA puMja hai| mAtra itanA hI nahIM vastutattva anantadharmAtmaka hone ke sAtha sAtha anekAntika bhI hai, mAnava buddhi jinheM paraspara virodhI guNa mAna letI hai, ve eka hI vastutatva meM apekSA bheda se eka sAtha rahate hue dekhe jAte hai / ' astitva nAstitva pUrvaka hai aura nAstitva astitva pUrvaka hai / ekatA meM anekatA aura anekatA meM ekatA. anusyUta hai, jo dravya dRSTi se nitya hai, vahI paryAyavRSTi se anitya bhI hai / utpatti ke vinA vinAza aura vinAza ke binA utpatti nahIM hai| puna: utpatti aura vinAza ke lie prIvyatva bhI apekSita hai anyathA utpatti aura vinAza kisakA hogA? kyoMki

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170 STUDIES IN JAINISM vizva meM sarvathA vinAza aura abhAva se utpatti jaisI bhI koI sthiti nahIM hai / yadyapi rovyatva aura utpatti-vinAza ke dharma paraspara virodhI hai, kintu donoM ko sahavartI mAne binA vizva kI vyAkhyA asambhava hai| yahI kAraNa thA ki bhagavAna mahAvIra ne apane yuga meM pracalita zAzvatavAdI aura ucchedavAdI Adi paraspara virodhI vicAra dhArAoM ke madhya samanvaya karate hue anekAntika dRSTi se vastutatva ko utpAda, vyaya aura gharovyAtmaka kahakara paribhASita kiyA / 5 jinopadiSTa yaha tripadI hI, anekAntavAdI vicAra paddhati kA AdhAra hai / syAdvAda aura nayavAda sambandhI vipula sAhitya mAtra isakA vistAra hai / vipadI hI jina dvArA vapita vaha "vIja" hai, jisase syAhAda rUpI vara-vRkSa vikasita huA hai| vaha vastutattva ke usa anekAntika svarUpa kA sUcaka hai, jisakA spaSTIkaraNa bhagavatI sUtra meM svayaM bhagavAn mahAvIra ne vividha prasaMgoM meM kiyA hai / udAharaNArtha, jaba mahAvIra se gautama ne yaha pUchA ki he bhagavan / jIva nitya hai yA anitya hai? he gautama ! jIva apekSAbheda se nitya bhI hai aura anitya bhii| bhagavan, yaha kaise ? he gautama - dravya dRSTi se jIva nitya hai, paryAya dRSTi se anitya / 6 isI prakAra eka anya prazna ke uttara meM unhoMne somila ko kahA thA ki he somila - dravya dRSTi se maiM eka hU~, kintu parivartanazIla cetanA avasthAoM (paryAyoM) kI apekSA se meM aneka bhI huuN| vastutattva ke isa ananta dharmAtmaka evaM anekAntika svarUpa kA yaha pratipAdana ukta Agama meM bahata hI vistAra ke sAtha huA hai, kintu lekha kI maryAdA ko dRSTigata rakhate hue uparokta eka-do udAharaNa paryApta hoNge| ___ vastutattva kI yaha ananta dharmAtmakatA tathA usameM virodhI dharma-yugaloM kI eka sAtha upasthiti anubhavasiddha hai| eka hI Amra phala khaTTA aura madhura (khaTTAmIThA) donoM hI ho sakatA hai| pitatva aura pUtratva ke do virodhI gaNa apekSA bheda se eka hI vyakti meM eka hI samaya meM satya siddha ho sakate haiM / vAstavikatA to yaha hai ki jinheM hama virodhI dharma-yugala mAna lete haiM, unameM sarvathA yA nirapekSa rUpa se virodha nahIM hai / apekSA-bheda se unakA eka hI vastutattva meM eka hI samaya meM honA sambhava hai / bhinna bhinna apekSAoM se eka hI vyakti choTA yA bar3A kahA jA sakatA hai athavA eka hI vastu ThaNDI yA garama kahI jA sakatI hai| jo saMkhiyA janasAdhAraNa kI dRSTi meM viSa (prANApahArI) hai, vahI eka vaidya kI dRSTi meM auSadhi (jIvana-saMjIvanI) bhI hai| ataH yaha eka anubhavajanya satya hai ki vastu meM aneka virodhI dharma-yugaloM upasthiti dekhI jAtI hai / yahAM hameM yaha bAta dhyAna meM rakhanI cAhie ki vastu meM aneka virodhI dharma-yugaloM kI upasthiti to hotI hai, kintu sabhI-virodhI dharma-yugaloM kI upasthiti nahIM hotI hai / isa sambandha meM dhavalA kA nimna kathana draSTavya hai - "yadi (vastu meM) saMpUrNa dharmoM kA eka sAtha rahanA mAna liyA jAve to parapara viruddha caitanya-acaitanya, bhavyatva aura abhavyatva Adi dharmoM kA eka sAtha AtmA meM rahane kA prasaMga A jAvegA / ' ata; yaha mAnanA adhika tarka saMgata hai ki vastu meM kevala ve hI virodhI dharma-yugala yugapat

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171 syAdvAda : eka cintana rUpa meM raha sakate haiM, jinakA usa vastu meM atyantAbhAva nahIM hai / kintu isa bAta se vastutatva kA ananta dharmAtmaka svarUpa khaNDita nahIM hotA hai aura vastutasva meM nityatAanityatA, ekatva - anekatva, astitva-nAstitva, bhedatva abhedatva Adi aneka virodhI dharma-yugaloM kI yugapat upasthiti mAnI jA sakatI hai| AcArya amRtacandra samayasAra kI TIkA meM likhate haiM ki apekSA bheda se jo hai, vahI nahIM bhI hai; jo sat hai vaha asat bhI hai, jo eka hai vaha aneka bhI hai, jo nitya hai vahI anitya bhI hai / 9 vastutattva ekAntika na hokara anekAntika hai / AcArya hemacandra anyayogavyavacchedikA meM likhate haiM ki vizva kI samasta vastueM syAdvAda ke mudrA se yukta hai, koI bhI ullaMghana nahIM kara sakate 10 yadyapi vastutattva kA yaha anantadharmAtmaka evaM anekAntika svarUpa hameM asAmaMjasya meM avazya DAla detA hai kintu yadi vastu-svabhAva aisA hI hai, to hama kyA kareM? bauddha dArzanika dharmakIrti ke zabdoM meM 'yadIdaM svayamarthebhyo rocate ke vayaM' yA punaH hama jisa vastutattva yA dravya kA vivecana karanA cAhate hai, vaha hai kyA ? jahA~ eka ora dravya ko guNa aura paryAyoM kA Azraya kahA gayA hai, vahIM dUsarI ora use guNoM kA samUha bhI kahA gayA hai / guNa aura paryAyoM se pRthak dravya kI koI sattA hI nahIM hai aura dravya se pRthak guNa aura paryAyoM kI koI sattA nahIM hai / yaha hai vastutattva kI sApekSitatA aura yadi vastu-tatva sApekSika anantadharmAtmaka aura anekAntika hai, to phira usakA jJAna evaM usakI vivecanA nirapekSa tathA aikAntika dRSTi se kaise sambhava hai? isalie jaina AcAryoM kA kathana hai ki (anantadharmAtmaka) mizrita tattva kI vivecanA binA apekSA ke sambhava nahIM hai | 11 " (ba) mAnavIya jJAna-prApti ke sAdhanoM kA svarUpa yaha to huI vastu svarUpa kI bAta, kintu jisa vastu svarUpa kA jJAna hama prApta karanA cAhate haiM, usake lie hamAre pAsa sAdhana kyA hai ? hameM una sAdhanoM ke svarUpa evaM unake dvArA pradatta jJAna ke svarUpa para bhI vicAra kara lenA hogA / manuSya ke pAsa apanI satyAmIpsA aura jijJAsA kI saMtuSTi ke lie jJAna prApti ke do sAdhana haiM : 1. indriyAM, aura 2. tarkabuddhi / mAnava apane inhIM sImita sAdhanoM dvArA vastutattva ko jAnane kA prayatna karatA rahA hai| jahAM taka mAnava ke aindrika jJAna kA prazna hai, yaha spaSTa hai ki aindrika jJAna na pUrNa hai aura na nirapekSa | mAnava indriyoM kI kSamatA sImita hai ataH ve vastu-tattva kA jo bhI svarUpa jAna pAtI haiM, vaha pUrNa nahIM ho sakatA hai / indriyAM vastu ko apane pUrNa svarUpa meM dekha pAne ke lie sakSama nahIM haiN| yahAM hameM yaha bhI smaraNa rakhanA cAhie ki hama vastutattva ko jisa rUpa meM vaha hai vaisA nahIM jAna kara use jisa rUpa meM indriyAM hamAre samakSa prastuta karatI haiM, usI rUpa meM jAnate haiM / hama indriya samvedanoM ko jAna pAte haiM, vastutattva ko nahIM / isakA artha yaha huA ki hamArA Anubhavika jJAna indriya- sApekSa hai !

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172 STUDIES IN JAINISM mAtra itanA hI nahIM, vaha indriya sApekSa hone ke sAtha hI sAtha vaha una koNoM para bhI nirbhara rahatA hai, jahAM se vastu dekhI jA rahI hai| aura yadi hama usa koNa (sthiti) ke vicAra ko apane jJAna se alaga karate haiM, to nizcita hI hamArA jJAna bhrAnta ho jaaygaa| udAharaNArtha, eka gola sikkA apane aneka koNoM se hameM vRttAkAra na lagakara, aNDAkAra dikhAI detA hai| vibhinna gurutvAkarSaNoM evaM vibhinna zArIrika sthitiyoM se eka hI vastu halkI yA bhArI pratIta hotI hai| hamArI pRthvI ko jaba hama usake gurutvAkarSaNa kI sImA se Upara jAkara dekhate haiM to vaha gatizIla dikhAI detI hai, kintu yahAM vaha hameM sthira pratIta hotI hai / dUra se dekhane para vastu choTI aura pAsa se dekhane para bar3I dikhAI detI hai| eka Tebala ke jaba vividha koNoM se phoTU lie jAte haiM to ve paraspara bhinna bhinna hote haiN| isa prakAra hamArA sArA Anabhavika jJAna sApekSa hI hotA hai, nirapekSa nhiiN| indriya samvedanoM ko una saba apekSAoM (conditions) me alaga haTakara nahIM samajhA jA sakatA hai, jinameM ki ve hue hai / ataH aindriya jJAna dik, kAla aura vyakti sApekSa hI hotA hai| kintu mAnava mana kabhI bhI indriyAnubhUti yA pratIti ke jJAna ko hI antima satya mAnakara santuSTa nahIM hotA, vaha usa pratIti ke pIche bhI jhAMkanA cAhatA hai| isa hetu vaha apanI tarka-buddhi kA sahArA letA hai| kintu kyA tArkika jJAna nirapekSa ho sakatA hai ? prathama to tAkika jJAna bhI pUrI taraha se indriya samvedanoM se nirapekSa nahIM hotA hai, dUsare tArkika jJAna vastutaH eka sambandhAtmaka jJAna hai / bauddhika cintana kAraNa-kArya, eka-aneka, asti-nAsti Adi vicAra-vidhAoM se ghirA huA hai / aura apanI ina vicAra-vidhAoM ke AdhAra para vaha sApekSa hI hogA 1 tarka-buddhi jaba bhI kisI vastu ke svarUpa kA nizcaya kara koI nirNaya prastuta karatI hai, to vaha hameM do tathyoM ke bIca kisI sambandha yA asambadha kI hI sUcanA pradAna karatI hai aura aisA sambandhAtmaka jJAna sambandha-sApekSa hI hogA, nirapekSa nhiiN| (sa) mAnavIya jJAna kI sImitatA evaM sApekSatA vastutaH vastutatva kA yathArtha evaM pUrNa jJAna sImita kSamatA vAle mAnava ke lie sadaiva hI eka jaTila prazna rahA hai / apUrNa ke dvArA pUrNa ko jAnane ke samasta prayAsa AMzika satya ke jJAna se Age nahIM jA pAye haiM aura jaba isa AMzika satya ko pUrNa satya mAna liyA jAtA hai to vaha satya satya na raha karake asatya bana jAtA hai / vastu tattva na kevala utanA hI jitanA ki hama ise jAna pA rahe haiN| manuSya kI aidrika jJAna-kSamatA va tarkavuddhi itanI apUrNa hai ki ve sampUrNa satya ko eka sAtha grahaNa nahIM kara sakatI / sAdhAraNa mAnava-buddhi pUrNa satya kA sAkSAtkAra nahIM kara pAtI hai / jaina dRSTi ke anusAra satya ajJeya to nahIM hai kintu binA pUrNatA ko prApta kiye use pUrNa rUpa se nahIM jAnA jA sktaa| prasiddha vaijJAnika albarTa AinsTIna ne kahA thA ki "hama kevala sApekSika satya ko jAna

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173 syAdvAda : eka cintana " sakate haiM, nirapekSa satya ko to koI pUrNa draSTA hI jAna sakegA / 12 aura aisI sthiti meM jabaki hamArA samasta jJAna AMzika apUrNa tathA sApekSika hai, hameM yaha dAvA karane kA koI adhikAra nahIM hai ki merI dRSTi hI ekamAtra satya hai aura satya mere hI pAsa hai / hamArA AMzika, apUrNa aura sApekSika jJAna nirapekSa satyatA kA dAvA nahIM kara sakatA hai | ataH aise jJAna ke lie hameM aisI kathana-paddhati kI yojanA karanI hogI, jo ki dUsaroM ke anubhUta satyoM kA niSedha nahIM karate hue apanI bAta kaha sake / kyA sarvajJa kA jJAna nirapekSa hotA hai ? yadyapi jaina darzana meM yaha mAnA gayA hai ki sarvajJa yA kevalI saMpUrNa satya kA sAkSAkAra kara letA hai, ataH yaha prazna svAbhAvika rUpa se uThatA hai ki kyA sarvajJa kA jJAna nirapekSa hai ? isa sandarbha meM jaina dArzanikoM meM bhI matabheda pAyA jAtA hai| kucha samakAlIna jaina vicAraka sarvajJa ke jJAna ko nirapekSa mAnate haiM jaba ki dUsare kucha vicArakoM ke anusAra sarvajJa kA jJAna bhI sApekSa hotA hai| zrI dalasukhabhAI mAlavaNiyA ne syAdvAdamaMjarI kI bhUmikA meM sarvaza ke jJAna ko nirapekSa satya batAyA hai| jabaki muni zrI nagarAja jI ne jaina darzana aura Adhunika vijJAna nAmaka pustikA meM yaha mAnA hai ki sarvajJa kA jJAna bhI kahane bhara ko hI nirapekSa hai kyoMki syAdasti sthAnnAsti se pare vaha bhI nahIM hai / vastusthiti yaha hai ki jahAM taka sarvajJa ke vastu jagat ke jJAna kA prazna hai, use nirapekSa nahIM mAnA jA sakatA kyoMki usake jJAna kA viSaya ananta dharmAtmaka vastu hai / ata: sarvajJa bhI vastutatva ke ananta guNoM ko ananta apekSAoM se hI jAna sakatA hai / vastugata jJAna yA vaiSayika jJAna (objective knowledge ) kabhI bhI nirapekSa nahIM ho sakatA, phira cAhe vaha sarvajJa kA hI kyoM na ho ? isIlie jaina AcAryoM kA kathana hai ki dIpa se lekara vyoma taka vastu mAtra syAdvAda kI mudrA se aMkita hai / kintu hameM yaha dhyAna rakhanA hogA ki jahAM taka sarvajJa ke Atma-bodha kA prazna hai vaha nirapekSa ho sakatA hai kyoMki vaha vikalparahita hotA hai / sambhavata: isI dRSTikoNa ko lakSya meM rakhakara AcArya kundakunda ko yaha kahanA par3A thA ki vyavahAra dRSTi se sarvajJa sabhI dravyoM ko jAnatA hai kintu paramArthataH to vaha AtmA ko hI jAnatA hai / vastusthiti yaha hai ki sarvajJa kA sva-Atma-bodha to nirapekSa hotA hai kintu vastu viSayaka jJAna sApekSa hotA hai / (da) bhASA kI abhivyakti sAmarthya kI sImitatA aura sApekSatA sarvajJa yA pUrNa ke lie bhI, jo ki saMpUrNa satya kA sAkSAtkAra kara letA hai, satya kA nirapekSa kathana yA abhivyakti sambhava hai / saMpUrNa satya ko cAhe jAnA jA sakatA ho kintu kahA nahIM jA sakatA / usakI abhivyakti kA jaba bhI koI prayAsa kiyA jAtA hai, to vaha sApekSika bana jAtA hai / kyoMki sarvajJa ko bhI apanI abhivyakti ke lie

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174 STUDIES IN JAINISM usI bhASA kA sahArA lenA hotA hai, jo ki sImita evaM apUrNa hai, "hai" aura "nahIM hai" kA sImA se ghirI huI hai / ata: bhASA pUrNa satya' ko abhivyakta nahIM kara sakatI hai| prathama to vastutattva ke dharma kI saMkhyA ananta hai, jabaki mAnavIya bhASA kI zabda saMbhyA sImita hai| jitane vastu-dharma haiM, utane zabda nahIM haiM / ataH aneka dharma anukta (akathita) raheMge hI / punaH mAnava kI jitanI anubhatiyAM hai , una sabake lie bhI bhASA meM pRthak-pRthak zabda nahIM hai, hama guDa kI miThAsa ko bhASA meM pUrNa rUpa se abhivyakta nahIM kara sakate / AcArya nemIcandra gommaTa sAra meM likhate hai ki hamAre anubhUta bhAvoM kA kevala anantavAM bhAga hI kathanIya hotA hai aura jitanA kathanIya hai, usakA bhI eka aMza hI bhASA meM nibaddha karake likhA jAtA hai (gommaTa sAra, jIva kANDa 334) cAhe nirapekSa jJAna ko sambhava bhI mAna liyA jAya, kintu nirapekSa kathana to kadApi sambhava nahIM hai, kyoMki jo kucha bhI kahA jAtA hai, vaha kisI na kisI sandarbha meM (in a certain context) kahA jAtA hai aura usa sandarbha meM hI use ThIka prakAra se samajhA jA sakatA hai anyathA bhrAnti hone kI sambhAvanA rahatI hai| isIlie jaina AcAryoM kA kathana hai ki jagat meM jo kucha bhI kahA jA sakatA hai, vaha saba kisI vivakSA yA naya se gabhita hotA hai| jina yA sarvajJa kI vANI bhI apekSA rahita nahIM hotI hai / vaha sapekSa hI hotI hai / ataH vaktA ke kathana samajhane ke lie bhI apekSA kA vicAra Avazyaka hai| punazca jaba vastutattva meM aneka viruddha dharma-yugala bhI rahe hue haiM, to zabdoM ke dvArA unakA eka sAtha pratipAdana sambhava nahIM hai| unheM RmikA rUpa meM hI kahA jA sakatA hai / zabda eka samaya meM eka hI dharma ko abhivyakta kara sakate haiM / ananta dharmAtmaka vastutattva ke samasta dharmoM kA eka sAtha kathana bhASA kI sImA ke bAhara hai / ataH kisI bhI kathana meM vastu ke aneka dharma anukta (akathita) raha jAveMge / aura eka nirapekSa kathana anukta dharmoM kA niSedha karane ke kAraNa asatya ho jaavegaa| hamArA kathana satya rahe aura hamAre vacana-vyavahAra se zrotA ko koI bhrAnti na ho isalie sApekSika kathana paddhati hI samucita ho sakatI hai / jainAcAryoM ne syAt ko satya kA cinha 13 isIlie kahA hai ki vaha apekSA pUrvaka kathana karake hamAre kathana ko avirodhI aura satya banA detA hai tathA zrotA ko koI bhAnti bhI nahIM hone detA hai| syAdvAda aura anekAnta sAdhAraNatayA anekAnta aura syAdvAda paryAyavAcI mAne jAte hai| aneka jainAcAryoM ne inheM paryAyavAcI batAyA bhI hai| kintu phira bhI donoM meM thor3A antara hai| anekAnta syAdvAda kI apekSA adhika vastu-artha kA dyotaka hai / jainAcAryoM ne donoM meM vyApaka-vyApya bhAva mAnA hai / anekAnta vyApaka hai aura syAdvAda vyApya / anekAnta vAcya hai to syAdvAda vAcaka / anekAnta vastusvarUpa hai, to syAdrAda usa anekAntika

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175 syAdvAda : eka cintana vastu svarUpa ke kathana kI nirdoSa bhASA paddhati / anekAnta darzana hai, to syAdAda usakI abhivyakti kA DhaMga / vibhajjavAda aura syAdvAda vibhajjavAda syAdvAda kA hI paryAyavAcI evaM pUrvavartI hai| sUtra kRtAMga meM mahAvIra ne nikSuoM ke lie yaha spaSTa nirdeza diyA ki ve vibhajjavAda kI bhASA kA prayoga kreN|15 isI prakAra bhagavAna buddha ne bhI majjhimanikAya meM spaSTa rUpa se kahA thA ki he mANakka, maiM vibhajjavAdI I ekAntavAdI nahIM / vibhajjavAda vaha siddhAnta hai jo prazna ko vibhAjita karake uttara detA hai / jaba buddha se yaha pUchA gayA ki gRhastha ArAdhaka hotA hai yA pravajita? unhoMne isa prazna ke uttara meM yaha kahA ki gRhastha evaM tyAgI yadi mithyAvAdI haiM to ArAdhaka nahIM ho sakate / kintu yadi donoM hI samyak AcaraNa karane vAle haiM to donoM hI ArAdhaka ho sakate hai|16 isI prakAra jaba mahAvIra se jayaMti ne yaha pUchA ki sonA acchA hai yA jAganA / to unhoMne kahA thA ki kucha jIvoM kA sonA acchA hai aura kucha kA jAganA / pApI kA sonA acchA hai aura dharmAtmAoM kA jAganA / 17 isase yaha bAta spaSTa ho jAtI hai ki vaktA ko usake prazna kA vizleSaNapUrvaka uttara denA vibhajjavAda hai / prazna-uttaroM kI yaha vizleSaNAtmaka zailI vicAroM ko sulajhAne vAlI tathA vastu ke aneka AyAmoM ko spaSTa karane vAlI hai| isase vaktA kA vizleSaNa ekAMgI nahIM banatA hai| buddha aura mahAvIra kA yaha vibhajjavAda hI Age calakara zUnyavAda aura syAdvAda meM vikasita huA hai| zUnyavAda aura syAdvAda bhagavAn buddha ne zAzvatavAda aura ucchedavAda ina donoM ko asvIkAra kiyA aura apane mArga ko madhyama mArga kahA / jabaki bhagavAn mahAvIra ne zAzvatavAda va ucchedavAda ko apekSAkRta se svIkRta karake eka vidhi mArga apanAyA / bhagavAna buddha kI paramparA meM vikasita zUnyavAda aura jaina paramparA meM vikasita syAdvAda donoM kA hI lakSya ekAntika dArzanika vicAradhArAoM kI asvIkRti hI thaa| donoM meM pharka itanA hI hai ki jahA~ zUnyavAda eka niSedhapradhAna dRSTi hai vahIM syAdvAda meM eka vidhAyaka dRSTi hai| zUnyavAda jo bAta saMvRti satya aura paramArtha satya ke rUpa meM kahatA hai vahI bAta jaina dArzanika vyavahAra aura nizcaya naya ke AdhAra para pratipAdita karatA hai| zUnyavAda aura syAdvAda meM maulika bheda apane niSkarSoM ke sambandha meM hai| zUnyavAda apane niSkarSoM meM hai niSedhAtmaka aura syAdvAda vidhAnAtmaka / zUnyavAda apanI sampUrNa tAkika vivecanA meM isa niSkarSa para AtA hai ki vastutattva zAzvata nahIM hai, ucchinna nahIM hai, eka nahIM hai, aneka nahIM hai, sat nahIM hai, asat nahIM hai / jabaki syAdvAda apane niSkarSoM ko vidhAnAtmaka rUpa se prastuta karatA hai- vaha yaha kahatA hai ki vastu zAzvata bhI hai, nazAzvata bhI hai, eka bhI hai, aneka bhI hai, sat bhI hai, asat bhI hai / ekAnta meM rahA

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176 STUDIES IN JAINISM huA doSa zUnyavAdI aura syAdvAdI donoM hI dekhate haiM / isa ekAnta ke doSa se bacane kI tatparatA meM zUnyavAda ke dvArA prastuta zUnyatA - zUnyatA kI dhAraNA aura syAdvAda ke dvArA prastuta anekAnta, anekAntatA kI dhAraNA bhI vizeSa rUpa se draSTavya hai| kintu jahAM zUnyavAdI usa doSa ke bhaya se ekAnta ko asvIkAra karatA hai, vahIM syAdvAdI, usake Age sthAt zabda rakhakara usa sadoSa ekAnta ko nirdoSa banA detA hai / donoM meM yadi koI maulika bheda hai to vaha apanI niSedhAtmaka aura vidhAnAtmaka dRSTiyoM kA hI hai ! zUnyavAda kA vastutattva jahAM catuSkoTivinirmavata zUnya hai, vahIM jaina darzana kA vastutattva anantadharmAtmaka hai| kintu zUnya aura ananta kA gaNita to eka hI hai / ina donoM kI vibhinnatA to usa dRSTi kA hI pariNAma hai, jo ki vaicArika AgrahoM se janamAnasa ko mukta karane ke lie buddha aura mahAvIra ne prastuta kI thii| buddha ke niSedhAtmaka dRSTikoNa kA pariNAma zUnyavAda thA to mahAvIra ke vidhAnAtmaka dRSTikoNa kA pariNAma syAdvAda / isa sambandha meM AdaraNIya dalasukha bhAI kA lekha 'zunyavAda aura syAdvAda' vizeSa rUpa se draSTavya hai / syAdvAda kA lakSya - eka vyApaka samanvayAtmaka dRSTi kA vikAsa bhagavAn mahAvIra aura buddha ke samaya bhArata meM vaicArika saMgharSa aura dArzanika vivAda apane carama sImA para thA / jaina AgamoM ke anusAra kucha samaya 363 aura bauddha AgamoM ke anusAra 62 dArzanika mata pracalita the / vaicArika Agraha aura matAndhatA ke isa yuga meM eka aise dRSTikoNa kI AvazyakatA thI, jo logoM ko Agraha evaM matAndhatA se Upara uThane ke lie dizA nirdeza de sake / bhagavAn buddha ne isa Agraha evaM matAndhatA se Upara uThane ke lie vivAdaparAGmukhatA ko apnaayaa| suttanipAta meM ve kahate haiM ki maiM vivAda ke do phala batAtA huuN| eka to vaha apUrNa va ekAMgI hotA hai aura dUsare kalaha evaM azAnti kA kAraNa hotA hai| ataH nirvANa ko nirvivAda bhUmi samajhane vAlA sAdhaka vivAda meM na pdd'e| 19 buddha ne apane yuga meM pracalita sabhI paraspara virodhI dArzanika dRSTikoNoM ko sadoSa batAyA aura isa prakAra apane ko kisI bhI dArzanika mAnyatA ke sAtha nahIM bAMdhA / ve kahate haiM paMDita kisI dRSTi yA vAda meM nahIM par3atA / 20 buddha kI dRSTi meM dArzanika vAda-vivAda nirvANa mArga sAdhaka ke kArya nahIM hai / anAsakta mukta puruSa ke pAsa vivAda rUpI yuddha ke lie koI kAraNa hI zeSa nahIM raha jAtA / 21 isI prakAra bhagavAn mahAvIra ne bhI Agraha ko sAdhanA kA samyak patha nahIM smjhaa| unhoMne bhI kahA ki Agraha matAndhatA yA ekAMgI dRSTi ucita nahIM hai jo vyakti apane mata kI prazaMsA aura dUsaroM kI nindA karane meM hI pAMDitya dikhAte haiM, ve saMsAra cakra meM dhUmate rahate haiM / 22 isa prakAra bhagavAn mahAvIra evaM bhagavAn buddha donoM hI usa yuga kI Agraha vRtti evaM matAndhatA se jana mAnasa ko mukta karanA cAhate haiM, phira bhI buddha aura mahAvIra kI dRSTi meM thor3A antara thaa| jahAM buddha ina vivAdoM se bacane

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syAdvAda : eka cintana kI salAha de rahe the, vahIM mahAvIra inake samanvaya kI eka aisI vidhAyaka dRSTi prastuta kara rahe hai, jisakA pariNAma syAdvAda hai / 177 syAdvAda vividha dArzanika ekAntavAdoM meM samanvaya karane kA prayAsa karatA hai / usakI dRSTi meM nityavAda - anityavAda, dvaitavAda - advaitavAda, bhedavAda - abhedavAda Adi sabhI vastu svarUpa ke AMzika pakSoM ko spaSTa karate haiN| inameM se koI bhI asatya to nahIM hai kintu pUrNa satya bhI nahIM hai| yadi inako koI asatya batAtA hai to vaha AMzika satya ko pUrNa satya mAna lene kA unakA Agraha hI hai / syAdvAda apekSA bheda se ina sabhI ke bIca samanvaya karane kA prayAsa karatA hai aura yaha batAtA hai ki satya tabhI asatya bana jAtA hai, jabaki hama AgrahI dRSTi se use dekhate haiM / yadi hamArI dRSTi apane ko Aha ke ghere se Upara uThAkara dekhe to hI hameM satya ke darzana ho sakate haiM / satya kA saccA prakAza kevala anAgrahI ko hI mila sakatA hai| mahAvIra ke prathama gautama kA jIvana svayaM isakA eka pratyakSa sAkSya hai / gautama ke kevala jJAna meM Akhira kauna sA tattva kA bAdhaka bana rahA thaa| mahAvIra ne svayaM isakA samAdhAna karate hue gautama se kahA thA he gautama terA mere prati jo mamatva hai, yahI tere kevala jJAna (satya darzana ) kA bAdhaka hai / mahAvIra kI spaSTa ghoSaNA thI ki satya kA sampUrNa darzana Agraha ke ghere meM rahakara nahIM kiyA jA sakatA / Agraha- buddhi yA dRSTi-rAga satya ko asatya vanA detA hai / satya kA prakaTana Agraha meM nahIM, anAgraha meM hotA hai, virodha meM nahIM, samanvaya meM hotA hai / satya kA sAdhaka anAgrahI aura vItarAgI hotA hai / upAdhyAya yazovijayajI syAdvAda kI isI anAgrahI evaM samanvayAtmaka dRSTi ko spaSTa karate hue adhyAtmasAra meM likhate hai : - yasya sarvatra samatA nayeSu, tanayeSviva, tasyAnekAntavAdasya kva nyUnAdhikazemuSI / / tena syAdvAdamAlambya sarvadarzanatulyatA / mokSodeza vizeSaNA yaH pazyati saSAM zAstravit // mAdhyasthyameva zAstrArtho yeSAM taccAru siddhayati / sa eva dharmavAdaH syAdanyaddbAlizavalganam // mAdhyasthasahitaM hyekapadajJAnamapi pramA / zAstrakoTi : vRthaivAnyA tathA caubala mahAtmanA // -adhyAtmasAra, 69-73. saccA anekAntavAdI kisI darzana se dveSa nahIM karatA / vaha sampUrNa dRSTikoNa ( darzanoM) ko isa prakAra vAtsalya dRSTi se dekhatA hai jaise koI pitA apane putra ko / kyoMki anekAntavAdI kI nyUnAdhika buddhi nahIM ho sakatI / saccA zAstrajJa kahe jAne kA adhikArI to vahI hai, jo syAdvAda kA Alambana lekara sampUrNa darzanoM meM samAna bhAva J-12

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178 STUDIES IN JAINISM rakhatA hai / vAstava meM mAdhyastha bhAva hI zAstroM kA gUr3ha rahasya hai, yahI dharmavAda hai / mAdhyastha bhAva rahane para zAstra ke eka pada kA jJAna bhI saphala hai anyathA karor3oM zAstroM kA jJAna bhI vRthA hai / eka saccA syAdvAdI sabhI darzanoM kA ArAdhaka kisa prakAra hotA hai, isa sambandha meM paramayogI Anandadhana jI likhate haiM : SaT darasaNa jina aMga bhaNIje, nyAya Sar3aMga jo sAdhe re / nami jinavaranA caraNa upAsaka, SaTadarzana ArAdhe re // 1 // jina sura pAdapa pAya bakhANuM, sAMkhya joga doya bhede re / Atama sattA vivaraNa karatA, lahI duya aMga akhede re || 2 || bheda abheda sugata mImAMsaka, jinavara doya kara bhArI de / lokAloka avalaMbana bhajiye, gurugamathI avadhArI re / / 3 / / lokAyatika kUkha jinavaranI, vaMza vicAra jo kI je / tattva vicAra sudhArasa dhArA, gurugama viNa kema pIje // 4 // jaina jinezvara uttama aMga, aMtaraMga bahiraMge re / akSara nyAsa dharA ArAdhaka, ArAdha dharI saMge re // 5 // rAjanaitika kSetra meM syAdvAda kA upayoga Aja kA rAjanaitika jagat bhI vaicArika saMkulatA se paripUrNa hai| pUMjIvAda, samAjavAda, sAmyavAda, phAsIvAda, nAjIvAda, Adi aneka rAjanaitika vicAra dhArAeM tathA rAjatantra, prajAtantra, kulatantra, adhinAyaka tantra Adi anekAneka zAsana praNAliyAM vartamAna meM pracalita haiM / mAtra itanA hI nahIM unameM se pratyeka eka dUsare kI samApti ke lie prayatnazIla hai / vizva ke rASTra khemoM meM baTe hue haiM aura pratyeka kheme kA agraNI rASTra apanA prabhAva kSetra bar3hAne ke hetu dUsare ke vinAza meM tatpara hai| mukhya bAta yaha hai ki Aja kA rAjanaitika saMgharSa Arthika hitoM kA saMgharSa na hokara vaicArikatA kA saMgharSa hai / Aja amerikA aura rUsa apanI vaicArika prabhusattA ke prabhAva ko bar3hAne ke lie hI pratispardhA meM lage hue haiN| eka dUsare ko nAma zeSa karane kI unakI yaha mahatvAkAMkSA kahIM mAnava jAti ko hI nAmazeSa na kara de / Aja ke rAjanaitika jIvana meM syAdvAda ke do vyAvahArika phalita vaicArika sahiSNutA aura samanvaya atyanta upAdeya hai / mAnava jAti ne rAjanaitika jagat meM rAjatantra se prajAtantra taka kI jo lambI yAtrA taya kI hai usakI sArthakatA syAdvAda dRSTi ko apanAne meM hI hai / virodhI pakSa ke dvArA kI jAne vAlI AlocanA ke prati sahiSNu hokara usake dvArA apane doSoM ko samajhanA aura unheM dUra karane kA prayAsa karanA, Aja ke rAjanaitika jIvana kI sabase bar3I AvazyakatA hai / vipakSa kI dhAraNAoM meM bhI sattA ho sakatI hai aura sabala virodhI dala kI upasthiti se hameM apane doSoM

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sthAdvAda : eka cintana 179 ke nirAkaraNa kA acchA avasara milatA hai, isa vicAra-dRSTi aura sahiSNu bhAvanA meM hI prajAtantra kA bhaviSya ujjvala raha sakatA hai / rAjanaitika kSetra meM saMsadIya prajAtantra (pArliyAmenTarI DemokresI) vastutaH rAjanaitika syAdvAda hai / isa paramparA meM bahumata dala dvArA gaThita sarakAra alpa mata dala ko apanI vicAra prastuta karane kA adhikAra mAnya karatI hai aura yathA sambhava usase lAbha bhI uThAtI hai / dArzanika kSetra meM jahAM bhArata syAdvAda kA sarjaka hai, vahIM vaha rAjanaitika kSetra meM saMsadIya prajAtantra kA samarthaka bhI hai| ataH Aja syAdvAda siddhAnta ko vyAvahArika kSetra meM upayoga karane kA dAyitva bhAratIya rAjanItijJoM para hai| pArivArika jIvana meM syAdvAdadRSTi kA upayoga kauTuMbika kSetra meM isa paddhati kA upayoga paraspara kuTumboM meM aura kuTumba ke sadasyoM meM saMgharSa ko TAlakara zAntipUrNa vAtAvaraNa kA nirmANa kregaa| sAmAnyatayA pArivArika jIvana meM saMgharSa ke do kendra hote haiM - pitA-putra tathA sAsa-bahU / ina donoM vivAdoM meM mUla kAraNa donoM kA dRSTibheda hai / pitA jisa pariveza meM bar3A huA, unhIM saMskAroM ke AdhAra para putra kA jIvana DhAlanA cAhatA hai / jisa mAnyatA ko svayaM mAnakara baiThA hai, unhIM mAnyatAoM ko dUsare se manavAnA cAhatA hai / pitA kI dRSTi anubhava pradhAna hotI hai, jabaki putra kI dRSTi tarkapradhAna / eka prAcIna saMskAroM se grasita hotA hai to dUsarA unheM samApta kara denA cAhatA hai / yahI sthiti sAsa-bahU meM hotI hai / sAsa yaha apekSA karatI hai ki bahU aisA jIvana jiye jaisA usane svayaM bahU ke rUpa meM kiyA thA, abaki baha apane yuga ke anurUpa aura apane mAtR pakSa ke saMskAroM se prabhAvita jIvana jInA cAhatI hai / mAtra itanA hI nahIM, usakI apekSA yaha bhI hotI hai ki vaha utanA hI svataMtra jIvana jIye, jaisA vaha apane mAtA-pitA ke pAsa jItI thii| isake viparIta zvazura pakSa usase eka anuzAsita jIvana kI apekSA karatA hai / yahI saba vivAda ke kAraNa banate haiN| isameM jaba taka sahiSNu dRSTi aura dUsare kI sthiti ko samajhane kA prayAsa nahIM kiyA jAtA, taba taka saMgharSa samApta nahIM ho sakatA / vastutaH isake mUla meM jo dRSTi- bheda hai, use anekAnta paddhati se hI samyak prakAra jAnA jA sakatA hai| vAstavikatA to yaha hai ki hama jaba dUsare ke sambandha meM koI vicAra kareM, koI nirNaya leM to hameM svayaM apane ko usa sthiti meM khar3A kara socanA cAhie / dUsare kI bhUmikA meM svayaM ko khar3A karake hI use samyak prakAra se jAnA jA sakatA hai| pitA putra se jisa bAta kI apekSA karatA hai, usake pahale apane ko putra kI bhUmikA meM khar3A kara vicAra kara le / adhikArI karmacArI se jisa DhaMga se kAma lenA cAhatA hai, usake pahale svayaM ko usa sthiti meM khar3A kare, phira nirNaya le / yahI eka aisI dRSTi hai, jisake abhAva meM loka-vyavahAra asambhava hai aura jisa AdhAra para syAdvAda yA anekAntavAda jagatguru hone kA dAvA karatA hai|

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180 STUDIES IN JAINISH saptabhaMgI saptabhaMgI syAhAda kI bhASAyI abhivyakti ke sAmAnya vikalpoM ko prastuta karatI hai| hamArI bhASA vidhi-niSedha kI sImAoM se ghirI huI hai / "hai" aura "nahIM hai" hamAre kathanoM ke do prArUpa hai| kintu kabhI kabhI hama apanI bAta ko spaSTatayA "hai" (vidhi) aura "nahIM hai" (niSedha) bhASA meM prastuta karane meM asamartha hote haiM athavA sImita zabdAvalI kI yaha bhASA hamArI anubhUti ko prakaTa karane se asamartha hotI hai| aisI sthiti meM hameM eka tIsare vikalpa "avAcya" yA "avaktavya' kA sahArA lete haiN| arthAt zabdoM ke mAdhyama se athavA "hai" aura "nahIM hai" kI bhASAyI sImA meM bAMdha kara use kahA nahIM jA sakatA hai / isa prakAra vidhi, niSedha aura avaktavyatA se jo sAta prakAra kA vacana-vinyAsa banatA hai, use saptabhaMgI kahA jAtA hai| 23 saptabhaMgI meM syAt asti, syAt nAsti aura syAt avaktavya ye tIna asaMyogI maulika bhaMga hai| zeSa cAra bhaMga ina tInoM ke saMyoga se banate haiN| unameM syAta-asti-nAsti, syAt asti avaktavya aura syAt nAsti avaktavya ye tIna dvisaMyogI aura antima syAta-astinAsti-avaktavya yaha trisaMyogI bhaMga hai / nirNayoM kI bhASAyI abhivyakti vidhi niSedha aura avaktavya ina tIna hI rUpa meM eka hotI hai / ataH usase tIna hI maulika bhaMga banate haiM.aura ina tIna maulika bhaMgoM se gaNita zAstra ke saMyoga niyama (law of combination) ke AdhAra para sAta hI bhaMga hI banate haiM, na kama na adhika / aSTasahastrI TIkA meM AcArya vidyAnandI ne isIlie yaha kahA hai ki jijJAsA aura maMzaya aura unake samAdhAna sapta prakAra ke hI ho sakate haiM / ata: jaina AcAryo kI saptabhaMgI kI yaha vyavasthA nirmUla nahIM hai| vastutattva ke ananta dharmoM meM se pratyeka ko dekara eka saptabhaMgI aura isa prakAra ananta saptabhaMgiyAM to banAI jA sakatI hai kintu ananta bhaMgI nhiiN| zve. Agama bhagavatI sUtra meM SaT pradezI ra kandha ke sambandha meM jo 23 bhaMgoM kI yojanA hai vaha vacana bheda kRta saMsthAoM ke kAraNa hai / usameM bhI mUla bhaMga sAta hI haiM / 24 paMcAstikAya sAra, pravacanasAra Adi prAcIna digambara Agama granthoM meM aura zepa paravartI sAhitya meM sapta bhaMga hI mAnya rahe haiM / ata: vidvAnoM ko ina bhramoM kA nivAraNa kara lenA cAhie ki aise saMyogoM me saptabhaMgI hI kyoM ananta bhaMgI bhI ho sakatI hai athavA AgamoM meM sAta bhaMga nahIM hai| saptabhaMgI bhI eka paravartI vikAsa hai| _____ saptabhaMgI kA pratyeka bhaMga eka sApekSika nirNaya prastuta karatA hai| saptabhaMgI meM syAt asti Adi jo sAta bhaMga haiM, ve kathana ke tArkika AkAra (logical forms) mAtra hai| usameM syAt zabda kathana kI sApekSikatA kA sUcaka hai aura asti evaM nAsti kathana ke vidhAnAtmaka (Affirmative) aura niSedhAtmaka (Negative) hone ke sUcaka haiN| kucha jaina vidvAn asti ko sattA kI bhAvanAtmakatA kA aura nAsti ko abhAvAtmakatA kA sUcaka mAnate haiN| kintu yaha dRSTikoNa jaina darzana ko mAnya nahIM

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syAdvAda : eka cintana 181 ho sakatA- udAharaNa ke lie jaina darzana meM AtmA bhAvarUpa hai| vaha abhAva rUpa nahIM ho sakatA hai / ataH hameM yaha spaSTa rUpa se jAna lenA cAhie, ki syAt asti, syAt nAsti apane ApameM koI kathana nahIM hai apitu kathana ke tArkika AkAra haiM, ve kathana ke prArUpa haiN| una prArUpoM ko tArkika kathana kA rUpa dene ke lie apekSA tathA uddezya aura vidheya padoM kA ullekha Avazyaka hai / jaise syAt asti bhaMga kA udAharaNa hogA-dravya kI apekSA AtmA nitya hai| yadi hama isameM apekSA (dravyatA) aura vidheya (nityatA) kA ullekha nahIM kareM aura kaheM ki syAt AtmA hai to hamArA kayana bhrama pUrNa hogA / apekSA aura vidheya pada ke ullekha ke abhAva meM saptabhaMgI ke AdhAra para kiye gaye kathana aneka bhrAntiyoM ko janma dete haiM, jisakA vizeSa vivecana hamane dvitIya bhaMga kI carcA ke prasaMga meM kiyA hai / Adhunika tarkazAstra kI dRSTi se saptabhaMgI kA pratyeka bhaMga eka sApekSika kathana hai jise eka hetuphalAzrita vAkya ke rUpa meM prastuta kiyA jA sakatA hai / saptabhaMgI ke prasaMga meM utpanna bhrAntiyoM se bacane ke lie use nimna sAMketika rUpa meM vyakta kiyA jA sakatA hai| saptabhaMgI ke isa sAMketika prArUpa ke nirmANa meM hamane cihanoM kA prayoga unake sAmane darzita arthoM meM kiyA hai - ciha na artha yadi...to (hetuphalAzrita kathana) apekSA saMyojana (aura) yugapad (eka sAtha) anantatA niSedha uddezya vidheya U 3 4 and bhaMgoM ke Agamika rUpa bhaMgoM ke sAMketika rUpa Thosa udAharaNa syAta asti a u vi hai yadi dravya kI apekSA se kathana karate haiM to AtmA nitya hai| syAt nAsti a u vi nahIM yadi paryAya kI apekSA se kathana karate hai to AtmA nitya nahIM hai| syAta asti nAstica (a10 u vi hai yadi dravya kI apekSA se kathana karate a2 u vi nahIM hai haiM to AtmA nitya hai aura yadi paryAya

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182 STUDIES IN JAINISM bhaMgoM ke Agamika rUpa bhaMgoM ke sAMketika rUpa Thosa udAharaNa kI apekSA se kathana karate haiM to AtmA nitya nahIM hai| sthAt avaktavya (a. a2)ya u yadi dravya aura paryAya donoM hI avaktavya hai apekSAoMse eka sAtha kathana karate haiM to AtmA avaktavya hai| (kyoMki do bhinna bhinna apekSAoM se do alaga alaga kathana ho sakate haiM kintu eka kathana nahIM ho sktaa)| athavA (a )ya u yadi ekasAtha Atma kI anaMta avaktavya hai apekSAoM kI dRSTi se kathana karate haiM to AtmA avaktavya hai| (syAd asti ca a u vi hai. yadi dravya kI apekSA se kathana karate avaktavyazca (a )ya u hai to AtmA nitya hai kintu avaktavya hai yadi AtmA kI ananta apekSAoM se eka sAtha kathana karate haiM to AtmA avaktavya hai| syAd nAsti ca a20 u vi nahIM hai yadi paryAya kI apekSA se kathana karate bhavaktavyazca .(a )ya u haiM to AtmA nitya nahIM hai kintu avaktavya hai . yadi AtmA kI ananta apekSAbhoM kI dRSTi se kathana karate haiM to AtmA avaktavya hai / syAd astica, nAstica, au vi hai. yadi dravya dRSTi se kathana karate haiM to avaktavyazca a2 u vi nahIM hai AtmA nitya hai aura yadi paryAya dRSTi .(a )ya u se kathana karate haiM to AtmA nitya avaktavya hai nahIM hai kintu yadi AtmA kI ananta apekSAoM kI dRSTi se kathana karate haiM to AtmA avaktavya hai| saptabhaMgI ke prastuta sAMketika rUpa meM hamane kevala do apekSAoM kA ullekha kara pAye haiM kintu jaina vicArakoM ne dravya, kSetra, kAla aura bhAva aisI cAra apekSAeM mAnI hai, usameM bhI bhAva-apekSA vyApaka hai| usameM vastu kI avasthAoM (paryAyoM) evaM

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syAvAda : eka cintana 183 guNoM donoM para vicAra kiyA jAtA hai| kintu yadi hama pratyeka apekSA kI sambhAvanAoM para vicAra kareM to ye apekSAeM bhI ananta hoMgI kyoMki vastutattva ananta dharmAtmaka hai| apekSAoM kI ina vividha sambhAvanAoM para vistAra se vicAra kiyA jA sakatA hai kintu isa choTe se lekha meM vaha sambhava nahIM hai| isa saptabhaMgI kA prathama bhaMga "syAt asti" hai / yaha svacatuSTaya kI apekSA se vastu ke bhAvAtmaka dharma yA dharmoM kA vidhAna karatA hai| jaise apane dravya kI apekSA se yaha ghar3A miTTI kA hai, kSetra kI apekSA se pUnA nagara meM banA huA hai, kAla kI apekSA se ziSira Rtu kA banA huA hai, bhAva arthAt vartamAna paryAya kI apekSA se lAla raMga kA hai yA ghaTAkAra hai Adi / isa prakAra vastu ke svadravya, kSetra, kAla evaM bhAva kI apekSA se usake bhAvAtmaka guNoM kA vidhAna karanA yaha prathama 'asti' nAmaka bhaMga kA kArya hai| dUsarA syAt 'nAsti' nAmaka bhaMga vastutattva ke abhAvAtmaka dharma yA dharmoM kI anupasthiti yA nAstitva kI sUcanA detA hai| vaha yaha batAtA hai ki vastu meM sva se bhinna para catuSTaya kA abhAva hai / jaise yaha ghar3A tAmbe kA nahIM hai, bhopAla nagara meM banA huA nahIM hai, grISma Rtu kA banA huA nahIM hai, kRSNa varNa kA nahIM hai Adi / mAtra itanA hI nahIM yaha bhaMga isa bAta ko bhI spaSTa karatA hai ki ghar3A-pustaka, Tebala, kalama, manuSya Adi nahIM hai| jahAM prathama bhaMga yaha kahatA hai ki ghar3A ghar3A hI hai, vaha dUsarA bhaMga yaha batAtA hai ki ghar3A ghaTa itara anya kucha nahIM hai / kahA gayA hai ki 'sarvamasti svarUpeNa para rUpeNa nAsti ca' arthAt sabhI vastuoM kI sattA svarUpa se hI hai para rUpa se nahIM / yadi vastu meM anya vastuoM ke guNa dharmoM kI sattA bhI mAna lI jAvegI to phira vastuoM kA pArasparika bheda hI samApta ho jAvegA aura vastu kA svasvarUpa hI nahIM raha jAvegA, ataH vastu meM para catuSTaya kA niSedha karanA dvitIya bhaMga hai / prathama bhaMga batAtA hai ki vastu kyA hai, jabaki dUsarA bhaMga yaha batAtA hai ki vastu kyA nahIM hai / sAmAnyatayA isa dvitIya bhaMga ko syAt nAsti ghaTa: " arthAt kisI apekSA se ghar3A nahIM hai, isa rUpa meM prastuta kiyA jAtA hai, kintu isake prastutIkaraNa kA yaha DhaMga thor3A bhrAntijanaka avazya hai| sthUla dRSTi se dekhane para aisA lagatA hai ki prathama bhaMga meM ghaTa ke astitva kA jo vidhAna kiyA gayA thA, usI kA dvitIya bhaMga meM niSedha kara diyA gayA hai| aura aisI sthiti meM syAdvAda ko sandehavAda yA Atma-virodhI kathana karane vAlA siddhAnta samajha lene kI bhrAnti ho jAnA svAbhAvika hai / zaMkara prabhRti vidvAnoM ne syAdvAda kI jo AlocanA kI thI, usakA mukhya AdhAra yahI bhrAnti hai / syAt asti ghaTa: aura sthAt nAsti dhaTa: meM jaba syAd zabda ko dRSTi se ojhala kara yA use sambhAvanA ke artha meM grahaNa kara 'asti' aura 'nAsti' para bala diyA jAtA hai to Atma-virodha kA AbhAsa hone lagatA hai / jahAM taka maiM samajha pAyA hUM sthAdvAda kA pratipAdana karane vAle kisI AcArya kI dRSTi meM dvitIya bhaMga kA kArya prathama bhaMga meM sthApita

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184 STUDIES IN JAINISM kiye gaye guNadharma kA usI apekSA se niSedha karanA nahIM hai, apitu yA to prathama bhaMga meM asti rUpa mAne gaye guNa-dharma se itara guNa-dharmoM kA niSedha karanA hai athavA phira apekSA ko badala kara usI guNa-dharma niSedha karanA hotA hai aura isa prakAra dvitIya bhaMga prathama bhaMga ke kathana ko puSTa karatA hai, khaNDita nahIM / yadi dvitIya bhaMga ke kathana ko usI apekSA se prathama bhaMga kA niSedhaka yA virodhI mAna liyA jAvegA to nizcaya hI yaha siddhAnta saMzayavAda yA Atma-virodha ke doSoM se grasita ho jAvegA, kintu aisA nahIM hai| yadi prathama bhaMga meM syAdastyeva ghaTa: kA artha kisI apekSA se ghar3A hai aura dvitIya bhaMga meM 'syAnAstyeva ghaTa:' kA artha kisI apekSA se ghar3A nahIM hai aisA kareMge, to AbhAsI rUpa se aisA lagegA ki donoM kathana virodhI hai| kyoMki ina kathanoM ke bhASAyI svarUpa se yaha AbhAsa hotA hai ki ina kathanoM meM ghaTa ke hI astitva aura nAstitva ko sUcita kiyA gayA hai| jabaki jaina AcAryoM kI dRSTi meM ina kathanoM kA bala unameM prayukta "syAt' zabda meM hai, ve yaha nahIM mAnate haiM ki dvitIya bhaMga prathama bhaMga meM sthApita satya kA pratiSedha karatA hai / donoM bhaMgoM meM ghaTa ke sambandha meM jinakA vidhAna yA niSedha kiyA gayA hai ve apekSAzrita dharma haiM na ki ghaTa kA svayaMtva kA astitva yA nAstitva / punaH donoM bhaMgoM ke 'apekSAzrita dharma' eka nahIM hai| bhinna bhinna hai| prathama bhaMga meM jina apekSAzrita dharmoM kA vidhAna hai, ve anya arthAt svacatuSTaya ke haiM aura dvitIya bhaMga meM jina apekSAzrita dharmoM kA niSedha huA hai, ve dUsare arthAt paracatuSTaya ke haiM / ataH prathama bhaMga ke vidhAna aura dvitIya bhaMga ke niSedha meM koI Atmavirodha nahIM hai / merI dRSTi meM isa bhrAnti kA mUla kAraNa prastuta isa vAkya meM usa vidheya pada ( Predicate ) ke spaSTa ullekha kA abhAva hai, jisakA ki vidhAna yA niSedha kiyA jAtA hai / yadi 'nAsti' pada ko vidheya sthAnIya mAnA jAtA hai to puna: yahAM yaha bhI prazna uTha sakatA hai ki jo ghaTa asti rUpa hai, vaha nAsti rUpa kaise ho sakatA hai ? yadi yaha kahA jAve ki para dravyAdi kI apekSA se ghaTa nahIM hai, kintu para dravyAdi ghaTa ke astitva ke niSedhaka kaise bana sakatA hai ? yadyapi yahAM pUrvAcAryoM kA mantavya spaSTa hai ki ve ghaTa kA nahIM apitu ghaTa ma para dravyAdi kA hI niSedha karanA cAhate haiM / ve kahanA yaha cAhate haiM ki ghaTa paTa nahIM hai yA ghaTa meM paTa Adi ke dharma nahIM hai, kintu smaraNa rakhanA hogA ki - isa kathana meM prathama aura dvitIya bhaMga meM apekSA nahIM badalI hai| yadi prathama bhaMga meM yaha kahA jAve ki ghar3A maTTI kA hai aura dUsare bhaMga meM yaha kahA jAve ki ghar3A pItala kA nahIM hai to donoM meM apekSA eka hI hai arthAt donoM kathana dravya kI yA upAdAna kI apekSA se hai / aba dUsarA udAharaNa leN| kisI apekSA se ghar3A nitya hai, kisI apekSA se ghar3A nitya nahIM hai, yahAM donoM bhaMgoM meM apekSA badala jAtI hai| yahAM prathama bhaMga meM dravya kI apekSA se ghar3e ko nitya kahA gayA aura dUsare bhaMga meM paryAya kI apekSA se ghar3e ko 'nitya nahIM' (anitya) kahA gayA hai| dvitIya bhaMga ke pratipAdana ke ye donoM rUpa bhinna bhinna hai|

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syAdvAda : eka cintana 185 dUsare yaha kahanA ki paracatuSTaya kI apekSA se ghaTa nahIM hai yA paTa kI apekSA ghaTa nahIM hai bhASA kI dRSTi se thor3A bhrAntijanaka avazya hai kyoMki paracatuSTaya vastu kI sattA kA niSedhaka nahIM ho sakatA hai / vastu meM paracatuSTaya arthAt sva-bhinna para dravya, kSetra, kAla, bhAva kA abhAva to hotA hai kintu unakI apekSA vastu kA abhAva nahIM hotA hai / yaha kahanA ki "kursI" kI apekSA Tebala nahIM hai yA pItala kI apekSA yaha ghar3A nahIM hai, kyA bhASA ke abhrAnta prayoga haiM ? isa kayana meM jainAcAryoM kA Azaya to yahI hai ki Tebala kursI nahIM hai yA ghar3A pItala kA nahIM hai / ata: paracatuSTaya kI apekSA se vastu nahIM hai, yaha kahane kI apekSA yaha kahanA ki vastu meM paracatuSTaya kA abhAva hai, bhASA kA samyak prayoga hogA / vidvAnoM se merI vinatI hai ki ve saptabhaMgI ke vizeSa rUpa se dvitIya evaM tRtIya bhaMga ke bhASA ke svarUpa para aura svayaM unake AkArika svarUpa para punarvicAra kareM aura Adhunika tarkazAstra sandarbha meM use punargaThita kareM to jaina nyAya kSetra meM isa zatAdvi varSa kI eka bar3I upalabdhi hogI kyoMki dvitIya evaM tRtIya bhaMgoM kI kathana vidhi ke vividha rUpa parilakSita hote haiM / ataH yahAM dvitIya bhaMga ke vividha svarUpoM para thor3A vicAra kara lenA aprAsaMgika nahIM hogA / merI dRSTi meM dvitIya bhaMga ke nimna cAra rUpa ho sakate haiM :. sAMketika rUpa udAharaNa (1) a u vi hai (1) prathama bhaMga meM jisa dharma (vidheya) kA a20uvi nahIM hai vidhAna kiyA gayA hai, apekSA badalakara dvitIya bhaMga meM usa dharma (vidheya) kA niSedha kara denA / jaise - dravya dRSTi se ghar3A nitya hai paryAya dRSTi se ghar3A nitya nahIM hai / (2) a u vi hai| (2) prathama bhaMga meM jisa dharma kA vidhAna kiyA a20u - vi hai| gayA hai, apekSA badalakara dvitIya bhaMga meM usake viruddha dharma kA pratipAdana kara denA hai| jaise - dravya dRSTi se ghar3A nitya hai paryAya dRSTi se ghar3A anitya hai / (3) a uvi hai| (3) prathama bhaMga meM pratipAdita dharma ko puSTa a20 u~vi nahIM hai| karane hetu usI apekSA se dvitIya bhaMga meM usake viruddha dharma yA bhinna dharma kA vastu meM niSedha kara denaa|

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186 STUDIES IN JAINISM sAMketika rUpa - udAharaNa jaise-raMga kI vRSTi se yaha kamIja nIlA hai raMga kI dRSTi se yaha kamIja pIlA nahIM hai| athavA apane svarUpa kI dRSTi se AtmA meM cetana hai| apane svarUpa kI dRSTi se AtmA meM acetana nahIM hai| athavA upAdAna kI dRSTi se yaha ghar3A maTTI kA hai| upAdAna kI dRSTi se yaha ghar3A svarNa kA nahIM hai / (4) a10u hai (4) jaba pratipAdita kathana deza yA kAla yA a2 - u nahIM hai donoM ke sambandha meM ho taba deza kAla Adi kI apekSA ko badalakara prathama bhaMga meM pratipAdita kathana kA niSedha kara lenaa| jaise - 27 navambara kI apekSA se maiM yahAM para huuN| 20 navambara kI apekSA se maiM yahAM para nahIM thaa| dvitIya bhaMga ke uparokta cAroM rUpoM meM prathama aura dvitIya rUpa meM bahuta adhika maulika bheda nahIM hai| antara itanA hI hai ki jahAM prathama rUpa meM eka hI dharma kA prathama bhaMga meM vidhAna aura dUsare bhaMga meM niSedha hotA hai, vahIM dUsare rUpa meM donoM bhaMgoM meM alaga alaga rUpa meM do viruddha dharmoM kA vidhAna hotA hai| prathama rUpa kI AvazyakatA taba hotI hai jaba vastu meM eka hI guNa apekSA bheda se kabhI upasthita rahe aura kabhI upasthita nahIM rahe / isa rUpa ke lie vastu meM do viruddha dharmoM ke yugala ka honA jarUrI nahIM hai, jabaki dUsare rUpa kA prastutIkaraNa kevala usI sthiti meM sambhava hotA hai, jabaki vastu meM dharma viruddha yugala ho / tIsarA rUpa taba banatA hai, jabaki usa vastu meM pratipAdita dharma ke viruddha dharma kI upasthiti hI na ho / caturtha rUpa kI AvazyakatA taba hotI hai, jabaki hamAre pratipAdana meM vidheya kA spaSTa rUpa se ullekha na ho / dvitIya bhaMga ke pUrvokta rUpoM meM prathama rUpa meM apekSA badalatI hai, dharga (vidheya) vahI rahatA hai aura kriyApada niSedhAtmaka hotA hai| dvitIya rUpa meM apekSA badalatI hai, dharma (vidheya) ke sthAna para usakA viruddha dharma (vidheya kA vyAghAtaka pada) hotA hai aura kriyApada vidhAnAtmaka

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syAdvAda : eka cintana 187 hotA hai| tRtIya rUpa se apekSA vahI rahatI hai, dharma (vidheya) ke sthAna para usakA viruddha yA viparIta rakhA jAtA hai aura kriyApada niSedhAtmaka hotA hai tathA antima caturtha rUpa meM apekSA badalatI hai aura pratipAdita kathana kA niSedha kara diyA jAtA hai / - saptagI kA tIsarA maulika bhaMga avaktavya hai| ata: yaha vicAraNIya hai ki isa bhaMga kI yojanA kA uddezya kyA hai ? sAmAnyatayA yaha mAnA jAtA hai ki vastu meM eka hI samaya meM rahe hue sat-asat, nitya-anitya Adi viruddha dharmoM kA yugapad arthAt ekasAtha pratipAdita karane vAlA aisA koI zabda nahIM hai / ataH viruddha dharmoM kI ekasAtha abhivyakti kI zAbdika asamarthatA ke kAraNa avaktavya bhaga kI yojanA kI gaI hai, kintu avaktavya kA yaha artha usakA ekamAtra artha nahIM hai / yadi hama avaktavya zabda para aitihAsika dRSTi se vicAra karate haiM to usake artha meM eka vikAsa dekhA jAtA hai| DA. padmA rAje ne avaktavya ke artha ke vikAsa kI dRSTi se cAra avasthAoM kA nirdeza kiyA hai(1) pahalA vedakAlIna niSedhAtmaka dRSTikoNa, jisameM vizva kAraNa kI khoja karate hue RSi usa kAraNa tatva ko na sat aura na asat kahakara vivecita karatA hai, yahAM donoM pakSoM kA niSedha hai| ( 2 ) dUsarA aupaniSadika vidhAnAtmaka dRSTikoNa jisameM sat, asat Adi virodhI tattvoM meM samanvaya dekhA jAtA hai / jaise - 'tadejati tannejati', 'aNoraNIyAn mahato mahIyAn' 'sadasaDheraNyam' Adi / yahA~ donoM pakSoM kI svIkRti hai / / ( 3 ) tIsarA dRSTikoNa jisameM tattva ko svarUpataH avyapadezya yA anirvacanIya mAnA yA hai, yaha dRSTikoNa bhI upaniSadoM meM hI milatA hai jaise 'yato vAco nivartante' 'yadvAcAnabhyuditam' 'naiva vAcA na manasA prAptuM zakyo..' Adi / buddha ke avyAkRtavAda evaM zUnyavAda kI catuSTakoTi vinirmukta tattva kI dhAraNA meM bhI bahuta kucha isI dRSTikoNa kA prabhAva dekhA jA sakatA hai / ( 4 ) cauthA dRSTikoNa jaina nyAya meM sApekSika avaktavyatA yA sApekSika anirvacanIyatA ke rUpa meM vikasita huaa| sAmAnyatayA avaktavya ke nimna artha ho sakate haiM - (1) sat va asat donoM kA niSedha karanA / (2) sat asat aura sadasat tInoM kA niSedha karanA / ( 3 ) sat, asat, sat-asat (ubhaya) aura na sat na asat (anubhaya) cAroM kA niSedha karanA /

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188 ( 4 ) vastutattva ko svabhAva se STUDIES IN JAINISM avaktavya mAnanA / arthAta yaha ki vastutasva anubhava se to A sakatA hai kintu kahA nahIM jA sakatA / ( 5 ) sat aura asat donoM ko yugapad rUpa se svIkAra karanA, kintu usake yugapad kathana ke lie koI zabda na hone ke kAraNa avaktavya kahanA | ( 6 ) vastutattva ananta dharmAtmaka hai arthAt vastutatva ke dharmoM kI saMkhyA ananta hai kintu zabdoM kI saMkhyA sImita hai aura isalie usameM jitane dharma haiM, utane vAcaka zabda nahIM hai / ataH vAcaka zabdoM ke abhAva ke kAraNa use aMzataH vAcya aura aMzata: avAcya mAnanA / yahAM yaha prazna vicAraNIya ho sakatA hai ki jaina vicAra paramparA meM isa raktavyatA ke kauna se artha mAnya rahe haiN| sAmAnyatayA jaina paramparA meM avyaktavyatA ke prathama tInoM niSedhAtmaka artha mAnya nahIM rahe haiM / usakA mAnya artha yahI hai ki sat aura asata donoM kA yugapat vivecana nahIM kiyA jA sakatA hai isalie vastutattva avaktavya hai / kintu yadi hama prAcIna jaina AgamoM ko dekheM to avaktavyatA kA yaha artha antima nahIM kahA jA sakatA hai / AcArAMga sUtra meM AtmA ke svarUpa ko jisa rUpa meM vacanAgocara kahA gayA hai vaha vicAraNIya hai / vahAM kahA gayA hai ki "AtmA dhvanyAtmaka kisI bhI zabda kI pravRtti kA viSaya nahIM hai / vANI usakA nirvacana karane meM kathamapi samartha nahIM hai| vahAM vANI mUka ho jAtI hai; tarka kI vahAM taka pahuMca nahIM hai, buddhi (mati) use grahaNa karane meM asamartha hai, arthAt vaha vANI vicAra aura buddhi kA viSaya nahIM hai / kisI upamA ke dvArA bhI use nahIM samajhAyA jA sakatA hai kyoMki use koi upamA nahIM dI jA sakatI, vaha anupama hai / usa apada kA koI pada nahIM hai arthAt aisA koI zabda nahIM hai jisake dvArA usakA nirUpaNa kiyA jA sake " 25 ise dekhate hue yaha mAnanA par3egA ki vastusvarUpa hI kucha aisA hai ki use vANI kA mAdhyama nahIM banAyA jA sakatA hai / punaH vastutatva kI ananta dharmAtmakatA aura zabda saMkhyA kI sImitatA ke AdhAra para bhI vastutatva ko avaktavya mAnA gayA hai| AcArya nemIcandra ne gomaTha sAra meM an abhilApya bhAva kA ullekha kiyA hai / ve likhate haiM ki anubhava meM Aye avaktavya bhAvoM kA anantavAM bhAga hI kathana kiyA jAne yogya hai / ataH yaha mAna lenA ucita nahIM hogA ki jaina parasparA meM avaktavyatA kA kevala eka hI artha mAnya hai / isa prakAra jaina darzana meM avaktavyatA ke cauthe pAMcave aura chaThe artha mAnya rahe haiM / phira bhI hameM yaha dhyAna meM rakhanA cAhie ki sApekSa aura avaktavyatA aura nirapekSa avaktavyatA meM jaina dRSTi sApekSa avaktavyatA ko svIkAra karatI hai, nirapekSa ko nahIM / arthAt vaha yaha mAnatI hai ki vastutattva pUrNatayA vaktavya to nahIM hai kintu vaha pUrNatayA avaktavya bhI nahIM hai / yadi hama vastutattva ko pUrNatayA avaktavya arthAt anirvacanIya mAna leMge to phira bhASA evaM vicAroM ke AdAna pradAna 1 26

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syAvAda : eka cintana 189 kA koI artha hI nahIM raha jAvegA / ataH jaina dRSTikoNa vastutattva kI anirvacanIyatA ko svIkAra karate hue bhI yaha mAnatA hai ki sApekSa rUpa se vaha anirvacanIya hai, nirapekSa rUpa se nahIM, sattA aMzataH nirvacanIya hai aura aMzataH anirvacanIya / kyoMki yahI bAta usake sApekSavAdI dRSTikoNa aura syAdvAda siddhAnta ke anukUla hai| isa prakAra pUrva nirdiSTa chaH arthoM meM se pahale tIna ko chor3akara antima tInoM ko mAnane meM use koI bAdhA nahIM jAtI hai / merI dRSTI meM avaktavya bhaMga kA bhI eka hI rUpa nahIM hai, prathama to "hai" aura "nahIM hai" aise vidhi pratiSedha kA yugapad (eka hI sAtha) pratipAdana sambhava nahIM hai; ataH avaktavya bhaMga kI yojanA hai| dUsare nirapekSa rUpa se vastutattva kA kathana sambhava nahIM hai ! ata: vastutattva avaktavya hai| tIsare apekSAe~ ananta ho sakatI hai kintu ananta apekSAoM se yugapad rUpa meM vastutattva kA pratipAdana sambhava nahIM hai isalie bhI use avaktavya mAnanA hogaa| isake nimna tIna rUpa hai| (1) (a', a2)ya u avaktavya hai, (2) ~ ya u avaktavya hai (3) (a)ya 5 u avaktavya hai| saptabhaMgI ke zeSa cAroM bhaMga saMyogika haiM / vicAra kI spaSTa abhivyakti kI daSTi se inakA mahatva to avazya hai kintu inakA apanA koI svataMtra dRSTikoNa nahIM hai, ye apane saMyogI mUla bhaMgoM kI apekSA ko dRSTigata rakhate hue hI vastu-svarUpa kA spaSTIkaraNa karate hai| saptabhaMgI aura trimUlyAtmaka tarkazAstra : ___ vartamAna yuga meM pAzcAtya tarkazAstra ke vicArakoM meM lyukAsivica ne eka nayI dRSTi dI hai, isake anusAra tArkika nirNayoM meM kevala satya, asatya aise do mUlya hI nahIM hote apitu satya asatya aura sambhAvita satya aise tIna mUlya hote haiM / isI sandarbha meM DA. esa. esa. bAraliMge ne jaina nyAya ko trimUlyAtmaka siddha karane kA prayAsa jayapura kI eka goSTI meM kiyA thaa27| yadyapi jahA~ taka jaina nyAya yA syAdvAda ke siddhAnta kA prazna hai ume trimulyAtmaka mAnA jA sakatA hai kyoMki jaina nyAya meM pramANa, sunaya aura dunaya aise tIna aMga mAne gye| isameM pramANa sunizcita satyatAkA, sunaya sambhAvita satyatA kA aura durnaya asatyatA ke paricAyaka hai / puna: jaina dArzanikoM ne pramANa vAkya aura naya vAkya aise do prakAra ke vAkya mAna kara pramANa vAkya kosakalAdeza (sunizcita satya yA pUrNa satya) aura naya vAkya ko vikalAdeza (sambhAvita satya yA AMzika satya) kahA hai| naya vAkya ko, na satya kahA jA sakatA hai aura na asatya, ata: satya aura asatya ka madhya eka tIsarI koTi AMzika satya yA sambhAvita satya kI mAnI jA sakatI hai| punaH vastutatva kI ananta dharmAtmakatA evaM svAdvAda ke siddhAnta bhI sambhAvita

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190 STUDIES IN JAINISM satyatA ke samarthaka hai kyoMki vastutattva kI ananta dharmAtmakatA anya sambhAvanAoM ko nirasta nahIM karatI hai aura syAdvAda usa kathita satyatA ke atirikta anya sambhAvita satyatAoM ko svIkAra karatA hai| isa prakAra vastusatya kI ananta dharmAtmakatA tathA pramANa, naya aura durnaya kI dhAraNAoM ke AdhAra para syAdvAda siddhAnta trimUlyAtmaka tarkazAstra ( Three valued logic ) yA bahumUlyAtmaka tarkazAstra ( Many-valued logic) kA samarthaka mAnA jA sakatA hai / kintu jahA~ taka saptabhaMgI kA prazna hai use trimUlyAtmaka nahIM kahA jA sakatA kyoMki usake nAsti evaM avaktavya nAmaka bhaMga kramazaH asatyatA evaM aniyatatA ( Indeterminate ) ke sUcaka nahIM hai / saptabhaMgI kA pratyeka bhaMga satya mUlya sUcaka hai, yadyapi jaina vicAroMko ne pramANa saptabhaMgI aura naya saptabhaMgI ke rUpa meM saptabhaMga ke jo do rUpa mAne haiM, usake AdhAra para yahA~ kahA jA sakatA hai ki pramANa saptabhaMgI ke sabhI bhaMga sunizcita satyatA kA aura naya saptabhaMgI ke sabhI bhaMga sambhAvita yA AMzika satyatA kA pratipAdana karate haiM / asatya mUlya kA sUcaka kevala to durnaya ho hai, ataH saptabhaMgI trimUlyAtmaka nahIM hai| Aja yaha Avazyaka hai ki hama Adhunika tarkazAstra ke sandarbha meM jaina tarkazAstra kA punarmUlyAMkana aura vivecana kareM aura yadi aisA kiyA jA sakA to isa 2500 vIM nirvANa zatAbdI varSa meM jaina nyAya kSetra meM hamArA yaha eka anupama yogadAna hogaa| TippaNiyA~ sthA 1. vAkyeSvanekAMtadyotI gamyaM prati vizeSakama / syAnnipAtorthayogitvAttava kevalinAmapi / / - Apta mImAMsA 103 2. sarvathA tvaniSedhako'nekAMtatAdyotakaH kathaMcidartha: syAtazabdo nipAtaH / -paMcAstikAya TIkA 3. syAdityavyayamanekAMtadyotakaM / -syAdavAdamaMjarI 4. kIdRzaM vastu ? nAnA dharmayuktaM vividhasvabhAvaH sahitaM, kathaMcit astitvanAstitvaikatvAnekatvanityatvAnityatvabhinnatvapramukhairAviSTam svAmI kAtikeya anuprekSA-TIkA zubhacaMdra 253 5. utpAdavyayaghrauvyayuktaM sat - tattvArtha sUtra 5 / 26 6. goyamA ! jIvA siya sAsayA siya asAsayA - davvaTThayAe sAsayA bhAvaThThayAe asAsayA - bhagavatI sUtra 7 / 3 / 273

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syAdvAda : eka cintana 191 7. bhagavatI sUtra - 168 / 10 8. dhavalA khaNDa 1, bhAga 1, sUtra 11, pR. 167 - uddhRta tIrthaMkara mahAvIra DA. bhArilla 9. yadeva tat tadeva atat, yadevakaM tadevAnekama, yadeva sat tadevAsat, yadeva nityaM tadevAnityaM - samayasAra TIkA (amRtacaMdra) 10. AdIpamAvyomasamasvabhAvaM syAhAdamudrA natimedi vastu __ anyayoga vyavacchedikA 5 11. na vivecayituM zakyaM vinApekSAM hi mizritam / / ___ abhidhAna rAjendra khaNDa, 4, pR. 1853 12. "We can only know the relative truth, the Real truth is known only to the Universal Observer.' --Quoted in Cosmology, Old and New p. XIII. 13. syAtkAraH satyalAJchana: 14. tataH syAdvAda anekAMtavAda - syAdvAdamaMjarI 15. bhikkhU vibhajjavAyaM ca viyAgarejjA - sUtrakRtAMga 1 / 14 / 22 16. majjhimanikAya - sUtra 8 (uddhRta Agama yuga kA jaina darzana pR. 53) 17. bhagavatI sUtra 12 2.443 18. dekhie - zUnyavAda aura syAhAda nAmaka lekha - paM. dalasukhabhAI mAlavaNiyA (AcArya Ananda RSijI abhinandana graMtha) pU. 265. 16. suttanipAta 51 / 2 20. suttanipAta 5103 21. suttanipAta 46 / 8-9 22. sayaM sayaM pasaMtA garahantA paraM vayam / je utattha viussanti saMsAra te viussiyA- sUtra kRtAMga 1 / 12 / 23 23. (a) saptamiH prakArairvacanavinyAsaH saptabhaMgIti gIyate / syAdvAdamaMjarI kArikA 23 kI TIkA (ba) praznavazAt ekatra vastuni avirodhena vidhipratiSedhakalpanA saptabhaMgI rAjavAtika 16 24. jaina darzana - DA. mohanalAla mehatA, pR. 300-307.

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192 25. savve sarA niyaTTaMti, takkA jatthana vijjaha maI tastha na gahiyA ... uvamA na vijjaI apayassa payaM natthi / AcArAMga 1 / 5 / 6 / 171 26. paNNavaNijjA bhAvA anaMtabhAgo du aNamilappAnaM / paNa vaNijjANaM puNa anaMtabhAgo sudanibaddho // STUDIES IN JAINISM gommaTasAra, jIva 334 27. aisA hI prayAsa DA. saMgamalAla pANDene pUnA vizvavidyAlaya meM Ayojita isa goSThI meM bhI kiyA hai / carcA eka savAla :- sarvajJa ke jJAna ko sApekSa kaise mAnA jAe ? sAgaramala jaina :- jahA~ taka sarvajJa ke vastu jagat ke jJAna kA prazna hai vaha nizcita rUpa se sApekSa hai / tathApi sarvajJa kA AtmajagatkA jJAna nirapekSa hai / kuMdakuMda ne bhI vastu jagat kA aura grAtmajagat kA jJAna isameM pharka kiyA hai / dUsarA savAla :- mAnavI jJAna kA pramANa aprAmANya kisa prakAra hai ? sAgaramala jaina :- mAnavI jJAna sApekSatayA pramANa apramANa hai / paM. rAmacandra jozI :- agara mAnavI jJAna (nirapekSatayA ) pramANa nahIM hai to pramANavyavasthA kisa lie ? sAgaramala jaina :- pramANyavyavasthA ( nirapekSatayA ) pramANita hai; tathApi pramANa vyavasthA se pramANita jJAna sApekSatayA pramANita hai, nirapekSatayA nahIM /

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syAdAda - eka anucintana kailAzacandra zAstrI jinAgama meM kahA hai ki bhagavAn mahAvIra ne apanI prathama dharmadezanA meM jo prathama vAkya kahA vaha hai-'upannei vA vigamei vA, dhuvei vA' vastu utpanna hotI hai, naSTa hotI hai, ruva hotI hai / utpatti vinAza aura dhauva paraspara meM virodhI dharma haiN| ataH eka vastu meM ina tInoM kA honA kAlabheda se saMmata bhI ho sakatA hai| kintu eka hI samaya meM eka hI vastu meM ye tInoM hote haiN| unake binA vastu kA astitva hI saMbhava nahIM hai| satkA lakSaNa hI utpAda vyaya dhrauvya hai| kahA hai - 'utpAdavyayauvyayuktaM sat - tattvArtha sUtra / utpAda vyaya ke vinA nahIM hotA / vyaya utpAda ke vinA nahIM hotA, utpAda aura vyaya dhrauvya ke binA nahIM hote, aura dhrauvya utpAdavyaya ke binA nahIM hotaa| tathA jo utpAda hai vahI vyaya hai, jo vyaya hai vahI utpAda hai jo utpAda aura vyaya hai vahI dhrauvya hai| jo dhrauvya hai vahI utpAda aura vyaya hai| isakA spaSTIkaraNa - jo ghaTa kA utpAda hai vahI miTTI ke piNDa kA vinAza hai kyoMki bhAva bhAvAntara ke abhAvarUpa hotA hai| jo miTTI ke piNDa kA vinAza hai vahI ghar3e kA utpAda hai kyoMki prabhAva bhAvAntara ke bhAvarUpa hai| aura jo ghaTa kA utpAda aura piNDa kA vinAza hai vahI miTTI kI sthiti hai kyoMki vyatireka ke dvArA hI anvaya kA prakAzana hotA hai / Presented in the Seminar on " Jaina Logic and Philosophy " (Poona University 1970). J-13

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194 tathA jo miTTI kI sthiti hai vahI ghaTa kA utpAda aura piNDa kA vinAza hai kyoMki vyatireka anvaya kA pratikramaNa nahIM karatA / STUDIES IN JAINISM yadi aisA nahIM mAneM to utpAda ko anya, vyaya ko anya aura dhauvya ko anya mAnanA hogA / aisA mAnane para ghaTa kI utpatti nahIM hogI kyoMki miTTI ke piNDa kA vinAza hone ke sAtha hI ghaTa utpanna hotA hai vahI ghaTa kI utpatti kA kAraNa hai, unake vinA ghaTa kaise utpanna ho sakatA hai ? yadi hogA to asat kI utpatti mAnanI hogI aura taba gadhe ke sIMga bhI utpanna ho sakeMge / isI prakAra utpAda aura dhauvya ke vinA kevala vyaya mAnane para miTTI ke piNDa kA vyaya hI nahIM hogA, kyoMki miTTI ke piNDa ke vyaya ke sAtha hI ghaTa utpanna hotA hai, utpatti ko vinAza se bhinna mAnane para piNDa kA vinAza kaise hogA / hogA to sat kA uccheda mAnanA hogA tathA utpAda vyaya ke vinA kevala dharauvya mAnane se yA to miTTI ruva nahIM hogI yA kSaNika athavA nitya hogI aura donoM avasthAoM meM ghaTa kI utpatti saMbhava nahIM hai / ataH utpAda, vyaya aura dharovya kA paraspara meM, vinAbhAva haiN| eka ke binA zeSa saMmbhava nahIM haiM / ataH sat utpAda vyaya harauvyAtmaka hai aura vahI dravya hai / kintu dravya kA utpAda vyaya Adi nahIM hotA, paryAyoM kA hotA hai / aura paryAyeM dravya meM hotI haiM / isaliye inheM dravya kahA jAtA hai / jaise bIja aMkura aura vRkSatva ye vRkSa ke aMza haiM / bIja kA nAza, aMkura kA utpAda aura vRkSatva kA dharauvya tInoM eka sAtha hote haiM / nAza kA AdhAra bIja hai, utpAda kA AdhAra aMkura hai, aura dharovya kA AdhAra vRkSatva hai aura ye saba vRkSa hI haiM / usI prakAra jo naSTa hotA hai, jo utpanna hotA hai aura jo dhruva hai ve saba dravya rUpa hI hai, dravya se bhinna padArtha nahIM hai / yadi utpAda vyaya dharauvya ko aMzoM kA na mAnakara dravya kA hI mAnA jAye to saba gar3abar3a ho jAyegI / isaliye utpAda vyaya dharauvya paryAya meM hote haiM aura paryAya dravyakI hotI haiM / ataH ye saba dravyarUpa hI haiM / yaha layAtmakatA vastu kA jIvana hai| isake vinA vastu nahIM banatI / AcArya samantabhada ne apane AptamImAMsA meM eka dRSTAnta ke dvArA ise spaSTa kiyA hai aura kumArila bhaTTa ne apane mImAMsA zlokavArtika meM usI kA anusaraNa karate hue kahA hai| * * vardhamAnakabhaGage ca rucakaH kriyate yadA / tathA pUrvArthinaH zokaH prItizcApyuttarArthinaH // mArthinastu mAdhyasthyaM tasmAd vastu tayAtmakam / ' bharthAt jaba vardhamAnaka ko tor3akara rucaka banAyA jAtA hai to vardhamAnaka ke premI ko zoka hotA hai aura rucaka ke premI ko harSa hotA hai / kintu svarNa ke premI ko na zoka hotA hai aura na ha / ataH vastu tayAtmaka hai kyoMki nAza ke vinA zoka nahIM, utpAda ke vinA harSa nahIM aura sthiti ke binA mAdhyasthya nahIM /

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sthAdvAda-eka anucintana 195 - isI se vastu na kevala nitya hI hai, na kevala anitya hI hai kintu nityAnitya hai| dravya rUpa se nitya hai aura paryAyarUpa se anitya hai| pAMtajala mahAbhASya ke zabdArthamImAMsA prakaraNa meM bhI isakA samarthana kiyA hai -'dravyaM nityamAkRtiranityA |....praakRtirnyaa anyA ca bhavati dravyaM punastadeva / ' ...arthAt dravya nitya hai aura prAkRti anitya hai / prAkRti badalatI rahatI hai kintu dravya vahI rahatA hai| prAkRti ke naSTa hone para bhI dravya kI sattA banI rahatI hai| prAya: anya darzana kisI vastu ko nitya aura kisI ko anitya mAnate haiM / kintu pratyeka vastu ke utpAdavyayadhrauvyAtmaka hone se pratyeka vastu nitya bhI hai aura anitya bhI / utpAda mora vyaya anityatA ke pratIka hai aura dhrauvya nityatA kA / ataH dravyarUpa se pratyeka vastu nitya hai aura paryAyarUpa se anitya hai| yadi vastu ko sarvathA nitya mAnA jAtA hai to usameM kisI bhI prakAra kA pariNamana na hone se arthakriyA nahIM ho sakegI aura arthakriyA zUnya hone se baMdha mokSa Adi kI vyavasthA nahIM bana sakegI / yadi vastuM ko sarvathA kSaNika mAnA jAtA hai to pUrvaparyAya kA uttara paryAya ke sAtha koI vAstavika sambandha na hone se bhI baMdha mokSa Adi kI vyavasthA nahIM bana sakegI / nityapakSa meM kartRtva nahIM banatA to anitya pakSa meM kartA eka aura bhoktA dUsarA hotA hai / ataH pratyeka vastu nityAnitya hai / isakA anubhava hama svayaM apane meM karate haiM / yadyapi hama svayaM bAla yuvA vRddha Adi avasthAoM meM badala rahe haiM phira bhI hamArA eka aisA astitva to hai jo saba meM anusyUta hai| usa apane astitva kI apekSA hama nitya haiM aura bAla, vRddha Adi rUpa parivartanoM kI apekSA anitya hai| ataH yaha zaMkA ki jo nitya hai vaha anitya kaise hai, nirmUla hai / tathA pratyeka vastu dravyarUpa se eka hai aura paryAya rUpa se aneka hai / dravya kA lakSaNa anvayarUpa hai aura paryAya kA lakSaNa vyatirekarUpa hai, dravya eka hotA hai paryAya aneka hote haiN| dravya anAdi ananta hotA hai, paryAya pratikSaNa naSTa hotI haiN| isa taraha dravyarUpa se eka hokara bhI vastu paryAyarUpa se aneka hone se ekAnakAtmaka haiM / eka hI mAtmA harSe viSAda sukha-duHkha Adi aneka rUpa se anubhava meM AtA hai| tathA pratyeka vastu bhedAbhedAtmaka hai / dravyarUpa se abhedAtmaka hai aura paryAya rUpa se bhedAtmaka hai / prAcArya samantabhadrane kahA hai - dravyaparyAyayorakyaM tayoravyatirekataH / pariNAmavizeSAcca zaktimacchaktibhedataH / saMjJAsaMkhyAvizeSAcca svalakSaNavizeSataH / prayojanAdibhedAcca tannAnAtvaM na sarvathA / / AptamI.8-71 / . .

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196 STUDIES IN JAINIEM dravya aura paryAya eka hI vastu hai, pratibhAsabheda hone para bhI abheda hone se| tathA donoM kA svabhAva, pariNAma, saMjJA, saMkhyA aura prayojana Adi bhinna hone se donoM meM bheda hai sarvathA nhiiN| yathA- dravya anAdi ananta tathA eka hotA hai| paryAya sAdisAnta tathA aneka hotI hai / dravya zaktimAn hai paryAya usakI zaktiyAM hai / dravya kI saMjJA dravya hai aura paryAya kI paryAya / dravya kI saMkhyA eka hai paryAya kI aneka / dravya trikAlavartI hai paryAya vartamAnakAlavartI hai| isI se donoM ke lakSaNa bhI bhinna hai| isa taraha dravya aura paryAya meM kayaMcit bheda aura kathaMcit abheda hone se vastu bhedAbhedAtmaka hai| tathA vastu bhAvarUpa bhI hai aura abhAvarUpa bhI hai / yadi vastu ko sarvacA bhAvarUpa mAnA jAtA hai arthAt dravya kI taraha paryAya ko bhI sarvathA bhAvarUpa svIkAra kiyA jAtA hai to prAgabhAva, pradhvaMsAbhAva, itaretarAbhAva aura atyantAbhAva kA lopa hone se paryAya bhI anAdi ananta aura sarvasaMkararUpa ho jAyegI aura eka dravya dUsare dravyarUpa ho jAyegA / ___ kArya kI utpatti se pahale jo usakA abhAva hotA hai use prAgabhAva kahate haiN| dravya to utpanna hotA nahIM / utpanna hotI hai paryAya / utpatti se pahale usakA prAgabhAva hotA hai / yaha prAgabhAva pUrvaparyAyarUpa hotA hai / yadi ise nahIM mAnA jAtA to kAryaparyAya anAdi ho jAyegI kyoMki kArya kI utpatti se pahale usakA abhAva na mAnane se vaha kArya utpatti se pahale bhI vartamAna kahalAyegA; kyoMki usakA abhAva amAnya hai / kArya kI utpatti ke pazcAt jo usakA abhAva hotA hai use pradhvaMsAbhAva kahate haiN| yadi use na mAnA jAya to sabhI paryAyeM ananta ho jAyegI / eka paryAya kA dUsarI paryAya meM jo abhAva hotA hai vaha itaretarAbhAva hai / jaise ghaTa paryAya kA paTa meM aura paTa paryAya kA ghaTa meM abhAva hai| yadi ise nahIM mAnA jAtA to koI bhI paryAya pratiniyata na rahakara sarvAtmaka ho jAyegI / eka dravya kA dUsare dravya meM abhAva atyantAbhAva hai / isako na mAnane para kisI bhI dravya kA apane asAdhAraNa svarUpa meM sadbhAva nahIM raha skegaa| saba dravya saba rUpa ho jaayeNge| isa prakAra ye cAra abhAva, jo bhAva rUpa hI haiM, vastu ke dharma haiN| inako na mAnane para ukta dUSaNa Ate haiM / ataH bhAva kI taraha abhAva bhI vastu kA dharma hai ataH vastu na kevala bhAvAtmaka hai aura na kevala abhAvAtmaka hai kintu bhAvAbhAvAtmaka hai| pratyeka vastu kA vastutva do muddoM para nirbhara hai- svarUpa kA upAdAna aura pararUpa kA apohana / akalaMkadeva ne kahA hai - 'svapararUpopAdAnApohatvaM hi vastuno vastutvam'5 / vastu kA vastutva svarUpa kA upAdAna aura pararUpa kA apohana hai| isakA matalaba hai ki pratyeka vastu apane svarUpa meM hI rahatI hai, pararUpa meM nahIM / yadi vastu kA apanA koI

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smAdvAda - eka anucintana 197 pratiniyata asAdhAraNa svarUpa na ho to use vastu nahIM mAnA jA sakatA / pratyeka dravya apanA asAdhAraNa svarUpa rakhatA hai| aura aisA tabhI sambhava hotA hai jaba dravya apane se bhinna anya dravyoM ke svarUpa ko svIkAra nahIM karatA / ataH pratyeka dravya svarUpa se sat hone ke sAtha pararUpa se asat bhI hotA hai| yadi vaha svarUpa kI taraha pararUpa se bhI sat ho to usameM aura anya dravyoM meM koI bheda nahIM rahegA aura usake sarva dravyarUpa hone kA prasaMga upasthita hogA / tathA yadi pararUpa kI taraha svarUpa se bhI vaha asat ho to usake tucchAbhAvarUpa hone kA prasaMga AtA hai / ataH pratyeka padArtha ko svarUpa se sat aura pararUpa se asat mAnanA hI hotA hai / yataH pratyeka padArtha sadasadAtmaka hai / 7 isa taraha pratyeka padArtha nityAnityAtmaka ekAnekAtmaka, bhedAbhedAtmaka bhAvAbhAvAtmaka yA sadasadAtmaka hai / nitya zranitya, eka aneka, bheda abheda, bhAva abhAva, sat asat ye saba paraspara meM viruddha dharma pratIta hote haiM / kintu apekSA bheda se eka hI vastu meM rahate haiM / ata: jainadRSTi se pratyeka vastu anekAntAtmaka hai / anekAnta meM anta zabda kA artha dharma hai / ataH zranekAntAtmaka kA artha hotA hai aneka dharmAtmaka | kintu padArtha ko aneka dharmAtmaka to sabhI mAnate haiM / eka dravya meM kevala eka hI dharma rahatA hai aisA to koI nahIM mAnatA / ataH yahA~ dharma se paraspara meM viruddha pratIta honevAle dharma hI liye gaye haiM / isI se jaina darzana anekAntavAdI darzana kahA jAtA hai / yahA~ eka zaMkA ho sakatI hai ki vastu ko jo para kI apekSA asat kahA gayA hai yaha to usakA svAbhAvika dharma nahIM hai Aropita dharma hai / kintu aisI zaMkA ucita nahIM hai kyoMki sat kI taraha asat bhI vastu kA svabhAvasiddha dharma hai / kevala vyavahAra usakA parakI apekSA kiyA jAtA hai kintu isase use Aropita nahIM kahA jA sakatA / isI taraha pratyeka padArtha meM ananta dharma svarUpasiddha haiM / kevala usakA vyavahAra parakI apekSA kiyA jAtA hai / isa prakAra vastu anekadharmAtmaka hai aura ve dharma aise haiM jo paraspara virodhI pratIta hote haiM / aisI vastu ko akhaNDa rUpa se jJAna ke dvArA jAnA jA sakatA hai kintu zabda ke dvArA kahA nahIM jA sakatA / sat kahane se kevala sat dharma kA hI bodha hotA hai / aura asat kahane se kevala asat kA hI bodha hotA hai / koI aisA zabda nahIM hai jo vastu ke pUrNa rUpa ko sparza karatA ho / grApa kaha sakate haiM ki anekAnta kahane pUrNa vastu rUpa kA grahaNa hotA hai / kintu yaha bhI yathArtha nahIM hai| kyoMki jaise sat kA pratipakSI dharmaM asat hai vaise hI anekAnta kA pratipakSI dharma ekAnta hai / ataH jaise sat ke vinA asat nahIM aura asat ke vinA sat nahIM, vaise hI ekAnta ke binA anekAnta nahIM / eka eka milakara hI to aneka hote haiN| eka ke vinA aneka saMbhava nahIM / ataH jaba saba anekAntAtmaka haiM to anekAnta bhI anekAtmAtmaka hai aura vaha ekAnta ke vinA saMbhava nahIM hai / ataH anekAnta zabda se bhI kAma nahIM calatA / S

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198 STUDIES IN JAINISM zabda kI isa asAmarthya ke sivAya eka kaThinAI aura bhI hai ki eka hI vastu ke viSaya meM vibhinna jJAtAoM ke vibhinna abhiprAya hote hai / aura ve jJAtA apane apane abhiprAya ke anusAra usa vastu ko kahate haiM / tathA apane apane abhiprAya ko hI yathArtha mAnakara jhagar3ate hai / isake viSaya meM kucha janmAndha manuSyoM aura eka hAthI kA udAharaNa diyA jAtA hai / kucha janmAndha manuSya apane apane sparzajJAna ke dvArA hAthI ke eka eka avayava ko hAthI mAnakara jhagar3ane lage taba kisI dRSTi saMpanna manuSya ne unake jhagar3e ko zAnta kiyA ki tuma logoM ne hAthI ke eka eka avayava ko hI jAnakara use hI pUrNa hAthI samajha liyA hai| tuma sabakA kathana prAMzika satya hai pUrNasatya nahIM hai| ataH eka hI vastu ke prAMzika sattA ko na to pUrNasatya hI kahA jA sakatA hai aura na sarvathA asatya hI kahA jA sakatA hai| ina saba kaThinAIyoM ko dUra karane ke liye syAdvAda kA AviSkAra huA / yadyapi anekAntavAda aura syAdvAda yaha ekArthaka mAne jAte haiM kintu unameM antara hai / anekAnta vastuparaka hai aura syAdvAda vacanaparaka hai / anekAntavAda kA kathana syAdvAda ke dvArA hI sambhava hai / syAdvAda 'syAdvAda' zabda syAt aura vAda ina do zabdoM ke mela se niSpanna huA hai / 'vadanaM vAda : ' ke anusAra vAda kA artha to kathana hai / 'syAt' pUrvaka kathana syAdvAda hai / ataH syAdvAda kA mukhya aMza 'syAt' zabda hai / vidhi Adi artho meM bhI lilakAra meM syAt kriyArUpa pada siddha hotA hai / kintu syAdvAda meM 'syAt' pada kriyArUpa pada nahIM hai| kintu vaha nipAta rUpa hai / nipAtarUpa syAt zabda ke bhI saMzaya Adi aneka artha haiM / kintu yahAM syAt zabda kA artha anekAnta hai / syAt zabda anekAnta kA dyotaka hai / zranekAnta kA lakSaNa prakalaMkadeva ne apanI aSTazatI meM ina prakAra kiyA hai - 'sadasannityAnityAdi sarvathaikAnta pratikSepalakSaNo'nekAntaH / '7 arthAt sarvathA sat, sarvathA asat sarvathA nitya, sarvathA anitya Adi sarvathA ekAntoM kA pratikSepa karane vAlA anekAnta hai / ata: anekAnta kA dyotaka athavA vAcaka syAt zabda kA prayoga jisa vAkya ke sAtha yaha prayukta huA hai usake arthatattva ko jaise pUrNarUpa se sUcita karatA hai / jaise jJAna pUrNavastu ko eka sAtha grahaNa karatA hai usa taraha se koI vAkya pUrNavastu ko eka sAtha nahIM khtaa| isaliye usake abhidheyavizeSa rUpa kA sUcaka syAt zabda kA prayoga kiyA jAtA hai| usake binA anekAnta rUpa artha kI pratipatti nahIM ho sakatI / 'kathaMcit' ityAdi zabda se bhI anekAnta rUpa artha kI pratipatti hotI hai kyoMki vaha bhI syAdvAda ke paryAya rUpa hai / sArAMza yaha hai ki zabda kI pravRtti vaktA ke adhIna hai| aura vaktA vastu ke aneka dharmoM meM se kisI eka dharma kI mukhyatA se vacana prayoga karatA hai| kintu isakA yaha artha nahIM hai ki usa vastu meM kevala hI eka dharma hai, ataH vivakSita dharma kI mukhyatA

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syAdvAda-eka anucintana 199 ke sAtha zeSa gauNa dharmoM kA sUcaka syAt zabda samasta vAkyoM ke sAtha guptarUpa se sambaddha rahatA hai| usakA prayoga kiye vinA bhI usakI pratIti zrotA ko ho jAtI hai yadi prayojaka kuzala' ho to| isI se bhagavAna mahAvIra kA upadeza jo zruta ke nAma se khyAta hai use prAcArya samantabhadrane 'syAdvAda' zabda se abhihita kiyA hai kyoMki vaha syAdvAda rUpa hai usake binA pUrNa jJAna ke dvArA jAne gaye pUrNa satya kA prakAzana saMbhava nahIM hai| sthAdvAda ke prasthApana kA zreya mukhya rUpa se prAcArya samantabhadra aura AcArya siddhasena ko prApta hai| prAcArya samantabhadra ne apane AptamImAMsA prakaraNa meM bhagavAna mahAvIra kI prAptatA kI mImAMsA karate hue sadekAnta, asadekAnta, avaktavyakAnta, nityakAnta anityakAnta, bhedaikAnta, abhedaikAnta, advaitakAnta, dvaitakAnta, hetuekAnta, AgamaikAnta devakAnta, pauruSakAnta Adi loka meM pracalita ekAntavAdoM kI samIkSA karake anekAnta vAda kI sthApanA kI hai| aura anta meM tatvajJAna kopramANa siddha karate hue use syAdvAdanaya saMskRta batalAyA hai / usakI vyAkhyA karate hue akalaMka deva ne kahA hai ki jaise kevala jJAna samasta jagat ke padArthoM ko eka sAtha grahaNa karatA hai usa taraha koI vAkya vastu ke saba dharmoM ko nahIM kahatA / isaliye usakA sUcaka syAt pada pratyeka vAkya ke sAtha sambaddha rahatA hai| kyoM ki vacana kI pravRtti krama se hotI hai isalie usase honevAlA jJAna bhI krmbhaavii| hotA hai| Age AcArya samantabhadra ne syAdvAda ko saptabhaMga aura naya-sApekSa kahA hai - - syAdvAda kI hI dena saptabhaMgIvAda aura nayavAda hai| prAcArya samantabhadrane satpa bhaMgIvAda ko lekara syAdvAda yA anekAntavAda kA vivecana kiyA hai aura siddhasena ne nayavAda ke dvArA anekAntavAda kA vivecana kiyA hai / nayavAda meM vividha darzanoM ke ekAMgI vicAroM ko saMgRhIta karake unheM prAMzikasatya ke rUpa meM svIkAra kiyA gayA hai bhora saptabhaMgIvAda meM eka hI vastu ke viSaya meM pracalita virodhI vicAroM yA kathanoM ko saMgRhIta kiyA gayA hai / nayavAda meM saba darzana saMgRhIta haiM aura dUsare meM darzanoM ke mAMzika mantavya samanvita hai| saptabhaMgIvAda syAdasti, syAt nAsti, syAdastinAsti, syAdavaktavya, syAdasti pravaktavya, syAnnAsti pravaktavya, syAdasti-nAsti-pravaktavya hai ye sAta bhaMga hai / inake samUha ko saptabhaMgI kahate haiN| ina sAta kA mUla vidhi aura niSedha hai isaliye ise vidhiniSedha mUlaka paddhati bhI kahA hai / saptabhaMgI kA lakSaNa hai - 'praznavazAdekana vastuni avirodhena vidhi pratiSedha kalpanA sptbhNgii|'11 praznavaza ekavastu meM virodha kA parihAra karate hue jo vidhi aura niSedha kA kathana hai vaha saptabhaMgI hai| itara darzanoM meM yadyapi aneka vicAra manekAntavAda ke samarthaka milate haiM aura isIliye sat asat ubhaya aura anirvacanIya bhaMgo kA saMketa dekhA jAtA hai, phira bhI

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200 STUDIES IN JAINISM ukta sAta bhaMgoM kA kramika vivecana yA ullekha anyatra nahIM milatA / bauddhadarzana meM to catuSkoTi ke nAma se sat asat ubhaya anumaya kA ullekha milatA hai / mAdhyamika darzana kA pratiSThApaka Arya nAgArjuna to ukta catuSkoTi se zUnya tatva kI vyavasthA karatA hai|12 jaina Agamika paddhati meM bhI vacanayoga ke cAra bheda kiye haiM-satya (sat) asatya (asat) ubhaya aura anubhaya / jaina AgamoM meM aura bauddhadarzana meM jise anubhaya kahA hai jaina dArzanika paddhati meM use hI pravaktavya yA avAcya kahA hai / ataH saptabhaMgI ke mUla ye cAra bhaMga hI hai zeSa tIna bhaMga jo cAra bhaMgoM ke mela se niSpanna kiye gaye haiM jaina dArzanikoM kI dena hai| ina sAtoM ke saMyoga se niSpanna bhaMgoM meM se kucha unhIM meM gabhita ho jAte haiM aura kucha punarukta hote haiM / vidhikalpanA hI yathArtha hai ata: eka hI vAkya paryApta hai aisI mAnyatA ThIka nahIM hai kyoMki pratiSedha kalpanA bhI yathArtha hai| pratiSedha kalpanAhI yathArtha hai aisA mantavya bhI ThIka nahIM hai kyoMki abhAvakAnta kA nirAkaraNa kiyA gayA hai / sat kA kathana karane ke liye vidhivAkya aura asat kA kathana karane ke liye pratiSedha vAkya, isa taraha do hI vAkya paryApta hai aisA mantavya bhI ThIka nahIM hai| jisake sat aura asat donoM dharma pradhAna rUpa se kahe jAte haiM usa vastu se jisake eka eka hI dharma pradhAnabhUta vivakSita hai vaha vastu bhinna hotI hai| kevala sattvavacana se, yA kevala prasattvavacana se kramArpita sattva-asattva kA kathana nahIM kiyA jA sakatA, taba sat, asat, ubhayarUpa tIna hI vacana paryApta hai aisA mantavya bhI ThIka nahIM hai kyoMki eka sAtha sat asat ko kahane rUpa jo pravaktavya kA viSaya hai vaha bhI eka vAkya hai / isItaraha inake mela se niSpanna sAta hI vAkya haiN| samantabhadra ne ina meM se prAdi ke cAra bhaMgoM kI vyavasthA karate hue kahA hai-sarva (cetana, acetana, dravya, paryAya Adi) svarUpAdicatuSTaya se sat kauna svIkAra nahIM karatA aura para rUpAdi catuSTaya se asat kauna svIkAra nahIM krtaa| yadi aisA svIkAra nahIM kiyA jAtA to iSTa tattva kI vyavasthA nahIM ho sktii| tathA krama se arpita svarUpa aura padarUpAdicatuSTaya se vastu ubhaya rUpa hai / aura sAtha svapadarUpAdicatuSTaya se kahanA zakya na hone se pravaktavya yA avAcya hai isa prakAra unhoMne cAra hI bhaMgoM kI vyavasthA karake zeSa tIna bhaMgoM ko uktakrama se vyavasthita karane kA saMketa kiyA hai| samantabhadra ke vyAkhyAkAra akalaMka aura vidyAnanda ke anusAra sAMkhya sadekAntavAdI, mAdhyamika asadekAntavAdI, vaizeSika sarvathA ubhayavAdI aura bauddha avAcyakAntavAdI haiM / tathA zaMkara kA anirvacanIyavAda sadavaktavya, bauddhoM kA anyApohavAda prasada

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syAdvAda - eka anucintana vaktavya aura yoga kA padArthavAda sadasadavaktavya koTi meM garbhita hai / isa taraha saptabhaMgI ke eka eka bhaMga meM eka eka darzana ke mantavya saMgrahIta karake unake ekAntavAda kA nirasana kiyA hai / 201 Upara kahA hai ki ekAntavAda ke vinA anekAntavAda nahIM hotA / ekAntoM ke sApekSa samUha kA nAma anekAnta hai / anekAnta pramANa kA viSaya hai aura ekAnta naya kA viSaya hai / sampUrNa artha ko grahaNa karanevAle jJAna ko pramANa kahate haiM aura ekAMzagrAhI zAna ko naya kahate haiM / Y vastu dravya paryAyAtmaka yA sAmAnya vizeSAtmaka hotI hai' 4 zrataH usake dravyAMza yA sAmAnya kA grAhI jJAna dravyArthika naya hai aura vizeSa yA paryAya kA grAhI jJAna paryAyArthika naya hai / ye donoM mUla naya haiN| inake naigama, saMgraha vyavahAra, RjusUtra, zabda maruDha tathA evaMbhUta ye sAta bheda haiM / 15 ye sabhI naya apane apane viSaya kI maryAdA meM rahate hue satya haiM kintu yadi ye apane hI viSaya ko satya aura anya nayoM ke viSaya ko mithyA kahate haiM to ye jhUThe haiM / ataH anekAntadarzI amuka naya saccce haiM, jhUThe haiM aisA bheda nahIM karatA / amuka naya ataH savanaya nirapekSa avasthA meM durnaya hote haiN| kyoMki kisI eka naya ko hI satya mAnane para saMsAra mokSa nahIM banatA / dravyArthika yA dravyAstika ko hI yA paryAyArthika paryAyAstika ko hI satya mAnane para saMsAra nahIM banatA kyoMki unameM eka sarvathA nityavAdI hai to dUsarA sarvathA anityavAdI hai / donoM hI pakSoM meM karmabandha sabhava nahIM hai aura bandha ke vinA mokSa kI abhilASA aura mokSa nahIM hai / dravyAstika naya kI dRSTi se AtmA hai vaha karma bAMdhatA hai aura usakA phala bhogatA hai / kintu paryAyAstika kI dRSTi se pratikSaNa naInaI paryAya utpanna hone se anya bAMdhatA hai anya bhogatA hai / ye donoM hI dRSTiyAM sApekSa hone para hI yathArtha haiM / zrataH sAMkhyadarzana dravyAstika kA vaktavya hai aura bauddha darzana paryAyArthika naya kA vaktavya hai / yadyapi kaNAda darzana meM donoM nayoM se prarUpaNA milatI hai kintu unameM sApekSatA nahIM hai kyoMki vaizeSika darzana AtmA paramANu Adi ko sarvathA nitya hI mAnatA hai aura ghaTa paTa, Adi ko sarvathA anitya hI mAnatA hai / kintu jaina darzana prakAza se lekara dIpaka taka ko samasvabhAva mAnatA hai / dravyarUpa se nitya aura paryAya rUpa se anitya / isa taraha saptabhaMga aura naya kI apekSA syAdvAda kA nirUpaNa jaina darzana ke sAhitya meM vistAra se milatA hai / yaha eka satya ke nirUpaNa kI viziSTa saraNi hai| usake vinA zranekAtmAtmaka tatva kA prakAzana saMbhava nahIM hai / anekAnta saMzayavAda nahIM hai yaha anekAntavAda yA syAdvAda na to ajJAnavAda hai aura na saMzayavAda hai /

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202 STUDIES IN JAINIS saMjaya kA kathana ki maiM vastu ko na sat jAnatA hUM aura na asat jAnatA hUM taba kaise use sata yA asat kahUM, ajJAnavAda hai / kintu syAdvAda kahatA hai ki vastu svarUpa se sat hai aura pararUpa se asat hai, yaha niNita tathya hai isameM na saMzaya ko sthAna hai aura na ajJAna ko / ataH jina dArzanikoM ne syAdvAda kI AlocanA karate hue usameM jo virodha, saMzaya Adi pATha doSa ApAdita kiye haiM ve usa para lAga nahIM hote| anya darzanoM ne bhI kisI na kisI rUpa meM anekAntavAda ko svIkAra kiyA hai| anya darzanoM meM anekAnta AcArya akalaMka deva ne apane tatvArthavAtika meM (pR. 37) kahA hai eka anekAtmaka hotA hai isa meM prativAdiyoM ko bhI vivAda nahIM hai / sAMkhya mAnatA hai - satva raja aura tamoguNa kI sAmyAvasthA kA nAma pradhAna hai / unake matAnusAra sattvaguNa utpAda aura lAghava rUpa hai, rajoguNa zoSa aura tApa rUpa hai, tamoguNa AvaraNa aura sAdana rUpa hai| phira bhI unakA paraspara meM aura pradhAna rUpa se koI virodha nahIM hai| vaizeSika darzana meM sAmAnya ko anuvRtti, buddhirUpa aura vizeSa ko vyAvRttibuddhirUpa kahA hai kintu sAmAnya hI vizeSarUpa bhI svIkAra kiyA hai jaise pRthivItva prAdi sAmAnyavizeSa rUpa haiN| bauddhamata meM varNAdiparamANuoM ke samudAya ko rUpaparamANu kahA hai| unake bhinna kSaNa hone para bhI paraspara meM tathA rUpAtmanA koI virodha nahIM hai / yadi kahoge ki bAhya rUpa paramANu nahIM hai kintu tadAkAra pariNata jJAna hI paramANu nAma se kahA jAtA hai to vijJAnAdvaita vAda meM bhI eka hI jJAna grAhakatva, viSayAbhAsa aurajJAnatva ina tIna zaktiyoM kA AdhAra svIkAra karane se eka anekAtmaka siddha hotA hai| tathA sabhI darzanoM meM pUrvakAla bhAvI aura uttara kAla bhAvI avasthA vizeSa kI apekSA eka hI kArya bhI mAnA gayA hai aura kAraNa bhI / ata: isa meM koI virodha nahIM syAdvAda para Apatti syAdvAda para Aja ke dArzanika vidvAna 'yaha Apatti karate haiM ki yaha hameM kisI satyataka na pahuMcAkara eka ulajhana meM DAla detA hai| usase hameM ardhasatyoM kA hI vodha hotA hai aura vaha unheM pUrNa satya mAnane kI preraNA karatA hai Adi / / asala meM syAdvAda to anekAntavAda ko prakAzana karane kI eka bhASA zailI hai| mUla vastu hai 'anekAntadRSTi' / pratyeka vastu ko pUrNarUpa se samajhane ke liye use vividha dRSTikoNoM se dekhanA Avazyaka hai, usake vinA pUrNa vastu kA jJAna saMbhava nahIM hai / aura jabataka pUrNavastu kA yathArtha jJAna na ho tabataka samyagdRSTi kI prApti nahIM ho sakatI

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spAbAda-eka anucintana 203 aura samyagdRSTi prApta hue vinA samyagjJAna aura samyak cAritra kI prApti saMbhava nahIM hai aura ina tInoM ke vinA mokSa prApta nahIM ho sakatA / _____ eka prAcArya ne kahA hai jo nayadRSTi se vihIna haiM unheM vastu svarUpa kI upalabdhi saMbhava nahIM hai aura vastu svarUpa kI upalabdhi ke vinA samyagdRSTi kaise ho sakatA hai ? samyagdRSTi hI samadRSTi hotA hai kyoMki dRSTi meM samyakpanA mAye vinA samatA nahIM A sktii| samatA ke vinA Atmika sukha zAnti prApta nahIM hotii| ataH samadarzI mahAvIra ne eka hI vastu ko bhinna bhinna dRSTikoNoM se dekhakara aura apane hI dRSTikoNa ko yathArtha mAnakara dUsaroM se lar3ane bhir3ane vAle manuSyoM kI azAnti ke dvArA utpanna samAja kI azAnti ko dUra karake unake samanvaya ke liye eka dRSTi pradAna kI jisake dvArA manuSya vastu ke pUrNarUpa ko jAnakara samadarzI aura samabhAvI bne| jinAgama meM kahA hai jo eka ko jAnatA hai vaha saba ko jAnatA hai aura jo saba ko jAnatA hai vaha eka ko jAnatA hai / 20 sthAdvAda parokSarUpa se saba ko jAnatA hai / kyoMki saba ko jAne vinA eka ko nahIM jA sakatA / aura isa syAdvAda ke dvArA parokSa rUpa se sarvadarzI hone ke pazcAt kevalajJAna prApta hone para pratyakSa rUpa se sarvadarzI hotA hai| syAdvAdazruta rUpa parokSa jJAna aura kevalajJAna rUpa pratyakSajJAna ye donoM sarvatattva prakAzaka hai / 21ina meM bheda parokSatA aura pratyakSatA kA hai / prathama ke vinA dUsare kI prApti asaMbhava hai / ataH syAdvAdadRSTi pratyakSa rUpa se janasamAja meM vaicArika zAnti pradAna karatI hai aura paramparA se pAtmika zAnti ke dvArA muktisukha prApta karAtI hai| yaha usa ahiMsA kI hI eka dena hai jise paramabrahma taka kahA gayA hai / vaicArika ahiMsA kA hI nAma syAdvAda hai| TippaNiyA~ 1. pravacanasAra pra. 2, kA. 3-4 kI TIkA, amatacandrAcArya / 2. AptamImAMsA 59kA, - aSTa sahastrI 2. AptamImAMsA Adi tathA aSTasahastrI 4. AptamImAMsA 10-11, aSTasahastrI 5. tasvArthavAtika 116 6. anekAnto'pyanekAntaH pramANanayasAdhanaH / / anekAntaH pramANAtte tadekAnto'pitAnayAt / / -vR. svayaMbhU strotra

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STUDIES IN JAINISM 7. aSTasahastrI pR. 286 8. aprayukto'pi sarvatra syAtkAro'rthAt pratIyate / vidhau niSedhe'pyanyatra kuzalazcet prayojakaH / / -laghIyastraya - 63 9. syAdvAda kevala jJAne - aSTasa. pR.-288 10. tattvajJAnaM pramANa te yugapad sarvabhAsanam / kramabhAvi ca yajjJAnaM syAdvAdanayasaMskRtam / -AptamI. 101 zlo 11. tatvAryavArtika 1 / 6 / aSTasahasrI pR. 125 12. na sannAsanna sadasanna cApyanubhayAtmakam / catuSkoTivinirmuktaM tattvaM mAdhyamikA viduH / / -mAdhyamikakArikA / 13. sadeva sarva ko necchet svarUpAdicatuSTayAt / asadeva viparyAsAnna cenna vyavatiSThate / kramArpitadvayAd dvaitaM sahAvAcyamazaktitaH / pravaktavyottarAH zeSAstrayo bhaDagAH svahetutaH / / -AptamI. 15, 16, (aSTasaha. 133 132) 14. aSTasahastrI pR. 142 15. titthamahavayaNa saMgaha visesapatthAra mUlavAyaraNI / davvaTThiyo ya pajjavahiNao ya septA viyappAsi / / -sanmati 113 16. sanmati 1 / 29 17. sanmati 1 / 17-21 18. iMDiyana philaoNsaphI (rAdhAkRSNan) 19. je NayadiTTIvihINA tANa Na vatthu sarUva uvaladhdi / vatthusasarUvavihINA sammAiTThI kahaM hoti / / -dravya. nayacakra 20. pravacanasAra 1148-49 21. syAdvAdakevalajJAne sarvatattvaprakAzane / bheda: sAkSAdasAkSAcca vastvanmatamaM bhavet / -AptamI. 105

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pramANoM se nayoM kA bheda IzvaracaMdra zarmA pramANoM se prameya kA jJAna hotA hai - isa vastu kA nirUpaNa sabhI dArzanikoM ne kiyA hai / pramANa kitane haiM ? aura unakA svarUpa kyA hai ? isakA gaMbhIra vivecana sabhI dArzanikoM ne yukti ko lekara kiyA hai / parantu nayoM ke dvArA prameya kA jJAna jaina darzana ke atirikta kisI anya zAstra meM vyavasthita rUpa se nahIM pAyA jaataa| jainadarzana ke pradhAna AcArya pramANa ko hI nahIM, nayoM ko bhI tattvajJAna kA sAdhana mAnate haiM / vikrama kI dUsarI zatI meM jinakI saMbhAvanA kI jAtI hai - una vAcaka umAsvAti jI ne tattvArthasUtra meM kahA hai - 'pramANanayairadhigamaH / ' (1-6) jaina tattvajJAna ke anusAra pramANoM kA jo svarUpa hai, vaha aneka aMzoM meM nyAya Adi zAstroM ke dvArA prakAzita svarUpa se bhinna hai / parantu nayoM kA svarUpa anya darzana zAstroM meM sarvathA prakAzita nahIM hai| aneka jaina tAkikoM ne nayoM ke lakSaNa prakAzita kiye haiN| tattvArthasUtra ke bhASya meM kahate haiM - ' jIvAdIn padArthAn nayanti - prApnuvanti - kArayanti -sAdhayantinivartayanti nirbhAsayanti upalambhayanti - vyaJjayanti - iti nayAH' (ta. bhA. 1-35) - siddhivinizcaya meM (10-1) kahA hai - nayate jJAnurmataM mtH| anuyogadvArA kI haribhadrasUri kI vRtti meM - kahA hai - naya: anantadharmAtmakasya vastunaH ekAMza: paricchedaH / (anu. hari. va. pR. 27). Presented in the seminar on " Jaina Logic and Philosophy" (Poona Univerity, 1975)

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206 STUDIES IN JAINISM A. prabhAcandra dvArA praNIta nyAyakumuda-candra Adi meM bhI naya kA lakSaNa isI prakAra kA hai| prAya: jaina tAkikoM ne pramANa aura naya ke svarUpa meM jo bheda hai usa para vicAra kiyA hai| prasiddha vidvAn bhaTTa akalaMkadeva naya ko pramANa svarUpa nahIM kahate / ve kahate haiM - jo jJAna artha kA nizcaya karate haiM, ve pramANa kahe jAte haiN| aura sAthahI pramANabhUta jJAna apane svarUpa kA bhI nizcaya karAtA hai / jaina tarka ke anusAra apane svarupa aura artha kA nizcaya karAnevAlA jJAna pramANa kahA jAtA hai / isa lakSaNa ko yadi mAnA jAya to naya ko bhI pramANa kahanA cAhiye / naya bhI jJAnarUpa hai aura vaha jJAna apane svarUpa aura artha kA nizcaya karAtA hai| isaliye vaha bhI pramANa ho jAnA cAhiye / isa prakAra kI zaMkA ho sakatI hai| isake uttara meM akalaMkadeva kahate haiMisa prakAra kI zaMkA yukta nahIM hai / naya artha ko nizcita nahIM karatA / kintu artha ke eka deza ko nizcita karatA hai| isa vastu ko unhoMne zloka meM kahA hai - svArthanizcAyakatvena pramANaM naya ityasat / svArthekadezanirNItalakSaNo hi nayaH smRtaH / / (ta. zloka vA. a-1|6 sU.) ghaTa - paTa - vRkSa Adi artha jisa jJAna se nizcita hote haiM vaha jJAna pramANa hai| parantu naya vastu ke nirNaya kA sAdhana nahIM hai| vastu kA prakAzaka na hone ke kAraNa naya ko avastu kA prakAzaka nahIM samajha lenA cAhiye / jisa jJAna meM vastu kA pAramArthika svarUpa nahIM prakAzita hotA, vaha jJAna mithyA jJAna hotA hai / jaba zukti dekhane para rajata ke rUpa meM pratIta hotI hai taba rajata jJAna mithyAjJAna hotA hai| vaha pramANabhUta nahIM hotaa| vastu ke eka deza kA prazAsaka hone ke kAraNa naya ko zukti meM rajata jJAna ke samAna mithyAjJAna nahIM mAnanA cAhiye / zukti meM jo rajata pratIta hotA hai, vaha vastu nahIM hai - na hone para bhI pratIta ho rahA hai isaliye avastu hai| parantu vastu ke jisa eka deza ko naya prakAzita karatA hai, vaha satyarUpa meM vidyamAna hai / isalie naya mithyA jJAna nahIM ho sakatA aura isa kAraNa vaha apramANa bhI nahIM ho sakatA / parantu vastu kA eka deza naya ke dvArA prakAzita hotA hai isaliye pramANa bhI nahIM ho sakatA / bhaTTa akalaMkadeva kahate haiM - vastu kA eka deza na vastu hai, na avastu, vaha vastu kA aMza hai| samudra kA aMza na samudra hotA hai, na asamudra hotA hai arthAt samudra se bhinna nahIM hotaa| yadi samudra kA aMza samudra ho to aMza se bhinna avaziSTa bhAga samudra bhinna ho jAnA cAhiye / yadi samudra kA eka aMza pUrNa samudra ke rUpa meM mAna liyA jAya to samudra ke jo zeSa aMza bace hoMge unako samudra nahIM mAnA jA skegaa| ve jala ke samUha kahe jaayeNge| unako samudra nAma nahIM diyA jA skegaa| nadiyA~ jala kA samUha haiM para ve samudra nahIM hai| nadiyoM ke samAna samudra ke bace hue bhAgoM ko samudra se bhinna mAnanA pddegaa| parantu vaha bacA huA bhAga samudra hai, samudra se bhinna nahIM hai|" isake atirikta samudra ke eka

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pramANoM meM nayoM kA bheda 207 aMza ko yadi samudra kahA jAyagA to anya aMzoM ko bhI samudra kahanA pddegaa| isa dazA meM aneka samudroM kI sattA mAnanI pddegii| aura yadi aneka samudra mAna liye jAye to eka vizAla samudra kA jJAna aura vyavahAra na ho skegaa| isalie samudra kA aMza, aMza hI kahA jAtA hai| vaha aMza na samudra hai, na samudra se bhinna / samudra ke aMza ke samAna vastu kA jo aMza hai vaha aMza hI hai| vaha na saMpUrNa vasturUpa hai aura na avasturUpa hai| vastu ke eka deza kA prakAzaka hone ke kAraNa naya pramANa se bhinna hai / isa abhiprAya ko prakAzita karane ke liye bhaTTa akalaMka deva ke zloka isa prakAra haiM - nAyaM vastu na cAvastu vastvaMzaH kathyate yataH / nAsamudraH samudro vA samudrAMzo yathocyate // tanmAtrasya samudratve zeSAMzasyAsamudratA / samudrabahutvaM vAsyAttaccetkAstu samudravit / / (ta. zloka.vA. sU. 6 zlo. 5-6) AcArya vAdi devasuri ne bhI ina zlokoM ko uddhRta kara ke naya ko pramANa aura mithyA jJAna se bhinna kahA hai| (syA. ratnA . pari. 7 pR. 1044). isake anantara bhaTTa akalaMkadeva kahate haiM - aMza ko jisa prakAra na vastu aura na avastu mAnA jAtA hai kintu vastu kA aMza mAnA jAtA hai, isa prakAra aMzI ko bhI na vastu aura na avastu mAnanA cAhiye / kintu usako aMzI mAnanA cAhiye / isa rIti se vastu to vaha hogI jo aMza aura aMzI kA samUharUpa hogii| isa dazA meM aMzoM ke prakAzaka jJAna ko jisa prakAra naya kahA jAtA hai, isa prakAra aMzI ke prakAzaka jJAna ko bhI naya kahA jAnA cAhiye / yadi aMzI kA prakAzaka hone ke kAraNa jJAna pramANa hai to aMza kA prakAzaka hone ke kAraNa naya ko bhI pramANa mAnanA cAhiye / yadi naya bhI pramANa ho jAya to pramANa se bhinna naya nahIM rahegA / isake uttara meM bhaTTAkalaMka kahate haiM- jaba aMzI kA jJAna ho aura usake samasta aMza gauNarUpa se pratIta hoM, taba jo jJAna hai vaha naya hI hai| vaha dravyAthika naya hai| paraMtu jaba samasta aMza pradhAnabhAva se pratIta hoM taba vaha jJAna pramANarUpa hotA hai / isaliye pramANa aura naya kA bheda hai| parantu isase naya ko apramANAtmaka nahIM samajhanA cAhiye / jo pramANa nahIM vaha apramANa hotA hai / aura jo apramANa nahIM vaha pramANa hotA hai / tIsarA koI prakAra nahIM hai - isaliye naya ko apramANa mAnanA paDegA / isa prakAra kA AkSepa ho sakatA hai / parantu yaha yukta nhiiN| pramANa aura apramANa se bhinna tIsarA prakAra hai -pramANa kA eka deza / isaliye naya pramANa kA eka dezarUpa hai| . bhaTTa akalaMka ke isa AkSepa-aura samAdhAna ko vAdi devasUri ne bhI svIkAra kiyA hai / (syA. ra. pari. 7.pU. 1045-1046).

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208 STUDIES IN JAINISM isa yukti krama ke anusAra naya kA pramANa se na sarvathA abheda hai aura na sarvathA bheda / isa kAraNa naya aMzataHpramANa bhI hai aura apramANa bhI hai| ina donoM mahAna vandanIya digambara aura zvetAmbara AcAryoM ke mata para vicAra karanA ucita pratIta hotA hai / samudra ke aMza ko dRSTAntarUpa meM lekara donoM AcAryoM ne vastu ke eka deza ko vastu aura avastu se bhinna kahA hai / parantu samudra ke aMza ke sAtha vastu ke aMza kI samAnatA ucita svarUpa meM nahIM pratIta hotii| samudra ke aMza ko lIjiye-samudra eka vizAla jala kA avayavI hai / avayavI ke jo avayava hote haiM, ve avayavI nahIM kahe jAte / paTa avayavI hai - tantu usake avayava hai, ve paTa nahIM hai / samudra ke avayava bhI samudra nahIM hai, yahA~ taka koI AkSepa nahIM ho sakatA / parantu samudra ke avayava asamudra arthAt samudra bhinna nahIM hai, yaha yukta nahIM pratIta hotA / tantu jisa prakAra apaTa hai arthAt paTa se bhinna hai, isa prakAra samudra ke aMza cAhe sUkSma bindu ke rupa meM hoM athavA vizAla pravAha ke rupa meM hoM, ve samuda se bhinna hai / paTabhinna avayava tantuoM se jisa prakAra avayavI paTa kI racanA hotI hai isa prakAra samudrase bhinna jalabundoM se athavA pravAhoM se samudrasvarUpa avayavI kI utpatti hotI hai| samudratva dharma kevala avayavI samudra meM rahatA hai, vaha biMdu athavA biMduoM ke samUharUpa pravAhoM meM nahIM rhtaa| paTatva kevala paTa meM hai, tantuoM meM paTatva nahIM hai / tantu jisa prakAra paTa ko utpanna kara sakate haiM isa prakAra samudra ke bindu samudra kA AraMbha kara sakate haiN| jahA~ bhI avayava-avayavI bhAva hai vahA~ vastu kA svarUpa isI prakAra se hotA hai / parantu vastu kA svarUpa samudra ke samAna nahIM hai| samudra eka vizeSa artha ko kahate hai / parantu vastu kisI eka artha ko nahIM kahA jAtA / jitane artha haiM, saba vastu haisaba meM vastutva dharma hai| vastutva ke jo aMza hai ve aMzI ke samAna vastu hai| jisa prakAra aMzI vastu hai isa prakAra aMzI ke aMza bhI vastu hai / vastutva jahA~ bhI rahegA usako vastu kahA jAyagA / kisI bhI artha ke avayavIrUpa meM jisa prakAra vastutva hai isa prakAra avayavoM meM bhI vastutva hai / arthAt ve bhI vastu hai / samudratva vastutva ke samAna vyApaka dharma nahIM hai / vaha kevala vizAla avayavI meM rahane vAlA hai / vaha samudra kI bUMdoM meM athavA choTe-moTe pravAhoM meM nahIM rahatA / samudra aura vastu meM yaha mahAna bheda hai / isa dazA meM vastu ke aMza kA prakAzaka jJAna bhI vastu kA prakAzaka hai / jaba dIpaka vA sUrya paTa ko prakAzita karatA hai taba vastu ko prakAzita karatA hai / jaba tantuoM ko prakAzita karatA hai taba bhI vastu kA prakAzaka kahA jAtA hai| dIpaka aura sUrya ke samAna jJAna bhI arthoM kA prakAzaka hai / cAhe paTa kA jJAna ho athavA tantuoM kA, donoM dazAoM meM vastu kA jJAna kahA jAyagA / vastu kA eka deza bhI vastu hai / eka dezarUpa vastu kA prakAzaka hone ke kAraNa pramANa ke samAna nayAtmakajJAna ko bhI pramANa kahanA cAhiye / pramANabhUta jJAna vastu ke eka deza kA prakAzaka hone para bhI pAramArthika vastu kA prakAzaka hai| naya ke

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pramANoM meM nayoM kA bheda 209 dvArA vastu ke jisa eka deza kA prakAzana hotA hai - vaha zukti meM rajata ke samAna mithyA nahIM hai, vaha satya hai / satya vastu kA prakAzaka hone ke kAraNa naya ko bhI pramANa kahA jAnA cAhiye / eka dIrgha jJAna ke arthAt aneka arthoM ke prakAzaka jJAna ke paTa Adi ke samAna avayava nahIM ho skte| paraMtu prakAzita vastuoM ke aneka aMza hone ke kAraNa jJAna ko bhI aMzIke rUpa meM kahA jA sakatA hai| avazya hI jJAna mukhya rUpa se aMzI nahIM hai| paraMtu aneka avayavI arthoM ke prakAzaka hone se jJAna kA eka aMza yadi eka artha ko prakAzita karatA hai, to dUsare artha ko prakAzita karanevAlA jJAna eka jJAna kA anya aMza kahA jA sakatA hai| yadi koI jJAna ghaTa-paTa-pustaka kA prakAzaka ho, to pustaka ke prakAzaka svarUpa ko jJAna kA prathama aMza, aura ghaTa se prakAzaka aMza ko dUsarA aMza aura paTa ke prakAzaka aMza ko tIsarA aMza kahA jA sakatA hai| eka aMza kA prakAzaka jJAna jisa prakAra pramANa hai, isa prakAra anya aMzoM kA prakAzaka jJAna bhI pramANa hai| jo pramANa kA ekadeza hai, vaha bhI pramANa hai| eka aMza kA prakAzaka jJAna mithyA aMza kA prakAzaka nahIM hai, isaliye apramANa nahIM ho sktaa| parantu satya aMza kA prakAzaka hone ke kAraNa, usake pramANa hone meM koI bAdhA nahIM A sakatI / naya ko apramANa se bhinna kahanA cAhiye / parantu usako pramANa se bhinna kahanA ucita nahIM hai / vastu kA eka deza jisa prakAra vastu hai, isa prakAra pramANabhUta jJAna kA aMza bhI pramANa hai| yaha toha A naya ke pramANa athavA apramANa hone kA vicAra / aba naya ke pramANamaya svarUpa kA bhI vicAra kara lenA cAhiye / pramANa zabda pramANa sAmAnya kA vAcaka jaina tarka ke anusAra pramANabhUta jJAna ke mati-zruta-avadhi-mana:paryaya aura kevala-yaha pA~ca bheda haiM / jo nayAtmaka jJAna hai usakA svarUpa ina meM se kisake sAtha samAnatA rakhatA hai ? isa para vicAra karanA cAhiye / zrI vAdidevasUri jI ne naya kA lakSaNa kiyA hai - ve kahate haiM -- zruta nAmaka pramANa se jo artha prakAzita hai usake eka aMza ko jo prakAzita karatA hai aura anya aMzoM meM udAsIna rahatA hai vaha jJAtA kA abhiprAya naya hai / (syA. ra pari. 7/1 pR. 1044) isa viSaya meM nyAyavizArada nyAyAcArya zrI yazovijayajI upAdhyAya ke gaMbhIra manana para dhyAna denA bhI Avazyaka pratIta hotA hai / ve tattvArthAdhigama sUtra ke vivaraNa meM kahate hai - nayoM ke viSaya meM aneka prakAra ke vicAra prAcIna AcAryoM ne prakaTa kiye hai| unameM se TIkAkArajI ke anusAra jo jJAna samasta nayoM ke aMzoM kA prakAzaka hai vaha pramANa hai aura aneka dharmAtmaka vastu meM koI eka dharma kA nizcaya naya hai aura vaha naya mithyA hai| do meM eka kI buddhi jisa prakAra mithyA hai isa prakAra naya bhI mithyA hai-kahA bhI hai; 'samasta naya ekAMta rUpa se apane pakSa kA pratipAdana karanevAle mithyA J-14

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210 STUDIES IN JAINISM anya pakSa ke AcArya kahate haiM - naigama Adi jaba paraspara kI apekSA rakhate haiM taba ve naya hote haiM / ve naya jaba samasta vastu ke svarUpa meM jJAna ko utpanna karate haiM, taba ajJAta vastu ke nizcaya kA sAdhana hone ke kAraNa, pramANa hai / parantu jaba naigama Adi paraspara kI apekSA nahIM rakhate, taba ve nayAbhAsa ho jAte haiN| ___ ina do meM se pahale pakSa ke anusAra samasta dharma saMpUrNa dharmI meM paryApti saMbaMdha meM nahIM rahate / kintu pratyeka meM paryApti saMbaMdha se rahate haiN| isaliye anaMta dharmAtmaka hone para eka dharma kA hI nizcaya pramANa nahIM ho sakatA / do arthoM meM dvitva paryApti saMbaMdha se rahatA hai| ina do arthoM meM yadi ekatva kA jJAna ho to vaha pramANa nahIM hai| do meM se pratyeka meM ekatva hai / parantu do meM ekatva nahIM hai| pratyeka meM ekatva hone para bhI jaba do arthoM kA eka rUpa meM jJAna ho arthAt donoM ko eka samajha layA jAya to vaha jJAna pramANa nahIM hotA, kintu mithyA jJAna hotA hai / isa viSaya meM upAdhyAya jI kA jo vAkya mudrita hai vaha isa prakAra hai - 'atra prathamapakSe sarveSAM dharmANAM sarvAvacchedena dhamiNi na paryAptiH kintu pratyekamityanantadharmAtmake'pyekadharmAvadhAraNasya dvayorekatvabuddhivannAprAmANyam / ' yahA~para mere vicAra ke anusAra 'nAprAmANyam' pATha nahIM honA caahiye| parasparakI apekSA se rahita naigama Adi ko nayAbhAsa siddha karanA hai isIliye unameM prAmANya kA niSedha aparihArya rUpa se Avazyaka hai ataH 'na prAmANyam' pATha cAhiye / pratIta hotA hai lekhaka ke pramAda se 'nAprAmANyam' pATha ho gayA hai / 'nAprAmANyam' pATha ko lekara kisI na kisI prakAra se vyAkhyA yadi kI jAya to vaha saralatA ke sAtha sAdhya kI siddhi ke liye apekSita hetu ke svarUpa ko prakAzita karane meM samartha nahIM bntii| dUsare pakSa ke anusAra samasta nayoM se ghaTita saptabhaMgIrUpa mahAvAkya kA eka deza naya siddha ho sakatA hai| jahAM eka naya ke sAtha dUsare naya ke vAkya kA saMbaMdha ho vahA~ paraspara kI apekSAhI hone se koI bhI bhaMga yadi saptabhaMgI kA bhaMga hai, to vaha naya vAkya ho jaaygaa| jo vAkya saptabhaMgI ke aMtargata nahIM haiM aura eka eka dharma ke pratipAdaka haiM aura anya dharmoM kA niSedha nahIM karate ve naya nahIM kahe jA skeNge| isaliye pramANa aura naya Adi kA lakSaNa isa prakAra karanA hogA / sAtoM dharma paryApti saMbaMdha se dharmoM meM rahate haiM- isa tatva kA pratipAdaka vAkya pramANa hogaa| jo vAkya sAta dharmoM se yakta dharmI ke kisI eka deza kA paryApti ke sAtha jJAna karAvegA aura usa dharma se bhinna dharma kA niSedha nahIM karegA, vaha naya hogA / aura jo vAkya eka dharma kA pratipAdana karatA huA virodhI dharma kA niSedha karegA, vaha durnaya hogaa| (ta.sU. 1-6 ta. vi. ga.dI. pR. 157158) yahAM para jina do pakSoM kA pratipAdana hai unameM se prathama pakSa ke anusAra eka

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pramANoM meM nayoM kA bheda 211 dharma kA hI nizcaya karane ke kAraNa nayoM ko apramANa kahA gayA hai / parantu isa hetu se nayoM kA aprAmANya nahIM siddha hotA / vastu ke anaMta dharmAtmaka hone para bhI jo vAkya' eka dharma kA pratipAdana karatA ho aura usake virodhI anya dharmoM kA niSedha na karatA ho vaha vAkya naya hotA hai| isa prakAra kA vAkya jirA jJAna ko utpanna karatA hai, vaha jJAna do ko eka samajhanevAle jJAna ke samAna nahIM hai / kintu eka ko eka samajhanevAle jJAna ke samAna hai| ataH naya hai aura isa kAraNa pramANa hai / parantu jo vAkya eka dharma kA pratipAdana karate haiM aura anya virodhI dharma kA niSedha karate haiM ve naya nahIM haiM - durnaya hai| isa kAraNa apramANa hai| dUsare pakSa ke anusAra sAtoM dharmoM kA paryApti saMbaMdha se eka dharmI ko adhikaraNa batAnevAlA vAkya pramANa kahA jAtA hai / parantu pramANa kA yaha lakSaNa pAribhASika hai| jo saptabhaMgI kA koI bhI eka bhaMga hai, vaha bhI vastu ke satya svarUpa kA prakAzaka hai| do athavA tIna dharmoM kA satyarUpa se prakAzaka vAkya jisa prakAra pramANa hai, isa prakAra eka dharma kA prakAzaka vAkya bhI pramANa hai / vaha vAkya naya hai / parantu naya hote hue pramANa hai| saptabhaMgI kA vAkya pramANa hai aura eka bhaMga kA pratipAdaka vAkya naya svarUpa hotA huA pramANa hai / saptabhaMgI vAkya nayoM kA samUha hai arthAta pramANAtmaka nayoM kA samUha hai| isaliye aneka dharmoM kA pratipAdaka hai / aneka kASThoM ke samUha ko kASThasamUha kahA jAtA hai / eka kASTha ko kASTha kahA jAtA hai kASTha kA samUha nahIM kahA jaataa| parantu kASTha bhAva donoM meM hai / eka kASTha meM kASTha-bhAva na ho aura kASThoM ke samUha meM kASThabhAva ho isa prakAra kI saMbhAvanA pratyakSa aura yukti ke viruddha hai / yadi naya pramANasvarUpa nahIM to nayoM kA samUha hone para bhI saptabhaMgI vAkya pramANavAkya nahIM ho skegaa| usa saptabhaMgI vAkya se honevAlI jJAna pramANabhUta jJAna nahIM ho sakegA / isaliye saptabhaMgI vAkya ko pramANa aura naya vAkya ko pramANabhAvase rahita kahanA pAribhASika pramANabhAva ko lekara yukta ho sakatA hai / vastu ke satyasvarUpa kA prakAzaka hone ke kAraNa, jo prAmANya hai usako lene para saptabhaMgI vAkya ke samAna nayavAkya ko bhI pramANabhUta mAnanA cAhiye / kisI bhI jJAna ke pramANabhUta hone ke liye sva aura para kA nizcaya karAnevAlA svarUpa honA cAhiye / yaha svarUpa saptabhaMgI vAkya se utpanna jJAna meM jisa prakAra hai isa prakAra eka naya vAkya se utpanna jJAna meM bhI hai| itanA pratipAdana karane ke anantara zrI yazovijayazrI upAdhyAya kahate haiM - sammati nAmaka grantha meM jo mata pratipAdita hai usake anusAra naya pramANa bhI hai aura apramANa bhI hai / laukika prAmANya ke kAraNa naya pramANarUpa hai| loka vilakSaNa arthAt alaukika prAmANya kA abhAva hai isaliye naya pramANarUpa bhI hai aura apramANarUpa bhI hai| isa abhiprAya kI prakAzaka sammati kI gAthA meM jo kucha kahA gayA hai vaha isa prakAra hai| "naya jisa aMza kA pratipAdana karate haiM usa viSaya meM ve satya jJAnarUpa haiM anya dharmoM

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212 STUDIES IN JAINISM kA niSedha karane para ve mithyAjJAnarUpa ho jAte haiN| isaliye jisane zAstra kA abhyAsa ucita rUpase kiyA hai vaha nayoM kA satya aura mithyA ke rUpa meM vibhAga nahIM krtaa|" yahAM para bhI naya-jJAna ke svarUpa para dhyAna denA cAhiye / jaba koI nayAtmaka jJAna kisI dharmoM meM dharma kA prakAzana karatA hai, to vaha dharma dharmI meM avidyamAna nahIM hotaa| isaliye vaha jJAna pramANabhUta hai / saptabhaMgI rUpa mahAvAkya se jo sAta dharmoM ko lekara bodha hotA hai usa bodha ke svarUpa meM na hone ke kAraNa yadi na ya vAkya ke dvArA utpanna honevAle satya jJAna ko apramANa kahA jAya to yaha aprAmANya pAribhASika hogA / yaha vastu ke svarUpa ke anusAra nahIM hogA / paribhASA ko choDakara vicAra kiyA jAya to nayAtmaka jJAna aura vAkya pramANasvarUpa hai- yahI yuktibala se pratIta hotA hai| isake anantara zrI upAdhyAya yazovijaya jI ne kahA hai - sammati kI gAthA ke anusAra naya pramANa bhI hai apramANa bhI hai / parantu anya pakSa ke anusAra naya na pramANarUpa hai, na apramANarUpa hai / ve kahate haiM-nayAtmaka jJAna saMdeha svarUpa nahIM hai| saMdeha meM do koTiyA~ hotI haiM, parantu nayAtmaka jJAna meM eka koTi hotI hai / isaliye vaha saMdeha rUpa nahIM ho sakatA / nayAtmaka jJAna samuccaya kA jJAnarUpa bhI nahIM ho sakatA / saMzaya meM prakAra ke aMdara virodha kA bhAga hotA hai| parantu samuccaya meM prakAra ke aMdara virodha kA bhAva nahIM hotA / nayAtmaka jJAna meM do dharma prakArarUpa se nahIM hote. isaliye vaha samaccayarUpa bhI nahIM ho sktaa|nyaatmk jJAna yathArtha hai, isaliye bhramarUpa bhI nahIM ho sakatA / sthANu meM puruSa kA jJAna yathArtha nahIM hotA, isaliye bhramarUpa hotA hai| nayAtmaka jJAna yathArtha hai isaliya bhramarUpa nahIM hai| apramAtmaka jJAna ke do bheda haiM - saMdeha aura bhrama / naya jJAna na saMzayarUpa hai na bhramarUpa hai, isaliye apramAtmaka nahIM hai / pramAtmaka jJAna samuccayasvarUpa bhI hotA hai parantu usameM eka dharma ke aMdara do avirodhI dharma prakAra rUpa se pratIta hote haiM / jaba kisI ko puruSa aura vRkSa-isa prakAra kA jJAna eka sAtha hotA hai, taba vaha samuccaya rUpa kahA jAtA hai / yahAM eka jJAna meM puruSatva aura vRkSatva do dharma prakAra rUpase pratIta hote haiM, jo paraspara virodhI nahIM hai / isaliye isa prakAra kA nizcaya samuccaya kahA jAtA hai| nayAtmaka jJAna meM koI eka dharma sattva athavA asattva prakAra rUpa se pratIta hotA hai / parantu usameM do avirodhI dharma nahIM pratIta hote isaliye vaha samuccaya rUpa nahIM ho sakate / isake anantara zrI upAdhyAya jI kahate haiM - naya jJAna apUrNa hone ke kAraNa pramArUpa bhI nahIM hai / eka dharmI meM sattva-asatva Adi sAta dharma jaba prakAra rUpa se pratIta hote haiM taba jo jJAna hotA hai vaha akhaMDa saMpUrNa hotA hai| isa prakAra kA saMpUrNa bodha naya jJAna meM nahIM hai, isaliye vaha pramArUpa nahIM hai / isake anantara upAdhyAyajI bhaTTa akalaMkadeva ke anusAra samudra ke aMza ko dRSTAnta rUpa meM lekara kahate pratIta

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pramANoM se nayoM kA bheda 213 hai - naya na pramANa hai, na apramANa kintu donoM se bhinna pramANa kA aMza / yahAM para bhI vicAra karane para naya jJAna saMdeha, bhrama aura samuccaya se bhinna to pratIta hotA hai, parantu pramA se bhinna nahIM pratIta hotA / saptabhaMgI ke samAna sAta dharmo kA prakAra rUpa se bhAva nahIM hai, isaliye Apa nayajJAna ko pramA se bhinna kahate haiN| paraMtu naya jJAna eka dharma ko prakAra rUpa se prakAzita karatA hai aura usa prakAzana meM koI bhUla nahIM hai, kisI avidyamAna dharma kA prakAzana nahIM hai, isaliye usako pramA se bhinna nahIM mAnanA cAhiye / dIpaka inegine arthoM kA prakAzaka hai aura sUrya samasta saMsAra kA prakAzaka hai / itanA bheda hone para bhI donoM ko prakAzaka mAnA jAtA hai / alpasaMkhyA meM padArthoM kA prakAza karane ke kAraNa dIpaka aprakAzaka nahIM ho jAtA / dIpaka aura sUrya donoM teja haiM / teja prakAzaka hai isaliye donoM prakAzaka haiM / saptabhaMgI vAkya aura nayavAkya donoM artha ke satya svarUpa ko prakAzita karate haiN| eka adhika dharmoM kA prakAzaka hai aura eka kevala eka dharma kA prakAzaka hai / itane aMtara se saptabhaMgI ke jJAna ko pramA aura naya ke jJAna ko atramA nahIM mAnanA caahiye| (nayo. pR. 113). zrI upAdhyAya jI ne nayopadeza meM nayajJAna ko pahale kahe hetuoM se anubhayarUpa arthAt na prabhArUpa, na apramArUpa kahA hai / aura usake anantara ve kahate haiM - isa prakAra kA nirUpaNa kevala merI buddhi kA vilAsa nahIM hai / tatvArthabhASya meM bhI isa bAta ko kahA gayA hai| tattvArthabhASya kA vacana hai -- ye naya anya zAstroM meM jo jJAna pratipAdita hai una jJAnoM ke svarUpa meM nahIM hai, aura apane tantra ke anusAra ayathArtha vastu kA nirUpaNa karane vAle bhI nahIM hai| kintu jo padArtha jJAna kA viSaya hai - ye usake vilakSaNa rUpa se svarUpa ko prakAzita karanevAle jJAna hai / / yahA~ bhI tatvArthabhASya ke kartA ne jo kahA hai, usase pratIta hotA hai - anya zAstroM meM nayoM kA nirUpaNa nahIM hai| isaliye zAstrAntara ke pratipAdya artha ke rUpa meM inako nahIM kahA jA sktaa| na hI ina ko svacchanda rUpa se calane vAle ayathArtha jJAna ke rUpa meM kahA jA sakatA hai / naya jJAna to padArtha ke jJAna hai, para ve isa prakAra ke jJAna haiM - jinakA svarUpa vilakSaNa hai / bhASyakAra naya jJAnoM ko kevala vilakSaNa jJAna kahate haiN| vilakSaNa hone mAtra se unako pramA aura apramA se bhinna kaho kA abhiprAya nahIM ho sakatA / pramAtmaka hone para bhI unako vilakSaNa jJAna ke rUpa meM kahA jA sakatA hai| isa lakSaNa meM jo artha zruta pramANa se pratipAdita hai, usake eka deza ke pratipAdaka jJAna ko naya kahA gayA hai / isa dazA meM naya, zruta pramANa ke bheda pratIta hote haiN| bhaTTa akalaMkadeva ne laghIyastraya kI racanA kI hai - usakI vyAkhyA AcArya prabhAcandra ne nyAyakumudacandra nAma se kI hai| vahA~ para "zrutabhedA nayA: sapta...' ityAdi kArikA meM syAt rUpa se sAta nayoM ko zruta pramANa ke bheda rUpa meM kahA gayA hai| yaha

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214 1 kathana bhI nayoM ko pramANa rUpa siddha karatA hai / zruta ko sabhI jaina tArkika pramANa mAnate haiM / zruta ke jo bheda haiM - unameM bhI zruta pramANa bhAva kA honA Avazyaka hai / naiyAyika loga pRthvI - jala Adi ko dravya kahate haiM / pRthvI jala Adi dravya ke avAntara bheda haiM / isaliye pRthvI - jala Adi sabhI nau artha dravya haiN| jaina tarka ke anusAra sparza-rasa-gaMdha aura rUpa, jisa meM ho vaha pudgala hai| pRthvI- - jala Adi pudgala ke bheda haiM / isaliye unameM bhI pudgalabhAva Avazyaka hai| pRthvI-jala Adi meM pudgalatva ke samAna naigama Adi sAta nayoM meM bhI zrutatva Avazyaka hai| zruta mAna lene para nayoM kA pramANamaya svarUpa aparihArya ho jAtA hai / yadi naigamAdi naya apramANa hoM, to ve pramANabhUta zruta ke bheda nahIM ho sakate / STUDIES IN JAINISM iMdriyoM dvArA jo jJAna paidA hotA hai vaha pratyakSa kahA jAtA hai / vyApti kI sahAyatA se hetu ke dvArA jaba sAdhya kA jJAna hotA hai, taba vaha anumAna kahA jAtA hai| ina donoM prakAra ke jJAnoM meM kisI vastu athavA vastu ke dharma ke jJAna kI apekSA nahIM hotI / jaba kisI vAkya ko sunakara artha kA jJAna hotA hai taba bhI sAmAnya rUpa se zabda aura artha ke vAcya vAcakabhAva kA jJAna ho, to usa jJAnako zabda se janya jJAna kahA jAtA hai / isako zrutajJAna bhI kahate haiM / paraMtu jaba kisI anya dharmI athavA dharma kI apekSA se zabda ko sunakara jJAna utpanna ho to vaha kevala zrutarUpa nahIM hotA kintu naya ho jAtA hai aura zabda se janya hai isaliye zruta kahA jAtA hai| zabda ke dvArA jaba taka kisI vastu kA jJAna na ho, tabataka jJAna kAnayAtmaka svarUpa nahIM prakaTa hotA / naigama Adi sAta naya haiN| ghaTa zabda ke bolane para kuMbhAra kA banAyA huA padArtha pratIta hotA hai / vaha padArtha isa prakAra kA hotA hai jisa kI grIvA gola aura kucha laMbI hotI hai, jisakA nIce kA bhAga cAroM ora se gola hai / usake dvArA jala Adi ko lAyA jA sakatA hai, jala Adi ko usameM rakhkhyA bhI jA sakatA hai / isa prakAra ke vizeSa dravya kA athavA usakI jAti ke samasta arthoM kA jo sAmAnya rUpase jJAna hai, vaha naigama naya hai / dhyAna rahe - indriya se cakSu se athavA tvacA se yadi isa prakAra ke dravya kA arthAt 'ghar3e kA jJAna ho to vaha jJAna tattvArtha bhASyakAra ke lakSaNa ke anusAra naya jJAna nahIM hai / ghaTa kahane para jaba jJAna hotA hai, tabhI vaha zrutajJAna kahatA hai / ( ta. bhA. a- 1 su-35 ) dekhane se yA chUne se ghaTa kA jJAna ho to vaha zrutajJAna arthAt naigamanaya nahIM hai / isI prakAra ghaTa - zabda ko sunane para nAma sthApanA dravya bhAva ghaToM kA jo jJAna hai, vaha saMgraha naya hai / yahA~ bhI yadi zabda ko binA sune eka ghaTa kA athavA samasta ghaToM kA jJAna ho to vaha saMgraha naya nahIM hai / jisameM gauNIvRtti adhika ho, sAmAnya kI upekSA kara ke vizeSa vyaktiyoM kA jJAna jisa meM adhika ho, isa prakAra kA bodha vyavahAra naya kahA jAtA hai / prAyaH vyavahAra naya meM vizeSa vyaktiyoM ko liyA jAtA hai, sAmAnya ko nahIM / yahI bhI prAya: gauNI vRtti kA Azraya hai / zabda meM hI gauNI vRtti kA Azraya ho sakatA hai, pratyakSa,

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215 pramANoM se nayoM kA bheda anumAna Adi meM nahIM / isaliye vyavahAra naya bhI zabda para Azrita hai / RjusUta naya ke liye tattvArtha bhASya kA vacana hai- satAM sAmpratAnAmarthAnAM abhidhAnaparijJAnamRjusUtra: / ( ta. bhA. 1 / 35 ) yahA~ para spaSTa rUpa se vidyamAna arthoM ke jo vAcaka zabda haiM unake jJAna ko RjusUtra kahA hai / isa prakAra naigama-saMgraha-vyavahAra aura RjusUtra, jo cAra arthanaya kahe jAte haiM, ve zabda para Azrita haiM, yaha unake svarUpa se spaSTa ho jAtA hai / sAmprata samabhirUDha aura evaMbhUta naya to zabda para hI mukhya rupa se Azrita haiM / isaliye unake zabdAtmaka hone meM kisI prakAra kI zaMkA nahIM ho sakatI / koI bhI naya ho, arthanaya vA zabdanaya, zabda sunane ke anaMtara apekSA se utpanna honA nayAtmaka hone ke liye Avazyaka hai / sammatikAra AcArya siddhasena kahate haiM'jAvaiyA vayaNa pahA, tAvaiyA ceva hoMti nayavAdA' (sanmati - 3 / 47 ) yahA~ bhI spaSTa rUpa se vacana ke mArgoM ko arthAt prakAroM ko nayavAda ke rUpa meM kahA gayA hai / bhaTTa akalaMka deva ke laghIyastraya kI vivRti meM ( nyAyakumu. 2pR. 783) spaSTa kahA hai - tIna kAloM ke sAtha saMbaMdha rakhanevAle jo aneka dravya aura paryAya haiM, unako naya prakAzita karate haiM / isaliye ka matijJAna se bheda nahIM ho sakate / matijJAna vidyamAna arthoM kA prakAzaka hai / mana ke dvArA jo matijJAna utpanna hotA hai vaha smRti - pratyabhijJAnacintA aura abhinibodha svarUpa hai / yaha mAnasa matijJAna bhI kAraNIbhUta matijJAna jisa artha ko prakAzita karatA hai usake viSaya meM hotA hai / matijJAna aura zrutajJAna ' ke isa bheda ko tattvArtha bhASya meM bhI kahA gayA haiM- 've kahate haiM, jo matijJAna hai vaha usa artha ko prakAzita karatA hai jo utpanna hai aura naSTa nahIM hai aura jo vartamAna kAla meM hai | paraMtu zrutijJAna tIna kAloM ke viSaya meM hotA hai / isake atirikta vaha jo utpanna hai aura jo naSTa hai aura jo utpanna nahIM hai una arthoM ko bhI prakAzita karatA hai / ' ( tattvArtha bhASya - 1 / 20 ) jaina tArkikoM ke ye vacana nayoM ko spaSTa rUpa se zrutajJAna ke bheda rUpa meM prakaTa karate hai / nyAyavizArada nyAyAcArya zrI upAdhyAya yazovijaya jI bhI naya ke lakSaNa meM kahate haiM- "sattvAsattvAdyupetArtheSvapekSAvacanaM nayaH / na vivecayituM zakyaM vinA'pekSAM hi mizritam ||2|| " jo padArtha sattva asatva Adi dharmoM se yukta hai unameM kisI niyata dharma ko prakAra rUpa se pratipAdita karanevAlA apekSA nAmaka zAbdabodha jisake dvArA utpanna ho, vaha vAkya naya vAkya hai / apekSAtmaka jo zAbdabodha hai, vaha jJAna nayAtmaka jJAna hai / jaba koI kahatA hai ghaTa hai taba zrotA kahatA hai isa vAkya se mujhe ghaTa ke viSaya meM jJAna utpanna huA hai / zrI upAdhyAya jI kahate

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216 STUDIES IN JAINISM hai-artha, viruddha pratIta honevAle aneka dharmoM se yukta hotA hai| binA apekSA ke usako kisI eka dharma ke sAtha nizcita nahIM kiyA jA sakatA / yahA~ para spaSTa rUpa se apekSA ke dvArA kisI eka dharma ke prakAzaka vAkya ko naya kahA gayA hai| prAcIna arvAcIna jaina tAkikoM ke naya ke viSaya meM jo vacana hai unase apekSA, naya jJAna ke liye prANarUpa meM pratIta hotI hai / jahA~ nayajJAna hai vahA~ aparihArya rUpa se apekSA kA honA Avazyaka hai| svayaM upAdhyAya jI kahate haiM jJAna svarUpa naya apekSAtmaka zAbdabodha ke rUpa meM hotA hai| spaSTa hai, koI bhI artha ho-usameM ananta dharma hote haiM / jaba apekSA ke dvArA kisI eka dharma kA jJAna hotA hai taba usake anya virodhI dharmoM kA jJAna nahIM hotaa| saptabhaMgI meM jJAna kA yaha svarUpa bahuta spaSTa hai / sva-dravya-kSetra-kAla aura bhAva kI apekSA se jaba kisI dharmI artha ke sattva dharma kA jJAna hotA hai taba prathama bhaMga hotA hai| isa prathama bhaMga meM virodhI asattva kA prakAra rUpa se bhAna nahIM hotA / jaba dvitIya bhaMga ke dvArA para-dravya-kSetra-kAla aura bhAva kI apekSA se asattva dharma kA prakAra rUpa se jJAna hotA hai taba satva kA jJAna nahIM hotaa| aba taka jitanA pratipAdana huA hai usase siddha hai saptabhaMgI ke rUpa meM ho athavA saptamaMgI ke binA ho, jaba bhI naya jJAna hogA taba apekSA avazya hogI / zrI vAdI devasUri AcArya ne spaSTa rUpa se zruta prabhANa ko ananta dharmAtmaka artha kA prakAzaka aura usake kisI eka dharma ke prakAzaka zabda-janya jJAna ko naya kahA hai| isa viSaya meM kucha mahAna jaina tAkikoM ke vacanoM meM bheda dikhAI detA hai| usa para apanI atyaMta alpa zakti ke anusAra meM vicAra karatA huuN| sanmatikAra AcArya siddhasena kahate haiM-pratyeka artha meM tInoM kAloM meM 'utpAda vyaya aura gharauvya' hote haiM / isakI vyAkhyA meM AcArya zrI abhaya devasUri kahate haiM-pratyeka artha meM utpAda Adi tIna kAloM meM hai isaliye pratyeka dravya ananta paryAyoM se yukta hai| isa ke anantara sanmatisAra eka samaya meM bhI eka dravya ko aneka prakAra ke utpAda Adi paryAyoM se yukta kahate haiM / isa tatva ko dRSTAnta dvArA siddha karane ke liye kArikA 42 vI meM kahA hai jaba AhAra karane para aneka avayavoM vAle zarIra kI utpatti hotI hai taba mana aura vacana kI bhI utpatti hotI hai| isI kAla meM ananta paramANuoM ke sAtha saMyoga-vibhAga kI bhI utpatti hotI hai| isa rItise pratyeka artha eka samaya meM ananta dharmAtmaka siddha hotA hai / isa tattva ko anya prakAra se siddha karane ke liye ve kahate hai- jaba bhI zarIra Adi dravya kI utpatti hotI hai tabhI tribhuvana ke antargata samasta dravyoM ke sAtha sAkSAt athavA paraMparA saMbaMdha se saMyoga utpanna hote haiN| sAdhAraNa logoM kA pratyakSa yadyapi

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pramANoM meM nayoM kA bheda 217 ananta dharmoM kA jJAna eka kAla meM nahIM kara sakatA to bhI ina ananta dharmoM kA abhAva nahIM siddha hotA / pahale jo anumAna prakAzita kiyA gayA hai, vaha ananta dharmAtmaka vastu ko pratikSaNa siddha karatA hai| __ spaSTa rUpa se AcArya zrI abhaya devasUri-dharmI ke ananta dharmoM kA jJAna utpanna karane meM pratyakSa ko asamartha aura anumAna ko samartha kahate haiN| paraMtu isake anantara hI ve kahate haiM-jaba bhI koI artha pratyakSa dvArA pratIta hotA hai taba vaha tribhuvana ke anya samasta padArthoM se bhinna rUpa meM pratIta hotA hai / bhinna rUpa meM artha kA yaha jJAna taba taka nahIM ho sakatA jaba taka ina ananta bhedoM kA, artha ke pAramArthika dharma rUpa meM jJAna na ho / isa prakAra kisI bhI artha ke anya padArthoM se bheda rUpa ananta dharmoM kA jJAna pratyakSa dvArA siddha ho jAtA hai| (sanmati kA. 3/42 gA.) isa rIti se abhaya deva sari jI ananta dharmoM ke jJAna ko pahale pratyakSa kI zakti se bAhara kahate haiM aura pIche pratyakSa se usake jJAna ko saMbhava bhI mAnate haiM / zrI. upAdhyAya yazovijaya jI to spaSTa rUpa se ananta dharmAtmaka vastu ko pratyakSa kahate haiN| ve kahate hai-ananta dharma apane dharmoM se abhinna hai isaliye jo pratyakSa athavA anumAna jJAna dharmI kA prakAzaka hai yaha ananta dharmoM kA bhI prakAzaka hai / isa dazA meM dharmI ke eka dharma ko prakAra rUpa se jAnane ke liye apekSA Avazyaka nahIM hai / yadi apekSA na ho to naya kA kA svarUpa nahIM siddha hotA / naya ke viSaya meM isa zaMkA ko uThAkara samAdhAna meM ve kahate haiM-yadyapi ananta dharmoM ke sAtha artha kA pratyakSa hotA hai / pratyakSa se hI nahIM anumAna se bhI hotA hai| paraMtu spaSTa jJAna apekSA ke binA nahIM ho usakatA |hsko spaSTa karane ke liye ve kahate haiM-jaba sattva athavA asatva Adi kisI eka niyata dharma ko prakAra rUpa se prakAzita karanA hotA hai taba yadi zabda pramANa kA sthala ho to naya kI apekSA se jJAna utpanna hotA hai aura pratyakSa kA sthala ho to avadhi aura avacchedaka Adi ke jJAna kI apekSA se hotA hai / upAdhyAya jI pratyakSa aura anumAna ke dvArA ananta dharmAtmaka vastu ke jJAna ko siddha karane ke liye Agama ke vAkya ko bhI pramANa rUpa meM kahate hai| vaha vAkya isa prakAra hai-'je egaM jANai se savvaM jANai' (AcA. zru. 1 a. 32-4 sU 122) ___ maiM yahA~ para apanA matabheda namratA ke sAtha prakAzita karanA cAhatA huuN| vidvAn logoM ko usameM jo bhUla dikhAI de usako prakAzita karane kA anugraha kreN| zrI abhaya devasUri jI ke anusAra eka artha kA samasta artho se bheda pratyakSa se pratIta hotA hai| isaliye pratyakSa bhedarUpa ananta dharmoM ko spaSTa prakAzita karatA hai| paraMtu bheda ko jaba pratyakSa se prakAzita kiyA jAtA hai taba pratiyogI kA pratyatyakSa hotA hai| vRkSa ko jaba zilA se bhinna kahate haiM, taba vRkSa aura zilA donoM pratyakSa hoM, to zilA kA bheda vRkSa meM pratyakSa ho sakatA hai / parantu yadi zilA pratyakSa na ho to zilA kA jJAna

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218 STUDIES IN JAINISM smaraNarUpa hogaa| usa dazA meM smaraNa se zilA pratIta hogI aura usakA bheda vRkSa meM pratIta hogaa| bheda kA jJAna pratiyogI ke jJAna ke binA nahIM hotaa| pratiyogI jaba pratyakSa ho, taba pratiyogI ke jJAna para Azrita bheda ke jJAna ko pratyakSa mAnA jA sakatA hai| jaba pratiyogI kA jJAna pratyakSa jJAna para Azrita na ho taba bheda kA jJAna pratyakSa nahIM ho sktaa| smaraNa meM pratibhAsita honevAlI zilA pratyakSa nahIM hai| isaliye vRkSa meM zilA kA bheda smRtidvArA utpanna mAnanA cAhiye / smaraNa jJAna pratyakSa anubhava se bhinna hai| yadi smaraNa se utpanna bheda jJAna ko bhI pratyakSa kahA jAya to dhUma ke dekhane se jisa parokSa vahUni kA anumAna huA hai usa vahUni kA bheda vRkSa meM pratIta hotA hai / usa vahani se bhinna vakSa ke pratyakSa ko bhI pratyakSa kahanA paDegA / paraMtu yaha spaSTa anubhava ke viruddha hai / jisa prakAra anumAna se nizcita parokSa vahUni kA zilA meM bheda cakSu se utpanna jJAna kA viSaya nahIM ho sakatA, isa prakAra tribhuvana ke samasta arthoM kA sAmAnya rUpa se jJAna hone ke kAraNa vRkSa meM jo samasta arthoM kA bheda pratIta hotA hai vaha bhI pratyakSa nahIM ho sakatA / anamAna aura zabda pramANa se tIna kAloM ke indriya-gamya to kyA atIndriya arthoM kA bhI jJAna ho sakatA hai| isaliye jo artha indriyagamya hai athavA atIndriya hai, unakA pratyakSa artha meM bheda zabda athavA anumAna para Azrita ho sakatA hai| usako pratyakSa jJAna kA viSaya nahIM mAnA jA sktaa| upAdhyAya zrI yazovijayajI ananta dharmAtmaka kisI bhI vastu ko pratyakSa Adi jJAnoM kA viSaya siddha karane ke liye anya hetuoM kA prayoga karate haiN| merA nivedana haianumAna aura zabda tIna kAla ke indriyagamya aura atIndriya arthoM ko parokSa rUpa se pratibhAsita karate haiM-isa viSaya meM kisI kA matabheda nahIM ho sakatA / kisI bhI dharmoM meM ananta dharma haiM, kucha indriyoM se gamya haiM aura kucha agamya haiM / ina donoM prakAra ke dharmoM ko ananta rUpa meM to kyA jinakI saMkhyA ho sake isa prakAra ke aneka dharmoM kA pratyakSa bhI yukti se siddha nahIM hotaa| isa viSaya meM upAdhyAyajI kahate haiM-jaba kisI ghaTa Adi eka dharmI ke dharmoM kA cakSu Adi se pratyakSa hotA hai to dharmarUpa dravya ke sAtha dharmoM ke abheda kA Azraya lene para jitane bhI dharma ghaTa Adi meM atIta-anAgata athavA vartamAna haiM una saba kA pratyakSa ho jAtA hai| yadi kahA jAya jina dharmoM ke sAtha indriya kA saMbaMdha hai unhIM meM dharmoM kA pratyakSa ho sakatA hai| paraMtu atIta-anAgata dharmoM ke sAtha indriya kA saMbaMdha nahIM ho sakatA isaliye unakA pratyakSa jJAna nahIM ho sakatA to isakA uttara isa prakAra hai-jaina tarka ke anusAra sAmAnya do prakAra kA hai- tiryak sAmAnya aura UrdhvatA sAmAnya / ina meM se jaba tiryak sAmAnya kA jJAna hotA hai arthAt sAmane rahanevAle ghaTa meM ghaTatva kA prakAra rUpa se pratyakSa hotA hai to ghaTatva ke sAtha saMbaMdha hone ke kAraNa purovartI aura vartamAna kAla ke ghaTa kA jisa prakAra pratyakSa hotA hai isa prakAra atIta aura anAgata ghaToM kA bhI ghaTatva ke sAtha saMbaMdha hone ke kAraNa

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pramANoM se nayoM kA bheda 219 pratyakSa ho jAtA hai / ghaTatva kevala sAmane rakhe huye vartamAna ghaTa meM nahIM hai| deza aura kAla ke dvArA vyavahita, atIta aura anAgata aura dUravartI ghaToM meM bhI hai| isalie ghaTattva se saMbaMdhI samasta ghaToM kA pratyakSa ho jAtA hai / purovartI aura paravartI kAloM meM rahane vAle pariNAmoM meM vyApaka rUpa se rahanevAlA dravya UrdhvatA sAmAnya hai| kapAla, ghaTa Adi miTTI ke pariNAma hai / miTTI jisa prakAra kapAla Adi meM anugata svarUpa se rahatI hai isa prakAra ghaTa meM bhI rahatI hai| kapAla Adi ke sAtha aura ghaTa Adi ke sAtha miTTI kA abheda bhI hai / abheda ke kAraNa miTTI se bhinna ghaTa kA jisa prakAra pratyakSa hotA hai, isa prakAra miTTI se abhinna kapAla Adi kA bhI pratyakSa ho jAtA hai| isa prakAra tiryaka sAmAnya aura urdhvatA sAmAnya ke dvArA dravya ke abheda ko lekara kisI bhI eka dharmI ke traikAlika samasta dharmoM kA pratyakSa ho sakatA hai| (nayo. kA. 3) isa viSaya meM merA vicAra isa prakAra hai-tiryak sAmAnya aura UrdhvatA sAmAnya kA dRSTAnta samasta dharmoM ke pratyakSa ke liye upayogI nahIM hai / ghaTatva rUpa sAmAnya kA saMbaMdha atIta-anAgata aura vyavahita ghaToM ke sAtha hai / purovartI paTa Adi ke sAtha bhI nahIM hai / vaha kevala samasta ghaToM kA bodha karA sakatA hai / para yaha bodha pratyakSAtmaka nahIM ho sakatA / ghaTatva rUpa tiryak sAmAnya ke dvArA samasta ghaToM kA jJAna mAnasa jJAna hai / mana usa meM pradhAna kAraNa hai| ghaTatva kA purovartI ghaTa ke sAtha jo saMbaMdha hai vaha iMdriya ke dvArA pratyakSa ho sakatA hai| paraMtu atIta-anAgata aura vyavahita ghaToM ke sAtha ghaTatva kA jo saMbaMdha hai vaha indriyoM kA viSaya nahIM ho sakatA / atIta-anAgata aura vyavahina dharmI artha parokSa haiM, unake sAtha indriya kA sIdhA saMbaMdha nahIM hai| sAkSAt saMbaMdha na hone ke kAraNa atIta Adi arthoM kA pratyakSa jJAna utpanna karane meM indriya asamartha hai| aba UrdhvatA sAmAnya ko lIjiye-miTTI kA eka piMDa hai usake aneka pariNAma hai, kucha pUrva kAla ke hai-kucha uttara kAla ke haiM / pariNAmI upAdAna kAraNa kA upAdeya kAryarUpa pariNAmoM ke sAtha bheda aura abheda hai / jaba miTTI ke piMDa kA pratyakSa hotA hai, to usake sAtha rahanevAle samasta pariNAmoM kA bhI pratyakSa hotA hai| ghaTa ke utpanna hone se pahale jitane miTTI ke pariNAma hai una saba meM miTTI dravya anugata hai| jaba una pariNAmoM ke sAtha saMbaMdha hotA hai taba miTTI ke sAtha bhI cakSu aura tvacA kA saMbaMdha ho jAtA hai| miTTI kA koI bhI pariNAma jaba indriyoM ke sAtha saMbaMdha rakhatA hai, taba vaha atItaanAgata athavA vyavahita nahIM hotaa| isaliye miTTI dravya ke pratyakSa hone para usake sAtha abheda rakhane vAle pariNAmoM kA pratyakSa hone meM koI rukAvaTa nahIM ho sktii| paraMtu jaba kisI dharmI kA pratyakSa hotA hai taba usameM rahanevAle ananta dharma dharmI se bhinna hI nahIM hote, abhinna bhI hote hai| parantu una ananta dharmoM meM kucha dharma abhinna hokara bhI vyavahita deza aura atIta-anAgata kAla ke sAtha saMbaMdha rakhane ke kAraNa pratyakSa nahIM ho sakate / paTa kA jaba pratyakSa hotA hai taba paTa meM jo vRkSa kA bheda rahatA hai-vaha paTa se

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220 STUDIES IN JAINISM bhinna aura abhinna bhI hai| paraMtu abhinna hone ke kAraNa vaha paTa athavA paTa ke rUpa Adi ke samAna cakSu kA viSaya nahIM bana sktaa| dharmI kA dharmoM ke sAtha bheda aura abheda haiisa tattva ko jAnane vAlA jaba paTa ko dekhatA hai taba paTa aura usake rUpa Adi kA jo bheda aura abheda hai usakA pratyakSa kara sakatA hai| para parokSa vRkSa Adi se jo bheda hai usakA bheda-abheda hone para bhI indriyoM dvArA pratyakSa jJAna nahIM ho sktaa| usa bheda kA jJAna mAnasa jJAna hai| dhUma ke pratyakSa hone para bhI dhUma ke dvArA vahni kA jo jJAna hai, vaha mana ke dvArA honevAlA anumAnAtmaka jJAna hai| pratyakSa dhUma ke jJAna se utpanna hone para bhI anamAna jJAna ko pratyakSa nahIM mAnA jAtA / ananta dharmoM ke sAtha abheda hone para bhI unakA pratyakSa jJAna nahIM mAnA jA sktaa| ananta dharma dharmI se abhinna hai isaliye pratyakSa dharma ke sAtha pratyakSa dharmI kA jJAna hone para dharmI ke sAtha abheda hone ke kAraNa jaba parokSa dharma kA jJAna hotA hai to vaha mana ke dvArA hotA hai bAhya indriya usako utpanna karane meM asamartha hai| isa viSaya meM zrI upAdhyAyajI ne naiyAyikoM kA mana ke anusAra sAmAnya lakSaNA nAmaka saMnikarSa ke dvArA utpanna pratyakSa jJAna kA dRSTAnta rUpa meM ullekha kiyA hai / naiyAyika mAnate haiM-ghaTatva kA jaba pratyakSa hotA hai taba ghaTatva ke sAtha saMbaMdha rakhanevAle samasta ghaToM kA pratyakSa ho jAtA hai| isa pratyakSa ko naiyAyika alaukika pratyakSa kahate haiN| yaha dRSTAnta bhI ananta dharmoM ke pratyakSa ko nahIM siddha kara skaa| jo purovartI ghaTa hai usameM ghaTatva pratyakSa ho sakatA hai| isa dazA meM ghaTa-aura-ghaTatva donoM ke sAtha naiyAyika mata ke anusAra indriya kA saMbaMdha ho sakatA hai| parantu jo ghaTa vyavahita athavA atIta-anAgata hai unake sAtha athavA una meM rahane vAle ghaTatva ke sAtha indriya kA saMbaMdha nahIM ho sakatA / saMbaMdha rahita ghaToM aura unameM rahanevAle ghaTatva kA pratyakSabinA saMbaMdha ke indriyAM nahIM kara sktii| pratyakSa ghaTa meM ghaTatva sAmAnya rUpa hai / jo aneka vyaktiyoM meM rahe isa kAraNa ghaTatva ke AzrayabhUta samasta ghaToM kA jJAna anumAna hai / aura isIliye mAnasa jJAna hai / anumAna jJAna meM pratyakSa zabda kA prayoga makhya nahIM gauNa ho sakatA hai / upAdhyAya jI ne yahA~ para eka vastu ke samasta sva aura para paryAyoM ko pratyakSa siddha karane ke liye sammati ke kartA mahAvAdI AcArya siddhasena gAthA ko pramANa rUpa meM diyA hai / (sanmati kA.1-31 gAthA) gAthA isa prakAra hai-egada vithammi je attha pajjayA vayaNa pajjavA pAvi / tIyANA gaya bhUyA tAvaiyaM taM havai davyaM // 31 / / gAthA ke anusAra kisI bhI eka paramANu aura jIva Adi dravya meM jitane bhI atIta anAgata zabda paryAya aura artha paryAya hote haiM utanA hI vaha dravya ho jAtA hai / mujhe isa gAthA para vicAra karane se pratIta hotA hai ki paryAyoM kA dravya se bheda hone para bhI kevala bheda nahIM hai abheda bhI hai| isaliye paryAyoM kI jo ananta saMkhyA hai vaha eka dravya kI bhI ho jAtI hai| isa rItise gAyAkAra eka mUladravya ko eka bhI kahate haiM aura

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pramANoM se nayoM kA bheda 221 ananta bhI kahate haiN| paraMtu aneka paryAyoM ke sAtha dravya kA pratyakSa hotA yaha gAthA kA abhiprAya siddha nahIM hotaa| joparyAya pratyakSa hai unake sAtha pratyakSa ho sakatA hai| kucha paryAyoM ke pratyakSa hone para bhI dravya kA pratyakSa siddha hotA hai| paraMtu deza-kAla se vyavahita paryAyoM ke sAtha dravya kA pratyakSa nahIM siddha hotA / ananta paryAyAtmaka honA eka vastu hai aura ananta paryAyoM ke sAtha pratyakSa honA-anya tattva hai| isI bAta ko spaSTa karane ke liye upA. zrI. yazovijaya jI kahate haiM-ananta dharmAtmaka vastu ke hone para bhI spaSTa bodha apekSA se hotA hai / ve kahate haiM-jahA~ zabda se jJAna hotA hai vahA~ naya kI apekSA se hotA hai| jahA~ pratyakSa jJAna hai vahA~ sattva athavA asattva Adi kisI niyata dharma ko lekara avadhi aura apacchedaka Adi ke jJAna kI apekSA se hotA hai / dIrgha parimANa kA pratyakSa, isa meM udAharaNa hai| jaba daMDa Adi kA jJAna hotA hai taba unake pariNAma kA jJAna pratyakSa hotA hai| parantu yaha isase dIrgha hai- isa prakAra kA jJAna niyata avadhi kI apekSA se hotA hai| paraMtu yadi avadhi pratyakSa na ho to usa avadhi kI apekSA se hone vAlA yaha isase dIrgha hai isa prakAra kA jJAna pratyakSa nahIM ho sktaa| pariNAma pratyakSa hai, paraMtu parokSa avadhi kI apekSA se honevAlA adhika dIrgha parimANa kA jJAna pratyakSa nahIM hai arthAta cakSu athavA tvacA usakA pratyakSa nahIM kara sakatI / parokSa kyA avadhi yadi pratyakSa bhI ho to ina donoM meM isa kA pariNAma dIrgha hai-isa prakAra kA jJAna karane meM bAhya indriya asamartha hai / tulanA ke sAtha pariNAma ke nyUnAdhika bhAva jAnane meM bAhya-indriya samartha nahIM, mana samartha hai| apekSA jJAna bAhya indriya se nahIM utpanna hotA, mana se utpanna hotA hai| jaba kabhI dIrva pariNAma ko dekhate hI jJAna hotA hai, taba usa meM kisI niyata avadhi kI to apekSA nahIM hotii| para sAmAnya rUpa se anya dravya kI apekSA khulI hai| cakSu athavA tvacA parimANa kA pratyakSa svayaM kara sakatI hai, paraMtu dIrghatA athavA hasvatA kA jJAna mana kI sahAyatA ke binA nahIM ho sktaa| isa liye dIrghatA Adi ke pratyakSa ko lekara ananta dharmoM ke sAtha vastu ke pratyakSa kA upapAdana yukta nahIM pratIta hotA / sArAMza isa prakAra hai-jaya jJAna pramANa se utpanna hai aura pramANAtmaka hai| zruta pramANa se utpanna hai isaliye zabda pramANa svarUpa hai| siddhivinizcaya meM spaSTa kahA haisyAtpramANAtmakatve'pi pramANa prabhavo nayaH / (si. vi. pR. 666-kA. 3) yadi naya pramANAtmaka hai to pramANa pada se hI usakA jJAna ho sakatA thA, phira pRthak naya zabda se nirdeza kyoM kiyA? itanI jijJAsA ho sakatI hai| isa kA uttara isa prakAra hai-samasta aryoM ke jJAna meM do hI jJAna samartha haiM-eka kevala jJAna aura dUsarA zrutajJAna / bheda itanA hai-jo kevala jJAna hai vaha samasta arthoM ko spaSTa rUpa se prakAzita karatA hai| parantu zruta jJAna aspaSTa rUpa se prakAzita karatA hai / zruta kA bheda naya hai| isaliye nayAtmaka jJAna bhI pratyakSa ke samAna saSTa nahIM hai| jitanA bhI zruta hai, vaha saba

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STUDIES IN JAINISM apekSA kA Azraya lekara virodhI dharmoM kA eka dharma meM pratipAdana nahIM karatA / naya kA svabhAva hai - eka dharmoM meM jo paraspara virodhI dharma haiM, unakA vaha apekSA ke dvArA pratipAdana karatA hai / isa vizeSa svarUpa ke kAraNa zruta pramANa ke aMdara samAveza ho sakane para bhI nayoM kA nirdeza bhinna rUpa se huA hai / 222

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STUDIES IN JAINISM Part III Jaina Ethics and Religion

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T. S. Kaighatgi in his paper "Jaina Ethics" distinguishes between individual morality. (manifest in the idea of Munidharma) and social morality (manifest in the idea of Sravakadharma) and explains the salient features of Jaina ethics with reference to these two ideas. While discussing metaphysical implications of Jaina ethics he claims that the ultimate moral goal is self-realisation, i. e. moksa. He also holds that Jainas take into account both motives and consequences of action as the object of moral judgement. K. C. Sogani in his note "Jaina Ethics and the Meta-ethical Trends" addresses himself to certain meta-ethical problems in the context of Jainism. Jaina concept of Subha, he claims, is defined as an experience in tune with ahimsa, which in spite of being complex avoids the two extremes of naturalism and nonnaturalisin. Jainas, in view of the author, also avoide the two extremes of cognitivism and emotivism with respect to the nature of ethical judgement. Jainas regard the judgement like 'Ahinsa is good as selfevident. In his first note "Jaina Theory of Symbol" D. D. Malvania explains the concept of religious symbol by referring to Jaina theory of Niksepa. He identifies symbol with sthapananiksepa. He also discusses the problem of justification of idol-worship in Jainism. His second note entitled "A Note on Jaina Mythology" apart from being informative, throws light on some mythological linkages between Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. J-15

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JAINA ETHICS T. G. Kalghatgi 1 Jainism is a realistic philosophy. It is empiricist in outlook, as it is based on the analysis of experience for its ontological stand. The spirit of anekanta a synthetic and a comprehensive approach, pervades its entire field of investigation be it metaphysical, epistemological or ethical. It is, therefore, not true to say that the Jaina view of life is negative and ascetic. The Jajnas do no advocate renunciation and ascetism as an end in itself. It is to be a means to the attainment of perfection. Nor is renunciation the only way of life. Fuller and purer life in this world is as much important as negation of pleasures of life Nivetti marga is not to be pursued purely for its own sake and at the cost of the positive outlook of life, pravstti marga. In the Adi-purana there is the description that Rsabha, the first tirthankara, gave training to his subjects in the art, agriculture and warfare. The Jaina Acaryas took active interest in establishment of benevolent kingdoms for the good of the people, as they realised that spiritual values cannot be pursued if secular activity for the spirtual values is neglected. They gave 'to Caesar what is Presented in the " Seminar on Jaina Logic and philosophy" (Poona University, 1975), Published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. II, No. 1.

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228 STUDIES IN JAINISM Cearars' and to God what is God's. Jainism played an important part in the social and political life of the people of this country. "A full life of social benevolence is as much important as the pursuit of the ascetic life of the munis. The denial of life and the world is a means and, we may say, a stage at the higher level of self-realisation.1 The ultimate ideal of a Jaina, as is the case with other systems of Indian Philosophy, except the Carvaka, is the attainment of perfection, moksa. It is perfection of the self, in which the higher self is realised by the development and the transcending through absorption of the lower self. This can be achieved by the triple path of samyag-darsana (right understanding), samyag-jnana (right knowledge) and samyag-caritra (right conduct) 2 For the Jaina, moral life is the empirical basis of self-realisation. Samyagdarsana and jnana are the psychological bases, as for the Buddha samyag-drsti is the psychological basis for the eightfold self-realisation. One who gets right faith (samyag-darsana) through the removal of darsana moha- attachment through ignorance, and right faith leads him to right knowledge (samyag-jnana). Such a non-attached person will adopt samyag-caritra for the sake of freedom from emotional entanglement in the form of raga dvesa.3 "The subject of samyakva is too vast and too imprecise to lend itself readily to numerical categorisation and there is considerable confusion and overlapping in the lists of qualities and defects conceived to describe it."4 Several qualities have been mentioned as characteristics of samyaktva. Samyaktva expresses itself in (i) nihsanka (free dom from doubt), (ii) nirjugupsa (absence of repugnance), (iii) amudhadrsti (absence of perversity of attitude), (iv) upaguhana (edification), consisting of Ksama (forgiveness) and leading persons to good path, stithi karana (strengthening the faith) and vatsalya (loving kindness ).5 "The description of the nature of samyaktva as shown above has a great psychological significance. It presents the mental setting required for developing character and personality as needed for spiritual progress.' "'6 The instinctive tendencies and emotions have to be channelised and sublimated with a view to attaining mental equipoise. Ethically the characteristics of samyaktva and samyag-caritra present a background and a canvas for the illumination of one's self towards attaining spiritual strength.

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JAINA ETHICS 229 II The positive empirical and practical outlook of the Jaina ethics can be understood if we study the distinction made here in the individual and social morality. One is the Muni dharma. It is primarily aimed at the attainment of perfection to be pursued on one's own effort without considering the soci aspects, although it has to be got through in society. Social impact cannot be be ignored. However, in this, personal salvation is aimed at. It is therefore very rigorous. The muni has to practise the five vratas rigorously. They are the mahavratas. The main purpose of this paper is to present philosophical and psychological bascs of Jaina ethics. It would not, therefore be necessary to go into the details of the distinction between individual and social morality, Muni dharma and Sravaka dharma. The muni dharma aims at seeking salvation through the practice strict moral and spiritual injunctions. The nature of the discipline is individualistic. In additon to the five vratas the ascetic has to practice (a) five samitis, (b) the control of the five senses, (c) six avasyakas and other practices, like taking one meal a day and and taking food by using ones palms. Acaranga Sutra and Dusavaik alika-sutra give description of the essential qualities required of an ascetic and the rules they have to follow in the monastic order. The code of conduct prescribed for an ascetic is for those who have renounced the world. It has a negative tone. However the ascctic has to be a philosopher and guide to the citizen. On certain occasions, he has to take active interest in the social and political life of the country he lives in. He has to guide the political authorities like king for the promotion of social and spiritual good. Acarya Simhanandi was responsible for the establishment of the Ganga dynasty in Karnatak. The social morality eerned with the code of conduct a citizen has to practise in consonance with the spirit of righteousness prescribed by the Jaina-Acaryas. The practice of the vratas is less rigorous' here. The vratas to be followed are the 'lesser vows'. They are the anuvratas. In addition to the five anu-vratas, a citizen has to follow (a) three gunavratas and (b) four siksa vratas. This is social ethics as its emphasis is on social values. They are instrumental values leading to the higher spiritual values. However, dharma, as Hiriyanna put it, is both an instrumental and intrinsic value. Dharma as value has social significance.

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230 STUDIES IN JAINISM We may now consider some of the moral and pratical implications of the social ethics as expressed in the practice of anuvratas in social morality. Ahimsa is the most important vrata to be practised by the Jainas. All vratas are subordinated to the ahimsavrata. In the practice of other vratas we should keep in mind that himsa should be avoided. The connotation of the concept of ahimsa has been taken in a wider sense when it is to be applied to the practice of the vrata by householders as we have called them citizens in a broad sense. A person living in a society should not injure any living being as far as possible and intentionally. He should avoid himsa of any kind. And ahimsa has been defined as abstenance from injury to living being caused intentionally or out of emotional disturbance like prejudice, hatred and such harmful psychic disturbance. We have to control ourselves. One should not be an agent for such himsa. This is sthula himsa. It is not as regorous as is to be followed by the munis. Every citizen can practise such type of the ahimsa vrata with ease and for the benefit of society. Even here certain forins of injury have been permitted in exceptional circumstances. While performing the daily duties like ploughing the field, one is aware that some form of injury to minute living being cannot be avoided. And for fear of that, we cannot give up activity which is primarily for the social good and social responsibility. This is Arambha hiinsa, Similarly it is the duty of a soldier, and as a matter of fact of all of us in times of emergencies in the present day society, to defend our honour and to fight for the righteous cause, even if it involves certain amount of himsa. Otherwise we shall be failing in our duty to society. This is virodha hiinsa. Even in such cases of violence there should be no wanton and senseless killing. Least amount of violence should be used and without harbouring ill will against the agress We may resist agression, but should not hate the agreesor. In the Yasastilaka Somadeva forbids a Ksatriya to avoid indiscriminate killing. For Gandhiji non-violence was a creed. Yet under certain exceptional circumstances, he advocated the use of violence for the promotion of a just cause. He advised the women to defend themselves even with arms against the attack of the goondas. He took part in the Boer war and the Zulu rebellion. He enlisted soldiers in the first World war. Gandhiji said, "I do believe that

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JAINA ETHICS 231 where there is a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence--_"8 Nonviolence is not to be considered as merely a negative concept expressing the commandment of non-injury. It has a positive content. "It implies the presence of cultivated and noble sentiments, like kindliness and compassion for all living creatures. The Buddha and Jesus were embodiments of compassion. Somadeva mentions i, maitri, ii. pramoda, iii. karunya and iv. madhyasthya as qualities to be cultivated for the practice of ahimsa. 10 We may also note that ahimsa is kindness to others not merely for the sake of doing good to others and for the altruistic purpose, but for the sake of oneself, to save one's self. If we give pain to any one we lower ourselves. In the Satrakrtanga, it has been mentioned that one who causes injury to others increases the enemies of his own soul.11 Gandhiji said that the essence of nonviolence is love; 'I believe in loving my enemies'.12 The social impact of Jaina ethics in its expression in the anuvrata movement is important for understanding the philosophical as well as the practical side of Jaina ethics. Jainas have worked out elaborate schematic presentations of the violations of the vratas and their moral and social consequenses. Suffice it to say practice of forgery, blackmarketing and overloading of animals out of greed. We should not accept stolen articles, we should not acquire property in a country hostile to us, nor should we read sex literature and see sex films. The schematic order of aticaras and the anuvrata movement have not much relevance for our discussion of the psychological and metaphysical implications of Jaina ethics. We may point out that the Jaina Acaryas saw to it that the schematic presentation is rooted in the practice of morality in every day life and has relevance to the social conditions of the times. The presentation is done in the background of the social conditions, it has cvolved. Therefore, the schematic presentation and the anuvrata movement are relevant to and important in the present day society. III We shall now consider the metaphysical implications of Jaina ethical problems. It is worth understanding the basic concept like a) the nature of Jaina outlook, b) the concepts of right and

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232 STUDIES IN JAINISM value of c) place of seeking pleasure in Janism and the Jaina weltanschauung. a) It has been contended by some that the Jaina outlook is negative and otherworldly. Life and world negation and not the life affirmation are the ends to be pursued. For the Jainas the ultimate spiritual excellence of moksa can be attained through the gradual process of self-denial. There is no short cut to moksa. However, we should note that the Jaina ethical thought has always emphasised the need for empirical values as means to the realisation of the highest and of perfection. They have not ignored the social aspect of life. In fact Sweitzer maintains that the problem of deliverance in the Jaina and the Buddhist thought is not raised beyond ethics. It was supreme ethic, and. " So far as actual ethical content is concerned, Buddhism, Jainisrn and Hinduism are not inferior to others." 13. Ethics of the Jainas is working in righteousness in all the days of one's life. b) While considering the Jaina theory of value and right we have to remember that in Jainism there is no cut and dried theory to which all actions get conformed. Life is complex and is not fitted to suit the theories. Moksa is the highest value from the point of view of spiritual perfection. From the Niscaya naya moksa is the supreme value. It is intrinsic in nature. It is difficult to say what is the nature of moksa. In the traditional sense it is the highest state of the pure soul in the siddha sila. However in a broad and ethical sense we can say that the end of every man's activity is self-rcalisation. The higher self has to be realised not at the cost of annihilating the lower self, but by developing and sublimating the lower self. In this sense, it is a continuous process in which the lower self transforms itself in to the higher by shedding its impurities and getting purer. This is realising ones pure self which remained soiled due to the veil of karma. From the empirical point of view, dharma is the supreme value, to be pursued for its own sake. It is moral and spiritual excellence. And considered from the ultimate point of view (niscayanaya) dharma is the instrumental value meant for he realisation of moksa. In ethics dharma has to be considered to the intrinsic value. Similarly, for the Jainas, ahimsa is to be considered both as intrinsic and intrumental value. It is intrinsic because ahin sa is the first principle of conduct. Every conduct

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JAINA ETHICS 233 is to be subordinated to the achievement of this ideal of life, the way of nonviolence. For the Jaina, abimsa is the supreme dharma. ( Ahimsa paramo dharmah) However ahimsa is also to be considered as a vrata to be practised by the muni and sravaka as well for the sake of attaining spiritual excellence in his own sphere of life. The distinction between ahimsa as a maha vrata and anuavrata is significant in this connection, Munidharma, as we have seen, aims at sceking salvation through the practice of the strict moral injuctions of ahimsa and other vratas. Among the vratas ahimsa is cardinal vrata. The aim of srava ka dharma is to make men good citizens and good men. And a layman who desires to go higher up in the stage of spiritual perfection has to go through the eleven stages of spiritual development. They are called pratimas. According to the Jainas, the question of determining the object of moral judgement as to the motive or consequence is not relevant because i) the question implies the relation between the cmotive and the cognitive aspects of moral judgement. ii) there is no separable distinction between affective and cognitive aspects in a concrete psychosis including mora judgements. Knowledge and feeling are so interwoven in experience that we can hardly say that a conduct is activated by motive or by the cognitive calculation of consequence. Both have their place in every moral judgment. That is also the view of Jaina thinkers. Therefore it is not needed to say that a moral act is determined either by inotive or by consequence. There are no exclusive theories advocatiug motive or utility. The nature of ethical judgement, according to Jainism is complex and presents a comprehensive picture of the act keeping the motive and consequence in view. As Blenshard says we cannot look at nature's bounty only with eye or reason. Such a picture will be insipid. Where there is no feeling, good and evil would be unrecognisable.14 The ethical ideal of a Jaina is neither merely to seek pleasure, nor mere self-mortification. Pleasures are insatiable. Pleasures cling to you. "Like the two clods of earth, one wet and the other dry, flung at the wall, those who love pleasure get clung due to the influx of karina. But the passionless are free."15 Yet the Jaina does not say that the pleasures have to be completely discarded. This is evident by the codes of conduct prescribed for the lay citizen.

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234 STUDIES IN JAINISM Mortification of the body is equally onesided. Even for a monk, rigorous asceticism is only a means to the end of selfrealisation. A citizen has his occupation, has a family and he performs all the duties and obligations of a citizen. Even a recluse has to take interest in the activities of the world like social and lical activities if it is to contribute to the increase of righteousness. As we have seen carlier, the Jaina Acaryas guided the destinies of the states and even helped the kings in establishing dyanasties as the activity was to promote the social and spiritual good of the people. The ultimate ideal of a Jaina is self-realisation. The self to be realised is the higher self. The lower self is not to be sacrificed, but to be sublimated and transcended. The Jaina View of life need not be considered as pessimistic nor is it merely optimistic. It exhorts us to strive for perfection in a world which is imperfect. That is possible through selfeffort, and not through the grace of any higher deity. The Buddha also advised his disciples to seek their own salvation. The Jaina Weltanschauung is melioristic. NOTES I. Indian Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. II, 1. Oct. 1974-Jaina ethics pp. 71. 2. Tattvarta-sutra : J. i. 3. Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara : Samantabhadra. - Caritracihikara 4. Jaina Yoga : R. William. Oxfrd. Univ. Press. pp. 41. 5. Based on the analyses in Jaina Yoga with modifications. 6. Jaina View of Life : T. G. Kalghatgi. Jivaraj Granthamala. pp. 172 7. Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara : Caritradhikara. 8. Young India. August. 1920 : Doctrine of the Sword. 9. Jaina View of Life : pp. 215. 10. Yasastokalaka Edt. by Handiqui, 334-337. 11. Sutrakrtanga : 1. 12. Young India : December, 1922. 13. Indian Philosophy : S. Radhakrishnan. : Vol. I (1941) pp. 52 14. Reason and Goodness : Blanshard. pp. 68. 15. Uttaradhyayan-sutra : XXV. 41-43.

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JAINA ETHICS 235 Discussion Sangamlal Pandey : My contention is that there is hardly any social ethics in Jainism. Even when Sravakadharma is accepted it is accepted in subordination so Munidharma and it is presumed all along that Sravakas cannot practice Munidharma in true sense of the word. M. P. Marathe : Dr. Kalghatgi's cquation of Moksa with self realization is misleading. Further, if Moksa is to be considered as an ethical ideal can't it be so considered independently of spiritual consideration ? Lastly, he also talks of 'supreme ethic'; but it raises the problem whether "ethic' could be graded. K. C. Sogani : Dr. Kalghatgi's attempt to discuss Jaina ethics in social perspective makes him guilty of confusing between ethics and religion in so far as he brings Moksa in ethics. Mukunda Lath : If Jainas were really interested in social action how is it that no Jaina writer has done any work on Dharmasastra, Rajaniti or other such theoretical interest. J. C. Sikdar Ahimsa is not a monopoly of Jainas. One finds discussion of Ahimsa in Patanjali, Manusmrti and other sources too. S. S. Barlingay : It is quite likely that its discussion in other schools came from Jainism. K. C. Sogani : How far is it correct to say that participation of Jaina Acaryas in the then active politics brought its downfall ? S. S. Barlingay : Many problems in recent Indian thought on revaluing Indian philosophy, partly at least, are due to misleading translations. e.g. Dr. Kalghatgi's translation of Moksa as selt realization. Secondly, our interpretation of Jaina or Vedanta ethics is biased by Chris doctrine of salvation. Is Moksa a salvation or something else ?

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236 STUDIES IN JAINISM Lastly, I differ from Sangamlal Pandey according to whom Jaina ethics has no social foundation, for I hold Ahimsa to be a formative principle of society. But it is hard to understand its link with Moksa. G. N. Josbi : Is there a complete cleavage between Sravaka dharma and Munidharma -- social and individual ethics -- or a continuity ? If the latter and if Sravakadharma is subsumable under Munidharma then there is certainly a place of Moksa in Jaina ethics. Moreover, is Jaina ethics a religious ethics or has it any scope for secular ethics ? T. G. Kalghatgi : There is no gap between social and individual ethics, although former is the foundation of the latter. They are linked by a gradual developmental process aimed at culminating into individual perfection. Moksa is an ideal that would lead an individual on the path of onward development. S. S. Barlingay : But if Moksa is essentially individualistic ideal how is it going to be helpful in social ethics ? T. G. Kalghatgi : Self-realization as individual ideal and social ethics are not contrary to each other. S. S. Barlingay : This is what I want you to assert. But, nevertheless the problem of their relation remains an intriguing one.

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JAINA ETHICS AND THE META-ETHICAL TRENDS Kamal Chand Sogani The main questions which meta-ethics is concerned with are usually three : (1) What is the meaning or definition of the terms like 'good', bad', 'right' and 'wrong' used in normative ethics ? (2) What is the nature of normative judgements of ethics (Moral Judgements) in which the terms good, right, etc. are used ? (3) How can moral judgements be justified ? Modern ethics is occupied with these questions and is predominantly devoted to the philosophical analysis of ethical terms or judgements. It may not have any relevance to our practical problems, but a sort of conceptual understanding and clarification is essential prior to any use of ethical concepts. In Jaina terminology the questions reduce themselves to the following: (i) What is the meaning or definition of the terms like Subha and Asubha ? (ii) What is the nature of judgements in which these terms are used ? (iii) How can such judgements be justified and supported ? I shall take these questions one by one and discuss the answer of Jaina thinkers regarding these contemporary questions of meta-ethical concern. The first question that confronts us is : What is 'good' or Subha'? This question, as Moore says, should not be confused The earlier version of this article was presented in the Seminar on "Jaina Logic and Philosophy" (Poona University, 1975). This article was published in "Buddhism and Jainism", Part II (Cuttack, 1976).

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238 STUDIES IN JAINISM with the question, what is the good' or 'Subha' or what thing or things are good or Subha ? The former question is more basic than the latter one. It may be asked whether the question of 'good' or Subha can be decided in a universe where there is no element of conciousness. In such a universe, according to the Jaina, there will be material things, but in the absence of consciousness good and bad are inconceivable. Thus, a universe without eonsciousness would be a universe without value. "Whatever is good, then, must stand in relation to consciousness." In the history of ethical thought good has been defined in various ways, namely as pleasent, as liked by me or most members of the group, as an object of favourable interest and so on. Any serious student of Jaina ethics would outright reject these definations of 'good' or 'subha'. According to the Jaina ethics, 'subha' is an experience in tune with Ahimsa.1 Since there are degrees of Ahimsa, so there are degrees of 'Subha' or 'good'. The ingredients of this experince which is complex but unified are emotions, and knowledge issuing in end-seeking action. Satisfaction on the fulfilment of ends is the accompaniment of the experience. The implication of the definition "Subha' or 'good' is that goodness does not belong to things in complete isolation from feeling; a thing is good, because it gives rise to an experience in tune with Ahimasa. Besides, that a thing does this is an objective fact and not an imaginary construction. The question, What is 'right can be answered, according to the Jaina, by saying that right cannot be separated from the good. Thus, right is that which tends to produce experience in tune with Ahimsa. The question, what is Subha in the realm of ethics is like the the question, what is Dravya in the realm of metaphysics. The definition of Dravya given by the Jaina Acaryas is : Dravya is that which is sat ( Being ). Here being 'is used in a comprehensive sense and not in a particular sense. But it is to be borne in mind that no particular thing can be apart from being. In logical way we can say that being is the highest genus whereas the particulars are its species and the relation between the two identity-in-difference. Similarly, when I say that "Subha is an experience in tune with Ahimsa'I am using the term 'Ahinsa, in the comprehensive sense and not in a particular sense. No particular Subha can be separated from Ahimsa and Ahimsa

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JAINA ETHICS AND THE META-ETHICAL TRENDS 239 manifests itself in all particular Subhas. In a logical sense, it can be said that Ahinsa is the highest genus and particular Ahimsas are its species, and the relation between Ahimsa and Abimsas is a relation of identity-in-difference. As for example, in non-killing and non-exploitation though the identical element of Ahimsa. is present, yet the two are different. So the above is the most general difinition of Subha just like the definition of Dravya. It may be noted that we can understand being only through the particulars since general being is unintelligible owing to its being abstract, though we can think of it factually, i. e. value-neutrally. Similarly, the understanding of general Ahimsa shall come only through the particular examples of Ahimsa, e. g. non-killing non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty etc., though we can think of it evaluatively. I may point out in passing that particular kinds of Ahinsa are a matter of exploration. Every age develops many kinds of subtle Himsa which are a matter of exploration. Gross Ahimsa like non-killing is easily recognisable but subtle Ahimsa like non-exploitation is a matter of discovery. Thus, different forms of Ahimsa will ever be appearing before us by our exploring outlook and tendencies. In fact, Ahimsa pre-supposes a realm of living beings, both human and non-human. So subha will be operative only in such a realm of living beings. No living beings, no subha. Thus, the definition of Subha as the experience in tune with Ahimsa is the most general definition like the definition of Dravya as tha which is Sat. The former can be thought of evaluatively, just as the latter can be thought of factually i. e. value-neutrally. It is alright that good is definable as the experience in tune with Ahimsa, but it may be asked, what is Ahimsa ? Now the question, what is Ahimsa, in the value-world is like the question, what is being in the factual world? Just as being' is understandable through the particular examples of things like pen, table, book etc. so also Ahimsa is understandable through the particular examples of Ahimsa, like non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty etc. When it is so easily understandable through examples, the craving for the definition of Ahimsa is pedantry serving non-purpose. Ahimsa can be thought by examples, just as in arithmetic 2+2 = 4 can be taught to a child with the help of an example, two balls + two balls = four balls, and gradually the child learns to do big sums without examples. In the same

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240 STUDIES IN JAINISM way Ahimsa can be understood gradually. The argument of understandability can not be adduced in the case of Subha without definition. For understanding subha definition is a necessity, but the similar necessity does not exist for Ahimsa in view of the above mentioned facts.3 The above definition of good or Subha presented by the Jaina thinkers avoids the two extremes of naturalism and non-naturalism, subjectivism and objectivism which are the present-day meta-ethical trends. According to naturalism moral terms like 'good' or 'right' can be reduced to empirical terms of psychology, biology, sociology etc. For instance, good means actually desired by oneself' or by people generally, or what tends to further human survival or what makes for social stability. The defects of these definitions are: (a) they reduce ethics to a branch of natural science, thus robbing it of its autonomy; (b) they do not leave any place for 'ought' experience since they refer only to what is. Frankenat is right when he says 'when we are making merely factual assertions we are not thereby taking any pro or con attitude towards what we are talking about. But when we make an ethical or value judgement we are not neutral in this way: it would seem paradoxical if one were to say 'X is good', 'Y is right, but he is absolutely indifferent to its being sought or done by himself or anyone else'. The merit of naturalism is that it regards value in the world as relative to consciousness. According to non-naturalism, moral terms cannot be reduced to non-moral terms of science. No doubt 'good' or 'right' have objective properties for their being recognised as such, but they are indefinable in non-ethical terms. They are of a very dilfferent kind being non-natural or non-empirical and so to speak 'normative rather than factual'. For instance, if we say that 'koowledge is good', it means that it is good by virtue of the non-natural character of goodness in knowledge known to us directly and not by any empirical observations. The defect of non-naturalism is that it regards good as simple, unanalysable, and indefinable, but the merit of this position is that it regards goodness as objective and not merely subjective. Now, when the Jaina says that 'Subha' is an experience in tunwith Ahimsa, he is accepting the merit of both naturalism and non

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JAINA ETHIES AND THE META-ETHICAL TRENDS 241 naturalism. The statement that Subha is an experience in tune with Abimsa accepts value in the world as related to consciousness and leaves room for 'ought' experience. For example, to say that kindness is an experience in tune with Ahimsa implies that we ought to be kind. Besides, that experience is not of the type 'liked by me' or 'approved by me' and so is not subjective or reducible to feeling but possesses an objective character, and at the same time this experience is not simple, unanalysable but complex and analysable, and therefore definable as has been explained above. The second and third meta-ethical questions that draw our attention are :(2) What is the nature of normative judgements of ethics? Or what is the nature of ethical judgements (obligatory and value) according to the Jaina ? (3) What is their justification ? Let me now state the second question more clearly. There have been recognised three kinds of knowledge : (1) Knowledge of facts, as this flower is yellow; (2) Knowledge of necessity, as 7 +5 = 12 and (3) Knowledge of value, as A was a good man or murder is wrong. The question under discussion reduces itself to this. Are ethical judgements expressive of any cognitive content in the sense that they may be asserted true or false ? Or do they simply express emotions, feelings, etc.? The upholders of the former view are known as non-cognitivists (emotivists). When we say that Himsa is evil, are we making a true or false assertion or are we experiencing simply a feeling ? Or are we doing both ? According to the congnitivists, the ethical judgement, 'Hiinsa is evil' is capable of being objectively true and thus moral knowledge is objective, whereas the non-cognitivists deny both the objectivity of assertion and knowledge in asmuch-as, according to them, ethical judgements are identified with feeling, emotions etc. Here the position taken by the Jaina seems to me to be this that though the statement, 'Himsa is evil is objectively true, yet it cannot be divested of the feeling element involved in experiencing the truth of the statement. In moral life knowledge and feeling cannot be separated. By implication we can derive from the Tattvarthastra5 that the path of goodness can be traversed through knowledge (Joana) and feeling and activity. Amotacandra says that first of all knowledge of right j..16

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242 STUDIES IN JAINISM and wrong, good and evil is to be acquired afterwards, while moral life is to be practised. Thus the conviction of the Jaina is that the knowledge of value and obligations is tied up with our feelings and that in their absence we are ethically blind. In fact, our feelings and knowledge are so interwoven into a complex harmony that we have never a state of mind in which both are not present in some degree. So the claims of cognitivists and noncognitivists are onesided and are very antagonistic to the verdict of experience. Blanshardo rightly remarks Nature may spread before us the richest possible banquet of good things, but if we can look at them only with the eye of reason, we shall care for none of these things; they will be alike insipid. There would be no knowledge of good and evil in a world of mere knowers, for where there is no feeling, good and evil would be unrecognisable. Again 'a life that directs itself by feeling even of the most exalted kind will be like a ship without a rudder'. Thus the nature of ethical judgement acording to the Jaina is cognitive-affective. "The achievement of good is a joint product of our power to know and our power to feel".? The next question in meta-ethics is to ask how our ethical judgements (value and obligation) can be justified. That the ethical judements are objectively true need not imply that their justification can be sought in the same manner as the justification of factual judgements of ordinary and scientific nature. The reason for this is that value cannot be derived from fact, ought from is. In factual judgements our expressions are value but in ethical judgements we cannot be indifferent to their being sought by ourselves or by others. That is why derivation of ought from is, value from fact is unjustifiable. The value judgements, according to Jaina, are self-evident and can only be experienced directly. Thus they are self-justifying. The conviction of the Jaina is that no argument can prove that <Page #258
SAINA ETHICS AND THE META-ETHICAL TRENDS 243 NOTES 1 Ahimsa presupposes first a world of living beings, both human and pon-human along with the fact that each of them is constantly affecting the other and is being affected by the other either evenly or unevenly. Secondly, Ahissa, presumes that life is dear to all (Fcato itfaa foet, C, Ayaranga Suttam, Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay, 197 and for all living beings pain is disturbance, fearful and unpleasant. (savvesi pANANaM ... assAtaM apariNivvANaM mahanmayaM dukkham, sUtra 49, Ayaranga Suttam) This is also expressed by saying that just as pain is unpleasent for onself, so also it is unpleasent for all living beings. (FTE fqai ga g aa Fod vitali, TT 940, Samanasuttam, Sarva Seva Sangha Prakashan, Varanasi, 19 Thus without these two presuppositions the talk of Ahimsa is inconceivable. It may be noted that these two presuppositions are psychological in nature and the statement of Ahinsa is evaluative in nature. The former are factual or descriptive assertions, while the latter is a normative or a value assertion. Does this mean that value-assertions can be derived from factual assertions, ethical conclusions can be drawn from non-ethical premises 'ought' can be derived from 'is'? This problem of the derivation of 'ought' from 'is' is important in contemporary metaethical discussions, but here I do not propose to argue from the point of view of the Jainist that value cannot be derived from the above-mentioned presuppositions; it is an independent intuition occuring in the context of the stated presuppositions. Had it been a deduction like the angles of a trinagle as equal to two right angles, the whole of mankind would have understood Ahir sa immediately. Thus, though the Jainist maintains the autonomy of normative ethical discourse by maintaining the distinction between facts and values yet he holds that there is some connection between fact and values. Though the two, fact and value, are no doubt distinct, yet they are not unrelated to each other. The relation is not of entailment but it is empirical. Life is dear to all does not entail <Page #259
244 STUDIES IN JAINISM un-parallelebraces all the asion, the econ un-paralleled statement in the entire Jainist literature. I need not say that it basically embraces all the aspects of social experience in its normative perspective. The political organisation, the economic orientation and the institutional set up can easily derive inspiration from this ethically significant statement. Thus, this above statement of the Ayaro is representative of the extent to which various consideration Ahimsa is supposed to include, althoughmost of the Jaina texts seem to include in Ahimsa only non-killing. As for example, it is said that the severance of vitalities out of passion is Himsa (pramattayogAtprANaSTT TITUT FEHT, VII. 13, Survarthasiddhi of Pujyapada, Bharatiya, Inana Peetha, Varansi) Munis discredit killing. (TUTTE froigt avrifat, TOT 148, Samana Suttam, Varanasi, 1975) One should neither kill nor cause to kill living being. (Taifa Star OTOTT, UT FUTOTT E71275, TTT 149 Samanasuttam, Varanasi, 1975) The essence of being a wise man is that he does not kill any being. (Tug afforori ari, JT a EHE FUT, TT 147, Samonasuttam, Varanasi, 1975) It should be borne in mind that if Ahirhsa is understood only in the sense of non-killing, it is narrow and socially not of wide significance. In fact, killing is the last limit of Himsa and not the only expression of Himsa. There are hundreds of expressions of Himsa-Ahimsa below that last limit. It seems to me that owing to the fact of avoiding this sort of expression of Himisa, the Purusarthasiddhyupaya seeks to explain falsehood-truth, stealing-nonsteaiing, unchastity-chastity, possession-non-possion etc. as forms of HirhssAhimsa. This way of expression regards Ahimsa as the essence of all virtues, thus giving supreme status to Ahimsa it deserves. In the pages to follow, I shall be using the word Ahimsa in this comprehensive sense. 3. It may be noted that the Purusarthasidddhyupaya (TSITGHT: Trai saratania, 44 Purusarthasildhyupaya of Amstacandra, Raychand Jaina Sastramala, Bombay) defines Ahimsa by saying that the non-emergence of attachment etc. is Ahinsa. This definition of Ahimsa has its own significance but this is not the type of definition required by the socio-ethical consciousness of mankind. This definition makes social values like devotion to the teacher, devoted service of the country etc. as exclusive of Ahirnsa. It is a deeply inner oriented definition, which though spiritually valuable, yet ethically is not of much significance. The same thing can be said of the definition, Apramatta is Ahimsaka (3109HT SCATT, TTTT Samanasuttam, Varanasi, 1975) because Apramada again is said to be the non-emergence of attachment etc. To adopt the above definition of Ahirhsa is tantamount to leaving the realm of both Subha and Asubha (good and bad) and to entering the realm of mysticism which does not concern us here. Our enquiry in ethics is concerned with the pursuit of Subha (good) and avoidance of Asubha (evil). 4. Eihics, Frankena; p. 83.

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JAINA ETHICS AND THE META-ETHICAL TRENDS 245 5. Tattvurthasutra 1.1 (Tativarihasutru of Umasyati under the title Sarvarthasidhi, (Varanasi)). 6. Reason and Goodness by B. Blanshard, p. 68. 7. Tbid, p.68. 6. Sc Note 1. Discussion ... (On the Version of the Paper read in the Seminar ) J. C. Sikdar : How do Jainas draw distinction between good and bad Subha and Asubha ? Mukunda Lath : Dr. Sikdar's using the word good for Subha is inappropriate, for Subha denotes something Mangalika, the denotation of which is not necessarily co-extensive with that of good. Good is a peculiarly western concept and we better stick to our own conents. kailAsacaMdrajI : jina prakAra ke praznoMkI carcA cala rahI hai unakA saMbaMdha spaSTa rUpa se jaina AgamoM se nahIM hai / kucha nayI zaMkAoM uThAyI gayI hai| unakA vicAra jainoM ne nahI kiyA hai / lekina ina praznoM ke uttara hameM jaina tarka ke anusAra hI dene cAhiye / ahiMsA kA aura zubha kA saMbaMdha AtmA se jor3A jAtA hai / apitu AtmA na mAnane vAle cArvAka bhI ahiMsA aura zubha mAnate haiN| zubha kA vastutaH pudgala aura AtmA ina donoM se saMbaMdha hai| zubha kI alaga alaga parAkASThA hotI hai aura zubha tathA azubha meM sApekSa rUpa se vibhAga karanA cAhie, nirapekSa rUpa se nahIM / usI taraha saMsAra aura mokSa meM nirapekSatayA pharka nahIM karanA caahie| saMgamalAla pAMDe : vAstava meM Values cannot be derived from facts. ina kA (DaoN. sogAnI jI kA) niSkarSa ki sphere of values in closely tied up with our feclings in the absence of which we are typically blind galata hai| hamAre acche hone kA aura hamAre aMdara saMvedana yA bhAva na hone kA koI saMbaMdha nahIM hai| usI prakAra unakA 'darzana' kA anuvAda knowledge galata hai : kyoM ki darzana meM faith kA element hai| jJAna usa se alaga hai| vaise AcAra

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246 STUDIES IN JAINISM kA saMbaMdha jJAna yA faith se hone ke bajAya cAritrya se hai| inhoMne apane nibaMdha meM jJAna kA vizleSaNa kiyA, cAritrya kA nhiiN| mere matAnusAra the nature of ethical judgements according to Jaina philosophy is essentially conative. isa prakAra se agara hama jaina Ethics kA vizlepaNa aura vivecana kareM to vaha aura aucityapUrNa hogaa| dayAnaMda bhArgava : DaoN. sogAnI ne ahiMsA kA jo lakSaNa diyA hai vaha janazAstrasaMmata hote hue bhI ativyApta banane se usa meM pariSkAra kI AvazyakatA hai| sAgaramala jana: DaoN. sogAnI jI kA Value yA mUlya kA svata:prAmANya prasthApita karane kA prayAsa aucityapUrNa nahIM hai| vastutaH jaina paraMparA meM zubha aura azubha aisI do dhAraNAoM na hote hue zuddha, zubha aura azubha aisI tIna dhAraNAe haiN| inameM se zubha aura azubha samAjasApekSa hai, ataH parataH pramANa haiN| zuddha bhAva rAgavihIna sthiti hone se svataH pramANa hai| es. em. zahA : purAne siddhAMtoM kA nayI bhASA meM spaSTIkaraNa dene kA sogAnI jI kA prayatna prazaMsanIya hote hue bhI unake nibaMdhapara mujhe tIna AzaMkAe haiM : eka, zubha aura azubha se kyA matalaba hai - auspicious and inauspicious ? dUsarI, zubha aura azubha sApekSa haiM yA nirapekSa ? aura tIsarI, zubha kA ziva se kyA saMbaMdha hai ? sAgaramala jaina : __ zubha kA ahiMsA se aura samAja se saMbaMdha hai aisA mAnate hue bhI vyakti aura samAja kI dRSTI se jaba zubha aura ahiMsA meM pharka ho to kaunasI ahiMsA pramANita lI jAe ? sAmAjika rUpa meM zubha yAne ahiMsA aisA mAna liyA to isa prakAra kI ahiMsA kA cetanA se kyA saMbaMdha hai ? kamalacaMda sogAnI: Ethics meM hameM zuddha kI bAta nahIM lAnI cAhie, nahIM to hamArA Ethics religious ethics ho jaaegaa| Ethics meM hameM hamArA vicAra zubha-azubha taka hI sImita rakhanA caahie| merA maMtavya yaha hai ki Consciousness ko choDakara zubha kA vicAra nahIM kiyA jA sktaa|

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JAINA ETHICS AND THE META-ETHICAL TRENDS 247 sureMdra bAraliMge : Ethics aura Religion yaha Western terminology hai aura zuddha, zubha aura azubha yaha hamAre yahA~ kI TarminaoNlaoNjI hai ! to kyA Apa yaha mAnate hai ki zubha aura azubha ethics kI terminology meM bilakula barAbara baiTha jAte hai ? kamalacaMda sogAnI : kAphI socane ke bAda mujhe aisA lagatA hai ki zubha aura azubha Ethics meM Ate haiM / dUsarI bAta yaha ki ahiMsA yaha generic term hai aura isalie usakI paribhASA hama nahIM kara sakate / hameM zubha vastu aura zubha meM pharka karanA cAhie / zubha ke jJAna ke AdhAra para hI amuka vastu zubha hai aisA hama kaha sakeMge / mere matAnusAra kisI bhI cIja ko zubha mAna lene ke lie usameM ahiMsA kA aMza honA cAhie /

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THE JAINA THEORY OF SYMBOL D. D. Malvania As far as the life of Mahavira described in the earliest canon is concerned we can say that he was always engrossed in self-realization, meditating upon his inner soul in order to remove all types of passions from it. He did not worship any symbol or an image throughout his life. But when we read later literature, canonical or non-canonical, gradually the symbols are found more and more, the reason being the organisation or the systematisation of his preachings as a separate religious system. When a religion takes a form of an order, it receives in its fold the followers of varied temperaments and capacities. In order to give some of the conceptions which are beyond an ordinary understanding the various types of symbols are evolved. Through symbols some vague ideas of those conceptions are conveyed. Here I am not to discuss the various symbols accepted by tho Jainas as they are discussed in detail by Dr. U. P. Shah in his Studies in Jaina Art. Here I intend 10 explain the theory of the symbols as accepted by the Jainas. Symbol, according to the Jaina authors, is nothing but Sthapana (tha vana) which is one of the four Niksepas (Nikkheva) : nama, stha pana, dravya and bhava. Prsented in the Seminar on " Jaina Logic and Philosophy" (Poona University, 1975).

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TUE JAINA THEORY OF SYMBOL 249 The niksepa is the method by which one can arrive at the proper meaning of the words used by the speaker. Sometimes we use the same word in different contexts keeping in mind different meanings. So the Jainas have classified the meanings of the words into four classes. There are certain words which are simple names given to the facts of the living or non-living world. Here, in such cases, the speaker uses the words for certain facts without nsidering the etymology of the word to denote a certain fact, Such words will denote simply the name (nama) of the fact and nothing more than that. If in present time a boy is named as Mahavira, this is his simple name and nothing more than that, He is not the great hero. But the Vardhamana, the last Tirthankara of the Jainas, was called by name Mahavira on seeing his heroism and so in this case the word Mahavira will mean more than the simple nane (nama) of that person because it denotes here also the real meaning of the word and this comes under bhara i. c. etymological meaning. But there are many idols in the Jaina temples which are designated as Mahavira. Here, the case is of the representation i. c. sthapana of Mahavira. So in this case the word Mahavira does not mean the simple name nor the real Maha vira but his copy or representative sthapana, And the author who writes the life of Mahavira says that on such and such a day Mahavira was born'. But on his birth he was simply a child without any name. But after some years this very child showed his heroism and became famous as Mahavira. According to the author the boy at his birth and the boy who becomes Mahavira after some years is the same entity and on this ground hc has used the word Maha vira even when he was not real Mahavira considering his substantial capacity (dravia). This is the case of draria. Stha pana is of two types : (1) where one can identify the symbol on the basis of its similarity with the original and (2) where one cannot do so without the instructions from others because of its dissimilarity with the original. The difference between the name and stha pana is this : simple name (nama) does not lead us to the honour which is bestowed on an original entity but the stha pana or the symbol or the representation arouses in us the same reverence which is bestowed on the original. Moreover one can expect the favour from the representative but

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250 STUDIES IN JAINISM not from the fact of having simple name. Further, Stha pana can be made of an established entity while in giving a simple nama this is not necessary. The Jaina authors have applied the Nayas to these Niksepas. There are two main Nayas - the dravyanaya or the substantial view and the parya yanaya - the modal view. According to the ayyanaya, nama, stha pana and dravia niksepas deal with the substance or the dravya and according to parya ya naya the bhava niksepa is dealing with the paryaya or the mode or state. Here the question is asked as to how rama and sthapana can deal with the dravya or substance. The answer is the nama once given refers to the same thing upto its end and same is the case with Stha pana or symbol. So they refer the dravya, the substance and not the paryaya or mode which is present for the time being. Here again the question my be asked - if all these three, mama, stha pana and dravya deal with the drvaya then there will be no difference between them. The answer is : We see the particular form, have the particular intention and have the indentification with a particular thing and also have a respect or otherwise and have the result according to our excepectations with reference to Stha pana, but such is not the case with reference to the simple name and substance. So Stha pana is different from nana and dravya. Dravya is the substantial cause of the bha va or mode and bhava is one of the modifiations of the substance, but such is not the case with nama and sthapana, Alternative explanation of the niskepas is also given by Jinabhadra. He says, nama is the title given to an entity stha pana is its form, causality is its dravya and it being an effect is bhava. Jinabhadra has discussed the views of upholders of the namanaya etc. where each one of these views rejects the other views and establishes its own validity. In this case the view of sthapananaya is mentioned. Thus nothing in this world is without the form (akara ) as the form-less entity does not exist because it is not known in any way and so it is just like the skyflower which does not exist. But at the end Jinabhadra concludes that in the Jaina view all the nayas are accepted and no one of them is rejected; whatever exists in this world is included in these four

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THE JAINA THEORY OF SYMBOL 251 .modes--nama etc. and ultimately there is nothing outside the scope of language and knowledge. According to the Jainas the Tirthankara or the Siddha is Viraraga and so is quite indifferent towards the worship. So the question is : why one should worship such a person who has no interest in us? The God or Siva, Rama and Krisna etc are pleased by the worship. So there is a point in their worship. But why one should worship the one who is Vitaraga ? And in such a position what is the use of having symbols of such persons ? Jinabhadra says that it is true that Jina has no interest in his worship but that does not mean that the person who worships does not have any fruit of his worsbip. The soul of the worshipper is purified by the inood he is having while worshipping the Jina. The nature of the Jina is knowledge etc. and these are the very qualities which are the causes of liberation and so one must have an appreciation for such qualities and worship is nothing more than that. And so the result of worship is the gain of such qualities which are responsible for the lieberation of the worshipper. The Jinas shown the way to liberation. So they are also conceived as the cause of liberation and hence they are to be worshipped. Just as by giving donation to others we ourselves acquire merit even so by worshipping the Jina we ourselves acquire the merit. Bhadrabahu has stated that when one worships the Jina or the Siddha he in this very world gets the wealth, the health etc. and also complete satisfication and in the next life goes to heaven or will have birth in high family or becomes liberated from birth and death. This is so because when engaged in worship his karmas ge destroyed at every moment. Here some one argues as follows. The worship of the Jina or the Siddha is without any result because they are not pleased with the worship and are also not angry if a person does not worship them. Moreover the Siddhas are not benefited by the worship, they are not cven accepting the worship, they are without any form and they are far away from us. So it is useless to worship them. Answer to this arguments is given by Jinabhadra thus : we do not say that the Jina or the Siddha gives the benifit for their worship but we only accept that whatever is gained by the living being is the result of their own action-good or bad. The living beings are the masters of their action and their results

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252 STUDIES IN JAINISM are given by none other than their actions. They themselves should have the result of actions, otherwise they would not reap the fruits of their action or they would get fruits without doing any. thing. The liberation is the result of the worship and that is nothing but the integral mode of the self; so that cannot be given by others. It is to be gained by one's own effort. Jinabhadra has discussed this in details and one should consult this part of his Visesa vasyakabhasya.

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A NOTE ON JAINA MYTHOLOGY D. D. Malvania In Acaranga l and Sutrakrtanga I we do not find Jaina mythology as such but in later literature it was systematised and it is difficult to be precise about the time of such systematisation. Generally, it can be said that during the period of the composition of the Angaba hya texts the Jaina mythology is gradually developed and during the period of Niryukti and Churni and Bhasya it is seen as fully developed. As the Jainas from the beginning believed in Karma and rebirth it was necessary for them to have the conception of the other world. And so they have accepted the hells and heavens from very early times. But it took several centuries to systematise their conception. The theory of Karma and that of mythology, it seems, have simultaneous progress in development. Karmas were classified into two classes - ghati i. e. destructive of the qualities of the soul and aghati - not destructive but creating something which hide the real nature of the soul. When the ghati Karmas are no more the soul becomes pure but it has the body which is the result of the aghati Karmas. In such a case there are assumed Presented in the Seminar on Jaina Logic and Philosophy" (Poona University 1975 )

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254 STUDIES IN JAINISM some souls which have the capacity to save the worldly being from the clutches of the Karmas. An assumption such as this is based on the experience of the followers on seeing a person like Mahavira or Buddha in this world before them and also seeing that some of his followers, though quite pure as preachers, have no interest in preaching their own ideas to the people. Thus the theory of Tirthankarsas or the Buddha is developed and then the mythology is created around this idea. The Jaina mythology conceives that there are 24 such Tirthankars and no more. Here the question of number is interesting but when we see the aneity of the theory of Avataras or the incarnations of God, the Tirthankaras and the Buddha, there remains no doubt that number is the result of the mutual influences. Theory of Tirthankaras is connected with mythology regarding the frame of the whole world (loka) and also with the mythology of time cycle. It is difficult to decide whether the Mythology of the frame of the Loka or that of time cycle was developed first. But probably the mythology of Loka preceded that of the time-cycle because such is also the case with other Hindu and Buddhist ideas about the Loka, while time cycle mythology of the Jainas has some special features. According to the Jaina mythology Loka is situated in the centre of the whole Akasa (space). The centre of the whole Loka is the mount Meru and that is surrounded by Jambudv.pa which in turn is surrounded by the sea Lavana. This Lavana sea is surrounded by the Dha taki dvipa which is surrounded by the sea kalodadhi. This Kalodadhi is surrounded by the Puskaravaradvipa which in turn is surrounded by the sea Puskarodadhi and in this way there are innumerable dvp.as and seas surrounding each other and ending with svayambhu ramana Samudra. But the human population is found only upto the part of the Puskara varadv. pa. So the mythology of the Tirthankaras has to deal with the area only upto the Puskaravaradvipa. The Jambudvipa is divided in seven countries (Varsas or Ksetras or vasyas or vaisas And these countries are delimited by six mountains which are designated as var sadharas. The countries beginning from extreme south are (1) Bharata (2) Haimavata (3) Hari (4) Videha (5) Ramyaka (6) Hairanyavata and (7) Airavata. But of these seven only in nos, 1, 4 and 7 there is possibility of the birth of the Tirthankaras and even these three nos. 1 and 7 have possibility of full cycle of time of avasarpini and utsarprini. The no. 4 Mahavideha is always

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A NOTE ON JAINA MYTHOLOGY 255 having a constant fourth area of time cycle and so even now there exist the Tithankaras. And hence these three, excepting the Devakuru and Uttarakuru in the Mahavideha are called the Karma bhumis and the rest countries are called Bhoga bhumis. Devakuru and Uttarakuru have always susama-susama-the first Ara out of the six Aras. The Harivarsa and Ramyakavarsa have always the second Ara-the Susama. Haimavata and Hairanyavata have always the third Ara-the Susama dusama. Mahavideha in its two parts, the east and west-Videha has always the fourth Ara-the Dusama susama and Bharata and Airavata have possibility of the full cycle of the time i. e. all the six Aras. Thus we can see that different countries are connected with different areas of time cycle. So far we have described the madhyaloka-the middle of the universe. Below this there is Adholoka-the lower world which have the Narakas- the hells and the upper portion of the middle of the universe is called urdhvaloka-the upper world having various types of abodes of the Gods. On the top or at the end of the Loka is the abode of Siddhas, the liberated souls. Thus I have surveyed the mythology about the Universe. For details one should read the canonical Texts like Jambudvipaprajnapti and the later texts like Tattvartha, Tiloyapannatti etc. DISCUSSION ON THE TWO PAPERS (Dr. Malavania explained some points in Hindi) DI. DI. mAlavaNiyA : jaina dharmakA jaisA jaisA Age vikAsa hotA gayA, jaise jaise graMthalekhana kA Age vikAsa hotA gayA vaise yaha bhI vicAra AyA ki mUrtipUjA nahIM honI cAhie / isapara yazovijayajI Adi bahuta likhA hai / mUrti kA aura mUrtipUjA kA virodha karanevAloM se unhoMne kahA : sthApanA ko Apa virodha karate haiM, Apa sthApanA kI pUjA nahIM kareMge, sthApanA ko nahIM mAneMge to Apa jo 'namo siddhANaM, namo arihaMtANaM' Adi japate haiM yaha kyA cIja hai ? yaha bhI eka taraha kI sthApanA hI Apane kara rakhI hai / ataH Apako agara mUrti kI pUjA nahIM karanI hai to yaha namaskAra, nAma aura maMtra chor3a dIjie / jo bhagavAn nahIM mAnate aura jo hareka bAta guru se samajha ke apane Apa kara sakate haiM unake lie mUrtipUjA kI koI

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256 STUDIES IN JAINISM AvazyakatA nahIM hai| lekina aura sabake lie apane guNavRddhi ke lie mUrtipUjA Avazyaka hai| aba vicAra kareMge jaina mythology ke bAre meM / samagra jaina sAhityameMcAhe vaha zvetAMbara ho yA digaMbara-jo AcArAMga hai vaha prathama bAta hai, dvitIya nahIM / use maiMne isalie TaTolA ki usapara se bhagavAn mahAvIra ne kahA~ mythology kA prayoga kiyA hai yA nahIM yaha jAna pdde| mujhe to kucha milA nhiiN| lekina dhIre dhIre Age bar3hane se jaina dharma kI vizeSa rUpa se sthApanA hotI gyii| isI avasthA se tIrthaMkaroM kI zabdAvali zuddha ho gayI / prAcIna AgamoM meM tIrthaMkara zabda bhI nahIM hai, arhat, jina Adi zabda haiM / lekina sAhitya meM tIrthaMkara zabda Ane kI zuruAta hote hI tIrthaMkaroM kI mythology bhI praviSTa ho jAtI hai / bauddha sAhitya meM eka buddhakAya hai, balki usake aneka rUpa hai / paraMtu dUsarI ora se 24 buddha yaha bhI vicAra aayaa| jainoM ne tIrthaMkaroM kI eka ke bAda eka aisI kalpanA kii| to bhI unakI saMsthA 24 huI / udAharaNArtha RSabhadeva ne kahA ki unakA pautra 24 vA tIrthakara hogaa| RSabhadeva ne jaise aMtima tIrthakara ke bAre meM kahA vase hI pahale buddha ne aMtima buddhadeva ke bAre meM khaa| bauddha vicAra aura sAhityameM jaise 1 buddha, 10 avatAra, 24 avatAra, vibhUtiyA~ Adi rUpa meM buddhoM kI saMkhyA baDhI usI taraha jaina vicAra aura sAhitya meM tIrthakaroM kA vikAsa huA / jainoM ne kevala 24 hI tIrthakara nahIM mAne, apitu atIta aura anAgata kAla ke bhI tIrthaMkara mAne / isI saMdarbha meM unhoMne deza aura kAla kI mythology upasthita kii| inameM se pahalI kaunasI yaha eka vicAraNIya prazna hai| tathApi mujhe aisA lagatA hai ki bhUgola pahale AyA aura usake sAtha tIrthaMkaroM kI aura kAla kI mythology ko bAda meM jor3A gyaa| itanA hI maiM sAmAnya rUpa se kaha sakatA huuN| ho sakatA hai ki merA maMtavya galata hai| isa saMbaMdha meM eka savAla uThA --- isa samaya bhArata varSa meM tIrthakara nahIM hai aura ho hI nahIM sktaa| lekina yahA~ nahIM hai to kahA~ hai? saba logoM ke bhagavAna haiM to jainoM ke hI kyoM nahIM? to isI para se vicAra AyA kI hamAre yahA~ abhI bhI tIrthaMkara maujUda haiN| aise eka kalpanA ke sAtha uttarottara yuktiyA~ vaDha jAtI haiN| kisI bhI eka tIrthaMkara ke bAre meM to 170 bAteM uThAyIM gayI hai / pahale jaba tIrthakara kA varNana hotA thA to janma Adi pA~ca-sAta bAteM banAyI jAtI thii| lekina jaise jaise samaya vaDhate gayA vaise vaise eka tIrthaMkara ke bAre meM 170 bAte batAne kA tarIkA zurU huaa| yaha bAta huzrI tIrthaMkaroM kii| aba vicAra kareMge bhUgola ke bAre meM / hinduoM meM to saptadvIpA pRthvI hai| isa se jainoM kA santoSa nahIM huA aura unhoMne asaMkhyAta dvIpavAlI pRthvI

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A NOTE ON JAINA MYTHOLOGY 257 kI kalpanA kI / lekina unhoMne yaha bhI kahA ki ase asaMkhyAta dvIpa hote huo bhI manuSya vasti DhAI dvIpoM meM hI hai| eka jaMbudvIpa, usake Upara dUsarA dvIpa, usake cAroM ora samudra aura usa para aura eka dvIpa / lekina usa ke Adhe bhAga meM hI manuSya vasti hai| ata: jainoM kA bhUgola kA nakzA aDhAI dvIpoM kA hai| kArana ina DhAI dvIpoM meM hI unhoMne manuSya vasti mAnI hai| usake Age nhiiN| asA kyoM? unhoMne eka daphe jo bAta batAyI usa meM parivartana nahIM kiyaa| inake alAvA honevAle dvIpoM meM koI balazAlI zakti-deva jaisI-kisI ko le jA sakatI hai| lekina ase dvIpa meM kisI kA janma nahIM ho sktaa| usake bAda bhUgola meM unhoMne kAla kA bA~TavArA kiyaa| unake matAnusAra jisa meM kAla kA unhoMne bA~TavArA kiyA vaha jaMbudvIpa DhAlI kI taraha gola hai| usake madhya meM meru hai| usake pUrva aura pazcima bhAga meM hamezA tIrthakara hote haiN| usake uttara-dakSiNa meM sAmAnya manuSyabhUmi hai| yaha bhogabhUmi hai| gola ke dakSiNa meM hama bhArata varSa meM rahane vAle loga haiM / Upara AryAvarta hai| ina donoM ko pUrA kAlacakra lAgU hogaa| yAne kisI ko bhI nikRSTa aura utkRSTa sukhakA anubhava yahA~ alaga alaga kAloM meM ho sakatA hai| bAkI ke madhya meM haiM, jinako thoDA sukha aura thoDA dukha inakA anubhava hotA hai| isaliye ise karmabhUmi kahate haiN| donoM ends meM karmabhUmi hai| bIca meM ke logoM ko sukha kA ArA milegA, lekina tIrthakara nhiiN| tIrthaMkaroM kA lAbha meru ke donoM ora honevAloM ko hI milegA / hama loga aura UparavAle durbhAgI haiN| unheM cauthe kAla meM tIrthaMkaroM kA lAbha milegA : yaha karmabhUmi hai / isakA rahasya yahI hai ki isa bhUmi meM manuSya hareka prakAra ke sukha-dukhakA anubhava kara sakatA hai| itanA hI nahIM lekina yahA~ kA AdamI jahA~ jAnA cAheM jA sakatA hai / cAhe mokSa yA naraka / kucha bhUmi aMsI hai ki jahA~ ase kRtya nahIM ho sakate ki jinake kAraNa kisI ko naraka mile| yahI bhUmi jaisI hai ki jahA~ hama saba prakAra ke karma kara sakate haiN| aura saba prakAra ke karmoM kA lAbha bhI uThA sakate hai| yaha usa kI vizeSatA hai| mukti lene ke lie kisI ko bhI mahAvidarbha meM janma lenA hogaa| isa taraha se unhoMne kAla aura bhUgola kI mythology nirmita kii| darabArIlAla koThiyA: tIrthaMkara ke avatIrNa hone ke samaya indrAdi kA Asana hila jAtA hai aura indra svayaM tIrthaMkara para abhiSeka karate haiM yaha bAta kabase AyI ? DI. DI. mAlavaNiyA: ... yaha bAta jaina purANa likhe jAne lage tabhI se zurU huzrI / purAne jaina Agama meM isakA koI jikra nahIM hai| J..17

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258 STUDIES IN JAINISM darabArIlAla koThiyA : saptadvIpa kI racanA RSabha deva ke pitA priyavratajI ne kI isake bAre meM jaina purANa meM kyA dikhalAI detA hai ? DI. DI. mAlavaNiyA : ___ jaina purANoM ke anusAra dika yA jagat kI racanA kabhI huI hI nhiiN| vaha anAdi hai| RSabha deva ke pitA kA nAma nAbhi hai, priyavrata nhiiN| unakA saba se purAnA caritra aMga meM nahIM upAMga meM milatA hai| upAMga aMga ke bAda . kamalacaMda sogAnI : kyA sarvajJatA myth nahIM hai ? DI. DI. mAlavaNiyA : kamalacaMda sogAnI : __mahAvIra praNIta tIrthaMkara kA ullekha sarva prathama kisa meM AtA hai ? vIra mahAna kA nAma kahA~ AyA hai ? DI. DI. mAlavaNiyA : ___ mere matAnusAra ye purANa kI bAteM haiN| usa ke pahale kI nahIM / prazna: aDhAI dvIpa kI kalpanA kA saMbaMdha yuropa, AziyA, AphikA aura amarikA se hai ? sAgaramala jaina : isakA spaSTIkaraNa meM karanA cAhatA huuN| mere matAnusAra yaha unheM jJAta vizva kI kalpanA hai| unhoMne zAyada yuropa-AziyA ko eka dvIpa ginA / unheM amarikA kA pUrA patA na calA ho / isaliye unhoMne use AdhA dvIpa ginA / unheM Aja ke AsTreliyA kA patA hI na ho| DI. DI. bhAlavaNiyA : ___ mere matAnusAra yaha bAta ThIka nhiiN| unhoMne pRthvI kA kiyA huA varNana pramANa ke pratyakSa AdhArapara kiyA hai, anumAna yA anya kisI pramANa ke AdhArapara nhiiN|

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A NOTE ON JAINA MYTHOLOGY 259 . sAgaramala jaina : sarvajJatA ke AdhArapara kyoM nahIM ? DI. DI. mAlavaNiyA : dvIpa varNana meM sarvajJatA ko mAnanA ThIka nahIM / aisA mAnanA sarvajJatA kA upahAsa hai / jaise, Age ke kAla meM tIrthaMkara nahIM hoMge aisA mahAvIra kA koI vacana nahIM hai| aiso bAteM Age ke AcAryoM ne kahI hoNgii| prazna: devAnaMdA ne dekhe svapna ke pratIka kitane prAcIna hai ? DI. DI. mAlavaNiyA: unakA ullekha sarva prathama kalpa sUtra meM milatA hai ; tathApi zrI. munivijayajI mahArAja saMpAdita kalpa sUtra meM eka noTa meM likhA hai ki kalpa sUtra ke saba se prAcIna prati meM svapna kA ullekha /varNana nahIM miltaa| Aja kala ke kalpa sUtra meM hai / to bhI usa meM kaba se AyA yaha kahanA kaThina hai / buddha ke mAtA ne dekhe svapnoM kI bAta bhI jAtakoM kI hai, prAcIna kAla kI nhiiN| prazna : jaina darzana meM svastika kA kyA rahasya hai ? vaha hiTalara ke svastika se kaise bhinna hai ? darabAraliAla koThiyA : jaina darzana meM pracalita svastika kA rahasya isa prakAra spaSTa kiyA jA sakatA hai| jana darzana meM vastu kI vyavasthA tIna taraha se--- pratipAdana, heya aura upAdeya -- kI gayI hai| heya-upAdeya dRSTi se sAta tattvoM kA, jJeya kI dRSTi se chaH dravyoM kA, pratipAdana kI dRSTi se nau padArthoM kA varNana kiyA jAtA hai / ina meM se heya-upAdeya saba se mahattvapUrNa hai| mUlata: jIva-ajIva ye do tattva hai| jIva kA svabhAva mUlataH Urdhvagamana kA hai aura svastika meM honevAlI khaDI lakIra usakA nidarzaka hai| usa meM honevAlI ADI lakIra jIva ke Urdhvagamana ko pratibaMdhaka vastuoM kI dyotaka hai / jIva kA ajIva se saMyoga karma hai / ajIvagata sAta tattvoM meM pudgala, usake dharma, kAla AdikA vivecana AtA hai| pudgala jIva ke Urdhvagamana ko nahIM rokatA hai| jIva-ajIva ko joDa ke paidA honevAlI do lakIroM ke cAra aMta meM honevAlI AdhI lakIreM deva, manuSya, pazu aura naraka gati kI dyotaka haiM / svastika ke Upara tIna biMdue rakhI jAtI haiN| ye tIna biMdueM samyak darzana, samyak jJAna aura samyak cAritya kI dyotaka haiN| usake

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260 STUDIES IN JAINISM Upara honevAlA ardhacaMdrAkAra isakA dyotaka hai ki ina tInoM ko prApta karanevAle jIvakA hI Urdhvagamana hotA hai| R. Sundara Rajan : Swastik is really what is called a hooked-cross. The swastik symbol of Hitler was adopted from the supposedly secret document of the Jews, called the protokols of the centre of Heion. In order to differentiate his symbol Hitler not only changed it but also called the symbol occurring in the Protokol evil. S. S. Barlingry : I found both clock-wise and anti-clock-wise Swastiks in Indonesian temples--both of Hindus and Buddhists.

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INDEX Abhayadeva Suri - 114, 216, 217. Acaranga Sutra - 3, 4, 5, 44, 227. 188, 229, 253. Acarasara - 47. Acit - 8. Actuality 151, 153. Adharma - 2, 4, 5, 42, 48, 53, 63, 65, 71. Adharmastika ya - 10. Adhyatmasara 177. Adipurana - 227. Ahimsa - 45, 203, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243 244 245, 246, 247. Ajiva -35, 38, 46, 77, 87, 97, 259. A kalanka 14, 63, 101, 106, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 130, 131, 134, 135, 137, 158, 166, 196, 198, 199, 200, 202, 206, 207, 212, 215. Akasa - 4, 5, 9, 10, 42, 48, 57, 65, 75, 97, 254. Akasa, Functions of 59-60, 91. Akasa, Jaina Description of - 58 Akasapradesa Aksapada 107. 60-61. Alaya vijnana - 78. Alokakasa - 61, 63, 64. Amrtacandra - 168, 171, 241. Anandaghana - 178. Anantavirya - 113, 114, 160. Anekanta 125, 131, 132, 134, 139, 144, 168, 174, 175, 197, Anekantava da 35, 101, 118, 119, 124, 125, 131, 143, 145, 172, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202. ,not scepticism 201-202. Anuvrata 229, 233. Anuyogadvara - 2. 171. Anuyogadvaravrtti - 205. Anyayogavyavacchedika Aptamimamsa - 7, 107, 108, 139, 168, 194, 195, 199. 104. Aristanemi Aristotle 142, 143, 149, 150, 159. Artha 2, 84, 85, 92, 93. Arthakriya 195. Asadhara Asanga - 107. 114. Astasati 158, 198. Astasahasri - 180. - - Astikaya 2, 4, 32, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 68, 69. 49-55. Astikaya, Concept of Asubha - 237, 246, 247. Asvaghosa 107. Atharvaveda - 103. Atomic Combination, Jaina Concept of 1-2, 37-48. Avasyaka Curni - 64. Badarayana - 107. Barlingay, S. S. 122, 189.

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262 STUDIES IN JAINISM Bhadrababu - 251. Dhrauvya --- 6,91, 140, 146, 170, Bhagavata, Srimad - 103. 193, 195. Bhagavati Sutra - 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, Dinnaga --110. 33, 41, 43, 44, 55, 71, 170, Dravya -- 2,9, 11, 13, 16, 32, 43, 180. 51, 88, 90, 92, 145, 150, 153, Bhartphari - 110. 171, 181, 182, 185, 193, 194, Bhava - 11, 88, 182, 193, 250. 195, 196, 197, 201, 207, 238, 239, 249, 250. Bhavasena - 114. Bhuta - 8, 9. Dravyasamgraha - 7, 52. Drsti, Samyak --- 202. Bhutavada - 8. Blanshard, B. - 242. Durnaya - 101, 157, 166, 201, 210. . Bradley, F. H. - 78. Dvadasanayacakra - 156. Buddha, Bhagavan - 104, 175, Einstein, Albert - 172. 176, 177, 187, 228, 231, 254. Caritra, Samyak - 84, 203, 259, Ethics, Jaina - 237, 242. Event, Possible --- 148. Carukirti - 114. Frankena, W. - 240. Carvaka - 8, 9, 228, 245. Gandhi, M. K. - 231. Chandogya Upanisad - 105. Gonunatasara -- 174, 188. Christ, Jesus - 231. Gedhrapiccha, Acarya - 107. Contingency, Possibility as - Guna - 5, 21, 89, 91, 97, 143, 154. 145, 146, 150, 169, Course of Events, possible - 148. 171, 184. Darsana, Samyak - 84, 259. Gunavrata -- 229. Dasavaika likasutra - 229. Haribhadra - 108, 113, 205. Dharma - 2, 4, 5, 42, 48, 63, Hegel, W. -- 159. 65, 71, 91, 135, 140, 144, 145, Hemacandra -69, 166, 171. 149, 169, 184, 187, 197, 198, Himsa, Arambha - 230. 199, 209, 210, 211, 213, 216, , Suksma - 230 217, 218, 219. Sthala - 230. Dharmabbusana - 134. Hintikka, J. - 143, 149. Dharmastikaya - 10. Hiriyanna, M. - 229. Dharmakirti -- 110, 111, 112, Individual, Particular - 149. 113, 171. Jadadravya -8. Dharmottara - 110. Jaimini - 107 Dhavala - 170. Jaina, M. K. - 158.

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INDEX 263 Jaina Nyaya, Origin of, 105-106 Laghiyastraya --- 213. , Stages of its Development Leibnitiz, W. - 153 -- 106-114. Logic, Many-Valued-163, 165, Jalpanirnaya -- 109. 166, 190. Jambudvipaprajsiapti - 255 Logic, Modal -- 165, 166. iva - 2, 4, 5, 35, 38, 46, 47, , the Jaina Concept of 48n, 49, 63, 71, 77, 87, 97, 101, 116-127. 259, 260. , Three--valued--159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 190. Jiva (self), Empirical and , Two - valued -- 161, 162, Spiritual, Distinction Between 163 -- 79-80. Jiva, Jaina Concept of-77-82. Loka - 3, 4, 254. Jzana, Samyak 84, 203, 259. Lokakasa ---40, 51, 61-63, 64. Kala - 10, 11, 33, 42, 43, 97, Lovejoy, A. 0. -153. 181, 193. Lucasiewicz, J. - 157, 158, 159, Kala, Addha samaya ---4. 160, 165, 189. Kalpa -- 73. Madhyamika --- 137, 200. Kalpasutra -- 259 Mahabhasya Patanjala - 195. Kamalasila - 110. Maha purana -- 47. Mabavira, Bhagavan - 104, Kanada - 107, 201. 106, 130, 137, 170, 175, 176, Kant, I. -- 159. 177, 193, 199, 248, 249. Karma --- 18, 37, 39, 44, 45, 46 Maha vrata -- 233. 48, 253, 254, 255. Majjhimanika ya -- 175. Karmavipaka - 39. Mallavadin -- 109, 156, 159. Karnakagomin -- 110 Kaya - 5, 9, 35. Mallisena --- 114, 157, 168. Manikyanandi - 113, 114. Kayatva --- 32 Kriya -- 15, 32, 37, 48n. Matilal, B. K. - 124, 125, 126, 127. Ksama -- 228 Matncela - 107. Ksetra - 11, 16. Matter, Jaina Concept of-8-25. Kumaranandi -- 113. , Transformation of -- 22-23. Kumarila - 110, 111. Maya -8. Kundakunda - 16, 63, 68, 173, Metaphysics, Jaina -- 1, 13, 19. 192. Mode, Alethic - 142. Kutasthanitya -- 24. , Deontic -- 142.

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264 STUDIES IN JAINISM , Epistemic - 142, 147. , Existential -- 142. Mookerji, Satkari -- 122. Munidharma --- 226, 228, 233, 235, 236. Mythology, Jaina --- 226, 253- 260. Nagarjuna - 107. Naigamanaya - 166. Nathmal, Muni - 156. Naya - 35, 102, 117, 157, 158, 159, 166, 201, 207, 210, 212. Nayabhasa - 117, 118. Nayasaptabharigi -- 159, 160, contohhovioi 159 160 161. Nayavada -- 101, 121, 122, 143 156, 161, 162, 163, 170, 179. and Many-valued Logic-156-164. Nayavivarana - 158. Necessity -- 142, 143. Nemi Candra - 174, 188. Niksepa - 226, 248, 249, 250. Nipata - 131, 136, 139, 157, 168. Nirjara -- 45. Niyamasara - 53. Nyayabhasya -- 105. Nyayakunudacandra --- 34, 114, 166, 206, 213. Nya yaviniscaya -- 34, 106, 113, 166. Occasion-sentence -- 143, 152, 153.. Omniscience (Sarvajnata), as a myth - 258, 259 , Jaina Concept of - 80-82. , Objections Against the Jaina concept - of 81, 82. Ontology, Jaina - 13, 48. Padartha - 2, 83, 85, 86, 87, 91, 92, 93, 95, 146, 197, 259. Paaca (maha) bhutas - 8, 56, 57, 58. Pancadhatus - 8 Pancastikaya - 4, 10, 50, 105, 168. Pancastika yasara -- 180. Panicaskandha -8, 10. Pandeya, R.C. - 122. Paramanu Anu - 5, 15, 16, 19, 21 - 22, 33, 34, 41, 43, 47, 50, 202, Parinama -- 2, 14, 33, 40, 48, , Pudgala - 22, 23. Parispanda - 20 Parsvanatha - 104. Paryaptisambandha - 210, 211. Paryaya -- 5, 6, 10, 11, 21, 48, 89, 91, 97, 145, 146, 149, 169, 171, 181, 182, 185, 194, 195, 196, 210, 250. Patraswami - 109. Plentitude, Principle of -- 153. Possibility - 141, 142, 143, 147, 167, 168. , Absolute -- 142, 143, 148, 155. , Apriori - 142 , Conceptual - 142, 143, . 148, 154, 155. , Epistemic - 142, 153. , Etiological -- 148, 154.

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INDEX 265 . Existential -- 154. Pudgala - 4, 8, 10, 12, 17, 18, , Nomological -- 142, 143, 23, 34, 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 148, 153, 155. 54, 63. Proper - 143,149, 153, 154. Pudgala stika ya -- 10. , Relative - 142, 143, 149 Pujyapada - 13, 63, 85, 92, 155. 93. Technical - 142. Quine, W. 0. von - 143, 152. Possibility, as capability, ability Recognition - 146, 150, or disposition - 147. Reichenbach, H. -- 106. , as minimal Probability Reidentification -- 146, 150. . 142, 153. Relativist, Historical -- 151. Potentiality -- 142, 147, 151, 153, Rgveda - 57, 103. Prabhacandra - 101, 113, 114, 206. Rsabha Deva - 103, 105, 227, 256, 258. Pradesa -- 5, 19, 32, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 46, 47, 48. Rapa - 8, 12, 14, 24, 33. Russell, B. -- 33. Prajnakara Gupta - 110. Samadeva, Yasastilaka --- 230, Prajna pana -- 38, 39, 43, 45, 231. 139. Samantabhadra - 7, 106, 107, Prakrti -8, 12, 22, 23, 36, 108, 109, 110, 111, 130, 137, 41, 78. 168, 194, 195, 199, 200. Prama - 116. Samanya, Tiryak - 218, 219 Pramana - 118, 120, 121, 139, , Urdhva --- 218, 219. 157, 158, 205, 206, 207, 208, Samayasara-- 171. 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221. Samkara -- 95, 123, 183, 200. Pramana and Naya, Difference Samgrahanaya - 166, 201. between -- 206-222. Sanjaya - 137. Pramanasaptabhargi -- 159, 161, Sanmati -- 109, 211, 215. 162. santaraksita - 110. Pramanavarttika --- 111, Saptabhangi -- 102, 117, 118. Pramanya - 101, 119, 120, 210. 119, 121, 122, 124, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 144, 160, 168, Prameyakamalamartanda - 166. 180-189, 100, 210, 211, 212, Prasastapada - 39. 213. Pravacanasara - 105, 180.. Saptabhargi and Three-valued Pravrttivijnana - 78. Logic -- 189-190.

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266 STUDIES IN JAINISM Saptabhargivada - 199-201. Sarasaingraha - 109. Sat -- 15, 83, 91, 92, 146, 197, 200, 239. Satkhandagama - 105. Scepticism -- 151, 161. Schweitzer, A.- 232. Sentences, Eternal --- 152. Shah, V. P.-- 248. Shastri, Pt. Kailash Chandra --- 158. Siddhasena - 14, 33, 106, 109, 157, 199, 215, 216, 220. Siddhiviniscaya - 113, 166, 205, 221. Siksa vrata -- 229. Simhanandi, Acarya - 229. Skandha - 20, 21, 23, 34, 42, 47, 51, 54. Slokavarttika, Mimaisa -194. Space and Time, Jaina Concep tion of -- 56-73. Sravakadharma--- 226, 228, 233, 235, 236. Sridatta -- 109. Stha pana - 249, 255. Stha pananiksepa - 226. subha - 220, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 245n, 247. Sumati - 109. Sunyavada and Syadvada - 175. Sutrakitanga -- 3, 4, 5, 25n, 44, 45, 175, 231, 253. Suttanipata -- 176. Syadva da - 71, 101, 102, 106. 110. 111, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 148, 149, 152, 153, 154, 157, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 189, 198-99, 202, 203. Syadvada and Anekantavadu, the Relation Between - 1.4, 174, 175. Syadvada and Saptabhangi, the Relation Between -- 134-136. Syadvada and Sinyavada - 175-76. Syadvada, Analysis of -- 130-37. , Analysis of Syat in-141-54. , Grounds of -- 169-74. Prayojana of -- 131-34. , Examples of -- 133-34. , Goal of -- 176-78. , Meaning of the term - 167-69. , Nature of -- 130-31. , Utility of, in everyday life-- 179. , Utility in Politics - 178-79. Syadva damasjari - 166, 168, 173. Syadva dam mainsa -- 130-37. Syat, Analysis of -- 141-154. Tarka - 116. Tattva - 2, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92-93, 146, 187, 188. Tattvasamgraha -. 110. Tattvarthasutra - 1, 6, 7, 14, 16, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 83, 89, 193, 205, 241, 255.

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INDEX 267 Tattvarthasutrabhasva - 33, 42, 205, 213, 215. Tattvarthasutravarttika -- 202, 206. Tattvarthasutravivarana --- 209. Time, Digambara Concept of .. 67-69. , Jaina cycle of - 72-73. Jaina Doctrine of - 64. Sveta mbara Concept of 69-70. Truth, Criterion of -- 151, 152. Truth-value - 150, 151, 153, 157, 159, 160, 165. , Change of -- 150-51. Udyotakara -- 110. Umasvati - 2, 7, 13, 34, 83-93, 96, 205. Upanisadis -- 9, 187. Utpadu -- 6, 91, 140, 146, 170, 193, 194. Uttaradhyayanasutra -- 1, 5, 6. Vadideva Suri - 207, 209. Vadiraja - 113. Vasubandhu -- 107. Vastu - 146, 208. Vaisesikasutra - 37, 38. Vaisesikasutrabhasya --- 38. Vatsyayana - 107. Vibhajjavada and Syadva da-175. Vidyabhusana, S. C. -- 122. Vidyananda - 106, 131, 158, 160, 161, 168, 200. Vimaladasa --- 114. Virasena - 113. Vyakhya prajnaptisutra- 50. Vyapti --116, 120, 214. Vyaya - 6, 91, 140, 146, 170, 193. Wright, Georg von --- 142. Yasomitra - 12. Yasovijaya - 114, 117, 156, 177, 209, 211, 212, 215, 218.

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Socioec e2666666 INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS :: SOME CLASSICAL INDIAN PERSPECTIVES Edited by Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University 1978, Demy, 8vo, Paperback, 101 pp. Rs. 10-00 * ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS WITHIN THE REACH OF EVERYONE : Claude Buffer, A Neglected 18th Century Post-Cartesian Philosophical work translated with introduction by S. V. Bokil, Fergusson College, Poona (India) AVAILABLE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ENGLISH 1980, Demy, 8vo, Paperback, xiv + 103 pp. Rs. 25-00 $ 6-30 THREE LECTURES ON JOHN RAWLS | A. P. Rao, 1980, Demy, 8vo, Paperback, 55 pp. Rs. 10-00, $ 3-00 SAS5661485CASACAS4066ACASA540ASASASARA36 LANGUAGE, TRADITION AND MODERN CIVILIZATION Edited by Ramchandra Gandhi (India) 1983, 'Demy, 8vo. Paperback, xiii + 185 pp. Rs. 50-00 BELIEFS, REASONS & REFLECTIONS S. S. Barlingay (India) 1983, Demy, 8vo, Paperback, xii + 252 pp. Rs. 70-00 $ 30-00 * FORTHCOMING * PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYA Proceedings of a Seminar organized by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University : the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late Kalidas Bhattacharya's Philosophical thought and inculdes his own final formulation of his Philosophical position. (Ed.) Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastay Demy, 8vo, Paperback, 200 pp. (Approx)