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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF JIVA AND SARVAJNATA
accept it to be logically possible. When the soul is in pure state and where there are no obstructions, omniscience is inevitable and natural because soul is constitutionally a knowing being.
It is very interesting to study the various objections raised by the Mimāṁsakas and the answer given by the Jainas and Buddhists side by side. The arguments based on classical pramăņas are also very interesting. Leaving them aside, I have chosen to advance a few positive Jaina arguments for the existence of the omniscient being. The argument from the nature of soul as consciousness implies that consciousness and soul are not different things which can be separated from each other, nor are they related together by some external relation like Samavāya. The soul is either conscious or unconscious before it is being related to consciousness through external relation. Now, the soul cannot already be conscious before it is related to consciousness by samavāya, because then samavā ya need not be there. If, on the other hand, it is unconscious, it may be so either due to unconsciousness being its very nature or due to unconsciousness being its property. If the latter is the case, inherence is again useless, since the soul is already accepted as unconscious; but if, on the other hand, unconsciousness is its very nature then it is similar to saying that consciousness is its very nature. In short, there cannot be any valid objection to accepting consciousness as the nature of the soul. Hence the soul and knowledge are not separable from each other like fire and heat but are co-extensive with each other. But this essentially knowing ability of the soul is crippled by it's long association with the Karmic-matter and comes back to its original glory when the obstacles are removed. Both positive and negative analogy have been given. As fire burns fuel when there is no obstacle, similarly the knowing-self will know anything, when all obstructions are removed. Negatively just as a diamond covered with dust does not reflect its usual lusture, so the self covered with knowledge-obscuring karmas etc. does not know anything. The argument from inferability (anumeyatva) is as follows. The existence of an omniscient being is established from the fact that to some beings, invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time and place become known as objects of direct perception. This knowledge could not have been derived through the senses because there is no sense-object-contact. This leads to the inference J- 6
| SR No. | 002008 |
| Book Title | Studies in Jainism |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | M P Marathe, Meena A Kelkar, P P Gokhle |
| Publisher | Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication Puna |
| Publication Year | 1984 |
| Total Pages | 284 |
| Language | English |
| Classification | Book_English, Philosophy, & Religion |
| File Size | 16 MB |