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SOME AMPHIBIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN UMASVATI
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I agree with Dr. Barlingay's contention that if the contention of the author gives rise to inconsistency then only there is a philosophical trouble and that we cannot succeed in getting rid of ambiguity completely. And yet, at the same time, I say that if on the one hand we are saying that jiva, a jiva etc. are dravyas and on the other that they are tattvas then there does remain some ambiguity and a misleading ambiguity. Similarly, it is equally misleading to say that ākāșa, dharma, adharma are dravyas. Are we saying that ākāşa is a dravya in exactly the same sense in which jiva is a dravya ? If we are saying that something is a dravya because it is spatial as well as temporal and if we are saying that ākāsa too is a dravya then the question does remain whether akāsa is called dravya because it is spatial and/or temporal.
Dr. V. P. Jain raised a question that although every dravya has or is said to have guņa as well as paryāya, with reference to dharma, adharma and äkā sa it is said that it is not they themselves that have gumas as well as pr yayas, but the things which are in ākāsa or in kāla, are supposed to have gumas and paryāyas. In such a situation my only objection is : here is a case of transferred epithet. Is it philosophically right to treat both these cases on par?
Dr. Sundara Rajan raised a question whether I believe in different kinds of existents. My answer is no. I count only those things to be existent which are part of the furniture of the worldYet in ordinary language we use · exists' or its near synonyms not only with reference to those objects which are part of the furniture of the world but even with reference to other objects.
wanting to draw attention of the scholars to such a phenomenon that is philosophically misleading as also the one that is noticeable in Umāsvāti.
