Studies in Jainism

SR No.: 002008
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: M P Marathe, Meena A Kelkar, P P Gokhle
Publisher: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication Puna
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 284
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Religion
File Size: 16 MB

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STUDIES IN JAINISM
What seems to have guided Umāsvāti's view is that both Tattvas and Padarthas can be enumerated. Prima facie this contention is sound as far as it goes. Enumerative rather than classificatory statement of Padārthas appears to be common to the discussion of Padarthas by the Prācina Niāva and that by Umāsväti. Similarly, the Sāmkhyas as also Umāsvāti adopt the enumerative pattern while enlisting their Tattvas. But this seems to be too weak a ground for Padārthas being equated with Tattyas. Equation of Tattvas with Padārthas seems to be Umāsvāti's innovation. But let it not be forgotten that innovations, philosophical or otherwise, should be meaningful and tenable. The only point which Umāsvāti seems to bring to the focus successfully is that both Tattvas and Padarthas can be mentioned by enumeration. But this does not warrant the equation of the two.
As one proceeds in one's study of Umāsvāti's works one begins to notice yet weaker links in his explanatory observations. Whereas consideration of Tattvas presupposes no use of communicative language and the scheme of concepts it brings in, that of Padārthas, does presuppose them. For, by Tattvas one may minimally mean the topics around which a philosophical discussion is designed to centre. It is irrelevant and redundant whether any statements are made about them or whether anything is attempted to be, communicated about them. Regarding Padarthas, on the contary the case seems to be different. They presuppose language and communication, no matter whether successful or not. This being the case, it seems misleading to suppose that Tattvas and Padārthas are the same. Further, there can be no language, which is bereft of concepts. Any consideration of and in terms of Padārthas, therefore, presupposes some concepts. Perhaps, it presupposes an interrelation between or among such concepts also. But it is doubtful whether a consideration of Tattvas also presupposes any concepts and the interrelation between or among them.
Supposing, again, even if one grants, for the sake of argument, that there is some relation, proximate or remote, between Tattvas and Padārthas, it does not follow that one should accept as many Tattvas as Padārthas. Further it is irrelevant for any philosophical inquiry to talk in terms of both of them. The number of items which the employment of significant expressions in a language designates and the number of topics or items that figure in a philo