Sudha Sagar Hindi English Jaina Dictionary

Author(s): Rameshchandra Jain
Publisher: Gyansagar Vagarth Vimarsh Kendra Byavar

Page 210

(191) reveal itself as well as its object. thing, they would always determine the Akala nka, although he accepts this as mode or an aspect of it, not determined one of the defining characteristics of by the other. So, for us, says Aklanka, valid cognition, considers harmony or the phrase, grasping the-hitherto non-discrepancy (avisa mvā da) to be ungrasped means determining the hitherthe true mark of valid cognition. For to-undetermined mode. Akalanka him non-discrepancy ( 3faciais) is to seems to relax this condition in the case be true mark of valid cognition. For
of memory. Thus he is not serious about him non-discrepancy of cognition
the condition in the case of memory. So, means its not being sublated by other
it ultimately-boils down to this that the valid cognitions as also its self-consis- essential characteristics of valid cognitency. By non-discrepancy he also tion, according to Akalan ka, are its means the correspondence of cognition non-discrepancy, its ability toenable us with the nature of its object. Sometimes to attain the object capable of purposive he also means by non-discrepancy the activity, and its determinate nature. It is coherence between the cognitive and
interesting to note that to be consistent conative activities. In addition to non- with the doctrine of non-absolutism discrepancy, definiteness or determi- Akala ka considers all empirical cognateness is regarded by him as one of nitions to be valid as well as invalid. No the essential characteristics of valid empirical cognition is absolutely valid cognition. He observes that even non- or absolutely invalid. Yet we call a discrepancy of cognition is impossible cognition valid, if it by far corresponds without its possessing a determinate with the concerned external object and nature. He has also introduced in his we call it invalid if it is mostly not in definition of valid cognition the adjec- consonance with the form of the contival phrase - 'grasping the hitherto cerned external object. The realisation ungrasped in order to qualify valid that the powers of the sense organs are cognition. The influence of limited seems to have led Akalar ka to Dharmaki rti is evident here. It might
famulate such a view. But Akalan nka be said that for the Buddhists who are
would not deny the absolute validity of momentarists it is alright to consider the highest transcendental perception valid cognition to be a cognition per
called Kevala-Joa na which requires taining to quite a new object. But for the
not media or sense organs and mind to Jainas reality is relatively permanent.
grasp its object. This suggests that the Hence it is not proper for Akalan ka to
theory of non-absolutism is not to be insert the adjectival phrase pertaining applied without discrimination. For if it to a novel object in his definition of
were so applied even the perfect knowlvalid cognition. Akalan ka replies that edgeof an omniscient being would have reality, since it is relatively permanent, to be regarded as partly valid and partly possesses innumerable modes. Hence invalid. But here the operation of noneven if two or more cognitions could absolutism ceases. Hence, it is said that operate in relation to one and the same even Anekā nta itself is anekā nta, that