Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 19

INDIAN LOGIC
fact remains that in Jayanta's Nyāya school perceptual cognition proper was always looked upon as a process of bare passive inspection while the inference-like steps here under consideration were noticed in the context of solving a rather secondary problem, viz. in the context of looking for a process in relation to which perceptual cognition proper could be said to act as a cause.
Jayanta has been discussing the question as to what in perceptual cognition constitutes pramāṇa and what pramānaphala; he is, therefore, reminded of a Buddhist position maintained in this connection, a position only briefly touched upon by him while treating the problem of pramāņa in general. The noteworthy point is that both Jayanta and the Buddhist hold broadly the same view as to how perceptual cognition is generated; for according to both it is generated when the object concerned acting on a sense-organ enables the cognizer concerned to identify this object as of this type or that (i.e. as belonging to this class or that). Both also agree in supposing that a cognition is a mental state generated under the conditions just described, again in supposing that a cognition is of the forin of an apprehension of the object concerned. But to the question as to what acts as karana (=instrumental cause) in relation to a cognition - i.e. as to what constitutes pramāna - the two give very different answers because they view the matter from very different angles. The Buddhist emphasizes that the karana of a cognition ought to be what is engaged in producing the apprehension of the object concerned, just as the karana of a cut-in-the-tree is the axe which is engaged in producing this cut; but then realizing that a cognition is itself of the form of the apprehension of the object concerned he feels that the karana of a cognition cannot be anything other than this cognition itself, which in turn means that the alleged karana of a cognition must be a karana just in appearance. Hence his thesis that a cognition in so far as it is apparently engaged in producing the revelation (=apprehension of the object concerned is a karana, the same in so far as it is of the form of the apprehension of this object is the resultant.16 However, even while thus virtually recognizing the exceptional nature of the notion of karana as applied to the case of a cognition, the Buddhist goes on to add that his explanation has an advantage in that according to it a pramāna and the concerned pramāņaphala are not located in two different seats (they being in fact one and the same thing viewed from two sides). This entire argumentation of the Buddhist is thoroughly foreigo to Jayanta's mode