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INDIAN LOGIC
and (iv) on the ground that otherwise the step (iv) should be a step referring to a past object, not one referring to a present onelo; the second party feared no such contingency'l. In fact, since it is commonsense that the memory concerned is not evoked for its own sake the latter attitude is as much understandable as the former. However, the second party next resorts to a lengthy frivolous argumentation and submits that an intermediate step as here suggesed is in principle impossible where the step (ii) is of the form of an inferential cognition rather than perceptual cognition, his point being that in that case nothing corresponds to the step (i); really, the passage from the step (ii) to (iv) takes place in an essentially similar fashion irrespective of whether the passage from the step (i) to step (ii) is an inferential or a perceptual process.)
In any case, Jayanta next offers certain points which should hold good in the eyes of both the parties in question. Thus the opponent objects : “The topic under discussion is perceptual cognition, but on your own showing the step (iv) is of the form of inferential cognition. How then is all this presently relevant ?"; Jayanta replies : “In the case of this inferential cognition too the relation of invariable concomitance is established with the help of perception; so at the time of establishing that relation the step (iv) is of the form of perceptual cognition."13 The difficulty with this reply is that on the occasion envisaged there arises no question of the step (v) taking place. Jayanta actually considers this difficulty in a somewhat different form, viz. “Why should the step (iv) not always be of the form of perceptual cognition ?"; to this he in essence replies : “When the step (iv) is obviously of the form of inferential cognition it would be improper to treat it as being of the form of perceptual cognition."! (In the meanwhile Jayanta has argued that the relation of invariable concomitance between the thing perceived and the pleasure etc. produced by this thing is established through mental perception, one of the relata being a mental state.)"
Viewed as a whole Jayanta's present discussion throws light on a question of most fundamental importance. Thus when a living organism physically encounters an object it finds the experience either comforting or discomforting in a specific way; and a result of this experience is that when on another occasion this organism has even a superficial observation of this object it is reminded of the past comfort or discomfort, a memory which in turn generates in this organism a
