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CHAPTER III
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Here a natural doubt arises as to why modes which are really different from God should not be claimed to be substànces like God. Rāmānuja's reply to this doubt is that what makes a mode is its complete dependence' on a substance, and that cit and acit-irrespective of their being different from or identical with, or both different from and identical with, God-can, therefore, be only modes but -ot substances. This dependent relation of a mode to its substance is compared to the relation of an adjective (vićeşaņa) to a substantive (viśesya). Although an adjective has, it is believed, some distinctive existence of its own, it cannot be understood without reference to, or rather without dependence upon, the subject (the substantive) it qualifies.'
The relation between the substance (īśvara) and the modes is said to be one of “inseparability” (ap?thaksiddhisambandha)”. This relation is said to hold between a sub
observation: "In general, wherever we cognise the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different". Vedāntasūtras, pp. 42-43 (the italics are mine). Here it is hard to resist the feeling that Rāmānuja himself has fallen into the error of contradiction with which he charges bhedābhedavādins and others. For one wonders if Rāmānuja can fully succeed in reconciling the notion of an anyatvam with that of atyantavilakṣaṇatvam within the limits of the same logic as he
employs against others. 1. Cf. "Matter and self are the adjectives of the absolute only in
the sense that the attribute cannot be known apart from its substance or subject.” Visiştādvaita, p. 233. That the 'modal dependence' suggested by this statement, does not rule out the idea of the monadic uniqueness on the part of an adjective or attribute, is further pointed out by the same critic from whom
the statement is quoted here. Ibid., p. 234. 2. Describing the nature of this sambandha, Hiriyanna observes :
