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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
has aimed at progressively demonstrating the fact that anekāntavāda is the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy.
The claim that Anekāntavāda is the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy hinges mainly on the fact that it has allowed the maximum scope for distinction to play its role. It will take us far afield if we go closely into the problem of elucidating how the analytical function of distinction is inherent in any realistic procedure. This problem deserves to be specifically brought within the focus of the discussion of comparative Indian philosophical thought although some broader questions like how the notion of anekānta is found, in some measure and form, even in some non-anekanta' schools of philosophy, a conscious,
1. The reconciliatory spirit (samanvayadsșți) which consists in an
endeavour to harmonise, by various methods, different or apparently conflicting views in a new synthesis, is found, in however imperfect a manner it may be from the Jaina point of view, among the several non-Jaina schools of philosophy. Some of the notable instances are: (a) the Ajñānavāda (agnosticism) of Sanjaya (vide B. M. Barua's A History of PreBuddhistic Indian Philosophy, Calcutta Univ., 1925), pp. 328-330; and JSJ, Pt. II, Intro. p. XXVIII-IX, (b) the Vibhajyavāda ('the Critical Method of Investigation'as contrasted with what the Buddha himself describes as the Ekantavāda, or the one-sided method, in Majjhima-nikāya, Sutta 99, vide NVVS, Prastāvanā, p. 11) or the Madhyamapratipada (samyutta, vide PMHS, Bhāṣātippaņāni, p. 62) of the Buddha which induced him to treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration' (JSJ, Pt. II, Intro., p. XXIX); (c) the celebrated four-fold (catuṣkoți) antinomial method of the Madhyamika founder, Nāgārjuna (cf. atastattvam sadasadubhayānubhātmakacatuskoțivinirmuktam sūnyameva / Sarva-darsana-sangraha, Ed. V. S. Abhyankar, Govt. Oriental (Hindu) Series, Poona, 1924; see also pp. 572-3 in
