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358
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
context, can convey both the meanings at once would not be correct, according to the Jaina, because of two reasons : first that no word can convey more than one meaning at a time, and secondly, even if it can, our mind can attend to them only in a successive order. A further mention of these difficulties incident to the concept will presently be made.
No such difficulties arise in the case of the third predication which is concerned with presenting, consecutively (kramārpaņayā), the two aspects of being' and 'nonbeing', although it is expressed in the shortened form of a single proposition. It is because of this consecutive element that this mode is aptly called differenced togetherness' (or distinguishable togetherness) in contrast to the phrase
undifferenced togetherness' (or undistinguishable togetherness) which signifies avaktavya. Both aspects are 'primitive', co-ordinate and mutually irreducible. Our mental (perceptual and other) as well as expressive (bodhanasāmarthyam and vacanasāmarthyam) faculties being ill-adapted for comprehending and asserting both of them at once in their primary togetherness (ubhayaprādhānyam) we can grasp and assert them either successively or confess to our inability to do if asked to do it at a single stroke. This is precisely what is done under the third and the fourth modes, respectively.
It is contended that the third mode is redundant, or
1. iti sakalavācakarahitatvādavaktavyar vastu yugapatsattvāsat
tvābhyām pradhānabhāvārpitābhyām akrāntañ vyavatişthate/ SM,
p. 145. 2. See SBT, p. 62, PNTA, IV. 15, and SRK thereon in SRK, pp.
718-719.
