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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
alternative truth while all together contain the total truth of a situation in which any feature predicated of a real is investigated. The reason why the number of modes is neither more nor less than seven is because, it is believed, any complex situation is amenable to treatment by this seven-fold technique if one is an adept in using it. It means every conceivable problem' regarding a factual situation can be reduced to the terms of these seven angles from which it can be viewed. Any attempt to add or subtract a mode will be found to be impossible since addition finds the mode already there, among one of the existing seven modes, and subtraction will mutilate an essential limb from the scheme. In the event of a fresh situation arising with regard
1. Jinabhadragani sums up the complex position of Syādvāda in
the following gathā: sabbhāvā sabbhāvobhayappio saparapajjaobhayao/ kumbhākumbhāvattavvobhayarūväibheo so// VBJ., gā. 2232. Explaining this gā. Maladhāri observes :.. tathā hi-svaparyāyaiḥ, paraparyāyaiḥ, ubhayaparyāyaiś ca sadbhävena, asadbhāvena, ubhayena, cărpito višeşitaḥ kumbhaḥ kumbhākumbhāvaktavyobhayarūpādibhedo bhavati--saptabhangī pratipadyata ityarthaḥ / SHM in VBJ, p. 910. In a similar manner Vidyananda and Samantabhadra sum up the entire position in two and four kārikās, respectively. See AMS, 14 and 16; and
TSV, p. 128, 49-52. 2. For instance, applying syādvāda to the postulation that reality
is one we get the following conclusions: the reality is one (syādekah); the reality is non-one or many (syädanekah); the reality is both one and many (syādekaścānekaśca); the reality is inexpressible (syadavaktavyaḥ); the reality is one and also inexpressible (syādekaścāvaktavyaḥ); the reality is many and also inexpressible (syādanekaścāvaktavyah); and, the reality is one, many and also inexpressible (syädekaścānekaścăvaktavyaśca). Cf. bhangăssattvādayassapta samśayāssapta tadgatäh/ jijñāsāssapta sapta syuh praśnāssaptottarāņi ca// quoted in SBT, p.8. This refutes objections such as the one by Kumārila who feels that "When
