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CHAPTER XI
1.
373
"the opinion that real knowledge of any kind is unattainable". In the light of these few observations on the non-sceptical attitude of syādvāda we find that Belvalkar gives a rather misleading twist to the nature of the method as a whole by stating the doctrine in such form as he has done.' As has already been remarked, even historically syādvāda arose in an appreciable degree, 'as a happy way leading out of the maze of the ajñānavāda' (agnosticism). This is expressed by Jacobi in the following passage: "Would any philosopher have enunciated such truisms, unless they served to silence
An attempt to assess the historical claims of the different opinions on the development of syädväda and its modes will take us far afield. However, for some information on these opinions, see SM, Intro. pp. LXXIV-LXXVIII; Syādvādamañjarī (by Mallişeṇa, Ed. with Hindi Tr. by Jagadiśacandra, Bombay, 1935) 26-29; NVVS, Prastāvanā, pp. 35-50; AJP, Vol. II, Intro. pp. CX-CXII; PrSKU, pp. LXXXVI-LXXXVIII: A. N. Upadhye's paper on "References to Syādvāda in the Ardhamāgadhi Canon", Proceedings and Transactions of the Ninth All India Oriental Conference, Trivandrum, Dec. 1937, Trivandrum, 1940 pp. 669-672, and The Canonical Literature of the Jainas (H. R. Kapadia, 1941, Bombay), pp. 218-220.
Whatever might be the value of the opinions as to the nature, the extent and the sources of influence on the development of syādvāda and its modes, we may safely assert that, philosophically speaking, syādvāda was an inherent necessity in the system of anekantavāda. This fact of its having been an inherent philosophical necessity need not invalidate the equally important fact that syādvāda enlarged its range in answer to a varied external demand. No doctrine or method, particularly the latter, can, after all, arise from an atmosphere of a philosophical vacuum. The great critical philosophy and the critical method, of Kant, if it could possibly arise at all, would be little more than an idle speculation were it not for the rationalistic dogmatism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz as well as for the empiristic scepticism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Any genuine growth in philosophical thinking is thus a story of action and reaction between vital ideas.
