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CHAPTER XI
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missing another point of criticism that “the Saptabhangi doctrine is of no practical utility” or “an expression of personal opinion over which we need not linger", the same critic proceeds to answer the specific charge by Belvalkar: “Nor can it be contended” he observes, “that the Saptabhangī doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of the Jaina philosophy. It is a logical corollary of the anekāntavāda, the doctrine of the manyness of reality. Since reality is "multiform' and ever changing, nothing can be considered to be existing everywhere and at all times and in all ways and places, and it is impossible to pledge ourselves to an inflexible creed".! Confirming Radhakrishnan on the second point of criticism, which is the main charge of Belvalkar, Hiriyanna briefly observes : “The thought underlying it (saptabhangī) is inherent in the doctrine, although its clear enunciation seems to belong to the present period.” The same opinion is suggestively expressed by R. G. Bhandarkar also.
Incidentally Belvalkar's misleading interpretation of anekāntavāda' as an 'indefinite' doctrine-which in turn means a shifting or evasive doctrine—is corrected by Hiriyanna's correct description of it : Interpreting 'anekānta' as meaning 'indeterminate in nature' Hiriyanna remarks: “This does not, however, mean that it is altogether indefinite but only that it cannot be defined absolutely. It is this idea that is conveyed by the sevenfold statement as a whole and it expresses the nature of reality in several steps, because no single mode of doing so is adequate to it.”
1.
Ibid., EIP, p. 67.
