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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
We gather from a consideration of the present charge, as well as of the other two charges, that the critics advance contrary criticisms even on the same point, as well as from the same viewpoint, viz., monistic absolutism. The irony of the situation is particularly evident in the fact that contradictory arguments are presented on the very issue of alleged contradiction and self-contradiction in syādvāda. Among others there seem to be two important reasons underlying the misconceived criticisms of the critics on syädvāda : The first is that they do not note an explicit reference in the very definition of syödvāda to the important condition that the modal judgments should not be 'incompatible' (avirodha) not merely with the other modal judgments within the sphere of syādvāda, but also with 'valid knowledge, perceptual, or otherwise', in the entire sphere of experience. Had this been fully recognised Rao's criticism on ‘self-contradiction’ would perhaps be not as strong as it is now. Then, 'the Saviour of all systems' would be found not committing suicide' but performing its benevolent mission of saving the absolutisms from their excessive dogmatism.
The second reason is their failure to realize the true significance, place and function of negation in Jaina philosophy, in general, and in syādvāda in particular. Since this subject has been dealt with, at several places, it is needless to enlarge upon it any further.
In concluding this chapter it would not be out of place to quote a passage by R. B. Perry which bears a striking resemblance to syādvāda in suggesting a procedure which, as in syädvāda, is at once a critique on 'vicious intellectualism'
