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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
as ubhayavāda or miśravāda) with the integral view of identity-in-difference which is the Jaina view of reality. It was found that in order to expose this confusion the Jaina thinkers had to emphasise the necessity of treating everything real as not merely a co-ordinate and integral synthesis, but also as a unique (jātyantara) one.
A further pursuit of our inquiry into some aspects of reality brought out the truth that only the principle of a co-ordinate synthesis could form an adequate basis for their existence and function. It was noticed, for example, that outside the framework of identity-in-difference the solution to the problem of relation (sambandha) would have to take the form either of crude realism or of subjectivism. Similarly, it was found that the principle of causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritvam) could not function in a reality which was not a co-ordinate synthesis of identity-in-difference.
After discussing two controversies which shed some light on the notions of substance (dravya) and attribute (paryāya as well as guņa) the ontological part of the present study was concluded.
The second part of the work concerned itself with some problems of epistemology with particular emphasis on anekāntavāda, nayavāda and syödväda. It was not possible to treat other questions of epistemology, e. g., the ways of knowing and the nature of validity.
Anekāntavāda—the doctrine of manifoldness (or 'indeterminateness')—was shown to be not so much a method as the source or presupposition of the other two methods. When viewed in the light of this doctrine reality was seen to reveal
