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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
fic features of the object concerned, without, of course, losing sight of the fact that they cannot stand by themselves without the support of the generic properties in the larger setting: of concrete reality. For example, when a person is asked to bring a mango fruit he attempts to bring mango, but not any other fruit, although he is aware of the fact that mango is: only a species in the genus of fruit.'
When the generic correlative of a specific feature is: entirely ignored the resultant fallacy comes to have only the semblance of the vyavahāra standpoint (vyavahāranayābhāsa) of which there can be no better example than the materialism of Cārvāka' in Indian philosophy.
The above three standpoints, viz., naigama, sangraha and! vyavahāra, come under the first comprehensive category, viz., dravyārthikanaya. This is so because these standpoints concern themselves with the durable side (dravyasaṁsparśī) of concrete reality. The remaining four standpoints, viz.,, rjusūtra, sabda, samabhirūờha and evambhūta, engage themselves in the analysis of the fleeting side (paryāyasaṁsparsi) of concrete reality. Hence their collective designation (paryāyārthikanaya), the second of the two comprehensive categories.
Among the four paryāyanayas only the first one, viz., rjusūtranaya, which will presently be dealt with, makes a direct ontological reference to an aspect of reality, viz., the
1. višeşatmakamevārthaí vyavahāraś ca manyate/
višeşabhinna samanyam asatkharavişāņavat// NKV, kā. 8.
Ibid., kūrikās 9 and 10. 3. PNTA, VII. 26. For two other instances see LTB, V, kā. 42 and
the NKC thereon in NKC, Vol. II, pp. 631-5.
