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CHAPTER X
317 the occasion to mention whether "the tree there” is mango, banyan, or any other, although "the tree" must be one of these. For there can be no universal without a particular', or a genus without species, although in a particular context the mention of the former will serve the purpose in hand. Similarly, when we state that everything is sat (being) it makes a perfectly understandable proposition, although it provisionally shuts out its necessary complement of asat (non-being).
Laying such an exaggerated emphasis on the universal as to leave no room at all for the particular leads to sangrahābhāsa, a fallacy of which the Sānkhya and the Advaita .schools of philosophy are notable instances.'
Vyavahāranaya" (the standpoint of the particular)
In contrast with the sangraha standpoint the vyavahāra standpoint specialises itself in being concerned with the speci
1. Ibid.
viśvamekaṁ sadaviśeşāditi/ PNTA, VII. 16. sangraho'pyaśeşaviseşāvišeşapratikṣepamukhena sāmānyamekam samarthayamāno durnayah.... / Nyāyāvatāra (P. L. Vaidya's
edn.), p. 85. 4. sangrahābhiprāyapravsttāḥ sarve'pyadvaitavādāḥ sānkhyadarśa
naṁ ca./ See also PNTA, VII. 17 and 18 and the SRK thereon. The reason why the Sānkhya system is instanced here is stated by Prabhācandra: vikāravikāriņoh sankhyaistādātmyābhyupa
gamāt/ NKL, Vol. II, p. 629. 5. This vyavahāranaya should be distinguished from another naya,
bearing the same name and occurring in a different classification of nayas into niscayanaya (the true viewpoint) and vyavahāranaya (the conventional or empirical viewpoint). There is nothing common between the two except the name.
