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CHAPTER XI
345
An objection to treating the present mode as a logical complement to the previous mode is that the two modes being mutually opposed, are self-contradictory. A refutation of this objection forms the subject of a specific account in an earlier chapter' and, indeed, runs as an undercurrent throughout the body of this work. It is, therefore, sufficient to remember here that the two elements, constituting the two modes, are not merely non-contradictory—because, if they were, the qualification 'without incompatibility”? (avirodhena) in the definition of syādvāda, would be meaningless—but are mutually necessary complements in the real. Contradiction would arise if the opposition were between the two absolute assertions “the jar exists" and "the jar does not exist”. The source of such a fault lies in the objector's mistake in construing the latter assertion, viz., “the jar does not exist”, as being equivalent to "the jar does not exist as a jar”. The true interpretation of it should be that “the jar does not exist as linen, or water etc.” There is surely no contradiction in the latter interpretation because of the fact that it is based on the assumption that the assertion is a relative (kathañcit) and determinate (niyata) abstraction from a complex and concrete real.
The third and the fourth modes may be treated jointly
3.
1. See supra, pp. 142-144 and pp. 163-169 (with f. notes). 2. See supra, p. 336.
For a refutation of a further charge that syādvāda brings about a situation of doubt (samsayavişayatvasambhava) owing to the co-existence of the relative concept of the non-existence (kathañcidasattvam ) with that of the existence(kathañcitsattvam), see SBT, pp. 6-7 and TRAG, p. 26.
