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when a signal verbal failure is inscribed on it would, therefore, be, according to the possible objector, paradoxically objectionable. Deferring a fuller discussion of the modal predicate, the 'inexpressible', to the next chapter, we may briefly indicate here the line of argument the Jaina would take in answering the present objection. The Jaina answer to this objection, it may be noted, necessarily entails a reference to the third mode of syādvāda also:
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
The predicate 'the inexpressible' does indeed record a signal verbal failure in expressing, at once, the great amplitude of the variegated reality as embodied in every factual event. But this failure is not due to the inherent unknowability, and, consequently, of the inexpressibility of reality, as in the case of the theories underlying the formulae like "sa eşa neti neti" or "catuskoțivinirmuktatvam" or "anirvacaniyata". It is, on the contrary, due to the bewildering wealth of impressions directly pouring into the human mind whose limitations of powers are such that it cannot at once grapple with all the impressions by way of all-comprehending attention and precise expression. Hence the postulation of the predicate in question. The only verbal feature of the predicate is the symbol (samjñā) 'avaktavya' employed in designating the predicate. This symbol declares the inadequacy of the verbal machinery when confronted with such cognitive situations. But this does not mean that avaktavya is the last word in our cognitive venture and, consequently, that we are inescapably condemned to be cognitively overwhelmed and verbally dumb. What is not simultaneously expressible can be expressed by a gradual process in the order of the atten
