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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
gated contents of reality is sure to bring upon itself not merely the reproach of the idealists (the Buddhist and the Vedantin whose views have already been examined) but also of the extreme realists, viz., the Naiyāyika to whom any reference to internality is disagreeable. The reproach from both sides would be that the Jaina holds a contradictory view owing to the incompatibility of identity and difference, or of internality and externality.
But once the manifold nature of things is granted, it is easy to understand that the Jaina position is inevitable. As Russell clearly points out a consistent monist finds relation needless for the obvious reason that there should be, for a relation, at least two entities which are irreducible to each other. But this is, ex hypothesi, impossible. Relationing is equally impossible with a consistent pluralist who subscribes to an unrelated series of momentary entities. Hence the Buddhist and the Vedantin have repudiated, rightly from their respective points of view, relation as a part of reality. The Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika also admits relation as third entity but unless he accepts it as being, in some degree, grounded in the relata, it is impossible for him to avoid infinite regress. There cannot be a genuine relational 'transaction' between externally conjoined relata. Hence the theory of identity of differents seems to be the only possible hypothesis on which any genuine element of relation can work.
لیے
The most surprising fact about the development of the Nyaya philosophy is that it compromises, at the hands of the neo-Naiyāyikas, some of its fundamentals and arrives at a
