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CHAPTER VII
243
This naturally raised the legitimate objection that the two absolutely different relata cannot be related by a relation-whether it be samyoga or samavāya—without a further relation relating the relata to the initial relation. The second relation, again, necessitates a third, and the third, in turn, a fourth, and so on, interminably, landing the Naiyāyika in the muddle of an infinite regress.'
By extending the notion of svarūpasambandha, which has already been accepted in some form, within a limited sphere of experience, over the entire range of experienced reality and, thereby, conceiving the relational element to be embedded in the terms themselves, the Naiyāyika can avoid the above difficulties. This would tone down his close adherence to difference and bring him nearer to the
other dharma, cannot arise; much less does, therefore, the question of relating them arise if only for the reason that no such tertiary entity is vouchsafed to us in our experience; na dharmadharmitvam atīvabhede vṛttyāsti cen na tritayam cakāsti / AVD, p. 31, kā. 7. SM (text); see also SM on the kā.
The acceptance of such an absolute distinction leads the Naiyayika to the curious position of holding caitanya or jñāna (caitanyaṁ jñānam, p. 38, SM) to be absolutely separate from atman connected with it (atman) by samavayasambandha. This samavayasambandha is supposed to avoid the contingency of why the jñāna of Caitra should not belong to Maitra since jñāna is adventitious to both persons alike. But this sambandha does not seem to help the Naiyāyika-samavāya being one, eternal and all-pervasive, and therefore identically the same (sarvatra vṛtter aviseṣāt) in both persons. Vide SM, p. 41.
The Jaina also accepts difference between the dharmi and the dharma (cf. prativastusvabhāvabhedad iti / SM (text), p. 32) but not in the absolute sense. See Note 8, p. 80 (Notes), SM. 1. samavāyasya samavāyāntarena vṛttyabhyupagame tu, tatrāpyaparasamavāyakalpane'navasthā nätidustarā / SDS, p. 252 f., TRD.
