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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
successive (kramabhävi), more or less extraneous events happening in the real. The main difficulty which has led to the disagreement on the relation between guna and paryāya is that abhedavādin considers himself a nominalist (hence the belief that the difference between guna and paryāya is one of name only) and bhedavādin a realist (hence the assertion that guna and paryāya are not merely two different names but also that they signify two distinct existents corresponding to the names). But the abhedavādin is not quite right in thinking that he is a nominalist owing to the fact that he does recognise the existence of guņa also, even though in an indirect form, viz., as something which is incorporated in paryāya. As a matter of fact Yaśovijaya even goes to the extent of singling out sahabhāviparyāya and naming it specially as guna.'
Hence the rift between the abhedavādin and the bhedavādin is not so great as to disrupt the uniform agreement between them on the basic structure of a real which is the foundation of the Jaina ontology. Vādideva's statement of the case, in the form of his bhedābhedavāda, not merely embodies a compromise between the other two rather extreme viewpoints but also suggests the right solution which is in consonance with the basic ontological presupposition of the Jaina philosophy.
1. See supra, p. 260.
