________________
CHAPTER VII
239
(daiśikavišeşanata) and (ii) the temporal relations (kālikaviśesanatā).'
Nevertheless its extension to cover the entire range of the relational nature of things is but the logical culmination of such a limited acceptance. Moreover, the consideration of the economy of thought (laghava) and the faithfulness to experience demands such extension.
Kumārila' also supports this thesis and admits that there is nothing like a separate relational link which is an independent intermediary between the relata and that the terms contain within themselves the relational trait which brings about the contact between things. The acceptance of this fact, viz., that relation is an objective factor residing in the relata themselves, and is, therefore, their (svabhāva or svarūpa) leads him to the conclusion that relation is nothing else than identity-in-difference which constitutes the nature of things. The Jaina concurs fully with this view and believes that objects have a natural disposition (yogyatā) for mutual contact at all levels and this disposition, described as relation, forms an integral aspect of the nature of things as identity-in-difference.
The untenability of the Nyāya position is particularly evidenced in its surrendering, at the hands of the
1. See Bud. Log., Vol. II, f.n. 3, p. 287, and f.n. 8, p. 290. Also, RML
pp. 153-154. 2. He characterises samavāya as svarūpam dharmadharmiņoh; see
supra, p. 222, f.n.2. 3. Vide Intro, SN, p. xcii, JPN, pp. 232-233.
"There is samavāya of smell in earth and not in water; SO the samavāya is many, say moderns". Dinakari, quoted in MML, f.n. 1. (The statement runs as: pşthivyāṁ gandhasya
