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maintains, require the necessity of the relata in it and, consequently, should exist in its own right. An analysis of its requirements, however, exhibits the serious lack of dependence upon its relata for its existence. It cannot therefore exist, Dharmakīrti affirms, as a full-fledged and independent real (tan na parāpekṣā nāma yadrūpah sambandhah siddhyet).
. When the truth of Dharmakirti's contention in the above argument is recognised, the falsity of the converse of the argument could also be easily perceived : a non-existent relation cannot, as it has been just observed, exhibit any 'expectancy' for the necessity of the relata inasmuch as the relata will not, then, have any basis for their subsistence (apekṣādharmāśraya-virodhāt”).
Lastly, Dharmakirti scathingly brings out a major inconsistency which, from the Idealist point of view, is destructive of the opponent's strength in upholding the reality of relation. Relation is acknowledged, as it has been repeatedly pointed out, by the Naiyāyika to be a distinct entity besides the relata in a relational situation. This provokes the Buddhist dialectician to the presentation of a new dilemma inherent in the relationship between the consti
1. PKM, p. 505. 2. Ibid. 3. The purport of this argument is contained in the following kā. of Dharmakīrti :
parāpekşã hi sambandhaḥ so'san katham apeksate/
saṁs ca sarvaniräśamso bhāvaḥ katham apekşate// PKM, spd., p. 505, kā. 3. See also NKC, Vol. I, p. 306, SRK, p. 813, and TSV, p. 148.
