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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
observed in course of this section, and, as confirmed by Śankara'himself, the sine qua non of a relation. The incompatibility between the absolutistic or the monistic dogma and the dualistic requirement of relation leads the Vedāntin altogether to deny relation either of samyoga or of samavāya, and, to accept the principle that there can be nothing like a relation apart from the object supposed to be joined by it."
In answer to the opponent's assertion that samyoga and samavāya are also subsistent' owing to the fact that we find, in experience, distinct designations or terms denoting their being (sabdapratyayadarśanāt)," Sankara observes that even where there is only one object there may be many designations referring to it in accordance with its myriad 'intrinsic' (svarūpa) and extrinsic' (bāhya) predications. One and the same Devadatta, for instance, may be, Sankara adds, the object of the epithets 'a man', 'a Brāhmaṇa', 'learned-inVeda', 'affable ',' a boy', 'a youth', 'an old man', 'a father' and 'a son' etc. Therefore the objects themselves (sambandhinaveva) can be fittingly termed by the epithets samyoga'and 'samavāya'and, there need be no third entity
1. dvayāyattatvāt sambandhasya / BBSB(text), II. 2.19, p. 61.
napi samyogasya samavāyasya vā sambandhasya sambandhivya
tirekenastitve kiñcit pramānam asti / Ibid. 3. Ibid. See the next f.n. infra. 4. sambandhisabdapratyayavyatirekena s amyogasamavāyaśabda
pratyayadarśanāt tayor astitvam iti cet / na / ekatve'pi svarūpabahyarūpāpekṣayānekaśabdapratyayadarśanāt / yathaiko'pi san devadatto loke svarūpaṁ sambandhirūpam capekşyānekaśabdapratyayabhag bhavati manusyo brahmanaḥ śrotriyo vadānyo bālo yuvā sthavirah pitä putrah pautro bhrātā jāmāteti... / Ibid., p. 61f.
