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CHAPTER VII
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relata permeate each other, they do not lose their individuality. If they do, they cease to be as such. Here we see that the Jaina does accept a kind of internal relation but he does so in the same degree as he accepts internal change in the objects, and also consistently with the external changes happening to them. The change happening when a wooden stick is burnt to ashes is internal as compared with the conjunctional or external change occurring when a few such sticks are tied in a bundle. In adopting this attitude the Jaina avoids the two extremes of the Naiyāyika externalist with whom an effect makes a complete break with the cause (arambhavāda), and, even samavāya is a mere external relation, and, of the Vedantin with whom the cause alone is, and the effect is not, and, therefore, a relation, if any, can operate within the being of an identical entity.' That relation is an objective fact-not an objective entity-grounded in the relata themselves, and that it is internal or external in accordance with the relative proportions of the intimacy or distinctness of the relata concerned in a particular situation are the important consequences resulting from the attitude the Jaina has adopted toward the problem of relations.
The other consideration relates to the notion of 'uniqueness' (jatyantararupatva) attaching to a relation: The Jaina looks upon the relation resulting from a combination of the relata in it as something unique (jātyantara), or sui generis, in comparison with the combining relata. That is, the resultant product emerging from the effectuation of the
1. As a matter of fact, a relation can never be substained on a strict absolute hypothesis.
