________________
226
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
also as an indubitably perceptual fact. He does so in opposition to what he considers as the aprioristic dialectic of Buddhism, and by implication, of the Vedānta also, wherein the mind imposes its own forms upon, instead of obeying the dictates of the events of the objective realm. This is the spirit underlying Prabhācandra's contention that the Buddhist seriously errs, not merely by ignoring what is directly perceivable, viz., the relational element, but also in describing it as a conceptual fiction (kalpanā) which is anything but perceptible.' This does violence to a "brute' fact of perceptual validity. If the Buddhist denial of the perceptual validity of relation is right, then, linen and its yarn, or the linen and its colour etc., ought to be seen as separate entities; but Prabhācandra rightly asserts that they are always perceived together. This constant togetherness is not conceived to be possible without the actual connecting factor of a relation.
One of the grounds on which the Buddhist bases the inadmissibility of relation is the lack of serviceability or practical utilitys (upakāritva, arthakriyäkāritva) attributed to relation. Prabhācandra effectively turns the table on the Buddhist by applying this test to the Buddhist conception of objects in general, and thereby shows how the relational element is a constituent factor in the make-up of the objects. If the atoms, for instance, are absolutely exclusive or discreet
1. sambandhasyadhyakşenaivārthānāṁ pratibhāsanāt/ Ibid. 2. kathar ca sambandhe pratiyamāne pratīyamānaşyāpyasambandha
sya kalpanā pratītivirodhāt ? Ibid. 3. See supra, p. 222, f.n. 2.
