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228 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE sees the repetition of the error just referred to in the instances of the pitcher and the bamboo, viz., the impossibility of denying it without implying a tacit acceptance of its reality. Because the negation of pervasiveness with reference to the relata is itself an attempt to invest the relata with a relational trait. In other words, attributing a lack of dependence or pervasiveness to the relata amounts to positing a relation between the relata. No negation is, as a Western' idealist would say, absolute; it generally implies an affirmation of something. An attempt to deny the very thing which is, in some form (kvacit) accepted, is, according to Prabhācandra, a form of contradiction.
The consequence which is supposed, as already indicated, to result from accepting the pāratantrya-sambandha, viz., the non-necessity for a relation between any two either 'fullfledged' or 'wholly finished' (nișpannayoh) or 'not-yetemerged' (anișpannayoḥ), entities is also resolved by Prabhācandra by his explanation that both alternatives are the two aspects of a single total situation which is identity of differents. A piece of linen, for instance, even prior to its coming into existence as a fabric, that is, when it is still anișpanna, exists (pațaparināmotpatteḥ prāg api sattvāt) in the form of yarn which is already nișpanna (tantudravyatayā nişpanna eva). Or, conversely, the yarn as the material cause, or substance, is concurrently existent, as itself (svarūpeṇa), with the yarn as linen which is yet
1. "The bare form of negation is not adequate to fact; it contains
mere emptiness or ignorance; we nowhere come upon a mere 'not-something'..every affirmative denies and every negative affirms." EIB, p. 134.
